IMF Staff Completes Review Mission to Egypt

Source: IMF – News in Russian

May 27, 2025

  • The IMF team and the Egyptian authorities made good progress on the assessment of economic performance and implementation of policy commitments under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement.
  • As Egypt’s macroeconomic stabilization is taking root, it is now time to accelerate and deepen the reform efforts to reduce the state footprint, level the playing field, and improve the business environment.
  • Discussions will continue virtually to finalize agreement on remaining policies and reforms that could support completion of the fifth review.

Washington, DC: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff team led by Ms. Vladkova Hollar visited Cairo from May 6 to May 18, and held productive discussions with the Egyptian authorities on economic and financial policies that could underpin the completion of the Fifth Review under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement.  

At the end of the mission, Ms. Vladkova Hollar issued the following statement: 

“The Egyptian authorities and IMF staff held constructive discussions which have advanced the technical work and policy discussions as part of the Fifth Review under the Extended Fund Facility.  

“Egypt has made substantial progress toward macroeconomic stability. Growth is expected to continue strengthening, and we upgraded our forecast for FY24/25 to 3.8 percent, in light of the stronger-than-expected outturn in the first half of the year. At the same time, the private investment share in total investment rose from 38.5 percent in H1 FY23-24 to almost 60 percent over the same period in FY24-25. Inflation rose slightly to 13.9 percent in April but remains on a downward trend. The current account remains wide, as rising imports, reduced hydrocarbon output, and Suez Canal disruptions offset strong tourism, remittances, and non-oil exports. Greater fiscal prudence—including through better oversight and control over large public sector infrastructure projects—is helping to contain demand pressures, with total public investment spending remaining below the established ceiling for July – December 2024.  

“We welcome the authorities’ recent efforts to modernize and streamline tax and customs procedures to increase efficiency and build confidence. These reforms are starting to yield positive results. Alongside these efforts, domestic revenue mobilization will need to continue, mainly by widening the tax base and streamlining tax exemptions, to support the government’s capacity to spend sufficiently on priority development and social needs. We also welcome the authorities’ efforts to develop a medium-term debt management strategy that aims to improve transparency and gradually reduce the large debt service cost in the budget. 

“With the macroeconomic stabilization now underway, it is critical for Egypt to carry out deeper reforms to unlock the country’s growth potential, create high-quality jobs for a growing population, and sustainably reduce its vulnerabilities and increase the economy’s resilience to shocks.  

“In order to deliver on these objectives, decisively reducing the role of the public sector in the economy and leveling the playing field for all economic agents should be key policy priorities. The implementation of the State Ownership Policy and the asset divestment program in sectors where the state has committed to reduce its footprint will play a critical role in strengthening the ability of the private sector to better contribute to economic growth in Egypt. Complementing this, efforts need to continue to improve the business environment.  

“We are grateful for the warm hospitality extended by the authorities during this mission. Discussions will continue virtually to finalize agreement on the remaining policies and reforms that could support the completion of the fifth review.”  

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Angham Al Shami

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/27/pr-2516-egypt-imf-staff-completes-review-mission-to-egypt

MIL OSI

IMF Reaches Staff-Level Agreement on the First Review under El Salvador’s Extended Fund Facility Arrangement

Source: IMF – News in Russian

May 27, 2025

End-of-Mission press releases include statements of IMF staff teams that convey preliminary findings after a visit to a country. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF’s Executive Board for discussion and decision.

  • IMF staff and the Salvadoran authorities have reached staff-level agreement on the first review of the 40-month extended arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF). Subject to approval by the IMF Executive Board, El Salvador would receive nearly US$120 million (SDR 86.16 million).
  • Program performance has been strong. Key fiscal and reserve targets were met with margins and substantial progress continues in the ambitious reform agenda in the areas of governance, transparency, and financial resilience.
  • Continued implementation of the fiscal consolidation plan and structural agenda remains critical to address macroeconomic imbalances and create conditions for stronger and more sustainable growth.

Washington, DC: IMF staff and the Salvadoran authorities have reached staff-level agreement on the first review of the country’s extended arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF). They also finalized discussion on the 2025 Article IV consultation focused on boosting El Salvador’s medium-term growth prospects.

Upon the conclusion of these discussions Mr. Cubeddu, Deputy Director of the Western Hemisphere Department, and Mr. Torres, Mission Chief for El Salvador, issued the following statement:

“IMF staff have reached staff-level agreement with the Salvadoran authorities on the first review under the 40-month EFF arrangement.[1] The agreement is subject to approval by the IMF’s Executive Board, and contingent on the implementation of the agreed prior actions.

“The authorities have made significant progress in implementing their economic reform plan under the IMF-supported program. Most program targets set for the first review were comfortably met, and implementation of the structural benchmarks is progressing well.  Meanwhile, despite a more challenging external backdrop, El Salvador’s economy continues to expand supported by improved confidence and still robust remittances. Prudent policies and more favorable terms of trade have led to reduction in inflation and the current account deficit.

Against the backdrop of early strong program implementation, understandings have been reached on policies to continue to secure program objectives, including with the technical support from the Fund and other development partners:

  • The fiscal consolidation will continue this year through cuts in the wage bill and current spending restraint, and plans are being developed to reform the civil service and the pension systems to underpin the adjustment beyond this year. This will be supported by the new Fiscal Sustainability Law, which is expected to be enacted shortly.
  • External buffers will be strengthened further through the accumulation of government deposits at the Central Bank, supported by financing from International Financial Institutions and fiscal discipline. Meanwhile, bank liquidity requirements will be raised in line with program commitments, while bank oversight is strengthened, including of cooperatives.
  • Following the adoption of the Anti-Corruption Law, attention will now focus in securing its proper and timely implementation to complement ongoing efforts to enhance governance, accountability, and transparency, including of the fiscal accounts of the overall public sector.
  • On Bitcoin, efforts will continue to ensure that the total amount of Bitcoin held across all government-owned wallets remains unchanged, consistent with program commitments, while also securing the unwinding of the public sector’s participation in the Chivo wallet by end-July.

There is a shared understanding that steadfast program implementation and agile policy making, in the context of rising global uncertainties, remain critical to further entrench stability and lay the foundation for stronger and more sustainable growth. IMF staff thank the Salvadoran authorities for the excellent collaboration and constructive discussions.”

[1] The EFF was approved by the IMF Executive Board on February 26, 2025, with total access of SDR 1033.92 million (about US$1.4 billion or 360 percent of quota), and initial disbursement of SDR 86.16 million. Other official creditors committed to provide additional financial support for a combined total of roughly US$3.5 billion.

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Meera Louis

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/27/pr-25162-el-salvador-imf-reaches-agreement-on-the-1st-rev-under-eff

MIL OSI

Tuvalu: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission

Source: IMF – News in Russian

May 27, 2025

A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

Washington, DC: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) team held discussions for the 2025 Article IV consultation for Tuvalu in Funafuti, during May 20-27. The team issued the following statement at the conclusion of the mission.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, OUTLOOK, AND RISKS

Tuvalu’s economy has experienced a strong recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. After falling for three consecutive years in 2020-22, GDP growth rebounded strongly at 7.9 percent in 2023, driven by the resumption of construction activity, the trade recovery, and higher government spending. GDP growth in 2024 is estimated to have reached 3.3 percent, supported by continued effects of reopening and major infrastructure projects. Since peaking at 14.2 percent in 2022Q3, inflation has been trending down and slowed to 1.2 percent in 2024, in line with global food and commodities prices and continued easing of shipping bottlenecks.

