IMF Executive Board Completes the Fourth Reviews Under the Extended Fund Facility and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility Arrangements and Approves US$13.7 Million Disbursement for Seychelles

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 16, 2025

  • The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed today the fourth reviews of Seychelles’ economic performance under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) Arrangements. Completion of the reviews allows for an immediate disbursement of about US$13.7 million intended to strengthen macroeconomic stability, sustain growth, and reinforce fiscal and monetary policy frameworks, while also supporting efforts to strengthen resilience to climate change, exploit synergies with other sources of official financing, and catalyze financing for climate-related investments.
  • Economic growth for Seychelles in 2024 is estimated at 2.9 percent, reflecting lower dynamism in the tourism sector. Inflation remained subdued and fiscal performance was tighter than budgeted, driven mainly by underspending on capital expenditure. For 2025, economic growth is projected at 3.2 percent, reflecting slower growth projected for Europe—Seychelles’ most important tourism source market.
  • Performance under the EFF has been strong with all quantitative targets and structural benchmarks for end-December 2024 met. However, two SBs scheduled for 2025 have encountered minor delays due to capacity constraints. Progress has been satisfactory under the RSF implementation, and the authorities remain committed to the programs’ objectives.

Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed today the fourth reviews of Seychelles’ economic performance under the 36-month EFF and RSF Arrangements approved on May 31, 2023. The completion of the reviews allows for the authorities to draw the equivalent of SDR 6.1 million (about $8.3 million) under the EFF and SDR 3.9 million (about $5.3 million) under the RSF, bringing total disbursements to SDR 30.5 million (about $41.7 million) and SDR 13.3 million (about $18.2 million) under the EFF and RSF, respectively.

Economic growth for Seychelles in 2024 is estimated at 2.9 percent, slightly lower than earlier forecasts due to lower activity in the tourism sector. Year-on-year inflation reached 1.7 percent as of December, driven by an increase in utility prices and pass-through effects of currency depreciation. Fiscal performance was tighter than budgeted driven mainly by underspending on capital expenditure, with a  primary surplus equivalent to 3.2 percent of GDP in 2024. The Central Bank of Seychelles has maintained an accommodative monetary stance. The current account deficit widened to 7.9 percent of GDP in 2024, but gross international reserves increased to $774 million, equivalent to 3.8 months of imports or 115 percent of the Assessing Reserve Adequacy (or ARA) metric.

EFF-supported program implementation has been strong. All quantitative program targets (QPCs) and structural benchmarks (SBs) for end-December 2024 were met. However, two SBs scheduled for the first half of 2025 have encountered minor delays due to capacity constraints. Progress has been satisfactory on RSF implementation. All reform measures (RMs) for March 2025 have been implemented. However,  one component of an RM scheduled for April 2025 (related to energy pricing and the issuance of a new multi-year electricity tariff system) is delayed and expected to be completed in November. The authorities requested minor modifications for two RMs slated for December 2025. 

The outlook suggests low but stable growth for 2025 and beyond but is subject to considerable uncertainty. Real GDP growth is projected at 3.2 percent for 2025 compared to 4.3 percent at the previous reviews. The downward revision reflects slower a weaker outlook for tourist activity on the back of slower growth in Europe (Seychelles’ most important tourism source market). Year-on-year inflation is expected to moderate to 1.2 percent by end-2025 due to lower utility, fuel and food prices. Reserve coverage is expected to increase to 3.9 months of import cover in 2025. Near-term downside risks relate mainly to how slower global growth and higher uncertainty translate into tourism arrivals and spending.

Going forward, continuation of prudent macroeconomic policies is paramount for maintaining resilience. The authorities’ near-term priorities are to support economic growth, strengthen fiscal and external positions, and maintain prudent monetary policy and a sound financial sector. In the medium-term, the authorities’ aim to continue a steady fiscal consolidation to reduce the ratio of public debt to GDP, while simultaneously improving the efficiency of public spending. Building capacity with respect to public financial management and financial sector supervision is another key focus. The structural reform agenda emphasizes revenue administration, public financial and investment management, climate change resilience, and governance improvements, including digitalization and transparency.

Following the Executive Board’s discussion, Mr. Bo Li, Deputy Managing Director, and acting Chair, issued the following statement:

“Seychelles has continued to demonstrate sound macroeconomic management and commitment to structural reforms. Lower than expected GDP growth for 2024 reflected lower tourism income and weakened performance in such sectors as accommodation, food services, and transportation. Fiscal outturns have been tighter than projected, reflecting delays in execution of capital projects, bottlenecks in public procurement, and civil service recruitment delays. Monetary policy remains accommodative in the face of low inflation. Good progress has been made on essential macrostructural reforms.

“For the fourth reviews, program performance under the EFF was strong, with all quantitative program targets and structural benchmarks through end-December successfully met. Progress has also been satisfactory on RSF implementation, with all RMs through March implemented and only one component of an RM scheduled for April has been delayed. The authorities continue to implement an ambitious reform agenda and prudent fiscal and monetary policies in the face of an increasingly challenging external environment.

“The authorities should remain vigilant with respect to near and medium-term risks as the outlook is subject to rising uncertainty. These include a slowdown in tourism activity due to slower growth projected for Europe—Seychelles’ most important tourism source market. Commodity price volatility could also feed through to inflation, while global trade tensions may reduce FDI and lead to tighter financial conditions. The EFF arrangement will continue to help protect macroeconomic stability and support stronger fiscal and external buffers, while advancing the authorities’ structural reform agenda.

“The authorities are advancing with reforms under the RSF to enhance the climate-resilience of public investments, diversify financing, and strengthen assessment and disclosure of climate-related financial sector risk. Successful implementation of the reform agenda will enhance economic resilience and external financing risks by building institutional capacity for public investment in climate adaptation and diversifying Seychelles’ power generation capacity—reducing its dependence on imported energy. Continued collaboration with the IMF and other partners will be important to help fill capacity gaps and to mobilize climate finance.”

Seychelles: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2022-30

 
 

2022

2023

 

2024

 

2025

2026

2027

2028

2029

2030

 

Act.

Prel.

Proj.

 

(Annual percent change, unless otherwise indicated)

                       

National income and prices

                 

Nominal GDP (millions of Seychelles rupees)

28,807

30,663

 

31,643

 

32,899

34,464

36,466

38,841

41,396

44,121

Real GDP (millions of Seychelles rupees)

25,585

26,163

26,935

27,808

28,692

29,662

30,673

31,731

32,835

Real GDP

12.7

2.3

2.9

3.2

3.2

3.4

3.4

3.4

3.5

CPI (annual average)

2.6

-0.9

0.3

1.0

2.0

2.6

3.0

3.0

3.0

CPI (end-of-period)

2.5

-2.7

1.7

1.2

2.6

2.8

3.0

3.0

3.0

GDP deflator average

1.6

4.1

0.2

0.7

1.5

2.3

3.0

3.0

3.0

           
           

Money and credit

           

Broad money

0.6

5.8

 

7.3

 

7.0

Reserve money (end-of-period)

-3.0

-3.5

 

-4.3

 

-2.2

Velocity (GDP/broad money)

1.2

1.2

 

1.2

 

1.1

Money multiplier (broad money/reserve money)

3.4

3.7

 

4.2

 

4.6

Credit to the private sector 5

4.0

7.4

 

12.1

 

9.4

9.1

8.6

8.4

8.1

8.0

                   
 

(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

   

Savings-Investment balance

                     

External savings

7.5

7.4

7.9

9.2

9.2

8.8

8.4

8.6

8.8

Gross national savings

15.5

17.3

 

16.1

 

16.6

16.4

16.9

17.5

17.3

17.2

Of which:  government savings

1.2

2.1

 

3.3

 

3.2

2.5

3.7

4.6

5.2

5.4

private savings

14.4

15.2

 

12.8

 

13.4

13.9

13.2

12.9

12.0

11.8

Gross investment

23.1

24.7

 

24.0

 

25.9

25.6

25.7

25.9

25.9

26.0

Of which:  public investment 1

2.7

4.2

3.5

5.3

5.0

5.1

5.3

5.3

5.4

private investment

20.4

20.5

20.5

20.6

20.6

20.6

20.6

20.6

20.6

Private consumption

50.6

49.4

 

49.8

 

48.6

47.6

48.0

47.8

48.9

49.6

 

(Percent of GDP)

   

Government budget 

                 

Total revenue, excluding grants

30.0

30.9

 

33.4

 

34.5

34.3

34.8

35.0

34.8

34.7

Expenditure and net lending

31.6

32.9

 

33.9

 

37.3

37.2

36.1

35.7

34.9

34.7

Current expenditure

29.2

29.2

 

30.2

 

31.6

31.8

31.0

30.3

29.6

29.3

Capital expenditure 1

2.7

4.2

 

3.5

 

5.2

5.0

5.1

5.3

5.3

5.4

Overall balance, including grants

0.1

0.2

 

0.9

 

-1.7

-1.3

-0.4

0.1

0.7

0.7

Primary balance

1.0

1.7

 

3.2

 

1.2

1.8

2.5

2.9

3.1

3.1

Total government and government-guaranteed debt 2

62.6

57.3

 

59.6

 

61.2

61.8

60.4

56.8

52.6

49.0

                   

External sector

                     

Current account balance including official transfers
 (in percent of GDP)

-7.5

-7.4

 

-7.9

 

-9.2

-9.2

-8.8

-8.4

-8.6

-8.8

Total external debt outstanding (millions of U.S. dollars) 3

5,471

5,694

 

5,945

 

6,208

6,428

6,645

6,585

6,588

6,620

 (percent of GDP)

271.1

260.3

 

273.0

 

283.8

285.0

282.9

267.4

255.0

242.2

Terms of trade (-=deterioration)

-8.7

-4.0

 

2.1

 

0.8

-1.7

-1.3

-0.9

-0.8

-0.6

Gross official reserves (end of year, millions of U.S. dollars)

639

682

 

774

 

817

830

862

893

956

1,021

Months of imports, c.i.f.

3.1

3.4

 

3.8

 

3.9

3.8

3.8

3.8

3.8

3.9

In percent of Assessing Reserve Adequacy (ARA) metric

102

105

115

118

117

118

119

124

127

Exchange rate

                     

Seychelles rupees per US$1 (end-of-period)

14.1

14.2

 

14.8

 

Seychelles rupees per US$1 (period average)

14.3

14.0

 

14.5

 

                   

Sources: Central Bank of Seychelles; Ministry of Finance; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

  1 Includes onlending to the parastatals for investment purposes.

     

  2 Includes debt issued by the Ministry of Finance for monetary purposes.

         

  3 Includes private external debt.

           
IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Kwabena Akuamoah-Boateng

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/16/pr-25199-seychelles-imf-4th-rev-eff-rsf-apr-usd-13-point-7-mill

MIL OSI

This Time Must be Different: Lessons from Sri Lanka’s Recovery and Debt Restructuring

Source: IMF – News in Russian

Opening Remarks by the IMF First Deputy Managing Director Gita Gopinath Conference on “Sri Lanka’s Road to Recovery: Debt and Governance” Shangri-La Hotel Colombo

June 16, 2025

Excellencies, distinguished guests, colleagues, and friends,

It is a great honor to join you today for this important conference which takes place at a critical juncture in Sri Lanka’s economic journey.

This conference comes not only at the mid-point of Sri Lanka’s IMF-supported economic reform program, but also at a moment when the global economy is facing powerful crosscurrents—slowing growth, rising tariffs, and a rapidly changing global economic order alongside profound uncertainty. Countries are being tested by shocks that are more frequent and more complex. The challenge for all of us is to build resilience in a world that demands it.

Achievements Resulting from Reforms Supported by the IMF-EFF Program

In this light, Sri Lanka’s experience stands out—both for the severity of the crisis the country experienced three years ago, and the remarkable progress that has been achieved in a very short time. The crisis was precipitated by years of declining tax revenues, depleted foreign exchange reserves and an explosive and unsustainable increase in public debt as growth collapsed. There were long lines for fuel, severe shortages of basic goods, record inflation, and widespread power outages. For many households, daily life became an exercise in hardship.

Today, thanks to bold reforms and the commitment of the Sri Lankan people, substantial progress has been made to restore macroeconomic stability and reduce hardships faced by people. Fuel, cooking gas, and medicines are available again. Inflation has been brought under control and economic growth has returned—expanding by 5 percent in 2024. On the fiscal front, the government has achieved an extraordinary adjustment and tax revenues have increased by more than two-thirds as a share of GDP.

The government has also put a strong emphasis on improving governance, which is fundamental for establishing trust with citizens and ensuring sustained growth. Important milestones have been achieved including central bank independence, improving public financial management, and strengthening the legal framework for anti-corruption.  Our analysis shows that comprehensive fiscal governance and accountability reforms in Sri Lanka can boost GDP by more than 7 percent and reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio by more than 6 percentage points over 10 years.

Sri Lanka also took the difficult but necessary decision to default on its public debt and pursue a sovereign debt restructuring. These decisive actions on debt have helped ease the burden on the country. External creditors have forgiven $3 billion in debt and restructured another $25 billion, extending repayment over two decades at lower interest rates. Sri Lanka’s bonds are once again included in global indices, and its credit rating has improved.

The experience of Sri Lanka holds important lessons for the world, and I would like to speak to the lessons from its debt restructuring.

I. The Nexus between Economic Reforms and Debt Restructuring

Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring had to deal with several challenges:

  1. Calibrating the restructuring targets to deliver sufficient debt relief. This was a complex endeavor. As with all restructurings, debt sustainability needs to be restored through a combination of debt relief and policy adjustments, such as fiscal effort. The targets must be carefully calibrated to consider country specific circumstances. In Sri Lanka’s case, the targets considered the severity of the crisis while also recognizing the country’s high levels of private savings, tourism receipts and remittances. Through this restructuring, over the next decade, external debt service as a share of GDP is reduced by a half, and external and total debt stock will fall by 27 and 34 percentage points of GDP respectively.
  2. Facilitating collaboration in a complex external creditor landscape. A full range of official creditors needed to find ways to coordinate, and not all creditors had the internal processes in place to deliver swiftly. The Official Creditor Committee chaired by France, India and Japan shepherded many creditors together and China informally coordinated with this group. Still there were challenges in the sharing of information across creditor groups and concerns about comparability of treatment across official bilateral creditors. To help move the process along, the IMF staff were very active in providing information and using IMF “good offices” on an ongoing basis to support coordination.
  1. Containing financial and social stability risks from the restructuring. A large share of Sri Lanka’s debt is domestic. The authorities recognized that external debt relief by itself would be unlikely to restore debt sustainability and domestic debt needed to be part of the restructuring effort. This had to be tackled carefully because of the significant exposure of Sri Lanka’s domestic financial sector, the central bank and the public pensions vehicle to government debt. To preserve financial and social stability, the authorities avoided nominal debt reductions and focused on lowering interest rates and lengthening maturities.

The Sri Lankan debt restructuring experience provides several lessons that will help make the process simpler for other countries that need restructuring in the future. Sri Lanka’s experience better illuminated the trade-offs in setting debt targets and directly led to the development of improved methodologies for evaluating state contingent features in debt contracts. It helped creditors learn how to improve coordination and gave them new instrument designs to contemplate. Together with other recent restructuring cases, it helped motivate important reforms to IMF’s debt policies.