The economic recovery is expected to continue, but growth is projected to moderate gradually over the medium term. Growth in 2025 is projected at 3 percent, driven by the construction of the new phase of Tuvalu Coastal Adaptation Project and an increase in public spending. While externally-financed projects are expected to continue to support economic activities, growth is projected to decline gradually to around 1.8 percent over the medium term, due to sluggish productivity growth, increasing emigration, and vulnerability to climate events. Inflation is expected to remain below 2 percent in 2025, reflecting the negative CPI at end-2024 and lower global commodity prices, and to rise gradually to 2.5 percent over the medium term, aligning with inflation dynamics of Tuvalu’s trading partners.

The fiscal balance is projected to turn to a surplus in 2025 reflecting higher grants but would deteriorate again starting in 2026. Higher grants are expected to more than offset the increase in expenditures and improve the fiscal balance from a deficit of 7 percent of GDP in 2024 to a surplus of 2.9 percent of GDP in 2025. Over the medium term, grants are projected to gradually decline to historical levels of around 27 percent of GDP, while current expenditure pressures would remain elevated. As a result, fiscal balances are expected to deteriorate gradually and reach -6.8 percent of GDP by 2030. Because the projected withdrawals from Tuvalu’s sovereign funds are not sufficient to fully finance the fiscal deficits, foreign financing will be required to close the financing gap. Under these baseline projections, Tuvalu is assessed to remain at a high risk of debt distress.

Downside risks to the outlook remain high. The global environment has significantly changed this year, reflecting escalated trade tensions, heightened policy uncertainty, and tighter financial conditions.  While Tuvalu’s export exposure is limited, heightened global uncertainty and volatility could affect Tuvalu’s external revenues, including from its internet domain, fishing licenses, and development assistance, and significantly impact Tuvalu’s public finances, external position, and growth outlook. Global risks of heightened trade tensions and higher commodity prices could also increase inflation. A sharp downward correction in financial market returns could affect the performance of Tuvalu’s sovereign funds. Under-performance of public corporations could cause fiscal risks, and further loss of CBRs would severely disrupt cross-border payments. An acceleration of outward migration would exacerbate labor shortages. Extreme climate events and climate change remain major risks to Tuvalu’s economic outlook. Upside risks include higher fishing licenses and grants and greater structural reform momentum, which could accelerate economic growth.

FISCAL POLICY

Fiscal policy should balance ensuring fiscal sustainability and supporting Tuvalu’s development priorities. Tuvalu’s high vulnerability to external shocks requires fiscal sustainability and adequate buffers against downside risks. Meanwhile, the government faces significant near-term spending pressures in order to deliver essential public services, while also having to address medium-term climate adaptation costs and labor shortages stemming from increasing emigration.

A multi-pronged fiscal strategy is required to address these challenges. Given persistent fiscal deficits and Tuvalu’s limited fiscal space, the main elements of the strategy should include: i) gradually reducing fiscal deficits; ii) increasing spending for priority areas; and iii) appropriately using fiscal buffers to stabilize fiscal accounts, cushion against shocks, and address long-term challenges. IMF staff’s simulations show that reducing the fiscal deficit gradually to around 2.3 percent of GDP by 2030 (compared to 6.8 percent of GDP in the baseline scenario) by utilizing the returns of the Tuvalu Trust Fund and the Consolidated Investment Fund (CIF) to finance deficits would keep public debt on a downward path. The domestic current balance would provide an appropriate anchor and is expected to improve to -40 percent of GDP by 2045 under the consolidation scenario, and the value of the buffer fund (CIF) would stabilize at around 40 percent of GDP, which is needed to cover major shocks and downside risks.

The recommended fiscal strategy entails a combination of revenue mobilization, expenditure rationalization, and resource reprioritization measures. Expenditure measures should primarily focus on unwinding the recent increases in current expenditure, including containing the increase in the wage bill, implementing cost-saving measures for the Medical Referral Scheme and overseas scholarships, unwinding the increase in goods and services spending, and cutting broad-based utility subsidies. Revenue mobilization should prioritize strengthening the compliance and efficiency of tax collection, while considering reviewing tax policies and exploring options to boost tax revenue and streamline tax incentives. Part of the savings from the above measures should be redirected to areas such as targeted protection for the most vulnerable, infrastructure, human capital, and climate resilience.

Improving public financial management (PFM) can help manage revenue volatility and fiscal risks. The authorities have made progress in PFM, including introducing the new Financial Management Information System and formulating the Medium-Term Fiscal Framework. The publication of Tuvalu’s Fiscal Risk Reports is also welcome. Further efforts are needed to improve budget reliability, strengthen investment management to enhance absorption capacity, implement climate budget tagging, enhance fiscal reporting and transparency on extra-budgetary funds and SOEs, and reinforce procurement management.

FINANCIAL SECTOR POLICIES

Establishing effective regulatory and supervisory frameworks is urgently needed. Priorities include strengthening the statutory role and expanding the supervisory perimeter of the Banking Commission of Tuvalu (BCT), issuing the proposed new prudential standards, enforcing the timely submission of prudential returns, and addressing delays in the audits of the financial statements of the financial institutions. These measures should be supported through adequate resourcing of the BCT to conduct both on-site and off-site supervision.

Continued efforts are needed to strengthen Tuvalu’s connectivity to the global payment system and improve financial inclusion. Tuvalu’s membership of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering is a welcome step, and the authorities should continue strengthen the legal framework and compliance. Efforts to address Correspondent Banking Relationship pressures should also take into account potentially low ML/TF risk environment in Tuvalu and focus on the outreach to the key foreign regulatory authorities, including a corridor risk assessment. The ongoing efforts to modernize banking services, including the recent launch of Tuvalu’s first ATMs, can help overcome geographical barriers and improve efficiency. Improving financial literacy and establishing a reliable national digital ID system are also crucial for financial inclusion. Meanwhile, introducing digital services should consider supervisory capacities and ensure financial integrity.

STRUCTURAL REFORMS

Structural reforms need to be carefully prioritized, focusing on addressing development bottlenecks and attaining higher growth potential. Priorities should include: i) collaborating with local communities to effectively develop the reclaimed land; ii) improving internet connectivity and leveraging IT technology to deliver more public services; iii) ensuring proper maintenance of key infrastructure assets, particularly transportation and utilities including renewable energy; iv) strengthening SOE governance and performance, accompanied by reviewing utility pricing to ensure cost recovery; and v) exploring economic diversification in sectors with higher potential, including agricultural products such as coconut, eco-tourism, and commercial fishery.

Mitigating the impact of emigration and enhancing climate resilience are crucial. While outward emigration has supported remittances and consumption, measures to enhance both human capital and labor supply are required to address labor shortage issues. The authorities should focus on improving education access and quality, enhancing training, and attracting returning migrants and promoting skill transfer. Facilitating female labor force participation could help bridge significant gender gaps in employment, while alleviating labor shortages. Tuvalu should continue to engage with development partners to secure climate financing and implement major climate resilient projects. In addition, the authorities need to further enhance disaster management through enforcement of amended building codes, use of risk maps to inform planning, and strengthening community disaster preparedness. Accelerating renewable energy production can lower Tuvalu’s energy costs, reduce its external sector vulnerability, and enhance energy security.

***

The mission would like to thank the Tuvaluan authorities and various stakeholders for their excellent hospitality and cooperation and candid discussions during the mission.