Over time, there have been other important improvements in the sovereign debt architecture. The IMF, Bank and G20 Presidency convened the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable to help serve as a forum for creditor dialogue and generate consensus on difficult issues that arise in restructurings. An important recent output of these efforts is a restructuring playbook, published at the time of our Spring Meetings, which lays out the typical steps in a restructuring and an indicative timeline. It is important to recognize that, thanks to these initiatives, experiences, and the G20 Common Framework, the restructuring process has become faster. In the recent case of Ghana’s, it took five months to get from an IMF staff level agreement to delivering the financing assurances required for program approval—roughly half the time it took for Chad in 2021 and Zambia in 2022. Looking ahead, let me assure you that our work on improving the timeliness and effectiveness of the global debt architecture will continue.

For Sri Lanka, the experience with the debt restructuring drives home the importance of managing the economy such that a similar situation will never arise again.

II. Important to Stay the Course

Let us be clear: none of the achievements thus far would have been possible without the courage and sacrifice of the Sri Lankan people. The crisis was costly and painful, particularly for the poor. The reforms undertaken to address the root causes of the crisis—adjustments in taxation, the removal of unsustainable subsidies, efforts to restore cost-reflective energy pricing—have asked a great deal from ordinary citizens. These are difficult measures. They test the social fabric. And yet, they are the foundation of a more resilient future.

That is why we must now turn our focus from crisis response to sustainable recovery. There is a lot that is still needed. Poverty rates at 24.5 percent in 2024, according to the latest World Bank estimates, are too high and need to be brought down quickly. This requires continued macroeconomic stability and successful implementation of structural reforms. Tackling corruption will require major reforms. Implementing the government’s action plan on governance reforms is critical. While much has been done to reduce external debt, domestic debt is still high and steadfast implementation of sound fiscal policy is critical to continue bringing it down.

None of this will be easy. In addition to the domestic challenges, the global environment is difficult with tariffs, geopolitical conflict and economic fragmentation posing major risks for small open economies like Sri Lanka’s.

This is why there is no room for policy errors. As the IMF Managing Director noted during our Spring Meetings in April: the choice facing countries today is between reform and regret. Between building buffers—or risking future crises.

Sri Lanka’s reform program has delivered strongly. But history reminds us of the risks. Of the 16 IMF programs Sri Lanka has engaged in over the years, about half ended prematurely. Often, reform fatigue sets in. Hard-earned gains were reversed. Growth faltered. The country cannot afford to repeat that cycle.

Let me therefore underscore how essential it is to sustain the reform momentum, and in a manner that is inclusive and accountable. Public dialogue matters. Transparency matters. Engaging civil society and listening to diverse voices—not just in Colombo, but across the island—will help ensure that policies are responsive and responsible. This conference is exactly the kind of platform that can foster such engagement. It is a space to reflect, to challenge assumptions, and to build consensus. The IMF will remain a steadfast partner as Sri Lanka pursues stable and inclusive growth that improves the lives of all citizens and future generations.

This time must be different! As President Dissanayake has said, let us ensure this is the last IMF program Sri Lanka will need.

We agree, and believe this is possible if Sri Lanka stays the course.

Thank you.

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER:

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/16/sp061625-gg-this-time-must-be-different-lessons-from-sri-lankas-recovery-and-debt-restructuring

MIL OSI

IMF Executive Board Completes Fourth Reviews Under the Extended Credit Facility and Extended Fund Facility Arrangements, First Review of an Arrangement Under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility, and Concludes 2025 Article IV Consultation with Papua New Guinea

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 13, 2025

  • The Executive Board completed the Fourth Reviews under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) and Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangements for Papua New Guinea, providing the country with immediate access to about US$172 million.
  • The IMF Executive Board also completed the First Review under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangement, making available about US$28 million to support the authorities’ policies to address longer-term structural balance of payments vulnerabilities associated with climate change. Papua New Guinea is the first Pacific Island country to access the RSF.
  • The IMF-supported programs will continue to support Papua New Guinea’s homegrown reform agenda, focusing on strengthening debt sustainability, alleviating FX shortages, fostering good governance, and building climate resilience, while protecting the vulnerable and promoting inclusive and sustainable growth.

Washington, DC: On June 13, 2025, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the Fourth Reviews of Papua New Guinea’s ECF/EFF arrangements and the First Review under the RSF arrangement.[1] The authorities have consented to the publication of the Staff Report prepared for this consultation.[2] The completion of these reviews allows for the immediate disbursement of SDR 121.07 million (about US$172 million) under the ECF/EFF and SDR 19.74 million (about US$28 million) under the RSF, bringing total disbursements under the programs so far to SDR 461.93 million (about US$655 million). The Executive Board also concluded the Article IV consultation with Papua New Guinea.

The ECF/EFF arrangements with Papua New Guinea were approved by the Executive Board on March 22, 2023, in an overall amount equivalent to SDR 684.32 million (260 percent of quota) to help address a protracted balance of payments need—manifested in foreign exchange shortages—and to support the authorities’ reforms to address longstanding structural impediments to inclusive growth. The 24-month RSF arrangement, which was approved by the Executive Board on December 11, 2024, in an overall amount of SDR 197.4 million (75 percent of quota), aims to help address risks to prospective balance of payments stability associated with longer-term structural challenges posed by climate change.

Papua New Guinea’s economic outlook remains positive as structural reforms continue to bear fruit. Notwithstanding a weakening external environment, growth is expected to increase to 4.7 percent in 2025, driven by strong growth in the resource sector and resilient growth in the non-resource sector in part thanks to improvements in access to foreign exchange. Headline inflation is expected to rise to 4.8 percent from a very low base in 2024 and core inflation is expected to edge up to 4 percent. Over the medium term, growth is expected to moderate and stabilize at just above 3 percent, supported by the non-resource sector growth, with inflation remaining anchored at around 4.5 percent.

The outlook is subject to significant downside risks, as Papua New Guinea is vulnerable to both domestic and external shocks. These risks are exacerbated by considerable capacity constraints and socio-political fragility that limit the government’s ability to design and implement policies aimed at economic stabilization, development, and climate adaptation. Commodity price volatility, as well as other global risks arising from geopolitical conflicts, geoeconomic fragmentation, trade barriers, and supply disruptions may create additional pressure on growth and inflation. On the upside, the kickoff of major resource projects, which are not yet in the baseline scenario, could boost economic growth in the medium run, with significant gains in exports and fiscal revenues once they begin operations.

Program performance has remained satisfactory, with the authorities displaying a sustained commitment to reforms. All but one end-December 2024 quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets under the ECF-EFF arrangements were met, and six out of eight structural benchmarks due were fully or partially implemented. One reform measure under the RSF arrangement was implemented.

At the conclusion of the Executive Board’s discussion, Mr. Bo Li, Deputy Managing Director, and Acting Chair, made the following statement:

“The Papua New Guinea (PNG) authorities have continued implementing their multipronged reform agenda under the Fund-supported programs, with the reforms continuing to bear fruit. Sustained commitment to these homegrown reforms will help achieve more resilient, inclusive, and greener economic growth.

“The authorities have been successfully reducing the fiscal deficit and adopted important amendments to the Income Tax Act—a major milestone in the simplification of tax policies. Going forward, further fiscal adjustment, guided by the implementation of the authorities’ medium-term revenue strategy and supported by efforts to limit the growth of current spending and strengthen expenditure efficiency, would help to durably reduce debt vulnerabilities. Securing fiscal space for social and capital spending, engaging in prudent borrowing, and strengthening debt management capacity, including to avoid incurrence of arrears, are also essential.

“Foreign exchange shortages continued to ease, supported by central banking reforms, increased flexibility of the Kina, and favorable external conditions. The current crawl-like arrangement remains appropriate to bring the Kina to its market-clearing rate and facilitate the return to Kina convertibility. A tighter monetary policy stance, through timely adjustments in the KFR, is needed to ensure consistency between monetary policy and the exchange rate regime. Further efforts to modernize monetary policy operations, strengthen the Bank of PNG’s liquidity management capacity, develop the interbank market, and operationalize its lender of last resort function would help to support financial sector development.

“Further strengthening governance and addressing the remaining gaps in the anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism regime are critical. Meanwhile, macro-structural reforms should focus on improving PNG’s external competitiveness and attracting foreign investment, including by removing barriers to trade, enhancing export capacity, and further diversifying the economy.

“Reforms under the new RSF arrangement will help the authorities build resilience against climate-related risks and address structural balance of payments vulnerabilities. The recent climate finance roundtable event, which provided several concrete and innovative climate finance options, will support the authorities’ efforts to effectively scale up resources for climate action.

“The ECF/EFF and RSF arrangements will continue to support the authorities’ homegrown reform agenda, helping address balance of payment needs and rebuild buffers, while avoiding disruptive adjustment and catalyzing support from other international partners. Timely technical assistance and advice from the IMF and other development partners will continue to underpin reform implementation.

Executive Board Assessment[3]

Executive Directors agreed with the thrust of the staff appraisal. They commended the authorities for their commitment to keep program performance on track in a fragile socio‑political environment and welcomed positive developments in macroeconomic and fiscal indicators. Given significant downside risks and elevated external uncertainty, they stressed the importance of building buffers to preserve macroeconomic stability. They encouraged the authorities to continue to advance critical structural reforms with the support of capacity development activities.

Directors supported the authorities’ fiscal consolidation strategy and stressed the need for continued efforts to durably reduce public debt risks, including by enhancing the rules‑based fiscal framework, strengthening debt management capacity, and maintaining a prudent borrowing strategy. They called for a continued reduction of the fiscal deficit while securing space for development spending by combining revenue mobilization efforts with improvements in expenditure efficiency and cash management. They called for a timely adoption of the amendments to the Internal Revenue Commission Act to reinforce accountability in revenue collection.

Directors commended the progress achieved in implementing central banking reforms. They supported efforts to depreciate the Kina to its market‑clearing rate and gradually eliminate foreign exchange restrictions. They broadly concurred that a tighter monetary policy stance would help anchor inflation expectations and support the exchange rate regime, and emphasized the importance of liquidity management reforms to strengthen monetary policy transmission. They encouraged further development of the financial sector while containing financial stability risks.

Directors encouraged the authorities to further promote good governance, law and order, proactively enhance their AML/CFT framework, allocate sufficient budget resources to the Independent Commission Against Corruption, and swiftly appoint its oversight committee members. They also emphasized the need for enhancing transparency in the financial dealings of state‑owned enterprises. 

Directors encouraged the authorities to expedite reforms to enhance external competitiveness and help attract foreign investment, including by improving the business environment, removing barriers to trade, enhancing export capacity, reducing gender imbalances, and further diversifying the economy. Directors commended efforts to scale up climate finance and called for maintaining focus on strengthening disaster risk management, setting up fiscal incentives for fuel efficiency and forest protection, and integrating climate considerations in infrastructure governance.

It is expected that the next Article IV consultation with Papua New Guinea will be held in accordance with the Executive Board decision on consultation cycles for members with Fund arrangements.

Papua New Guinea: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2021–2026

 
 

Nominal GDP (2021):      

US$26.3 billion 1/

   

Population (2021):         

11.8 million

   

GDP per capita (2021):    

US$2,217

   

Quota:

SDR 263.2 million

   
 
 

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

2026

 

Actual

Actual

Actual

Est.

Proj.

Proj.

 
 

(Percentage change)

 

Real sector

 

 

Real GDP growth

-0.5

5.7

3.8

3.8

4.7

3.5

 

Resource 2/

-11.6

5.1

1.3

1.7

4.7

1.4

 

Non-resource

4.2

5.9

4.7

4.5

4.8

4.2

 

Mining and quarrying (percent of GDP)

8.2

8.2

8.5

9.9

12.2

13.4

 

Oil and gas extraction (percent of GDP)

17.1

23.7

18.9

18.3

16.4

16.2

 

CPI (annual average)

4.5

5.3

2.3

0.6

4.8

4.6

 

CPI (end-period)

5.7

3.4

3.9

0.7

4.0

4.3

 
 

(In percent of GDP)

 

Central government operations

 

Revenue and grants

15.1

16.6

17.9

17.0

17.9

18.6

 

Of which: Resource revenue

1.1

3.9

3.9

3.5

4.2

4.5

 

Expenditure and net lending

22.0

21.9

22.3

20.4

20.5

19.7

 

Net lending(+)/borrowing(-)

-6.8

-5.3

-4.3

-3.4

-2.6

-1.2

 

Non-resource net lending(+)/borrowing(-)

-8.0

-9.1

-8.2

-6.9

-6.8

-5.7

 
 

(Percentage change)

 

Money and credit

 

 

Domestic credit

15.9

1.5

12.1

1.6

3.6

2.3

 

Credit to the private sector

2.5

6.9

14.9

3.2

13.4

10.8

 

Broad money

13.4

14.7

9.9

-6.4

-8.5

7.7

 
 

(In billions of U.S. dollars)

 

Balance of payments

 

 

Exports, f.o.b.

10.8

14.6

12.8

13.4

14.9

15.1

 

Imports, c.i.f.

-4.4

-5.9

-5.4

-4.6

-6.1

-6.8

 

Current account (including grants)

3.3

4.6

2.8

5.0

3.5

4.2

 

(In percent of GDP)

12.6

14.4

9.1

15.8

10.8

12.7

 

Gross official international reserves

3.2

4.0

3.9

3.7

3.0

3.5

 

(In months of goods and services imports)

4.5

5.9

6.7

5.6

3.7

4.3

 
 

(In percent of GDP)

 

Government debt

 

 

Government gross debt

52.6

48.2

53.9

52.1

50.5

48.9

 

External debt-to-GDP ratio (in percent) 3/

25.0

23.5

27.0

27.4

29.7

30.5

 

External debt-service ratio (percent of exports)

4.3

2.2

2.7

3.4

4.5

5.4

 
 

Memo Items

 

US$/kina (end-period)

0.2850

0.2840

0.2683

0.2500

 

NEER (2005=100, fourth quarter)

91.2

100.3

95.3

89.3

 

REER (2005=100, fourth quarter)

125.3

134.6

129.0

119.5

 

Terms of trade (2010=100, end-period)

48.3

70.4

64.0

62.7

67.7

66.8

 
 

Nominal GDP (in billions of kina)

91.6

111.4

110.6

121.5

134.9

144.2

 

Non-resource nominal GDP (in billions of kina)

68.4

75.9

80.3

87.3

96.3

101.6

 
 

Sources: Papua New Guinea authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

 

1/ Based on period average exchange rate.

 

2/ Resource sector includes production of mineral, petroleum, and gas and directly-related activities such as

 

mining and quarrying, but excludes indirectly-related activities such as transportation and construction.

 

3/ Public external debt includes external debt of the central government, the central bank, and guarantees to other entities.

 

[1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

[2] Under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, publication of documents that pertain to member countries is voluntary and requires the member consent. The staff report will be shortly published on the www.imf.org/en/Countries/PNG page.

[3] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chair of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Pemba Sherpa

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/13/pr-25197-papua-new-guinea-imf-completes-4th-rev-under-ecf-eff-1st-rev-of-arrang-under-rsf-art-iv

MIL OSI

IMF Staff Completes 2025 Article IV Mission to Mali

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 13, 2025

End-of-Mission press releases include statements of IMF staff teams that convey preliminary findings after a visit to a country. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF’s Executive Board for discussion and decision.

  • Mali’s economy is grappling with major headwinds, including food insecurity and security threats, frequent climate shocks, external financing constraints and an uncertain economic outlook. Despite these challenges, the economy is showing resilience and projected to continue to improve over the medium-term.
  • The authorities remain committed to a 3 percent fiscal deficit, in line with the WAEMU target to maintain fiscal sustainability.
  • The authorities have launched an ambitious long-term development plan “Vision 2063”, accompanied by a National Strategy for Emergence and Sustainable Development 2024-2033, to achieve high, sustainable, and inclusive growth. Its success hinges on the implementation of sound macroeconomic policies and making decisive progress on structural reforms.

Washington, DC: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff team, led by
Ms. Wenjie Chen, visited Bamako from June 9 to 13, 2025, to conduct the 2025 Article IV consultation with the Malian authorities. The team held productive discussions with the authorities and other stakeholders on recent economic developments, the outlook, and medium-term policies to support macroeconomic stability and inclusive growth.

At the end of the visit, Ms. Chen issued the following statement:

“Mali’s economy has shown some resilience despite significant headwinds. Economic growth is estimated at 4.7 percent in 2024 unchanged form 2023, due to a combination of factors, including an electricity crisis, flooding and lower gold production. The government’s fiscal deficit declined to 2.6 percent of GDP in 2024 driven by robust revenue mobilization, exceptional payments form mining and telecom companies and tighter control of current spending amid constrained financing. Tight financing conditions in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), and the absence of external budget support resulted in high borrowing costs for the Government.

“Real GDP growth is projected to increase to 5.0 percent in 2025, weighed down by reduced output from the shutdown of the largest gold mine and ongoing security risks. Contingent on resumption of full mining activities, growth is expected to rebound to 5.4 percent in 2026. The fiscal deficit is forecast to widen to 3.4 percent in 2025, driven in part by government spending to mitigate the impact of the flooding. However, the outlook remains uncertain, with considerable downside risks.

“Fiscal policy should prioritize achieving fiscal sustainability, particularly by converging toward WAEMU’s 3-percent fiscal deficit ceiling. Key priorities include strengthening domestic revenue mobilization through broadening the tax base, including from the mining sector, and strengthening the revenue and customs administration. Moreover, the authorities should focus on improving spending efficiency while safeguarding public investment and protecting vulnerable households.

“Reducing domestic policy uncertainty and advancing structural reforms are essential to unlocking Mali’s growth potential. Strengthening fiscal governance, improving public financial management, addressing vulnerabilities in State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and enhancing their oversight—particularly in the electricity utility, Energie de Mali—are critical. Greater policy stability and transparent regulatory frameworks are crucial for attracting foreign investment.

“The staff team thanks the authorities and other counterparts for their close collaboration and productive discussions.”

The team met with the Minister of Economy and Finance, Mr. Alousséni Sanou, the Minister of Justice Mr. Mamoudou Kassogue, and the National Director of the BCEAO for Mali, Mr. Baréma Bocoum, senior staff of the main ministries and government agencies, development partners, and the private sector.

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Tatiana Mossot

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/13/pr-25196-mali-imf-staff-completes-2025-article-iv-mission

MIL OSI

Press Briefing Transcript: Julie Kozack, Director, Communications Department, June 12, 2025

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 12, 2025

SPEAKER:  Ms. Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department, IMF

MS. KOZACK: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to this IMF Press Briefing. My name is Julie Kozak. I’m the Director of Communications at the IMF.  As usual, this press briefing will be embargoed until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time in the United States.  And as usual, I will start with a few announcements, and then I’ll take your questions in person on WebEx and via the Press Center.  And I have quite a few announcements today, so please do bear with me. 

On June 18th, the Managing Director will travel to Brussels, where she will hold bilateral meetings with officials.  On June 19th, she will travel to Luxembourg to present the Euro Area Annual Consultation at the Eurogroup meeting.  On June 20th, the Managing Director will be in Rome to speak at the Mattei Plan for Africa and the Global Gateway event, a joint effort with the African Continent.  This event is co-chaired by Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.  And from there, the Managing Director will travel to Japan from June 22nd to 24th.  During her visit, she will hold meetings with Japanese officials, members of the private sector, and other stakeholders. 

Turning to other management travel.  First Deputy Managing Director Gita Gopinath will travel to Sri Lanka, Singapore, and Indonesia.  On June 16th, she will participate in the Sri Lanka Road to Recovery Conference, where she will deliver opening remarks.  And in all three countries, our FDMD will meet with officials and various stakeholders during this trip. 

From June 24th through 26th, our Deputy Managing Director Bo Li will attend the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting of the New Champions in Tianjin, China.  DMD Li will participate in sessions on safeguarding growth engines and the role of digital assets in Global payment systems. 

On June 30th, Deputy Managing Director Nigel Clarke will participate in the Finance for Development Conference and in Sevilla, Spain. 

And with that, I will now open the floor to your questions.  For those of you who are connecting virtually, please do turn on both your camera and microphone when speaking.  All right, let’s open the floor.   

QUESTIONER: I have two questions on Ukraine.  After meetings in Kyiv last month, the IMF mission emphasized the importance of Ukraine’s upcoming budget declaration for 2026-2028, which will determine the course of the fiscal framework and policies.  What are the Fund’s expectations, and does the IMF have any specific requirements or policy guidelines for this document?  And secondly, if I may, do you have data of the IMF Board — IMF support meetings to approve the aides review for Ukraine?     

MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Ukraine?                                          

QUESTIONER: So, Ukraine has recently defaulted on its GDP-linked securities and, before that, failed to reach an agreement with creditors to restructure its part of its sovereign debt.  How concerned is IMF with these developments, and do you see any risks for the EFF repayments from Ukraine?  Thank you. 

QUESTIONER: Some follow-up to your question.  IMF sources indicate that Ukraine transferred $171 million repayment to the Fund on June 9th, the first repayment on loans received post-February 2022.  Can you confirm this payment was received?  And how does the IMF view Ukraine’s emerging shift towards repayment on wartime financing?  Thank you. 

MS. KOZACK: Let me take these questions for a moment, and I’ll remind you where we are on Ukraine.

On May 28th, IMF staff and the Ukrainian authorities reached Staff–Level Agreement.  And this was for the Eighth Review of the EFF program.  Subject to approval by our Executive Board, Ukraine will have access to about U.S. $500 million, and that would bring total disbursements under the program to U.S. $10.6 billion.  The Board is scheduled to take place in the coming weeks, and we’ll provide more details as they become available.  I can also add that Ukraine’s economy has remained resilient.  Performance under the EFF has continued to be strong despite very challenging circumstances.  The authorities met all of their quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets, and progress does continue on the structural agenda in Ukraine.

Now, with respect to the specific questions on the budget declaration, what I can provide there is that our view is that the 2026-2028 budget declaration will provide a strategic framework for fiscal policy for the remainder of the program over that period of time.  It will help focus the debate on key expenditure priorities, including recovery, reconstruction, defense, and social spending.  And it will also form the basis for discussion of the 2026 budget, which, of course, will also be an important milestone for Ukraine. 

On the question regarding the debt, what I can say there is that we encourage the Ukrainian authorities and their creditors to continue to make progress toward reaching an agreement in line with the debt sustainability targets under the IMF’s program and the authority’s announced strategy.  So that’s sort of our broad view on the debt.  On the implications for completion of the review, as in all cases where a member country may have arrears to private creditors, staff will assess whether the requirements under the Fund’s lending into arrears policy are met.  In light of this, again, we encourage the authorities to continue to make good-faith efforts toward reaching an agreement in light of the debt sustainability targets. 

And on your question about Ukraine’s payment to the Fund, what I can say is that, in general, we don’t comment on specific transactions of individual members.  What I can guide you to is that we do provide on our website detailed information on members’ repayments.  And this is made available on a monthly basis.  So, at the end of each month, if you look at the Ukraine page, you can see the transactions that were made.  And on a daily basis, we provide detail on member countries outstanding obligations to the IMF.  So that can give you a sense of how the overall obligations of Ukraine have evolved on a daily basis. 

QUESTIONER: Can you give us an update on the relationship between the IMF and Senegal?  Where do things currently stand with misreporting and a new program?  This is my first question.  And the second one I have is the Fifth Review under the Policy Coordination concerning Rwanda.  The IMF stated that “Rwanda continues to demonstrate leadership in integrating climate consideration into macroeconomic policy and leveraging institutional reforms to mobilize climate finance.”  Now my question is, can you please tell us concretely what kind of institutional reforms have been implemented by Rwanda? 

MS. KOZACK: So, before I answer this, are there any other questions on Senegal or Rwanda? I see none in the room. Anyone online want to come in on Senegal?  Okay, I don’t see anyone coming in, so let’s start with Senegal, and then we’ll move to Rwanda. 

What I can say on Senegal is that we, the IMF and our team in particular, remained actively engaged with the Senegalese authorities, including during a visit to Dakar over March and April and further discussions during the Spring Meetings, which were held here in Washington in April.  We do continue to work with the authorities to address the complex misreporting case that is ongoing.  And addressing this complex case does require a rigorous and time-intensive process.

I also want to take the opportunity to add that the IMF supports our member countries in a variety of ways, and it goes beyond just providing financing.  So, for example, in the case of Senegal, we are continuing to provide the authorities with technical assistance, including, for example, on our debt sustainability analysis that is tailored to low-income countries.  We’re working closely with the authorities on compiling government financial statistics.  This is being led by our Statistics Department.  We’re providing technical assistance on energy sector reform, public investment management, and revenue mobilization, and that, of course, is with support from our fiscal experts. 

With respect to a new program.  We don’t have currently a fixed timeline for a new program, and we are awaiting the final audit outcome. 

Now, turning to your question on Rwanda here.  What I can say, and maybe just to step back and remind everyone of where we are in Rwanda.  On June 4th, so just a few days ago, our Executive Board concluded the Fifth Review of Rwanda’s policy Coordination Instrument.  Rwanda’s economic growth remains among the strongest in Sub-Saharan Africa, and that’s despite rising pressures both on the fiscal side and the external side.  Rwanda, of course, we’re encouraging Rwanda to continue with a credible fiscal consolidation, strong domestic revenue mobilization, and a strong monetary policy. 

With respect to your specific question, Rwanda successfully completed its Resilience and Sustainability Fund program, the RSF program, in December of 2024, six months ahead of the initial timetable.  And under this RSF, Rwanda did carry out a number of institutional reforms that were focused on green public financial management, climate public investment management, climate-related risk management for financial institutions, and disaster risk reduction.  So, these are some of the institutional reforms that Rwanda completed, which led us to make that statement about their leadership in this area. 

I can also add that these reforms, along with some of the other reforms they’re having, they’re undertaking, such as a green taxonomy and the adoption of best practices in climate risk reporting by financial institutions.  The idea is that this together will help to close information gaps, improve transparency, and that hopefully will allow for a boost to private sector engagement in advancing Rwanda’s ambitious climate goals and its broader goals toward economic development and strong and sustainable growth. 

QUESTIONER: Two questions on Syria.  The Fund said this week that Syria needs substantial international assistance for its recovery efforts.  Firstly, can you give us an estimation of how much economic assistance Syria will need?  And secondly, could you just let us know if there were any discussions around if a potential Article IV was discussed? 

MS. KOZACK: Thank you. Any other questions on Syria?                   

QUESTIONER: Just to know if there was any demand from the Syrian government for any kind of technical assistance from the IMF to help them recover, economically speaking?

MS. KOZACK: Does anyone online want to come in on Syria? I don’t see anyone coming in. So let me step back again and give a sense of where we are on Syria.

I think, as many of you know, an IMF staff team visited Syria from June 1st through 5th.  This was the first IMF visit to Syria since 2009.  The goal of the visit was to assess the economic and financial conditions in Syria, as well as to discuss with the authorities their economic policy, and also to ascertain the authorities ‘ capacity-building priorities, ultimately to support the recovery of the Syrian economy.  I think, as we’ve discussed here before, Syria faces enormous challenges following years of conflict that have caused immense human suffering, and it’s reduced the Syrian economy to a fraction of its former size. 

At the IMF, we’re committed to supporting Syria in its efforts.  Based on the findings of the mission, IMF staff, in coordination with other partners, are developing a detailed roadmap for policy and capacity development priorities for key economic institutions.  And within the IMF’s mandate, this covers the Finance Ministry, the Central Bank, and the Statistics Agency.  So those would be the areas where we will be focusing in terms of the detailed roadmap on priorities, economic and capacity building priorities. 

Syria, as noted, will need substantial international assistance.  We don’t yet have a precise estimate of that assistance.  But what I can say is this will also — it will not only require concessional financial support, but also substantial capacity development support for the country.  And that’s basically where we have left it with the Syrian authorities.  And, of course, we will continue to engage closely with them, and we are committed to helping them, supporting them on their recovery journey. 

QUESTIONER: Is the date of the IMF mission to Argentina already said?  And based on that definition, when would the First Review of the agreement could take place?  And another one, in the last few days, the Argentina government has launched different mechanisms to try to increase the level of foreign exchange reserves.  Is the IMF worried that Argentina will not reach the target set in the agreement?  And could the IMF give Argentina a waiver on this?  Thank you very much. 

MS. KOZACK: Okay, any other questions in the room on Argentina? I know we have several online.

QUESTIONER: Thanks for taking my questions.  I would like to know how does the IMF evaluate the listed economy measures, particularly the issue of the measure to use undeclared dollars.  Thank you.

QUESTIONER: My first question is about the reserve target for the new program with Argentina.  Central Bank is about $4 billion below the target set for June.  Also, some operations are expected that could increase their reserve stock.  Officials said on Monday evening that local currency bonds can now be purchased with U.S. dollar and that the minimum time requirement for foreign investors to hold onto some Argentina bonds will be eliminated.  The IMF is concerned that the Central Bank is not accumulating reserves touch foreign trade and is only receiving income touch debt.  Is the consensus with the authorities to postpone the Frist Review and allow time for Argentina to activate credit operation in order to close — to get closer to the target set for June, or Argentina should resort to a waiver?  And what is your view on the recent measures? 

And that second question is about the possibility of an IMF mission arriving in Argentina in the coming weeks.  Is that possible?  Would it be a technical staff mission, or could the Managing Director or Deputy Executive Director also come?  Thank you very much. 

QUESTIONER: So, the question is the same as (connection issue) First Review of the agreement signed in April (connection issue)

QUESTIONER: -Is the IMF considering granting a waiver and also if they build up. 

MS. KOZACK: You’ve broken up quite a bit, and now we’re not able to hear you, so we’ll try to get you back, or I think what I understood from your question is it’s broadly along the same lines as some of the other questions. What we can do is if you want to connect via the Press Center, I can read the question out loud. But what I’m going to do is move on.                      

QUESTIONER:  Basically, echoing my colleague’s questions on the timing of the mission and whether an extension was granted to meet the reserve’s target, well, for the First Review generally.  And separately, Argentina has July 9th dollar debt payments, which will obviously affect reserves.  How will that payment and timing affect your calculus of the reserves target within the First Review?  Thank you.

QUESTIONER: Well, yes, also echoing my colleague’s question regarding whether the timeline for the First Review, the end date remains this Friday, which was what it said on the Staff Report.  And also, there was a ruling lately, these past few days, against former President Cristina Kirchner.  I was wondering if that raises any concerns in the IMF regarding any political conflict or any subsequent economic impact. 

MS. KOZACK: I think we’ve covered all the questions on Argentina. Anyone else on Argentina? Okay, very good.  So, let me try to give a response that tries to cover as many of these questions as I can.  So again, I’m just going to step back and provide where we are with Argentina. 

So, on April 11th, the IMF’s Executive Board approved a new four-year EFF arrangement worth $20 billion for Argentina.  The initial disbursement was $12 billion, and the goal of the program was to support is to support Argentina’s transition to the next phase of state stabilization and reform.  The Milei administration’s policies continue to evolve and to deliver impressive results, as we have previously noted. 

In this regard, we welcome the recent measures announced this week by the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance as they represent another important step in efforts to consolidate disinflation, support the government’s financing strategy and to rebuild reserves and, more specifically, steps to strengthen the monetary framework and to improve liquidity management.  These are important to further reduce inflation and inflation expectations.  The Treasury’s successful reentry into capital markets and other actions to mobilize financing for Argentina are also expected to boost reserves, and stability overall for the country continues to be supported by the implementation of strong fiscal anchor in the country. 