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Pemba Sherpa

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/27/mcs-tuvalu-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2025-article-iv-mission

MIL OSI

United Kingdom: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission

Source: IMF – News in Russian

May 27, 2025

A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

  • An economic recovery is underway. Growth is projected at 1.2 percent in 2025 and will gain momentum next year, although weak productivity continues to weigh on medium-term growth prospects.
  • The authorities’ fiscal plans strike a good balance between supporting growth and safeguarding fiscal sustainability. It will be important to stay the course and deliver the planned deficit reduction over the next five years to stabilize net debt and reduce vulnerability to gilt market pressures. Further refinements of the fiscal framework could help minimize the frequency of fiscal policy changes. In the longer term, the UK will face difficult choices to align spending with available resources, given ageing-related expenditure pressures.
  • The Bank of England (BoE) should continue to ease monetary policy gradually, while remaining flexible in light of elevated uncertainty. Calibrating the monetary policy stance has become more complex, given the recent pickup in inflation, still fragile growth, and higher long-term interest rates.
  • The authorities’ Growth Mission focuses on the right areas to lift productivity. Given the breadth of the agenda, prioritizing and sequencing of structural reforms, along with clear communication, will be key to success.

Washington, DC – May 27, 2025:

Economic Outlook

After a slowdown in the second half of 2024, an economic recovery is underway and is expected to gain momentum. Economic activity decelerated during 2024 H2, partly reflecting weaker export performance in the challenging global environment. In recent months, high frequency indicators have shown signs of improvement. Growth is projected at 1.2 percent in 2025 and 1.4 percent in 2026, as monetary easing, positive wealth effects, and an uptick in confidence bolster private consumption, while the boost to public spending in the October budget will also help support growth. The forecast assumes that global trade tensions lower the level of UK GDP by 0.3 percent by 2026, due to persistent uncertainty, slower activity in UK trading partners, and the direct impact of remaining US tariffs on the UK. The authorities’ structural reforms, including to planning, and the increase in infrastructure investment could increase potential growth if properly implemented. However, medium-term growth is still forecast to remain subdued relative to the pre-GFC trend, at 1.4 percent, given weak productivity.

Risks to growth remain to the downside. Tighter-than-expected financial conditions, combined with rising precautionary saving by households, would hinder the rebound in private consumption and slow the recovery. Persistent global trade uncertainty could further weigh on UK growth, by weakening global economic activity, disrupting supply chains, and undermining private investment.

Fiscal Policy

The authorities’ fiscal strategy for the next five years appropriately supports growth while safeguarding fiscal sustainability. The new spending plans are credible and growth-friendly, taking account of pressures on public services and investment needs. They are expected to provide an economic boost over the medium term that outweighs the impact of higher taxation. As revenue is projected to increase, deficits are set to decline and stabilize net debt.

It will be important to stay the course and reduce fiscal deficits as planned over the medium term. There are significant risks to the successful implementation of the fiscal strategy, from the high level of global uncertainty, volatile financial market conditions, and the challenge of containing day-to-day spending. Materialization of these risks could result in market pressures, put debt on an upward path, and make it harder to meet the fiscal rules, given limited headroom. To this end, staff recommends adhering to the current plans, and implementing additional revenue or expenditure measures as needed if shocks arise, to maintain compliance with the rules.

In the longer term, difficult fiscal choices will likely be needed to address spending pressures and rebuild fiscal buffers. Under current policies, staff analysis suggests spending to be around 8 percent of GDP higher by 2050, mainly due to additional outlays on health and pensions from population ageing. There is limited space to finance this spending through extra borrowing, given high debt and elevated borrowing costs. Unless revenue is increased, for which there is scope, tough policy decisions on spending priorities and the role of the state in certain areas will be needed to better align the coverage of public services with available resources.

While recent reforms of the fiscal framework enhance its credibility and effectiveness, further refinements could improve predictability and reduce pressure for frequent fiscal policy changes. The new current balance rule helps preserve space for investment, while the debt rule safeguards fiscal sustainability. The transition to a three-year rule horizon, aligned with the spending reviews, is expected to make the rules more credible, while allowing time to adjust gradually to shocks. Staff welcomes the authorities’ commitment to hold a single annual fiscal event, but notes that there is still significant pressure for frequent fiscal policy changes, given that small revisions to the economic outlook can erode the headroom within the rules, which is the subject of intense market and media scrutiny. Refinements to the fiscal framework could promote further policy stability. Options include (1) de-emphasizing point estimates of headroom in OBR assessments of rule compliance; (2) establishing a formal process so that small rule breaches do not trigger corrective fiscal action outside of the single fiscal event; or (3) assessing rules only once per year at the time of the fiscal event.

Monetary Policy and Operations

A gradual and flexible approach to monetary easing continues to be appropriate to support the economy and protect against inflationary risks. The pickup in inflation that began in 2024 is expected to last through the second half of this year, with a return to target later in 2026 as underlying inflationary pressures continue to recede. Although monetary policy calibration has become more difficult due to still-weak growth, the temporary rise in inflation and high long-term interest rates, staff sees the BoE’s gradual pace of easing as appropriate. Given the elevated uncertainty, the MPC is encouraged to retain flexibility to adjust the monetary stance in either direction if needed.

The BoE should continue to strengthen its forecasting capacity and communications. Staff welcomes the implementation of the Bernanke Review and the use of scenarios and conditional guidance in the BoE’s communications. The BoE will benefit from continuing to invest in modeling capacity, data and personnel, to be able to tailor scenarios promptly as economic conditions change. In the scenarios, interest rates should be allowed to adjust to economic developments, so that the scenarios are more informative and consistent, rather than assume that interest rates follow current market expectations. Lastly, MPC members could make greater use of the information from the central forecast and the alternative scenarios to justify the MPC decision and explain their personal views.

The BoE’s transition to a repo-based framework will mitigate balance sheet risks. QT continues to be conducted in a gradual and predictable manner. As the balance sheet normalizes, transitioning to a demand-driven approach, with reserves provided to banks mainly through repo operations, will reduce the market footprint of the BoE and limit its exposure to interest and credit risks. This will also maintain monetary control and the flexibility for new QE in the future, while providing sufficient reserves for financial stability reasons. The transition is being accompanied by a timely review of BoE instruments to consider the relative role of repo operations and asset purchases, as well as the balance between short and long-term repos.

Financial Sector Policies

The banking sector remains broadly resilient and macroprudential settings are appropriate, despite global financial stability risks increasing over the past year. The banking system is adequately capitalized and liquid with healthy levels of profitability, and the 2024 desk-based stress test showed that it can support households and businesses during times of severe stress. Macroprudential settings remain appropriate, as indicators of financial vulnerabilities are close to their long-term average, although global risks have risen in the past year given more volatile asset prices and credit spreads.

Significant progress has been made assessing and reducing vulnerabilities in the non-bank sector and work should continue at the domestic and international levels. Managing risks in the sector is critical, as it accounts for over half of UK financial assets. The system-wide exploratory scenario (SWES) has improved understanding of linkages with the banking sector and contagion risks, while the BoE’s new repo facility for non-banks is in line with previous AIV recommendations. The BoE could, in the future, consider expanding access to this facility so as to include a broader range of non-banks with a large gilt market footprint, provided they are adequately supervised and regulated. Ongoing work, including with the FSB, is essential to better monitor and manage non-bank leverage, concentration, and liquidity risks. Work should also continue on closing data gaps to enhance financial system surveillance.

Recent episodes of global bond market turbulence underscore the importance of enhancing gilt market resilience. Gilt market functioning has remained orderly. Vulnerabilities have nonetheless risen, given increased supply and the reduction in demand by more patient investors, with hedge funds and non-residents playing a greater role, and the BoE reducing its holdings as part of QT. Staff recommends close monitoring as well as regular stress testing and engagement with market participants to detect and manage future risks. In this regard, the shift of issuance toward shorter-dated securities for FY2025/26 has been well received by the market. The authorities are considering policies to enhance structural resilience, such as central clearing for gilt repo transactions, which is welcome.

Reforms to the financial sector and its regulation should balance promoting growth with preserving continuity and financial stability. While staff supports the government’s aim of enhancing the role of financial services as a driver of growth, risks will need to be carefully managed. Regulatory reforms should balance simplification and modernization with mitigating vulnerabilities, while being well-communicated. Consolidating pension funds has the potential to reduce fees and expand access to diverse asset classes, but it will be important to guard against possible unintended side-effects, including from reduced competition. Staff supports the FPC’s recommendation that the Pensions Regulator has the remit to take financial stability considerations into account. This would strengthen its ability to oversee the evolving pensions landscape and help manage potential risks from consolidation of funds and changes in investment strategies.

Structural Policies

Persistently weak productivity remains the UK’s primary obstacle to lifting growth and living standards. The UK has faced a decline in trend productivity growth since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), further widening the gap with the US. Along with adverse shocks, including Brexit, the pandemic and the energy price crisis, the slowdown has left the level of UK GDP around one quarter below what the pre-GFC trend would imply. This slowdown has multiple causes, including chronic under-investment, low private R&D, limited access to finance for businesses to scale up, skill gaps, and a deterioration in health outcomes.

While the authorities’ Growth Mission focuses on the right areas, careful prioritizing and sequencing of policies will be key to success. The agenda is ambitious and impacts many parts of the economy. Reforms are broadly aligned with past IMF recommendations, although many of them are still at the formulation and consultation stage. Delivering on the Growth Mission involves significant challenges given limited fiscal space, the breadth of the reforms, and the volatile external environment. In refining their strategy, the authorities will thus need to carefully sequence reforms, ensure internal coherence among them, and prioritize early wins to build momentum and garner support for more complex initiatives. Continued clear communication with the public and markets will also be essential.

Stability, capital, and skills are the most important aspects of the Growth Mission. Staff recommends prioritizing the following three most binding constraints to growth. First, policy stability is critical to support business confidence in an increasingly uncertainty global environment. In this context, recent efforts to strike trade agreements with key partners, including the EU, India, and the US, demonstrate the authorities’ commitment to finding common ground and establishing a more predictable environment for UK exporters. Second, the planning reform and complementary public infrastructure projects can lift the chronically-low private investment, which has weighed on productivity. Finally, boosting people’s skills, enhancing their health, and incentivizing work will address shortages in sectors like construction and healthcare, while providing the productive workforce needed by growth industries. Reforms in these three areas are likely to deliver the largest growth benefits, while laying a strong foundation for progress on other fronts.

Industrial policy can play a complementary role to support particular sectors, but economy-wide reforms should remain the main tool to boost competitiveness and growth. Structural reforms that apply horizontally across the whole economy, such as easing planning restrictions, are likely to have the greatest impact. These reforms are prerequisites to realize the full potential of vertical interventions at the sectoral level, such as investments by the National Wealth Fund and initiatives under the new industrial strategy. Sectoral interventions should be focused on addressing market failures, identified using an evidence-based approach, and supported by rigorous appraisal processes, while being subject to strict budgetary limits, prudent risk management, and comprehensive risk reporting.

The mission thanks the authorities and other counterparts for open discussions, productive collaboration, and constructive policy dialogue.

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Camila Perez

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/27/cs-uk-aiv-2025

MIL OSI

IMF Executive Board Concludes 2025 Article IV Consultation with New Zealand

Source: IMF – News in Russian

May 26, 2025

Washington, DCMay 26, 2025: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation [1] with New Zealand on May 19, 2025.

Tight monetary policy has helped bring inflation back to target, but at the expense of growth. Real GDP contracted by 0.5 percent y/y in 2024, as investment fell by 4.1 percent y/y, household consumption stagnated. The slowdown has been particularly pronounced in interest-rate-sensitive sectors including retail trade, construction, and manufacturing. The financial sector remains resilient despite rising non-performing loans. A recovery in external demand and improved terms of trade have helped narrow the current account deficit to 6.2 percent of GDP, though it remains above long-term trends. Despite a challenging economic backdrop, the government delivered modest fiscal consolidation in FY2023/24, with the primary deficit narrowing to 2.4 percent of GDP. Tight monetary policy helped bring inflation within the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ)’s 1–3 percent target band in 2024Q3, after 13 consecutive quarters, with headline inflation reaching 2.5 percent y/y in 2025Q1. The RBNZ has thus eased the Official Cash Rate (OCR) several times since August 2024, bringing it closer to the neutral rate.

The return of inflation to target is enabling monetary policy easing and a return to growth. Inflation is forecast to remain within the target band, allowing monetary policy to gradually move to a neutral stance. Real GDP is projected to expand by 1.4 percent y/y in 2025, with monetary policy easing providing a boost to consumption and investment. Growth is expected to accelerate to 2.7 percent y/y in 2026, as the lagged impact of lower interest rates is fully realized. Fiscal policy is expected to continue to balance needed medium-term consolidation with growth considerations. The government’s broad-based structural reform agenda is aimed at boosting medium-term productivity growth, including via reforms to attract foreign investment, enhance competition, reduce regulatory burdens, accelerate housing supply growth, and progress toward closing of the infrastructure gap.

Risks to the outlook are tilted to the downside. Downside risks stem from a softer-than-expected recovery due to elevated global uncertainty and a weak labor market or the occurrence of a natural disaster. Upside risks include a stronger rebound in growth due to faster-than-expected monetary policy transmission. As a small open economy, New Zealand is vulnerable to trade disruptions, geoeconomic fragmentation, or a global economic slowdown.


Executive Board Assessment[2]

Executive Directors agreed with the thrust of the staff appraisal. They welcomed that the economy is showing signs of a nascent recovery and that inflation has returned to the Reserve Bank of New Zealand’s target, after a prolonged period of significant price pressures. Noting the country’s exposure to trade and investment shocks, Directors underscored the importance of maintaining prudent policies to safeguard macroeconomic stability and implementing ambitious structural reforms to address medium‑ and long‑term economic challenges.

Directors commended the role of monetary policy in helping bring inflation back to target. They agreed that the current monetary policy easing is appropriate and should continue until reaching a neutral level, while remaining data‑dependent and responsive to economic conditions. Directors welcomed the expanded macroprudential toolbox and concurred that macroprudential tools should continue to be used to address financial risks that may emerge as policy rates are reduced.

Directors agreed that fiscal policy should focus on growth‑friendly, medium‑term consolidation, while supporting the most vulnerable. They called for comprehensive revenue reforms that enhance efficiency and incentivize long‑term investment. Directors also encouraged the authorities to pursue expenditure reforms, including to the pension system, that are grounded in a cost‑benefit analysis.

Directors agreed that financial stability risks are contained and recommended that household and financial balance sheets continue to be monitored closely. They welcomed progress in key reforms, notably the Depositor Compensation Scheme and the Deposit Takers Act. Directors noted the authorities’ efforts to increase banking competition and emphasized that prudential settings should remain adequately calibrated to guard against financial stability risks. Given housing shortages, they called for improving affordability and expanding housing supply and welcomed the reform efforts around resource management in these areas.

Directors commended ongoing structural reforms to overcome slow productivity growth and boost long‑term growth. They welcomed the authorities’ plans to boost competition and innovation, reduce barriers to overseas financing, and deepen capital markets. Investing in infrastructure and enhancing resilience to natural disasters will also be needed.

It is expected that the next Article IV Consultation with New Zealand will be held on the standard 12‑month cycle.




[1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

[2] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chair of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm .

Table 1. New Zealand: Main Economic Indicators, 2021-30

(Annual percent change, unless otherwise indicated)

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

2026

2027

2028

2029

2030

Est.