Our team continues to engage frequently and constructively with the Argentine authorities as part of the program’s First Review.  I can add that a technical mission will visit Buenos Aires in late June to assess progress on program targets and objectives and to also discuss the authority’s forward-looking reform agenda.  More broadly and despite the more challenging environment, the authorities, as I said, have continued to make very notable and impressive progress.  So, I will leave it at that. 

Let’s go online for a bit, and then we’ll come — no, let’s go right here in the back.  You haven’t had a question, and you’re in the room.                             

QUESTIONER: Given the recent escalation in global trade tensions and the effect of the tariffs, what is the IMF’s assessment of how these developments are affecting emerging economies?  And what policy recommendation does the IMF have for countries facing increased external pressures? 

MS. KOZACK: Okay, let me answer — let me turn to this question on emerging markets, a very important constituency and part of our membership here at the IMF. So, let me start with where we were and what our assessment was as of April.

In April, when we launched our World Economic Outlook, we projected growth in emerging and developing countries to slow from 4.3 percent in 2024 to 3.7 percent in 2025 and then to come back a little bit to 3.9 percent in 2026.  We did have at that time also significant downgrades for countries most affected by the trade measures, and that includes China, for example.  We have seen since then that there have been some positive surprises to growth in the first quarter for this group of countries, including China.  We have also seen recent reductions in some tariffs, and that represents kind of an upside risk to our forecast.  And, of course, we will be updating our forecast, including for this group of emerging and developing countries, as part of our July WEO update, and that will be released toward the end of July. 

In terms of our recommendations, we recommend what we would call a multi-pronged policy response.  So first, to carefully calibrate monetary policy and also macroprudential or prudential policies to maintain stability in countries.  We also recommend for this group of countries, but for all of our members, to rebuild fiscal buffers to restore policy space to respond to, of course, future shocks that may occur.  For countries that may face particular disruptive pressures in the foreign currency, foreign exchange market, we would say that they could pursue targeted interventions if those instances are disruptive.  We also are encouraging again all of our countries to undertake the necessary reforms to no longer delay reforms associated with boosting productivity and longer-term growth. 

I think maybe stepping back, we’ve been talking for quite some time in the IMF about a low growth, high debt environment.  And this, of course, applies to this group of countries as well.  So, dealing with the debt side, of course, is important through fiscal consolidation, but also, very importantly, boosting growth and productivity growth.  So, countries can also have a more prosperous society and also deal with some of their debt issues through stronger growth is also very important. 

All right, let me go online, and then I’ll come back to the room.  Let’s see.  Online, I see a few hands up.                             

QUESTIONER: My question is on Japanese tour conducted by Managing Director.  Could you give more details on how Japanese tour played this month?  For example, is there any chance for giving speeches or press conference and so on? 

MS. KOZACK: So, as I said, the Managing Director will visit Japan later this month. Her visit will mostly entail meetings with government officials and also the business community as well as other stakeholders. She will have an opportunity to also do some outreach, and we can provide further details to you as her agenda becomes more concrete.  But she is very much looking forward to the visit.  Japan, as I think we’ve said before, is an important partner for the IMF.  And the Managing Director is very much looking forward to meeting with Japanese officials and talking more broadly to other stakeholders in Japan about the important partnership that the IMF has with Japan. 

I see some other hands up online.  Unfortunately, I can’t see.  So, I think if you’re online and you have your hand up, just jump in. 

QUESTIONER: You already referred to your own economic outlooks when you talked about emerging markets.  But I was — I wanted to ask you, does the IMF anticipate a similar growth downgrade as we’ve just seen for the World Bank this week and its economic assessment?  Because, of course, back in April, the cutoff point for your last report was just as Donald Trump was announcing the Liberation Day tariffs. 

MS. KOZACK: Okay, so thank you for that. Any other questions on the global outlook? Okay, so let me take this one, and then we’ll come back to some other questions. 

So, what I can say in terms of the forward-looking, I mean, first, I want to start by reiterating that we will release a revised set of projections in July as part of our regular WEO update.  What I can add is that since we released our World Economic Outlook, what we call the WEO, in April, we have seen some, you know, some data come in and some other developments.  So first, we have seen some trade deals that have lowered tariffs, notably between the U.S. and China, but also the U.S. and the UK, and at the same time, the U.S. has raised further tariffs on steel and aluminum imports.  So taken together, such announcements, combined with the April 9th pause on the high level of tariffs, these could support activity relative to the forecast that we had in April.  But nonetheless, we do have an outlook for the global economy that remains subject to heightened uncertainty, especially as trade negotiations continue. 

I can also add that recent activity indicators reflect a complex economic landscape.  So, this is recent high-frequency data.  We have some outturns in the first quarter, which indicated a front-loading of activity ahead of the tariff announcements that took place in April.  And some high-frequency indicators also show some trade diversion and unwinding of that earlier front loading.  So, this is kind of the more recent indicators.  So, all of this creates kind of a complicated picture for us with some upside risk, some other developments, and we’ll take all of these developments together into account as we update our forecast toward the end of July in our WEO. 

QUESTIONER: When you say support activity, do you mean there’s a chance it could be an improved outlook? 

MS. KOZACK: So yes, by support activity, what we mean is that it’s kind of positive, it’s a little bit of a positive sign for economic activity. So that’s related, though, I would say, to the specific announcements. So, so just going back to say, the announcements of the trade deals that have lowered tariffs, particularly the ones between the U.S. and China and the U.S. and the UK, those could be supportive or a bit more positive for economic activity going forward.  But the overall picture is both complicated for the reasons that I mentioned. 

We have some front loading in the first quarter.  Some of that seems perhaps to be unwinding in more recent indicators.  And we also, of course, have to remember that we are in an environment of very high uncertainty, and uncertainty, in general, tends to dampen economic activity. 

So, the overall picture is quite complex.  And so, we will take all of these factors into account as we move forward with our forecast in July.  And, of course, between now and when we release our forecast later in July, we would expect that there will be further data releases.  And also, there is the possibility that there can be further announcements that we would have to take into account or further developments that we would have to take into account as well. 

Let me just stay online for another minute.  I think I have one more hand up online or two hands online. 

QUESTIONER: My question is about Egypt.  I was hoping to ask you if the Egyptian authorities have requested a waiver from the Fund for any of the requirements related to the Fifth Review of the country’s ongoing loan program and specifically if a waiver has been requested related to targets for divestment from state-owned assets.  And if you have any update on the timing of the Fifth Review, that would also be very helpful.  I know there were some suggestions that the Fifth Review could be combined with the Sixth Review, in which case we wouldn’t see it until September rather than the June date that had previously been talked about.  Thank you.

MS. KOZACK: Anyone else on Egypt?

QUESTIONER: My question is related to the previous one by my colleague.  She asked about the state-owned companies to be listed for IPOs or for private sectors to be having a bigger stake in the economy.  How the IMF evaluate the progress achieved by the Egyptian authorities during that?  And also, when the Fifth Review to be finished after the physical meetings happened in past May?  And what are the most recent progress achieved until now during this?  And also, I’d like to ask about how IMF evaluated the latest step by Egyptian government to give the Minister of Finance the right to issue sukuk in the guarantee of place in Red Sea as published in the last two days. 

MS. KOZACK: Okay, thank you. Anyone else have questions on Egypt? So, on Egypt, as I think many of you know, an IMF team visited Cairo.  From May 6th to May 18th, the team held productive discussions with the Egyptian authorities on their economic and financial policies.  Discussions are continuing virtually to finalize agreement on remaining policies and reforms that could support the completion of the Fifth Review under the EFF. So again, discussions around the Fifth Review are continuing virtually. 

As we have said here before, Egypt has made clear progress on its macroeconomic reform program with notable improvements in inflation and in the level of international reserves.  As Egypt’s macroeconomic stabilization is taking hold, it’s now the time for efforts to focus on accelerating and deepening reforms, including reducing the footprint of the state, leveling the playing field, and improving the business environment in Egypt. 

What I can add is that in order to deliver on these objectives, particularly with respect to reducing the footprint of the state, leveling the playing field, et cetera, it’s important to decisively reduce the role of the public sector in the economy.  The implementation of the state ownership policy, as well as the asset divestment program in sectors where the state has committed to reduce its footprint, will be playing a critical role in strengthening the ability of Egypt’s private sector to contribute to growth and activity in the Egyptian economy, which will ultimately support improvements in livelihoods of the Egyptian people.  We remain committed to supporting Egypt in building economic resilience and fostering stronger private sector-led growth. 

On some of the more specific questions related to Sukuk, I don’t have a response here, but we’ll come back to you bilaterally. 

QUESTIONER: It’s a quick overall question.  Could you remind us the condition for a country to come under IMF supervision?  Does it require specifically a program, or can it come from the IMF itself?  Thank you very much. 

MS. KOZACK: Can you clarify what you mean by IMF supervision? Just so I understand.

QUESTIONER: To be perfectly honest, in the past few days, we had comments from the French government about the fact that it could become under IMF supervision.  I’m not very interested in specifically about France, but just in general overall how IMF comes to work with governments.  What are the conditions for the IMF to step in and come to help the government?  Thank you very much. 

MS. KOZACK: Very good. So, let me maybe take this opportunity to step back and explain kind of the three big pillars of the work of the IMF.

So, the first is policy advice, and this is done mainly through the Article IV consultation process.  The reason it’s called Article IV is because it’s in Article IV of our Articles of Agreement, and every member country of the IMF — so, we have 191 member countries — every member country commits when they join the IMF to participate in the Article IV consultation process.  So that applies to every member.  And that is a process that I know you here are very familiar with, where the IMF sends a team, and we conduct an assessment of the economy, and we provide policy advice to the country.  That’s done for all members. 

Another leg or another pillar of what we do at the IMF is capacity development.  And for capacity development, this is at the request of the member.  So, this could be, you know, very specific advice on a specific area where our technical expert would go and do sort of a deep dive analysis and provide detailed policy recommendations.  But it’s really meant at building state capacity.  So often, this is done in areas such as revenue mobilization or public financial management, statistics, monetary policy frameworks, and debt management.  These are some of the areas where we would provide technical assistance to countries.  That’s at the request of the member. 

And the same is true for our financial support.  So, for financial support, this is done again at the request of the member country.  The member would request financial support from the Fund, and then the Fund would then send a team and ultimately develop a program that reflects the commitments of the authorities.  But that program would need to be aimed at getting the country back on its feet.  In our technical language, it’s restoring medium-term viability for the country.  And that financing program has a balance between financial resources that the Fund provides and also policy measures taken by the part of the authorities.  But that, again, is at the request of the member country. 

QUESTIONER: So, my question is about cryptocurrency and digital assets.  What is the IMF’s view right now on the daily use transactions by people, by governments, in paying and accumulating Bitcoin and other digital currencies?  What risks and opportunities do you see on behalf of the IMF and what shall be done on the governmental level to implement any additional safeguards requirements to make this like a daily routine operations?  Thank you. 

MS. KOZACK: Okay, so I think on the broad topic of kind of crypto assets, what we can say is that they have gained popularity as an asset class. And also, what we see is that the underlying technology, which is a digital ledger that is shared, trusted, and programmable, is broadly viewed as highly valuable. And that technology may have broader societal benefits.  So, we do see crypto assets as a speculative asset as an asset class.  At the IMF, we generally don’t recommend crypto assets as legal or cryptocurrencies as legal tender.  We also do see that there are some potential risks that could arise from crypto assets.  These include risks to financial stability, to consumer and investor protection, and also to market integrity. 

So, in order to balance, in a sense, the opportunities based on the technology and a new asset class with some of these risks, what we advise countries to do is to establish a robust policy framework to effectively mitigate some of the risks while allowing society to take advantage of the benefits or the opportunities that arise from this new technology. 

QUESTIONER:  The Bank of Russia recently cut its key interest rate from 21 percent to 20 percent, marking its first easing move since September 2022.  From the IMF perspective, what are the implications of this monetary policy shift?  Thank you. 

MS. KOZACK: So, on Russia, let me just step back a minute, and I’ll provide our overall assessment of the economy, and then I’ll get to your specific question.

So, what we see in Russia is that last year, we saw the economy overheating, and now what we observe in Russia is a, is sharp slowdown of the economy, with growth slowing but inflation still relatively elevated.  Growth in 2025 is expected to slow to 1.5 percent based on our forecast from April, and this was compared to 4.3 percent in 2024.  And this reflects policy tightening, cyclical factors, and also lower oil prices. 

Now, with respect to the action by the Central Bank, as you noted, the Central Bank indeed reduced the key policy rate from 21 percent to 20 percent for the first time.  This was the first reduction since September of 2022.  And the action taken by the Central Bank was in response to slowing growth, which I just mentioned, and also some easing of inflation pressures. 

So, as I noted, inflation still remains high.  It was just under 10 percent in May.  But our forecast has inflation declining going forward.  So, we expect inflation to ease to 8.2 percent by the end of this year.  And we anticipate that inflation will turn to the target of 4 percent in the first half of 2027.  So that’s the IMF forecast.  So, the inflation challenge for Russia remains, and it’s appropriate.  Therefore, that monetary policy remains tight, and even with this cut, monetary policy is still tight. 

I am going to now take the opportunity to read one question or some questions on Ghana and some questions on Sri Lanka, and then we’ll bring the Press Briefing to a close.  So, on Ghana, I have three questions.  The first one is about an update on when Ghana’s program will be presented to the Board following Staff–Level Agreement. 

The second question is about the amended Energy Sector Levy Act to add GH₵1 per liter on petroleum products to defray the cost of fuel purchases for thermal plants.  Has the IMF taken note of this, and what’s its position on using taxes versus passing these costs through tariffs? 

The third question on Ghana is whether the IMF is looking at the possibility of revising Ghana’s IMF program targets as the cedi’s sharp appreciation against the dollar has affected many variables that influence these targets set by the Fund? 

So let me take a moment to just respond on Ghana.  So again, stepping back to where we are on Ghana.  On April 15th, the IMF staff and the Ghanaian authorities reached Staff–Level Agreement on the Fourth Review of Ghana’s Extended Credit Facility.  Upon approval by our Executive Board, Ghana would be scheduled to receive about U.S. $370 million, bringing total support under the ECF to $2.4 billion since May of 2023.  We anticipate bringing the review to our Board in early July, so in just a few weeks. 

What I can add about the question about the cedi’s sharp appreciation is that you know, of course, as we look at a program, we look at all of these developments, including, of course, developments in the exchange rate.  And so, future program reviews will provide an opportunity for the team to carefully assess all of the evolving macroeconomic and financial conditions, including exchange rate movements, and to ensure that the program’s targets and objectives remain appropriate and achievable. 

And on the fuel levy, what I can say is that this is a new measure that will help generate additional resources to tackle the challenges in Ghana’s energy sector, and it’s also going to bolster Ghana’s ability to deliver on the fiscal objectives under the program. 

And I’m going to read one last set of questions on Sri Lanka, and then we will bring the Press briefing to a close.  So, we have a number of journalists asking about Sri Lanka.  So there’s — we’re consolidating the questions here.  So, these journalists are asking for updates on the IMF’s view on Sri Lanka’s progress in implementing cost recovery, electricity prices, and the automatic price adjustment system.  They’re asking about the date for the Executive Board’s consideration of the Fourth Review under the program. 

And another question, has the government raised the issue of recent global shocks and possible further pressure on the economy and its ability to meet its reform program targets?  How do we rate the new government’s approach to corruption? 