Projections

NATIONAL ACCOUNTS

Real GDP (production)

5.7

2.9

1.8

-0.5

1.4

2.7

2.7

2.2

2.2

2.2

Domestic demand

10.0

4.5

-0.8

-0.8

1.8

2.6

2.4

2.1

2.1

2.0

Private consumption

7.9

4.1

1.0

0.2

1.0

3.1

3.0

2.4

2.4

2.3

Public consumption

7.9

5.2

0.8

0.0

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.7

0.8

0.8

Investment

17.2

4.1

-5.4

-4.1

2.4

3.2

2.7

2.3

2.1

2.1

Public

6.2

3.6

10.2

0.5

0.3

2.3

2.5

2.8

2.8

2.8

Private

12.6

4.3

-3.2

-6.5

1.9

3.5

2.7

2.1

1.7

1.8

Private business

14.5

7.3

-2.2

-5.0

2.6

3.5

2.8

2.1

1.6

1.6

Dwelling

8.6

-2.3

-5.6

-10.1

0.0

3.6

2.3

2.4

2.1

2.4

Inventories (contribution to growth, percent)

1.4

0.0

-1.4

0.2

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Net exports (contribution to growth, percent)

-4.8

-1.6

2.6

0.3

0.3

-0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Real gross domestic income

5.0

2.3

1.1

0.3

2.9

3.1

2.8

2.4

2.3

2.3

Investment (percent of GDP)

25.0

26.3

24.2

23.1

23.4

23.4

23.3

23.2

23.1

23.1

Public

5.7

5.9

6.5

6.4

6.3

6.2

6.2

6.2

6.2

6.2

Private

19.4

20.4

17.8

16.7

17.1

17.2

17.1

17.0

16.9

16.8

Savings (gross, percent of GDP)

19.0

17.1

17.3

16.9

18.3

18.8

19.0

19.2

19.4

19.6

Public

-3.5

-4.2

-3.5

-4.4

-5.1

-3.9

-2.5

-1.4

-0.4

0.0

Private

22.5

21.3

20.9

21.3

23.4

22.7

21.5

20.6

19.9

19.6

Potential output

1.5

1.9

2.2

2.2

2.2

2.2

2.2

2.2

2.2

2.2

Output gap (percent of potential)

1.8

2.7

2.4

-0.3

-1.1

-0.6

-0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

LABOR MARKET

Employment

2.2

1.7

3.3

-0.1

0.7

1.5

2.0

1.7

1.3

1.5

Unemployment (percent of labor force, ann. average)

3.8

3.3

3.7

4.7

5.3

5.2

4.7

4.3

4.5

4.4

Wages (nominal percent change)

3.8

6.5

7.0

4.6

4.3

3.9

3.3

3.3

3.0

3.0

PRICES

Terms of trade index (goods and services, % change)

-1.0

-3.1

-3.4

2.9

1.9

1.3

0.5

0.4

0.2

0.1

Consumer prices (avg, % change)

3.9

7.2

5.7

2.9

2.4

2.3

2.2

2.0

2.0

2.0

GDP deflator (avg, % change)

3.0

5.8

5.1

3.6

3.2

2.8

2.2

2.2

2.2

2.1

MACRO-FINANCIAL

Official cash rate (policy rate, percent, avg)

0.3

2.2

5.2

4.7

3.6

3.3

3.3

3.3

3.3

3.3

Credit to the private sector (percent change)

6.1

4.3

0.1

1.6

3.2

5.6

4.5

4.0

3.9

4.0

Interest payments (percent of disposable income)

5.3

6.3

8.5

8.1

7.3

7.2

7.0

6.9

6.9

6.9

Household savings (percent of disposable income)

3.6

3.3

2.7

2.5

2.4

2.3

2.9

3.6

4.4

5.1

Household debt (percent of disposable income)

174

173

168

166

160

160

159

158

157

157

GENERAL GOVERNMENT (percent of GDP) 1/

Revenue

37.6

38.8

37.0

38.7

37.6

37.5

37.5

37.7

37.9

38.0

Expenditure

40.0

43.3

40.9

41.9

43.1

42.3

40.5

39.7

38.8

38.0

Net lending/borrowing

-2.5

-4.4

-3.9

-3.2

-5.5

-4.8

-3.1

-2.0

-0.9

0.0

Operating balance

-0.3

-2.2

-1.7

-0.7

-3.0

-2.5

-0.8

0.1

1.1

1.9

Cyclically adjusted primary balance 2/

-2.8

-4.2

-3.7

-3.4

-3.6

-2.9

-1.4

-0.2

1.1

2.0

Gross debt

46.0

48.6

45.8

48.4

53.2

56.4

59.0

58.8

57.5

55.1

Net debt

10.6

17.0

19.0

19.8

23.5

26.4

28.0

28.6

28.0

26.4

Net worth

94.6

102.0

96.3

94.4

87.1

81.3

77.3

74.8

73.5

73.0

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

Current account (percent of GDP)

-6.0

-9.2

-6.9

-6.2

-5.1

-4.6

-4.3

-3.9

-3.7

-3.5

Export volume

-2.3

-0.5

11.0

4.1

3.9

3.9

4.1

4.0

4.2

4.2

Import volume

14.5

4.7

-0.4

2.4

2.0

3.5

3.2

3.3

3.4

3.4

Net international investment position (percent of GDP)

-47.9

-52.5

-51.3

-49.4

-52.1

-54.0

-55.8

-57.3

-58.6

-59.6

Gross official reserves (bn US$)

16.4

13.7

14.8

23.2

MEMORANDUM ITEMS

Nominal GDP (bn NZ$)

353

385

413

427

448

472

496

518

540

564

Percent change

9.0

9.2

7.1

3.4

4.9

5.5

4.9

4.4

4.4

4.3

Nominal GDP per capita (US$)

48,845

47,819

48,360

48,448

47,158

49,022

50,472

51,643

53,044

54,378

Real gross national disposable income per capita (NZ$)

54,586

55,293

54,662

53,632

54,724

55,635

56,458

57,044

57,611

58,081

Percent change

3.7

1.3

-1.1

-1.9

2.0

1.7

1.5

1.0

1.0

0.8

Population (million)

5.1

5.1

5.2

5.3

5.4

5.5

5.5

5.6

5.7

5.8

US$/NZ$ (average level)

0.708

0.636

0.614

0.605

Nominal effective exchange rate

109.9

106.5

105.0

104.9

Real effective exchange rate

107.6

105.5

105.7

106.1

Sources: Authorities’ data and IMF staff estimates and projections.

1/ Fiscal year.

2/ In percent of potential GDP.

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Pemba Sherpa

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/23/pr25159-imf-executive-board-concludes-2025-article-iv-consultation-with-new-zealand

MIL OSI

IMF Reaches Staff-Level Agreement with São Tomé and Príncipe on the First Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Completes 2025 Article IV Mission

Source: IMF – News in Russian

May 23, 2025

End-of-Mission press releases include statements of IMF staff teams that convey preliminary findings after a visit to a country. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF’s Executive Board for discussion and decision.

  • IMF staff and the São Toméan authorities have reached a staff-level agreement on the first review of the economic policies underpinned by the 40-month ECF-supported program. Most quantitative targets for the first review have been met and significant progress was made on a range of macro-structural issues.
  • The authorities have made progress in re-building macroeconomic stability, improving the fiscal position, and advancing the government’s reform agenda. Inflation has declined from recent highs, due to global disinflation and a tight monetary stance. Growth is expected to pick up and inflation to further decelerate over the medium term.
  • The authorities remain committed to the objectives established in the ECF-supported program approved by the IMF Executive Board in December 2024.

Washington, DC: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff team, led by Mr. Slavi Slavov, Mission Chief for São Tomé and Príncipe, held meetings in São Tomé during May 8-21, 2025, to discuss progress on the authorities’ reforms and policy priorities in the context of the first review of São Tomé and Príncipe’s 40-month program supported by the Extended Credit Facility (ECF). The arrangement was approved by the IMF Executive Board for a total amount of SDR18.5 million (around US$25 million) on December 19, 2024. The team also conducted discussions on the 2025 Article IV consultation.

At the conclusion of the visit, Mr. Slavov issued the following statement:

“The São Toméan authorities and IMF staff team have reached a staff-level agreement on the first review of São Tomé and Príncipe’s economic program supported by the ECF arrangement. Subject to approval by the IMF’s Executive Board, São Tomé and Príncipe would have access to about SDR 4 million (US$5.3 million), bringing the total IMF financial support disbursed under the current arrangement to around SDR 8 million (about US$10.6 million).

“Against an increasingly challenging global economic backdrop, the São Toméan economy remains relatively resilient, with growth of 1.1 percent in 2024 despite stubbornly high inflation, a tight policy mix, and the country’s vulnerability to climate change and natural disasters. Inflation remains in the low double digits, while core inflation has declined significantly. The pegged exchange rate has served as an anchor to support domestic stability, but the inflation differential with the Euro Area has put pressures on the fragile external position of the country.

“Growth is expected to reach 2.9 percent in 2025, accelerate further to 4.7 percent in 2026, and remain at around 3.5 percent over the medium term. This reflects the recovery of the agriculture sector and tourism, while private and public investments are expected to boost growth going forward. The IMF-supported program plays a catalytic role in mobilizing financial support and technical assistance from the country’s main development partners. Declining international oil prices are expected to reduce fiscal and external sector pressures, improving reserves accumulation and macroeconomic stability. Reforming the energy sector remains key to unlocking growth and alleviating pressures on public debt and foreign exchange reserves. The government has made significant strides in fiscal consolidation, reaching a domestic primary balance of zero in 2024, better than the targeted deficit of 0.5 percent of GDP.

“Discussions on the 2025 Article IV consultation focused on the importance of investing in resilient infrastructure and improving public investment management to reduce the country’s vulnerability to climate change and natural disasters. Discussions also covered improving inflation forecasting, liquidity management, and strengthening financial inclusion.

“The IMF staff team met President Carlos Vila Nova; Prime Minister Américo d’Oliveira dos Ramos; Minister of State for Economy and Finance Gareth Haddad do Espírito Santo Guadalupe; Acting Governor of the Central Bank Lara Simone Beirão; other government officials; representatives of the private sector including banks; and development partners. The mission expresses its deep appreciation to the authorities for their cooperation, hospitality, and constructive policy discussions.”

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Pavis Devahasadin

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/22/pr25157-sao-tome-and-principe-imf-reaches-sla-1st-rev-under-ecf-completes-2025-aiv-mission

MIL OSI

A Changed Global Landscape: Policy Priorities in CESEE

Source: IMF – News in Russian

Speech by Alfred Kammer, Director, European Department of the IMF — Slovenia

May 23, 2025

It is a great pleasure to be with you in Ljubljana.

Let me begin by setting the stage for what I hope will be an insightful discussion on policy options in the presence of geoeconomic shocks and uncertainty.

I will focus on Central, Eastern and Southeastern European (CESEE) countries.  

After a respectable recovery last year, we downgraded growth for 2025 and 2026 across Europe  

Heightened uncertainty and trade policy volatility have been the main factors And the latest data releases from Q1 2025 are so far in line with our forecast.

The downgrade for the CESEE region[1] has been more sizeable than for advanced Europe: from over 3 percent in 2025 and 2026 to 2.4 and 2.7 percent respectively.

The larger impact is primarily due to a comparatively larger manufacturing sector. The growth revision would have been even larger if not for the German infrastructure package and an acceleration of Europe wide-defense spending

Inflation in CESEE countries meanwhile is coming down somewhat faster. But, as the chart shows, inflation rates will remain above targets for some time. Persistent services inflation and lagged effects of still high wage growth are key drivers – a point I will return to later as a risk to competitiveness.

In my remarks today, I will address two points: (i) how the changing global landscape is affecting CESEE countries and (ii) what the key policy priorities are.

Let me give a summary of my key points

  • What do we know so far about the effects of trade disputes including via trade diversion?

In a nutshell, the impact across the CESEE regions varies widely. Some of the most US-tariff-exposed countries, namely Hungary and Slovak Republic and to a lesser extent the Czech Republic, are in the constituency.

The tariffs between the US and China have just been lowered from very extreme levels, but they remain high and could increase again. Economic spillovers could be large for some specific sectors, even though our preliminary assessment is that the trade diversion effects should be manageable overall.

  • What can policymakers do to navigate a more uncertain and volatile period?

Primarily, changes are permanent. Businesses and households will need to adapt to these. A principle-based approach can help lessen the impact.  

  • First, maintain trade openness as much as possible. Protectionism will hurt inward investment, lower investment further and bring down productivity and income growth.
  • Second, stay the course on sound macroeconomic policies. In times of uncertainty, markets will scrutinize fundamentals. Durable policies can limit increases in risk premia. This means that central banks should remain cautious on monetary normalization and governments need to keep an eye on fiscal sustainability.
  • Third, generate growth through traditional means: domestic structural reforms. The size of untapped gains from domestic structural reforms is surprisingly large.
  • The question here is how the CESEE region can overcome political constraints. In my final observation I will discuss how the EU budget can play a catalyzing role.

I will highlight two channels:

  • Direct exposure to US tariffs
  • Potential effects of trade diversion from US-China trade dispute

The CESEE region’s integration into global value-chains and trade linkages creates exposure to shifting trade dynamics.

The EU has sizable direct trade linkages with China and the US (LHS), and linkages by individual CESEE countries to the US are substantial.

Exposures are especially large in the Slovak Republic and Hungary. Exports to the US (primarily cars, car parts, batteries, and in the case of Hungary electronics) account for about 3 per cent of GDP in 2024.

Czechia and Hungary have also large export positions to the US via smartphones and computers exports. For the time being, tariffs on these items have been exempted per the announcement made on April 11.

Any increase in tariffs would have substantial dampening effects on growth.

Indirect effects via supply chains will also become important tailwinds. In a 2024 IMF study, we show that an increase in EV imports from China could have significant GDP effects in the range of 1-1½ percent over 5 years via the supply chains in CESEE countries heavily reliant on the automotive sector.  A slowdown in Germany’s automotive sector has about a 5-10 times larger impact in percent of GDP in Slovakia and Hungary given their larger share of the sector relative to Germany.

If US-China trade tensions persist, multiple channels of trade diversion could come into play.

EU imports from China could increase, U.S. companies could try to find new export destinations including in Europe, and European firms could seek to find new export opportunities in the U.S. and China as a result of high China-U.S. tariffs.

Finally, competition on third-country markets could increase as countries look for new export markets. CESEE countries could be innocent bystanders. For instance, Turkish businesses could experience increased competition in third markets reducing margin or market shares.

We have estimated the potential size of trade diversion from China using a partial equilibrium approach.

Our preliminary estimates from April 8 tariff announcements[2] for the EU are for higher imports from China of around 0.25 percent of EU GDP in the near term.[3] The estimates are similar to ECB estimates discussed in their latest economic Bulletin. The 90-day rollback of most bilateral tariffs imposed since April 2 announced by the US and China on May 12 implies lower numbers, but better to be prepared for the worst.

Trade diversion would also affect inflation. Increased import competition would likely lower final prices. Headline inflation could be reduced by 20 basis points in 2026.

The economic effects for consumers and producers are likely mixed. Lower final goods prices would benefit consumers. Similarly, lower imported intermediates could also benefit European firms by reducing input costs. But trade diversion means also a rise in competition and in specific sectors such as consumer electronics or transportation equipment, adjustment effects could be large.

With all that said, the aggregate size of trade diversion effects appears manageable, although the impact could be large in individual countries and sectors.

Let me turn to policy priorities.

Let me now say a few words on what the CESEE region can do in the face of tariffs.    