QUESTIONER: My question is, recently Sri Lankan president announced that the existing IMF program is likely (inaudible) that it will be the final program for the country as it tries to achieve financial independence.  What is the IMF’s view on this?  Is it achievable given the current situation in Sri Lanka?  And what is the progress on the IMF Board approval for the next review?  Thank you. 

MS. KOZACK: All right, so again, just stepping back and reminding where we are on Sri Lanka.

So, on April 25th, IMF staff and the Sri Lankan authorities reached Staff–Level Agreement on their fourth review of Sri Lanka’s economic reform program.  The program and Sri Lanka’s ambitious reform agenda continue to deliver commendable outcomes.  Performance under the program remains strong overall, and the government remains committed to program objectives.  Completion of the review is pending approval of the IMF’s Executive Board, and it is contingent on the completion of prior actions. 

What I can add is that our IMF team, of course, is closely engaged with the authorities to assess the measures that were recently announced by the regulator on June 11th.  And these include a 15 percent increase in in electricity tariffs and the publication of a revised bulk supply transaction account guidelines for this.  So, these were two prior actions.  Once the review is completed by our Executive Board, Sri Lanka would have access to about $344 million in financing, and we will announce the Board date for Sri Lanka in due course. 

With respect to some of the more specific questions on governance, what I can add is that in end-February, the government published an updated government action plan on governance reforms.  And this action plan included important commitments such as enacting a public procurement law, an asset recovery law, and other actions that are aligned with the recommendations that were included in the IMF’s Governance Diagnostic Report. 

On the question about kind of the global situation and the impact on Sri Lanka, what I can say there is that, like for all countries in an environment of high uncertainty around policy and in general, high global uncertainty, this poses, of course, risks to an economy like Sri Lanka’s, as it does to many others.  If some of the risks associated with high global uncertainty were to materialize, the way we will approach this will be to work very closely with the authorities first to assess the impact of any downside risk that materializes, and then we will also work with the authorities to consider what are the appropriate policy responses within the contours of the program. And more broadly, for all countries, including Sri Lanka, it’s really critical for each country to sustain its own reform momentum.  Sustaining reform momentum, both with macroeconomic policy reforms and, importantly, some of the growth-enhancing reforms that we were talking about earlier, is critical for all countries in our membership, including Sri Lanka. 

And on the question regarding the president’s remarks, I think there, what I can simply say is to repeat that, you know, Sri Lanka has made commendable progress, you know, in implementing some very difficult but much-needed reforms.  The effects — these efforts are really starting to bear fruit.  We see a remarkable rebound in growth following Sri Lanka’s crisis.  Inflation is low, international reserves are continuing to grow, revenue collection on the fiscal side is improving, and the debt restructuring process is nearly complete.  So, I think it’s really important to recognize, you know, the significant efforts that Sri Lanka has taken and also the tremendous progress that has been made.  Right now, of course, we are very much focused on the current EFF, and therefore, as I mentioned, it’s going to be critical for Sri Lanka to sustain the reform momentum through the remainder of this EFF program. 

And with that, I am going to bring this Press Briefing to a close.  Let me thank you all for your participation today.  As a reminder, as usual, this briefing is embargoed until 11:00 A.M. Eastern Time in the United States.  A transcript will be made available later on IMF.org, and should you have any clarifications or additional queries, please reach out to my colleagues media@imf.org. This concludes our Press Briefing for today.  I wish everyone a wonderful day, and I do look forward to seeing you all next time.  Thank you very much. 

*  *  *  *  *

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Brian Walker

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/12/tr-061225-com-regular-press-briefing-june-12-2025

MIL OSI

IMF Executive Board Concludes 2025 Article IV Consultation with Ireland

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 11, 2025

  • The Irish economy has performed well and entered 2025 in a strong position.
  • The domestic economy is projected to continue growing, albeit at a slower pace in a highly uncertain global environment.
  • There are significant external downside risks to growth and public finances, which are vulnerable to external trade and tax policy shifts.

Washington, DC: On June 6, 2025, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the Article IV Consultation for Ireland.[1]

The Irish economy has performed well. The domestic economy, as measured by the Modified Gross National Income, is estimated to have grown by about 4 percent in 2024. Robust consumption and strong net exports, dominated by foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs), contributed positively to growth. Headline inflation has fallen to target, while service inflation has been more persistent. The labor market remains tight, although pressures appear to be easing. The general government balance continued to register a sizeable surplus in 2024, supported by large corporate income tax receipts from multinational enterprises. Bank lending growth has strengthened, largely driven by housing and consumer loans.

The domestic economy is projected to continue to grow, though at a slower pace in a highly uncertain global environment. The strong labor market and rising real incomes, as well as anticipated pick up in housing investment and government capital spending would support domestic demand. While the direct effect of the announced tariff measures is projected to be contained, heightened global uncertainty would though weigh on household and business spending decisions.

There are significant downside risks to the growth outlook. The concentration of activity in a small number of MNEs leaves the economy and public finances vulnerable to external trade and tax policy shifts and firm- or sector-specific shocks. More broadly, a sustained reversal of globalization would put at risk the Irish economic model which has benefitted from free trade and capital flows. Domestically, supply-side constraints could delay the attainment of infrastructure and housing goals.

Executive Board Assessment[2]

Executive Directors welcomed the strong economic performance, which has been underpinned by robust domestic demand and prudent policies. Directors highlighted that while the outlook remains positive, there are considerable downside risks, given high global uncertainty and Ireland’s significant exposure to trade and investment shocks. Accordingly, Directors emphasized the need to maintain fiscal prudence, safeguard financial stability, and advance structural reforms to support resilience and growth.

Directors recommended that fiscal policy continue to focus on building buffers, stepping up public investment, and reducing revenue uncertainty. Noting that the economy is operating at full capacity, Directors agreed that a broadly neutral fiscal stance with increased capital expenditure is appropriate as it would allow Ireland to address infrastructure needs without adding to aggregate demand. Important measures include enhancing public spending efficiency and broadening the tax base to reduce reliance on uncertain corporate tax revenue. Directors agreed that Ireland would benefit from a strengthened national fiscal framework that further ensures long-term fiscal sustainability and enhances the credibility and predictability of fiscal policy.

Directors recognized the resilience of the financial sector, while underscoring the importance of continued close monitoring of financial stability risks. Noting the high global uncertainty, Directors emphasized the need for continued vigilance, as shocks to the non-bank sector could be transmitted to other parts of the financial system and the real economy. Directors agreed that the macroprudential stance is appropriate and that measures should continue to be reassessed as conditions evolve. While welcoming progress on reducing risks from the non-bank sector, Directors urged continued efforts to improve regulation and supervision and address data gaps in collaboration with international regulators and other jurisdictions.

Directors emphasized the importance of enhancing resilience and competitiveness, amid external policy shifts and deepening geoeconomic fragmentation. Measures to promote linkages between domestic and multinational firms in innovation cooperation and improve infrastructure would help foster increased competitiveness. Directors also encouraged continued engagement in the EU to further strengthen the single market. Noting the potential dividends for growth, Directors acknowledged that Ireland is well-positioned to harness the benefits of digitalization and AI. They also highlighted the need to address supply-side constraints in housing, including by boosting productivity in the construction sector and enhancing housing policy certainty.

Ireland: Selected Economic Indicators, 2021–30

     

Projections

 
 

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

2026

2027

2028

2029

2030

 

(Annual percentage change, constant prices, unless otherwise indicated)

 

Output/Demand

                   

Real GDP 1/

16.3

8.6

-5.5

1.2

3.2

2.1

2.1

2.2

2.1

2.3

Real GNI* (growth rate) 2/

13.9

4.6

5.0

3.7

2.4

2.2

2.0

2.2

2.3

2.3

Domestic demand

-16.4

8.0

6.0

-11.9

7.6

2.4

2.4

2.4

2.5

2.5

Public consumption                 

6.3

3.0

4.3

4.3

2.5

2.5

2.5

2.5

2.5

2.5

Private consumption                 

8.9

10.7

4.8

2.3

2.3

2.0

2.0

2.0

2.1

2.1

Gross fixed capital formation

-39.4

3.7

2.8

-25.4

20.0

3.0

3.0

3.0

3.0

3.0

Exports of goods and services

14.1

13.5

-5.8

11.7

3.1

2.2

2.5

2.5

2.5

2.5

Imports of goods and services

-8.7

16.0

1.2

6.5

4.9

2.4

2.8

2.7

2.8

2.7

Output gap

3.4

3.1

1.0

1.2

0.9

0.6

0.3

0.1

0.0

0.0

                     

Contribution to Growth

                   

Domestic demand

-13.1

4.7

3.5

-7.7

4.4

1.4

1.4

1.4

1.5

1.5

Consumption

3.0

3.0

1.6

1.1

1.0

0.9

0.9

0.9

0.9

0.9

Gross fixed capital formation

-16.3

0.8

0.6

-5.9

3.4

0.6

0.6

0.6

0.6

0.6

Inventories

0.2

0.9

1.3

-3.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Net exports

29.1

3.3

-9.1

9.3

-1.0

0.7

0.7

0.8

0.7

0.8

Residual

0.3

0.6

0.1

-0.3

-0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

                     

Prices

                   

Inflation (HICP)

2.4

8.1

5.2

1.3

1.9

1.7

1.8

1.9

2.0

2.0

Inflation (HICP, core)

1.6

5.0

5.1

2.4

2.1

2.2

2.0

2.0

2.0

2.0

GDP deflator

1.1

6.8

3.6

3.3

1.9

1.4

1.8

2.1

2.0

2.0

                     

Employment

                   

Employment (% changes of level, ILO definition)

6.5

6.9

3.4

2.7

1.5

1.1

0.8

0.6

0.6

0.6

Unemployment rate (percent)

6.3

4.5

4.3

4.3

4.5

4.7

4.8

4.8

4.8

4.8

                     
 

(Percent of GDP)

Public Finance, General Government

                   

Revenue

22.2

22.3

24.3

27.8

25.6

25.7

25.7

26.1

26.2

26.2

Expenditure

23.5

20.6

22.7

23.5

24.2

24.4

24.6

24.8

24.9

25.0

Overall balance

-1.4

1.7

1.5

4.3

1.4

1.3

1.1

1.3

1.3

1.2

in percent of GNI*

-2.7

3.3

2.7

7.4

2.4

2.3

1.9

2.3

2.3

2.0

Primary balance

-0.6

2.3

2.2

4.9

2.0

1.9

1.7

2.0

2.1

2.0

Cyclically adjusted primary balance

-1.6

1.4

1.9

4.4

1.7

1.7

1.6

1.9

2.1

2.0

Structural primary balance 3/

-0.6

-0.6

-0.4

-0.8

-0.9

-0.9

-0.9

-0.8

-0.7

-0.7

General government gross debt

52.6

43.1

43.3

40.9

36.4

34.4

33.1

31.6

30.2

29.0

General government gross debt (percent of GNI*)

102.3

84.2

75.9

70.0

62.8

59.3

57.1

54.5

52.1

50.1

                     

Balance of Payments

                   

Trade balance (goods)

37.5

39.4

30.6

33.1

36.6

36.1

35.7

35.6

35.8

35.8

Current account balance

12.2

8.8

8.1

17.2

12.2

11.6

11.1

10.6

9.9

9.2

Gross external debt (excl. IFSC) 4/

284.9

229.9

218.9

198.0

179.9

166.4

153.3

140.6

129.3

118.9

                     

Saving and Investment Balance

                   

Gross national savings

35.3

31.7

34.4

34.6

31.5

30.9

30.3

29.9

29.3

28.8

Private sector

35.5

29.0

31.8

29.2

29.1

28.6

28.4

27.7

27.2

26.8

Public sector

-0.2

2.7

2.6

5.3

2.4

2.2

2.0

2.2

2.2

2.0

Gross capital formation

23.1

22.9

26.3

17.4

19.3

19.2

19.3

19.2

19.4

19.5

                     
                     

Memorandum Items:

                   

Nominal GDP (€ billions)

449.2

520.9

510.0

533.4

561.2

581.1

603.9

630.2

656.8

685.2

Nominal GNI* (€ billions)

230.8

267.0

290.9

311.8

325.3

337.0

349.8

364.9

380.7

397.2

Modified domestic demand (percentage change) 5/

8.0

8.8

2.6

2.7

2.1

2.1

2.2

2.2

2.3

2.3

                     

Sources: CSO, DoF, Eurostat, and IMF staff estimates and projections.

     

1/ Real GDP growth is reported in non-seasonally adjusted terms. 

 

2/ Nominal GNI* is deflated using GDP deflator as proxy, since an official GNI* deflator is not available.

     

3/ Excludes estimated windfall CIT receipts. In 2024 also excludes CIT receipts of 2.5 percent of GDP following judgment by the Court of Justice of the EU.

 

4/ IFSC indicates international financial services.

     

5/ Modified Domestic Demand (MDD) measures Ireland’s domestic economic activity by excluding certain capital investment items such as aeroplanes purchased by leasing companies in Ireland and Intellectual Property purchases of foreign-owned corporations from final domestic demand.

 

[1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

[2] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Camila Perez

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/10/pr25189-ireland-imf-executive-board-concludes-2025-article-iv-consultation-with-ireland

MIL OSI

Navigating Uncertainty by Putting Your Fiscal House in Order

Source: IMF – News in Russian

Opening Remarks by Deputy Managing Director Kenji Okamura at the Tenth Tokyo Fiscal Forum

June 10, 2025

Good morning and welcome to the tenth Tokyo Fiscal Forum.

Let me first thank our co-hosts, Japan’s Ministry of Finance and the Asian Development Bank Institute for the excellent collaboration, and the Japanese government for its generous support.

At last year’s forum, I spoke about revenue collection and spending efficiency in the context of high public debt and low growth.

Since then, major policy shifts have occurred, and trade tensions have flared, leading to market turbulence and even to a brief period of turmoil in early April. Tensions have abated but policy uncertainty remains elevated.

This heightened uncertainty, together with tighter financial conditions, is weighing on growth prospects, amplifying debt risks in countries where debt levels are already high. In fact, our recently released Fiscal Monitor estimates public debt could increase by approximately 4.5 percent of GDP in the medium term because of a significant rise in uncertainty.

This is why our discussion today is focused on fiscal frameworks. In this rapidly changing environment, countries must prioritize putting their own fiscal house in order. This includes countries in the Asia-Pacific.

Public debt levels in the region, excluding China, are on average 20-26 percent of GDP higher relative to 2007. This will make it more difficult to manage the growing spending pressures from aging, development needs, and natural disasters.

Strengthening fiscal frameworks helps governments in the region tackle long-standing challenges and build fiscal buffers against uncertainties. For countries with high or rising debt, it would help reduce risks, while avoiding disruptive fiscal adjustments, ultimately improving long-term growth prospects.

I look forward to hearing more from our distinguished panel on this.

Tomorrow the forum will focus on GovTech, and how governments can harness the full potential of digitalization. The demand and development of digital products and services in Asia and the Pacific have accelerated quickly, outpacing most other regions. But more can be done to integrate emerging technologies, like AI, to improve the efficiency of public finances.

The panelists in tomorrow’s session will share their experiences applying some of the latest technologies.

On both these topics, the IMF is here to support you. In collaboration with the Asian Development Bank and World Bank, and through our Global Public Finance Partnership, we are ramping up our technical assistance. That said, this forum is an opportunity to hear from you. I welcome any suggestions you might have on how we can better tailor more of our advice to support your needs.

In these times of high uncertainty, fiscal policy can be an anchor for confidence and stability. Prudent policies, within a robust fiscal framework can deliver growth and prosperity for all.