  • First, Europe—and everyone—needs more trade, not less. The EU as well as CESEE should continue its open trade policy and expand its network of trade agreements.  
  • Second, we must accept that the global trade regime has changed. This means that any support to mitigate tariff or trade diversion effects should remain temporary, and targeted

Support measures cannot substitute for differences in the underlying fundamentals. In particular, the recent appreciation of CESEE currencies in unit-labor-cost adjusted terms is a concern.

What can policymakers do in the short term?

In the current global environment, navigating uncertainty is crucial.

In the short run, governments should aim to retain macroeconomic stability through credible and sustainable macroeconomic policies and build resilience

Starting with monetary policy, central banks need to remain focused on durably reaching price stability targets.  

  • In several large CESEE countries—including Hungary—inflation is slowing, but is still above targets.   
  • Central banks should ease cautiously. We advise caution because core inflation in the CESEE region remains higher than hoped for, and inflation expectations are more responsive to current inflation levels.   

Still high wage growth requires close attention. Increases have outpaced productivity and are contributing to higher inflation persistency. High labor costs also pose a risk to CESEE’s competitiveness

Our fiscal advice remains broadly unchanged. For many countries, rebuilding fiscal buffers is still a priority.  

  • The challenge is how to manage rising long-term spending pressures from aging, healthcare, climate, and now higher defense spending. 
  • Some countries can accommodate temporary increases in priority spending while keeping debt sustainability in mind.  
  • But for many CESEE countries the space is limited. This means they will have to undertake smart adjustments: (i) make public services more efficient and programs better targeted; (ii) reallocate spending priorities away from low priority areas, (iii) and boost fiscal revenues. In many cases, this can be done without raising tax rates by closing loopholes and more efficient administration. 

We continue to have concerns about Europe’s medium-term outlook: growth is low and there are rising spending needs:   

  • Labor supply is dwindling because of aging. 
  • Investment has been slowing
  • And Europe’s productivity growth has been very low over the last two decades. 

This makes meeting fiscal pressures increasingly difficult. 

  • Spending needs are expected to rise significantly over the next decades, for advanced economies by 5¾ percentage points and emerging economies by 8 percentage points of GDP.  
  • In the CESEE region, energy-related investments needs are urgent and very large. 
  • And across the region, defense spending is on the rise.  

This brings us to my final point which is how CESEE countries could generate medium-term growth.

Domestic structural reforms, while often overlooked, provide a large untapped source of European growth potential. 

  • In a forthcoming study, we find that comprehensive national reforms could raise real GDP levels by about 5 percent in advanced economies and between 6.6 and 9.3 percent in the CESEE region. 
  • These are sizeable gains and could be an important growth antidote to the poisonous effects of uncertainty and volatile policy disputes.

These reforms would remove inefficiencies at home and complement the earlier discussed EU-wide reforms. Specifically: 

  • Domestic labor market and skill-upgrading reforms top the priority list in terms of their macroeconomic
  • Fiscal-structural reforms and lower cost of business regulations would provide another substantial impetus.  
  • Reducing corruption and inefficiencies through governance reforms is particularly important in several CESEE countries. 

Successful implementation of these reforms will require political will, and in some cases, also capacity building.  

Overcoming the reform inertia is “the challenge” of Europe.

Let me conclude with a few observations on how to overcome this obstacle.

We think the EU budget could play a catalyzing role. Recent initiatives—such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)—have made important strides in strengthening policy performance. The next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2028-2034 should build on this momentum, further embedding a performance-based approach, especially in areas where current incentives are weak, but outcomes depend heavily on effective effort.

This is particularly relevant for pre-allocated funds tied to national plans, where member states design and implement policies. In such cases, stronger performance incentives can help ensure that investments yield meaningful results.

To maximize the impact of EU financing, the budget could reward projects that complement EU-level objectives—for example, national reforms like streamlining permitting processes for local distribution networks that connect with cross-border energy infrastructure.

At the same time, policy coherence across all levels of government is essential. While the EU budget can offer strategic direction and alignment incentives, successful implementation ultimately depends on ownership at national, regional, and local levels. The EU budget can set incentives, but decisions need to be made at home.

Let me conclude here …

…and leave with a slide on our key messages.

I now look forward to hearing from you. Thank you!

[1] Excluding Belarus, Russia, Türkiye and Ukraine.

[2] “April 8 tariffs” refers to the tariff increases between the US and China announced just before the 90-day pause on April 9.

[3] This figure decreases to 0.09 percent with the May-12 tariffs

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER:

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/22/sp052325-ak-a-changed-global-landscape-policy-priorities-in-cesee

MIL OSI

Press Briefing Transcript: Julie Kozack, Director, Communications Department, May 22, 2025

Source: IMF – News in Russian

May 22, 2025

SPEAKER:  Ms. Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department, IMF

MS. KOZACK: Good morning, everyone and welcome to this IMF Press Briefing.  It is wonderful to see you all today on this rainy Washington morning, especially those of you here in person and of course also those of you joining us online.  My name is Julie Kozak.  I’m the Director of Communications at the IMF.  As usual, this press briefing will be embargoed until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time in the United States.  And as usual, I will start with a few announcements and then I’ll take your questions in person on WebEx and via the Press Center.  

So first, our Managing Director, Kristalina Georgieva, and our First Deputy Managing Director, Gita Gopinath, are currently attending the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting taking place in Canada right now.  Second, on May 29th through 30th, the Managing Director will travel to Dubrovnik, Croatia to attend a joint IMF Croatia National Bank Conference focused on promoting growth and resilience in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe.  The Managing Director will participate in the opening panel and will hold meetings with regional counterparts.  

On June 2nd, the Managing Director will travel to Sofia, Bulgaria to attend the 30th Anniversary celebration of the National Trust Ecofund.  During her visit, she will also hold several bilateral meetings with the Bulgarian authorities.  

Our Deputy Managing Director, Nigel Clarke, will travel to Paraguay, Brazil, and the Netherlands next month.  On June 6th, he will launch the IMF’s new regional training program for South America and Mexico, which will be hosted in Asuncion by the Central Bank of Paraguay.  From there, he will travel to Brasilia to deliver a keynote speech on June 10th during the Annual Meeting of the Caribbean Development Bank.  He will also then travel to the Netherlands on June 12th to 13th to participate in the 2025 Consultative Group to Assist the Poor Symposium and to meet with the Dutch authorities.  

Our Deputy Managing Director, Kenji Okamura, will be in Japan from June 11th to 12th for the 10th Tokyo Fiscal Forum to discuss fiscal frameworks and GovTech in the Asia Pacific region.  

And finally, on a kind of housekeeping or scheduling issue, the Article IV Consultation for the United States will be undertaken on a later timetable this year, with discussions to be held in November.  

And with those rather extensive announcements, I will now open the floor to your questions.  For those connecting virtually, please turn on both your camera and microphone when speaking.  All right, let’s open up.  Daniel.

 

QUESTIONER: Thanks for taking my question.  I just wonder if the IMF has any reaction to the passage of last night in the House of Representatives of the One Big, Beautiful bill.  And a related question, how concerned are you by the increase in yields on long-dated U.S. treasuries?  What do you think it says about the market’s view of U.S. debt going into the future and sort of any possible spillovers for IMF borrowers as well?  MS. KOZACK: On the first question, what I can say is we take note of the passing of the legislation in the House of Representatives earlier this morning.  What we will do is we will look to assess a final bill once it has passed through the Senate and also once it’s been enacted.  And, of course, we will have opportunities to share our assessment over time in the various products where we normally would convey our fulsome views.  