Before concluding, I would like to thank Vitor for his leadership and contributions to this forum. This is the last time he’ll be participating as Director of the Fiscal Affairs Department, but his legacy as the founding father of the forum will live on.

With this, let me turn over to the conference organizers. I wish you a productive discussion over the next two days.

Thank you.

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/10/sp-fiscal-forum-navigating-uncertainty-by-putting-your-fiscal-house-in-order

MIL OSI

The Caribbean Challenge: Fostering Growth and Resilience Amidst Global Uncertainty

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 10, 2025

As prepared for delivery

Introduction and Road Map

Good evening, everyone.

It is a great pleasure to join you here in Brasilia for the 55th Annual Meeting of the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB or the Bank).

Thank you Valerie for your very kind introduction. I also take this opportunity to thank the Bank for giving me the honor of delivering this year’s lecture in memory of Dr. William Gilbert Demas.

It is highly symbolic that this year’s meeting takes place in Brazil for the very first time. This symbolizes a new beginning and demonstrates the CDB’s broad and international coalition of shareholders all vested in CDB’s success.

The CDB is an incredibly important institution that has a vital role to play in the Caribbean’s development. It must be cherished, and supported, even as it delivers value to its borrowing and non-borrowing membership in harmonious partnership with all its stakeholders.

This is also the first CDB Annual General Meeting under the presidency of Mr. Daniel Best. It is therefore in order to, again, congratulate President Best and to wish him tremendous success.

Dr. Demas’s contributions throughout his career—as a policymaker, as an academic, and as an economist—cannot be overstated. He left a legacy of far-sighted vision and Caribbean excellence. A legacy that the whole region can be proud of.

We need to channel that vision and that excellence to meet two urgent priorities for the region. First, to lift growth prospects and living standards. And second, to build resilience against persistent economic shocks and natural disasters. These two objectives go hand in hand. We need the second to sustainably deliver on the first.

At a moment of exceptional uncertainty in the global economy, these tasks become even harder—and our efforts become even more urgent.

Today, I will address the growth and resilience challenge: both in the global context and in the context of the Caribbean region.

I will then discuss how regional policymakers can respond—by implementing sound macroeconomic policies and by following through on necessary structural reforms.

Finally, I will share how the IMF is supporting our members to boost growth prospects and build resilience in today’s uncertain global environment.

The Global Growth Challenge

Let me start with the global growth outlook.

After a series of shocks over the past five years, the global economy seemed to have stabilized—at steady but underwhelming rates, as compared with recent experience.

However, the landscape has now changed. Major policy shifts have signaled a resetting of the global trading system. In early April, the US effective tariff rate jumped to levels not seen in a century.

And, while trade talks continue and there’s been a scaling back of some tariffs, trade policy uncertainty remains off the charts.

 

As a result, we significantly downgraded our most recent global growth projections in the April World Economic Outlook—by 0.5 percentage point for this year, from 3.3 to 2.8 percent; and 0.3 percentage point in 2026, from 3.3 to 3.0 percent. This represents the lowest global growth in approximately two decades, outside of 2020, the year of the pandemic.

A natural question is: if trade tensions and uncertainty persist, what could be the impact on global growth?

To start, we know that uncertainty imposes huge costs. With complex modern supply chains and changing bilateral tariff rates, planning becomes very difficult. Businesses postpone shipping and investment decisions. We also know that the longer uncertainty persists, the larger the costs imposed.

In addition, rising trade barriers hit growth upfront. Tariffs do raise fiscal revenues but come at the expense of reducing and shifting economic activity—and evidence from past episodes suggests higher tariff rates are not paid by trading partners alone. These costs are passed on to importers and, ultimately, to consumers who pay higher prices.

Protectionism also erodes productivity over the long run, especially in smaller economies. Shielding industries from competition reduces incentives for efficient resource allocation. Past productivity and competitiveness gains from trade are given up, which hurts innovation.

Tariffs will impact economic growth differently across countries, but no nation is immune. The IMF’s most significant downgrades to growth are concentrated in countries affected the most by recent trade measures. Low-income countries face the added challenge of falling aid flows, as donor countries reprioritize resources to deal with domestic concerns.

And we have already seen an increase in global financial market volatility. Equity market valuations declined sharply in response to the April tariff announcements. Unusual movements in the US government bond and currency markets followed.

Equity markets have since regained ground on the hopes of a swift resolution of trade tensions. But with continued uncertainty and tighter financial conditions, we assessed in our most recent Global Financial Stability Report that risks to global financial stability have increased significantly.

These global realities result in three main vulnerabilities.

First, valuations remain high in some key segments of global equity and corporate bond markets. If the economic outlook worsens, these assets are vulnerable to sharp adjustments. This could, in turn, affect emerging markets’ currencies, asset prices, and capital flows.

Second, in more volatile markets, some financial institutions could come under strain, especially highly leveraged nonbank financial institutions, with implications for the interconnected financial system.

Third, sovereign bond markets are vulnerable to further turbulence, especially where government debt levels are high. Emerging market economies—which already face the highest real financing costs in a decade—may now need to refinance their debt and finance fiscal spending at even higher costs.

 

These vulnerabilities, and the potential for impact in emerging economies, should not be underestimated nor ignored.

But let me step back from these most recent economic and financial developments. As I mentioned, global growth prospects were already underwhelming.

And looking over the medium term, these global growth prospects, as I mentioned previously, remain at their lowest levels in decades.

What is driving this? Our analysis shows that a significant and broad-based slowdown in productivity growth accounts for more than half of the decline in global growth.

This is partly because global labor and capital have not been flowing to the most dynamic firms. Lower private investment after the Global Financial Crisis and slower working-age-population growth in major economies exacerbated the problem. Our studies show that, without a course correction, global growth rates by the end of this decade would be below the pre-pandemic average by about 1 percentage point.

Simply put, new uncertainties on top of already weak economic prospects make for a very challenging global growth backdrop.

The Caribbean Growth and Resilience Challenge

It is not surprising, then, that most Caribbean countries also face a challenging outlook.

In our latest World Economic Outlook, we already projected tepid growth in the Caribbean region overall—even before accounting for the US trade policy announcements. Stronger performance in some countries—such as Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago—was offset by slower growth in others.

And in several countries, crime weighs on growth prospects. Particularly in Haiti, where the security situation hampers efforts to sustain economic activity, implement reforms, and attract aid and foreign direct investment.

On top of that, we estimate that the April tariff announcement and its global spillovers would lower Caribbean regional growth by at least 0.2 percentage point on average.

But the impact varies across countries.

In tourism-dependent economies, where growth is closely tied to US economic activity, the impact will mainly depend on the size of the US tourist base (Figure).

In oil-exporting countries, lower commodity prices and higher volatility are the main channels of transmission. Lower global growth means lower demand for these commodities which adversely impacts the economies of commodity exporting countries.

Slower growth, while a relatively recent phenomena from a global perspective, is, unfortunately, not new to the Caribbean. Declining growth trends in the Caribbean region have loomed over the longer horizon as well. Recent IMF analysis finds that most Caribbean countries had significantly slower growth over the last decades: 2001–2023, as compared with the previous two decades: 1980–2000 (Figure).

For tourism-dependent Caribbean economies, we estimate a decline in potential growth from 3.3 percent over the 1981 – 2000 period to 1.6 percent over the following two decades, 2001-2019.

This presents the Caribbean with an aggravated challenge – to reverse the trend of slower growth at a time when global growth is also declining. That is, the challenge is to reverse the trend of slower growth when the wind in the proverbial sail is weaker and has changed direction.

Let’s be clear about what is at stake.

Slower growth in the Caribbean slows the improvement in living standards and stymies the aspirations of Caribbean people for better opportunities. Slowing growth, in the past, has also meant that convergence in income levels between the Caribbean and advanced economies has stalled. In other words, the gap between the economic fortunes of the Caribbean national and that of her counterpart in the advanced world is growing wider.

 

Of course, there are exceptions to the regional trend. In particular, Guyana’s economy has grown rapidly over the past two decades, progressing from low-middle-income to high-income status. Growth accelerated to over 45 percent on average in the past three years, making Guyana the fastest growing economy in the world!

But for the Caribbean more broadly, the questions on which we should focus is – what explains the pattern of declining growth? And, what is the appropriate menu of policy responses to this pattern?

With respect to the first question, and as in the rest of the world, a key explanation for declining growth is weak productivity growth.

The growth challenge is not a mystery. Growth potential can be decomposed into its constituent factors and we can compare how the Caribbean’s growth potential has declined over time. Such an analytical and data-driven approach reveals that the Caribbean’s growth potential is a half of what it was a few decades ago. Addressing the Caribbean growth challenge requires systematic and comprehensive policies to strategically improve the factors that contribute to growth potential. Zooming in on one of the important factors: the Caribbean’s productivity growth has declined to almost zero. This is at the root of the Caribbean’s growth challenge. In addition to productivity growth, physical and human capital development need to be accelerated. So, ladies and gentlemen, there is no magic solution to the Caribbean growth challenge. There is no quick fix either. In fact, great danger exists if we believe that the growth challenge can be addressed with quick fixes. Solving the growth question will require as much effort as the effort put into the macro stability reforms successfully undertaken in Jamaica, Barbados and Suriname.

What Should Policymakers Do? – Maintain and Entrench Macro Stability

The goal for policymakers is clear: to foster resilient and inclusive growth that sustainably raises living standards.

How should this be achieved?

  1. Maintain and entrench macro-economic stability and
  2. Decisively and comprehensively address the factors that raise growth potential

As a pre-requisite, countries should strive to pursue policies that restore, maintain and entrench macroeconomic stability – stable prices, sustainable fiscal trajectories, adequate foreign exchange reserves and financial sector stability.

The collective Caribbean experience powerfully demonstrates the transformative potential of macroeconomic stability. Jamaica, for example, which was burdened with unemployment rates that averaged 20% between the early 1970’s and the end of the 1980’s and 15% between over the 1990’s to the mid 2000’s only achieved the previously unimaginable result of low single digit unemployment rates, in the region of 4% and lower, when stability became entrenched.

Stability is also a friend to the poor as Jamaica’s experience also highlights.

Jamaica achieved the lowest rate of poverty in its history in 2023, again on the back of entrenched macroeconomic stability in the context of an institutionalized social protection framework supplemented by temporary and targeted counter-cyclical measures at times of distress.

Friends, our history and global economic history clearly demonstrate that economic stability is indispensable to national success, regardless of chosen social and political organization. Economic stability should therefore be guarded and protected as a national asset, allowing for focus on higher order challenges like structural reforms to unlock growth potential. Also, the requirements of stability should act as a constraint on policy. Any proposed policy action that has the prospect of jeopardizing any of the components of stability should not make it through the policy formation gauntlet. Securing economic stability into the future requires laws but laws are insufficient. Stability over the long term is best preserved by developing, empowering, and strengthening institutions.

Build fiscal buffers, strengthen fiscal frameworks, and bolster resilience.

The Caribbean region hosts different currency regimes. The key requirement is internal consistency within the chosen currency regime. Floating rate and fixed rate currency regimes impose their own constraints. These need to be observed for success.

While there is always room for improvement in monetary frameworks, the areas within the macro stability complex, that require urgent attention in the Caribbean, are rebuilding fiscal buffers, strengthening fiscal frameworks and bolstering resilience.

Let’s face it: on top of all the other challenges, government budgets in the region are strapped. Providing extraordinary support in response to extraordinary shocks has depleted buffers.

Public debt ratios have come down since the pandemic—this is good news. However, in many countries—including Caribbean countries—debt and financing needs are still too high.

In fact, for some Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU) members, achieving their regional debt target of 60 percent of GDP by 2035, a full decade from now, will require sizeable efforts.

With timely fiscal consolidation, countries can bring down debt ratios and by so doing, they can protect themselves against future shocks. And they can make space to invest in crucial human and physical capital—an investment in their own future.

In addition, some Caribbean countries have pegged exchange rates, which have been a long-standing anchor of stability—for example, in the Eastern Caribbean. The ECCU is one of only four currency unions in the entire world[1] and stands as a testimony to the capacity of Caribbean people to collaborate, cooperate and innovate.

However, to safeguard the stability provided by this currency union long into the future, fiscal policies must be sustainable, resilient, and consistent with the exchange rate regime. Inconsistency only serves to compromise the currency union with the potential for destabilizing consequences.

Our advice to policymakers on how to rebuild buffers and strengthen frameworks is straightforward: mobilize tax revenue, spend wisely, and plan ahead.

Let’s start with mobilizing tax revenue. The tax revenue yield in Eastern Caribbean countries is falling short of peers. Inefficient tax exemptions and weak tax administrations are leading to large revenue losses.

Broadening the tax base and removing distortions will not only increase revenues but also support investment and growth. The Fund has provided technical assistance to our members in the Caribbean to support their ongoing efforts in this area.

Let me turn to spending wisely. Not all spending is productive spending. With limited fiscal space focus must be on spending that has the potential to deliver quantifiable social and economic returns within reasonable timeframes. Policymakers should keep the quality and composition of spending under review, including by containing unproductive spending, enhancing efficiency, and digitalizing government services.

Finally, plan ahead. With conviction. Credibility is critical to allow fiscal consolidation to proceed gradually with lower financing costs and better growth results.

Strong medium-term fiscal frameworks, with well-designed fiscal rules and specific plans for fiscal policies and reforms, can help bring debt down and investment up.

Frameworks that combine debt and operational targets—and are backed by adequate capacity and institutions—can be particularly powerful.

This approach worked well in Jamaica, where fiscal responsibility was written into law under the Financial Administration and Audit Act. The Act established a public debt goal of 60 percent of GDP and a rule that determines the annual target fiscal balance consistent with that objective. An Independent Fiscal Commission is the arbiter of Jamaica’s fiscal rules and provides an opinion on fiscal policy sustainability, strengthening credibility and accountability.

Planning ahead also means being ready for the certainty of economic shocks. A golden rule in policymaking in a country is to design policies that fit the country’s circumstances. Shocks are a permanent feature of Caribbean small state reality. Caribbean economic policy ought, therefore, to make provisions for the inevitability of economic shocks. In Jamaica’s Act, there are clear escape clauses for large shocks and an automatic adjustment mechanism to secure a return to the debt target.

Well-designed and transparent sovereign wealth funds can also help stabilize public finances when shocks hit. For example, Trinidad and Tobago’s sovereign wealth fund insulates fiscal policy from oil price fluctuations. Guyana’s fund helps manage its natural resource revenues, finance investment, and save for the future. And St. Kitts and Nevis is considering a fund to smooth volatile revenues from the Citizenship-by-Investment program.

Planning for shocks is ever more important in regions like the Caribbean that face recurrent threats from natural disasters.

Our countries need to be prepared before disasters hit.

Recurring natural disasters impair productive infrastructure and hinder human development, constraining productivity growth even further.

Major natural disasters cost an average of 2 percent of GDP per year in Caribbean countries and close to 4 percent of GDP in the Eastern Caribbean countries.

There is a physical dimension to disaster preparedness, which involves investing in resilient infrastructure.

There is also a financial dimension, which involves developing resilient risk transfer, contingent claim and insurance mechanisms.

Unfortunately, rising global private re-insurance premiums are making the task even harder. Domestic insurance premiums have also been rising. The result is lower insurance coverage in the private sector, and thus potentially more burden on governments when a natural disaster strikes.

Caribbean countries can secure a comprehensive insurance framework with multiple layers: self-insurance through their own fiscal buffers, participation in pooled risk transfer arrangements, contingent financing and catastrophe bonds.

With respect to the first layer, in Jamaica, there is a legislated requirement to save annually in a natural disaster fund. I recognize, however, that for some countries individual buffers have declined since the pandemic and need to be restored.

On the second layer, the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) helps fill an important gap. Coverage has steadily improved since its inception, and the CCRIF has made prompt payouts after various natural disasters. This included US$85 million across five countries, Grenada, St Vincent & the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, the Cayman Islands and Jamaica, in a matter of days after Hurricane Beryl, underscoring the Facility’s regional importance. Further expanding coverage would pay off in the long term.

On the third layer of contingent financing, the World Bank has approved catastrophe deferred drawdown options for Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, among other countries in the pipeline. Furthermore, Grenada and St. Vincent and the Grenadines have already drawn on these instruments following natural disasters.

In addition, the IDB has credit contingent facilities with Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica, St Vincent and the Grenadines among other countries.

On the fourth layer, Jamaica has, with World Bank assistance, independently sponsored two catastrophe bonds.

Now, to be clear, stability, resilience and risk transfer by themselves, do not automatically deliver the elevated growth needed. However, elevated levels of economic growth cannot be achieved without stability. Furthermore, stability and resilience set the stage for elongating the economic cycle by significantly lowering a country’s risk premium, lowering the cost of capital, expanding the frontier of project economic viability and providing the counter-cyclical capacity to respond to shocks, thereby limiting the duration and intensity of downturns, and providing for longer unbroken periods of consecutive economic growth. The Jamaican experience demonstrates these relationships.

To achieve higher growth, in addition to stability, policymakers have to decisively address factors that elevate growth potential beginning with the productivity gap.

Decisively address structural obstacles to lift firm level productivity

Addressing the growth challenge requires reversing the decline in the Caribbean’s growth potential by 1) improving total factor productivity and 2) boosting investment in physical and human capital.

Our analysis for the ECCU shows that the bulk of total factor productivity losses come from high costs of finance, cumbersome tax administration, inefficient business licensing and permits, and skills mismatches in the workforce. From my experience, this can also be applied to most of the Caribbean beyond the ECCU.

Overcoming these obstacles could bring substantial productivity gains ranging from 34 to 65 percent— which would be an incredible result! This could close the gap in income per capita with the US by 9 to 27 percentage points.

Simplify and Digitalize Regulation, Business Licensing, Permits and Tax Payment Procedures

One practical step is to promote digitalization of Caribbean societies which can significantly boost productivity. This will require a multifaceted strategy including investment in digital infrastructure, digital transformation of government, reducing the cost and increasing the availability of data transmission, improving digital literacy, among other factors.

Application of digital tools and digital technologies to improve access to government services, while reducing time, ought to be seen as a non-negotiable imperative. As an obvious example, further enhancing taxpayer access to digital government services—through e-payment, e-filing, and e-registration—would not only reduce the administrative burden but also encourage compliance, fostering a better environment for entrepreneurship.

In much of the Caribbean, businesses have to navigate a complex labyrinth of licensing, permitting and regulatory regimes. This is a drag on productivity. While the largest enterprises have the scale to absorb the inefficiencies, smaller firms suffocate from overly burdensome processes. We know that the economic vitality of a country is linked to the level of hospitability of the business environment to its small and medium-sized firms.

There is, therefore, tremendous scope in the region to greatly simplify regulatory processes and eliminate unnecessary steps. Furthermore, the digitalization of licensing, permitting and regulatory procedures promises to enhance the efficiency of firms, boosting productivity.

Improving Access to Finance

That leads me to another practical step: improving access to finance, which can encourage new businesses and support a transition into the more productive formal sector. Finance is the oxygen of business, and its affordable and widespread availability is essential for having a dynamic business environment.

There could be an entire session on improving access to finance as it is so fundamental, yet so multifaceted and complex.

Many factors hinder access to finance in the Caribbean. I will touch on a few.

First, legacy weaknesses in banks’ balance sheets limit access to credit, investment, and growth across the region. So it is important to address vulnerabilities in the banking sector. This includes timely compliance with regulatory standards and easier ways to dispose of impaired assets. Progress is happening: banks are building buffers and reducing non-performing loan ratios. But more work is needed to ensure all banks meet regulatory minimums.

Reducing the costs of non-performing loan resolutions, ultimately reduces the cost of loans. This can be achieved by modernizing insolvency regimes to encourage faster out-of-court debt workouts. Asset management companies—if they are properly funded—would facilitate asset disposals.

Collateral infrastructure should also be strengthened through effective credit registries and partial credit guarantee schemes. For example, the recently created regional credit bureau in the Eastern Caribbean can help lower the cost and time of credit risk assessments and close information asymmetry gaps. This will help small and medium enterprises access credit while safeguarding credit quality.

Stronger anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism financing frameworks can help protect the financial system from external threats and retain correspondent banking relationships, the absence of which impedes access to credit.

The above financial sector measures are absolutely necessary but hardly revolutionary.

Revolutionizing access to credit in the region could be achieved by enabling mobile real-time, instant, 24/7 payment system platforms as exist in India through their Unified Payments Interface (UPI) and right here in Brazil through Pix.

In both India and Brazil, access to finance and to financial services have been transformed, and inclusiveness expanded, by these innovations. Transactions are free, or ultra-low cost, and these payment platforms are integrated into banking apps and into e-commerce platforms.

Of course, these systems only exist within the context of national identification systems that provide the necessary identity verifications as required.

Seize the Opportunities from the Renewable Energy Transition.

The use of oil imports for electricity generation is costly and has led to very high electricity prices which undermines competitiveness—particularly for the tourism industry—at the expense of potential growth.

As we explored last December in the Caribbean Forum in Barbados, a successful energy transition can foster inclusive, sustainable, and resilient growth.

That transition will look different for energy-importing and energy-exporting countries.

For energy importers, diversifying into renewable energy, with fast declining costs, can reduce reliance on expensive and volatile oil imports. It would also offer relief from some of the highest electricity costs in the world. Consider this key fact: electricity in many countries in the Caribbean costs, a minimum of, twice as much as in advanced economies. We have been discussing this in the region for a long time. Too long.

The energy transition would enhance external sustainability for energy importers, while making them more competitive, more resilient to shocks, and more likely to grow faster and on a sustainable basis.

But seizing these opportunities requires tackling key obstacles. For example, high upfront investment costs. Limited fiscal space. Regulatory hurdles for private investment. And small market sizes and isolated grids that hinder economies of scale.

So, the transition to renewables will take time and investment. It will also take efforts coordinated on a regional scale.

One immediate, cost-effective step is to implement energy efficiency measures. For example, both Barbados and Jamaica have retrofitted government buildings with energy-efficient equipment. This delivers quick savings, typically without large upfront costs.

On the regional front, initiatives like the Resilient Renewable Energy Infrastructure Investment Facility—championed by the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank and supported by the World Bank—offer a promising step forward.

Regional mechanisms to promote pooled procurement and to harmonize regulatory frameworks will also be key.

Energy exporters in the Caribbean face a different set of challenges. Most notably, they have the difficult task of managing changes in fossil fuel demand and fiscal revenues while maximizing the value of existing reserves.

But the energy transition is also an opportunity to diversify into the green energy sectors of the future, such as green petrochemicals and green hydrogen.

Energy exporters will also need to watch out for spillovers from other regions’ climate policies, such as border carbon adjustment mechanisms. For example, Trinidad and Tobago faces exposure to the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, which could, potentially, affect over 5 percent of the country’s total exports. And a further 5 percent is at risk if the EU expands its Mechanism.

But energy exporting countries can also turn this type of spillover into an advantage. By introducing their own carbon pricing systems, they can retain revenue in their economies rather than have it collected by their trading partners.

Invest in Human Capital, Bridge the Skills Gap and Invest in Physical Infrastructure

The most important investment Caribbean countries can make is in boosting the human capital of the region. Human capital development is multifaceted, but today I will focus on the central elements of education and skills.

Invest in Human Capital; Address the Skills Gap

Given the small size of Caribbean economies, and the absence of economies of scale, economic success will be determined by the level and quality of human capital in the region.

Elevated levels of economic growth will require substantial improvements in education and skills outcomes across the region, and in some countries more than others. This is deserving of the region’s energy and focus.

A recent survey for the ECCU highlights a shortage of skilled labor as a key constraint for businesses. I know this skills gap is also a reality in Jamaica and can be generalized across much of the Caribbean.

What can be done? The answer is twofold: enhance the skills of those employed and provide opportunities to those who have skills but are not in the labor market.

Expanding vocational training and modernizing education systems, coupled with active labor market policies, can help mitigate the skills gap. And digital tools can connect employers with potential employees.

Emerging technologies—such as artificial intelligence—make closing the skills gap all the more important. The opportunity is that rapidly evolving technologies could bring high productivity gains, with the threat that failure to upgrade skills could expose industries important to the region such as business process outsourcing.

Harnessing that potential in Caribbean countries includes, for instance, integrating AI and data science into all levels of education.

The good news is that many countries in the region are facing the skills challenge head on.

For example, my home country of Jamaica launched a national initiative—supported by the World Bank—for secondary school students in the areas of Science, Technology, Engineering, Arts, and Mathematics, also known as the STEAM initiative.

In Barbados, the 2022 Economic Recovery and Transformation Plan aims to enhance the business environment by advancing digitalization and skills training.

In St. Vincent and the Grenadines, an ongoing education reform is focused on modernizing and expanding post-secondary technical and vocational education to better align skills with labor market needs.

And in Antigua and Barbuda, the planned expansion of the University of the West Indies Five Islands Campus will provide new opportunities for higher education and regional talent development.

However more can be done, and should be done, in each of these countries. The goal of policy should be to have Caribbean schools rank in the upper quartile of the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) benchmarks.

On creating more opportunities, bringing more women into the labor market can contribute to economic growth.

We estimate that eliminating the gender gap in the ECCU—which is over 11 percentage points, on average—could boost regional GDP by roughly 10 percent. That is a powerful economic case for inclusive labor policies, such as enhanced access to childcare and elderly care.

It is also imperative to foster opportunities for youth. Caribbean countries have some of the highest youth unemployment rates in the world, ranging from 10 to 40 percent. Empowering future generations is at the core of addressing the growth and resilience challenge in the region.

I want to acknowledge the important efforts led by the Caribbean Community, CARICOM, to work towards deeper social and economic integration.

Earlier this year, we saw tangible progress. CARICOM members are working to enable free movement of CARICOM nationals for willing countries. Importantly, this initiative also includes access to primary and secondary education, emergency healthcare, and primary healthcare for migrating individuals.

Boost Investment in Infrastructure

Improved infrastructure enhances the productivity of capital as well as the productivity of labor. The Caribbean will need much higher levels of investment to restore and boost its growth potential.

Workers depend on public transportation to get from home to work and back home again. If this, for example, routinely takes an hour and a half each way, on average, and costs a third of weekly wages, then labor productivity will suffer. Efficient, affordable, accessible mass transportation enhances productivity. While taxis complement bus transportation, they cannot be an effective substitute. This is more of a problem in larger Caribbean territories and I know that Jamaica is tackling this problem head-on.

Similarly, road and highway connectivity that opens new investment opportunities and reduces the cost of transportation of people and goods enhances productivity of capital as well as the productivity of labor and enhances growth potential.

Modern commerce relies on communication and, importantly, on data. I mentioned this earlier. There is scope for telecommunications and broadband infrastructure to be improved, for data costs to be lowered, and for data access to be expanded. This will require investment. Hopefully, private investment, but investment that will need to be facilitated by government policy.

Water is the source of life. Without water, communities are less productive, and businesses cannot function. Across the region, significant investment in water treatment, storage, and distribution infrastructure will be required to support economic growth and improve standards of living over the medium term.

All of these elements of infrastructure – transportation, broadband, roads, water, and energy, dealt with earlier, – need considerable investment to keep Caribbean societies competitive and to raise the growth potential.

However, Caribbean governments will not have the required resources to finance these investments from tax revenues, and at the same time fund education, health, security and other essential services.

As such, governments will need to consider attracting local, regional, and international private capital in well-structured transactions to finance the productivity enhancing infrastructure needs of the region.

This can be accomplished through the variety of Public Private Partnerships (PPP) modalities that exist and with the advice of multilateral partners, such as the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) who are very experienced in structuring these kinds of transactions, and who know what is required to generate investor interest.

I can speak from experience – the IFC has been instrumental in assisting Jamaica to develop its pipeline of PPP’s.

My advice however is to not develop PPP’s sequentially, one at a time, starting one as the other concludes. Given the preparation period required for each, sequential PPP development will take too long. Instead, pursue PPP’s using a programmatic approach. That is, develop a pipeline of infrastructure PPP’s in parallel so you can bring these to market in rapid succession. The time and resources required for investors to familiarize themselves with the macro-environment, the legislative framework, the regulatory architecture, the country risks etc., with uncertainty around bid success, needs to be amortized over a number of transactions – in order to attract deep pocketed and experienced investors prepared to provide competitive bids.

Open, transparent and competitive PPP’s, that are well structured, can help bridge the infrastructure gap and boost productivity.

The Role of the IMF

These are not easy times, and these are not easy steps to take. They require clarity of vision, coordination, partnerships, technical expertise and lots of energy.

But these steps can put Caribbean countries on a path toward greater growth and resilience.

Rest assured that the IMF remains fully committed to supporting our members across the region.

Our near-universal membership provides us with a unique global perspective and we are informed by a large range of cross-country experiences over the last 80 years.

With 191 member countries the IMF, as compared to the United Nations with 192 member countries, is as global as it gets. We engage with each of our members on a country-by-country basis, as well as on a regional basis with currency unions, including the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union.

Our member countries, including Caribbean states, are shareholders and owners of the IMF. We work for you. And we do so through three primary modalities – (i) surveillance, where we provide a review and analysis of our member countries’ economy on an annual or biennial basis. This review, called the Article IV Consultation report, named after the clause in our articles that mandates this exercise, is a principal obligation of IMF membership. This review, which contains country specific policy advice, is published, and freely available, online. I encourage media practitioners, economists, financial analysts, public policy advocates, and citizens interested in their country and region to access these Article IV reports for your country and make good use of the information and analysis contained therein.

The second modality through which the IMF provides a service to its member countries is capacity development. Here we provide technical analysis and tailor-made policy advice on specific issues that countries may be grappling with. For example, designing of tax policy measures, improving efficiency in public spending, optimizing public debt management, bolstering the capacity of statistics agencies and the development of monetary policy tools to name a few. Under this modality we also provide training courses for public officials through regional institutions such as CARTAC and also in courses at the IMF’s headquarters in Washington, DC.

Our third modality is the one that most are familiar with – the IMF provides financing designed to address balance of payments challenges. Our long-established lending toolkit helps countries restore macroeconomic stability. In this goal of restoring macroeconomic stability many countries have had successful engagements with the IMF. In the region, Jamaica, Barbados, and Suriname come immediately to mind.

At the recent IMF Spring Meetings I moderated a panel where the Greek Finance Minister made the point that at this juncture of very challenging fiscal circumstances in the Eurozone, only six countries within the 27 member EU have fiscal surpluses, and it so happens that four of these had IMF programs during the Global Financial Crisis.

And the IMF continues to evolve to meet the needs of our member countries. Our rapid facilities provide emergency financing when shocks hit. And our newer Resilience and Sustainability Facility provides affordable long-term financing to support resilience-building efforts.

In the Caribbean, Barbados and Suriname have made great strides in positioning their economies for growth while reducing vulnerabilities under their economic programs supported by the Extended Fund Facility. These countries’ ownership of the reforms has been critical to their success.

Jamaica had access to—but did not draw on—the Fund’s Precautionary and Liquidity Line, which provided an insurance buffer against external shocks. It supported efforts to keep the economy growing, reduce public debt, enhance financial frameworks, and upgrade macroeconomic data.

The Fund also provided rapid financing to seven Caribbean member countries during the pandemic.

And Barbados and Jamaica have benefitted from the Resilience and Sustainability Facility. Reforms have helped integrate climate-related risks in macroeconomic frameworks, provide incentives for renewable energy to support growth, and catalyze financing for investment in resilience.

We are also engaging closely with Haiti through a Staff-Monitored Program. This Program is designed to support the authorities’ economic policy objectives and build a track record of reform implementation, which could pave the way for financial assistance from the Fund.

Of course, the effectiveness of our advice and financial support is enhanced by our continued efforts in capacity development. In particular, I would like to highlight the work of CARTAC, which has been operating since 2001.

CARTAC offers capacity building and policy advice to our Caribbean members across several areas: from public finance management, to tax and customs administration, to financial sector supervision and financial stability, and beyond.

We greatly appreciate the generous support received so far for CARTAC. But more is needed to close the financing gap. I hope we can count on your advocacy with development partners to sustain CARTAC’s essential work.

In my time at the Fund thus far, I have seen how much advanced countries rely on, and use, the IMF’s intellectual output to the benefit of their countries and how this output features in, and informs, public discourse in many member countries. The IMF is an incredibly powerful resource that works for you and I strongly encourage Caribbean countries to strategically maximize their use of the IMF and what it has to offer.

A Call to Action

Let me conclude.

Policymakers in the Caribbean are facing a complex set of old and new challenges.

But challenging times can also be times of opportunity, action, and resolve.

The Caribbean is a region of immense promise, with rich cultural heritage, natural beauty, and vibrant population.

The world is undergoing profound change. This change introduces global vulnerabilities to which the Caribbean is not immune. The resilience of small open economies like those in the Caribbean is likely to be tested.

It is imperative, therefore, that Caribbean countries work to put their macro-fiscal houses in order while engaging in deep and meaningful structural reforms to increase the growth potential of Caribbean economies.

You hold the keys to the future of the region. You have the tools, the talent, and the tenacity to chart a new path for growth and resilience. Your actions can make a difference to the Caribbean’s prospects.

We have seen many steps in the right direction to address bottlenecks and boost productivity. And we encourage you to keep going.

Implement those reforms that are under your control.

Continue to work together across the region.

Capitalize on CARICOM to achieve a larger market for the movement of people, investment, and trade.

Stay focused on the goal: delivering more economic resilience, higher growth prospects, and better living standards for people across the Caribbean.

And, you can count on the Fund along the way.

Thank you.


[1] The other currency unions are: Economic Community of Central African States (CEMAC); West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU); and the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

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https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/10/dmd-clarke-cdb-speech-june-10

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Nepal: IMF Reaches Staff-level Agreement on Sixth Review Under the Extended Credit Facility

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 10, 2025

End-of-Mission press releases include statements of IMF staff teams that convey preliminary findings after a visit to a country. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF’s Executive Board for discussion and decision.

  • The Nepali authorities and the IMF team have reached staff-level agreement to conclude the sixth review of Nepal’s economic reform program supported by the IMF’s Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement. Once the review is approved by IMF Management and completed by the IMF Executive Board, Nepal will have access to about $42.7 million in financing.
  • The growth recovery is expected to gather pace in FY2025/26 underpinned by policy measures announced in the budget aimed at improving project execution and boosting private sector confidence, while lending rates remain accommodative. However, timely and full execution of budget spending is important to durably strengthen economic growth.
  • Completion of the sixth review by the IMF’s Executive Board will require completing a prior action relating to further progress with the loan portfolio review.

Washington, DC: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) team led by Ms. Sarwat Jahan visited Kathmandu during May 26 to June 10, 2025. After constructive discussions, Ms. Jahan issued the following statement at the end of the mission: “The Nepali authorities and IMF staff reached staff-level agreement on the policies and reforms needed to complete the sixth review under the ECF (see Press Release No. 22/6)[1]. The agreement is subject to approval by the IMF’s Executive Board. Upon completion of the Executive Board Review Nepal would have access to SDR 31.4 million (about US$42.7 million), bringing the total IMF financial support disbursed under the ECF to SDR 251.1 million (about US$331.8 million), from a total of SDR 282.4 million.

“Nepal continues to make progress with the implementation of the ECF-supported program. Program performance has been satisfactory, with all quantitative performance metrics for mid‑January 2025 met except for the indicative target on child welfare grants. The implementation of structural benchmarks has gained momentum while reforms in some areas are still ongoing. Key reforms that have been completed or are on-track to be completed soon as part of the sixth review include completion of a tax expenditure report, publication of revised National Project Bank guidelines, and finalization of a post-Loan Portfolio Review (LPR) roadmap. Significant progress was made on bringing key recommendations from the IMF’s 2021 Safeguard Assessment and 2023 Financial Sector Stability Report into draft Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB) Act amendments in preparation for submission to Parliament. The NRB remains committed to completing the LPR and is finalizing the selection of the independent international consultant to assist with the LPR. The completion of the sixth review by the IMF’s Executive Board is contingent on NRB making further progress with the loan portfolio review.

“Domestically, economic activity has continued to gradually recover, underpinned by a rebound in construction and manufacturing, continued expansion of hydropower capacity, and a good harvest that helped offset the impact of the September 2024 floods. Growth in FY2024/25 is estimated to exceed 4 percent, although still below potential. Inflation, which spiked temporarily following the floods, decelerated to 3.4 percent y/y in April 2025. The external position continued to strengthen, with robust growth in exports, remittances, and tourism receipts outpacing the recovery in imports.

“Financial sector vulnerabilities have not yet eased, with non‑performing loans (NPLs) increasing to 5.2 percent in April 2025, impacting bank capital. The financial health of the savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs) remains challenging.

“Looking ahead, growth is projected to strengthen in FY2025/26, while inflation is expected to remain contained within the NRB’s tolerance level. However, the outlook is subject to important downside risks, including under-execution of capital projects, an increase in financial sector vulnerabilities, elevated global trade tensions and uncertainty, and potential disruptions to domestic policy continuity and reform implementation.

“Against this background, policies and reforms envisaged under the ECF-supported program remain well-placed to help preserve macroeconomic stability and strengthen Nepal’s policymaking framework. The FY2025/26 budget is broadly consistent with the program objective to maintain fiscal and debt sustainability, while initiating reforms to increase capital spending, providing further incentives to encourage private sector investment, and expanding the public school midday meal program.

“Monetary policy continues to follow a cautious data-driven approach, with maintaining focus on price and external stability a key to supporting growth. Amendments to the NRB Act would strengthen the central bank’s independence and governance and make the bank resolution regime more robust. Rising financial sector vulnerabilities warrant increased vigilance. In this context, it is essential to launch the LPR in a timely manner and prioritize measures to deal with problematic SACCOs. Creation of an Asset Management Company should be approached with extra caution given the risks involved and should be made conditional on improvements to the debt recovery framework, including the insolvency law, and a thorough review of the business case for such an entity. The authorities have continued to make tangible improvements to the anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) legal framework, and are now shifting their focus to effective implementation of Nepal’s AML/CFT Action Plan.

“The IMF team held meetings with the Honorable Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Mr. Bishnu Prasad Paudel, the National Planning Commission Vice-Chairman Honorable Dr. Shiva Raj Adhikari, the Nepal Rastra Bank Governor Dr. Biswo Nath Poudel, and other senior government and central bank officials. The IMF team also met with representatives from the private sector, think tank and development partners.”

“The IMF team is grateful to the Nepali authorities for their hospitality and for open and constructive discussions.”

[1] The Extended Credit Facility (ECF) provides financial assistance to countries with protracted balance of payments problems. It supports countries’ economic programs aimed at moving toward a stable and sustainable macroeconomic position consistent with strong and durable poverty reduction and growth. The ECF is expected to help catalyze additional foreign aid.

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https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/10/pr-25191-nepal-imf-reaches-agreement-on-6th-review-under-the-ecf

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IMF Staff Completes 2025 Article IV Mission to Turkmenistan

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 10, 2025

End-of-Mission press releases include statements of IMF staff teams that convey preliminary findings after a visit to a country. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF’s Executive Board for discussion and decision.

  • Growth slowed in 2024 due to weak hydrocarbon exports. The main economic challenge is to translate hydrocarbon wealth into more diversified, sustainable, and inclusive growth.
  • A more market-based strategy, reforms to the monetary and exchange rate frameworks, increased public spending efficiency, and enhanced governance and transparency would support the transition to a more diversified and robust economy.
  • Further improvements in the availability, quality, and reliability of economic statistics would help inform policy makers and increase transparency and credibility.

Washington, DC: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission led by Ms. Anna Bordon visited Ashgabat during May 21-June 3, 2025. The purpose of the visit was to review the country’s economic landscape, including its financial developments, economic outlook, risks, and policies aimed at promoting diverse, inclusive, and sustainable growth. The mission met with senior government officials, representatives of the private and financial sectors, and the diplomatic community. At the end of the visit, Ms. Bordon issued the following statement: 

“Economic activity moderated in 2024, and inflation softened in recent months. IMF staff estimate that growth slowed to 3.0 percent in 2024 from 4.5 percent in 2023, owing to weak hydrocarbon exports. Inflation decelerated from 3.8 percent at end 2024 to 1.1 percent in March 2025 owing to a sharp slowdown in food inflation combined with deflation in non-food items and low inflation in services. Credit growth and monetary conditions have been tighter since the second half of 2023, while the parallel market exchange rate has remained broadly stable. The current account surplus narrowed from 5.9 percent of GDP in 2023 to 4.4 percent in 2024.

“Looking ahead the economy is expected to expand at around 2.3 percent in 2025 and over the medium term. Hydrocarbon exports growth is expected to be negative in 2025, but to gradually pick up to around 2 percent over the medium term while non-hydrocarbon growth is expected to remain subdued, given the challenging business environment, investment inefficiencies, significant real exchange rate overvaluation, and protectionism. Inflation is projected to pick up gradually over the medium term due to looser monetary conditions, returning to its recent historical average of 8 percent, which is primarily fueled by the long-standing policy of increasing public sector wages and pensions by 10 percent annually. The external position is projected to gradually deteriorate, shifting from a surplus to a deficit, driven by lower hydrocarbon prices, declining oil exports, and an overvalued currency. Rising wages are also expected to fuel import demand, further weakening the trade balance. Risks to the outlook remain tilted to the downside.

“The nonhydrocarbon primary balance improved in 2024, with higher revenues more than offsetting an increase in capital spending. Looking ahead, the deficit is anticipated to narrow further over the medium term, with capital spending expected to moderate. To leverage this positive trajectory, it is crucial for Turkmenistan to focus its spending on enhancing physical and human capital. This will require improving spending efficiency and public investment management, transitioning towards performance-based public wage increases, and reforming state-owned enterprises (SOEs).

“Strengthening fiscal reporting and public financial management (PFM) should be a top priority. Turkmenistan should expedite the implementation of medium-term budgeting, establishment of a single treasury account, and the expansion of fiscal reporting coverage. Reforming SOEs is also pivotal in managing fiscal risks, enhancing fiscal transparency, and fostering private sector development by reducing the state footprint.

“The Central Bank of Turkmenistan (CBT) should focus on price and financial stability. Until recently, the CBT had typically kept monetary policy loose to support the government’s long-term development objectives. Since the second half of 2023, however, CBT net lending to banks has slowed considerably, owing to SOE repayments. Going forward, commercial bank lending for development purposes, if needed, should be supported by the state budget, and not by the CBT. The CBT should also modernize its central bank operations and accelerate its efforts to strengthen financial regulation, supervision, and crisis management.

“Unifying the exchange rates would support Turkmenistan’s diversification objectives and reduce economic distortions and governance vulnerabilities. Turkmenistan should consider a significant upfront adjustment of the official exchange rate combined with sufficiently tight macroeconomic policies, a clear communication strategy, and enhanced social benefits to protect the most vulnerable. Post-adjustment, the devalued official exchange rate can remain the monetary anchor, with the CBT ready to provide FX to meet demand. Exchange restrictions on current international transactions should also be eliminated, to create a level-playing field, improve efficiency, and alleviate FX shortages. The adjustment measures and supporting reforms need to be sequenced carefully, while recognizing inherent uncertainties.

“Turkmenistan is adequately prioritizing economic diversification. A pre-requisite for diversification is macroeconomic stability, including as a core element the unification of the exchange rates and elimination of exchange restrictions. Moving away from a centrally planned economy will require continued efforts to liberalize prices and reduce the state footprint to allocate resources more efficiently. A more market-oriented economy will also require improving governance, skills, infrastructure, digitalization, and logistics while accelerating the efforts toward WTO accession.

“Further improvements in the availability, quality, and reliability of economic statistics would help inform policy makers and increase transparency and credibility.   

“The IMF team is grateful to the authorities and other stakeholders for their warm hospitality and insightful and candid discussions.”

Turkmenistan: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2022–26

 
   

 

 

 

 

 

 

   
 

Est.

Est.

Est.

Proj.

Proj.

   

 

2022

2023

2024

2025

2026

   
   

 

Output and prices

(Annual percentage change)

   

Real GDP 1/

3.0

4.5

3.0

2.3

2.3

   

Real hydrocarbon GDP

-6.4

-0.6

-10.6

-2.6

1.8

   

Real nonhydrocarbon GDP

5.2

5.6

5.7

3.0

2.3

   

Consumer prices (end of period)

3.0

1.4

3.8

4.0

6.0

   

Consumer prices (period average)

11.2

-1.6

4.6

3.9

5.0

   
 

Investment and savings

(In percent of GDP)

   

Gross investment

18.2

17.0

16.0

13.0

12.9

   

         Of which: State budget

0.5

0.9

1.6

0.7

0.7

   

Gross savings

27.9

22.9

20.4

15.1

13.3

   
 

Fiscal sector

(In percent of GDP)

   

Overall fiscal balance 2/

3.4

0.1

-0.1

0.3

-0.3

   

      Revenue

16.4

13.8

14.4

14.1

13.7

   

      Expenditure

13.0

13.7

14.5

13.8

14.1

   

Total public debt 3/

7.9

5.8

3.6

3.3

3.1

   
 

Monetary sector

(12-month percent change, unless otherwise indicated)

   

Credit to the economy 4/

8.2

0.3

2.2

5.4

5.9

   

Credit to GDP ratio

58.6

53.1

49.6

49.9

49.6

   

    Broad money, incl. foreign currency deposits at CBT

-2.6

-2.5

10.1

5.3

6.7

   
 

External sector

(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

   

Exports of goods (In millions of US$)

14,727

12,963

12,168

11,218

11,068

   

Imports of goods (In millions of US$)

7,188

7,401

7,665

8,407

9,085

   

Current account balance

9.7

5.9

4.4

2.1

0.4

   

Foreign direct investment

2.0

0.9

0.4

0.0

0.0

   

Total public sector external debt

7.9

5.8

3.6

3.3

3.1

   
         

Memorandum items:

         

Nominal GDP (in millions of manat)

198,371

219,848

240,363

251,884

268,110

   

Nominal GDP (in millions of US$)

56,677

62,814

68,675

71,967

76,603

   
   
   

Sources: Turkmen authorities; and Fund staff estimates and projections.

       

1/ Staff uses its own GDP estimates given that the narrative underlying the official GDP growth estimates is hard to reconcile with other available data. In particular, official GDP growth is extremely stable, despite shocks, including the pandemic.

                   

2/ Excluding receipts from government bond issuance and privatization proceeds.

                 

3/ Includes domestic state government debt and external public and publicly guaranteed debt.

               

4/ Including credit to SOEs.

 

 

 

                     
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