On your second question, which was on the bond market.   What I can say there is that we know that the U.S. government bonds are a safe haven asset, and the U.S. dollar, of course, plays a key role as the world’s reserve currency.  The U.S. bond market plays a critical role, of course, in finance and in safe assets.  And this is underpinned by the liquidity and depth of the U.S. market and also the sound institutions in the U.S.  We don’t see any changes in those functions.  And, of course, what we can also say is that although there has been some volatility in markets, market functioning, including in the U.S. Treasury market, has so far been orderly.  

 

QUESTIONER: My question is about Ukraine.  Two topics particularly.  So, the first one, when is the next review of the Ukraine’s EFF is going to be completed, and what amount of money would be disbursed to Kyiv?  And could you please outline the total sum that is remaining within the current program?  And the second part, it’s about debt level.  What is the IMF assessment of current Ukraine’s government debt level?  Is it stable?  Do you see any vulnerabilities and any risks for Ukraine?  Thank you.  

MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Ukraine?  Does anyone online want to come in on Ukraine?  Okay, I don’t see anyone.  

What I can say on Ukraine is that just two days ago, our Staff team started policy discussions with the Ukrainian authorities on the eighth review under the eff.  So, the team is on the ground now.  The discussions are taking place in Kiev and the team will provide an update on the progress at the end of the mission.

In terms of the potential disbursement, I’m just looking here; that’s the seventh disbursement.  We will come back to you on the size of the disbursement, but it should show in the Staff report for the Seventh Review what would be expected for the Eighth Review.  And it would also show the remaining size of the program.  But we’ll come back to you bilaterally with those exact answers.  

And what I can then say on the debt side is at the time of the Seventh Review under the program, we assessed debt, Ukraine’s debt to be sustainable on a forward-looking basis and as with every review that the team of course, will update its assessment as part of the eighth review discussion.  We’ll have more to say on the debt as the eighth review continues.  

 

QUESTIONER: Just one more thing on Ukraine.  Does it make sense for them to consider using the euro as a defense currency for their currency, given the shifting geopolitical sense and what we are seeing with the dollar? MS. KOZACK: So right now, under the program, Ukraine has an inflation targeting regime, and that is where what the program is focused on, our program with Ukraine. So, they have an inflation targeting regime.  They are very much focused on ensuring the stability of that monetary policy regime that Ukraine has.  And, of course, that involves a floating exchange rate.  And I don’t have anything beyond that to say on the currency market.

 

QUESTIONER: The agreement with the IMF established a target for the Central Bank Reserve to meet by June.  According to the technical projection, does the IMF believe Argentina will meet this target?  And if it’s not met, is it possible that we will grant a waiver in the future?

MS. KOZACK: anything else on Argentina?  

QUESTIONER: About Argentina, what is your assessment of the progress of the program agreed with Argentina more than a month after its announcement in last April?  

 

QUESTIONER: The government is about to announce a measure to gain access to voluntarily, of course, but to the dollars that are “under the mattress”, as we call them, undeclared funds to probably meet these targets that Roman was asking about.  I was wondering if this measure has been discussed with the IMF.  And also, you mentioned Georgieva visiting Paraguay and Brazil, if you there’s any plan to visit Argentina as well?  

QUESTIONER: President Milei is about to announce, you know, Minister Caputo, in a few minutes that there is a measure to use similar to attacks Amnesty.  Is the IMF concerned that this could violate its regulations against illicit financial flows? 

MS. KOZACK: So, with respect to Argentina, on April 11th, I think, as you know, our Executive Board approved a new four-year EFF arrangement for Argentina.  It was for $20 billion.  It contained an initial disbursement of $12 billion.  And that the aim of that program is to support Argentina’s transition to the next phase of its stabilization program and reforms.  

President Milei’s administration’s policies continued to deliver impressive results.  These include the rollout of the new FX regime, which has been smooth, a decline in monthly inflation to 2.8 percent in April, another fiscal surplus in April, and reaching a cumulative fiscal surplus of 0.6 percent of GDP for the year, and efforts to continue to open up the economy.  At the same time, the economy is now expanding, real wages are recovering, and poverty continues to fall in Argentina.  

The Fund continues to support the authorities in their efforts to create a more stable and prosperous Argentina.  Our close engagement continues, including in the context of the upcoming discussions for the First Review of the program.  This First Review will allow us to assess progress and to consider policies to build on the strong momentum and to secure lasting stability and growth in Argentina.  And in this regard, there is a shared recognition with the authorities about the importance of strengthening external buffers and securing a timely re-access to international capital markets.  

What I can say on the question about the announcements on that — the question on the undeclared assets.  All I can say right now is that we’re following developments very closely on this, and of course, the team will be ready to provide an assessment in due course.  

On the second part of that question, I do want to also note, and this is included in our Staff report, that the authorities have committed to strengthening financial transparency and also to aligning Argentina’s AML CFT, the Anti-Money Laundering framework, with international standards, as well as to deregulating the economy to encourage its formalization.  So, any new measures, including those that may be aimed at encouraging the use of undeclared assets, should be, of course, consistent with these important commitments.  

And on your question about Paraguay and Brazil, I just want to clarify that it is our Deputy Managing Director, Nigel Clarke, who will be traveling to Brazil and Paraguay, not the Managing Director.  

 

QUESTIONER: Two questions on Syria.  With the U.S. and EU announcing the lifting of sanctions recently, how does this affect any sort of timeline with providing economic assistance?  And secondly, the Managing Director has said that the Fund has to first define data.  Can you just walk through what that entails?  

MS. KOZACK: Can you just repeat what you said?  The Managing Director has said?

 

QUESTIONER: The need to define data.  Just sort of a similar question.  I’m just wondering, following the World Bank statement last week about, you know, Syria now being eligible to borrow from the bank, what sort of discussions the Fund has had with the Syrian authorities since the end of the Spring Meetings and, you know, any update you can give us around possible discussions around an Article IV.  

 

QUESTIONER: About the relationship and if there’s any missed planned virtual or on the ground? 

MS. KOZACK: Let me step back and give a little bit of an overview on Syria. So, first, you know, we’re, of course, monitoring developments in Syria very closely.  Our Staff are preparing to support the international community’s efforts to help with Syria’s economic rehabilitation as conditions allow.  We have had useful discussions with the new Economic Team who took office in late March, including during the Spring Meetings.  And, of course, you will perhaps have seen the press release regarding the roundtable that was held during the Spring Meetings.  IMF Staff have already started to work to rebuild its understanding of the Syrian economy.  We’ve been doing this through interactions with the authorities and also through coordination with other IFIs. And just to remind everyone, our last Article IV with Syria was in 2009.  So, it’s been quite some time since we have had a substantive engagement with Syria.  Syria will need significant assistance to rebuild its economic institutions.  We stand ready to provide advice and targeted and well-prioritized technical assistance in our areas of expertise. I think this goes a little bit to your question on, like, what do we mean by defining data.  I think what the Managing Director was really referring to there is since it has been such a long time since we have had a substantive engagement with Syria, the last Article IV, as I said, was in 2009.  I think there, what she’s really referring to is the need to really work with the Syrian authorities to rebuild basic economic institutions, including the ability to produce economic statistics, right, so that we — so that we and the authorities and the international community of course, can conduct the necessary economic analysis so that we can best support the reconstruction and recovery efforts.  

With respect to the lifting of sanctions, what I can say there is that, of course, the lifting of sanctions and the lifting of sanctions are a matter between member states of the IMF.  What we can say in serious cases that the lifting of sanctions could support Syria’s efforts to overcome its economic challenges and help advance its reconstruction and economic development.  Syria, of course, is an IMF member, and as we’ve just said, you know, we are, of course, engaged closely with the Syrians to explore how, within our mandate, we can best support them.  

 

QUESTIONER: My question is on Russia.  In what ways is the IMF monitoring Russia’s economy under the current sanctions and conflict conditions, and have regular Article IV Consultations or other surveillance activities with Russia resumed to track its economic developments?  

MS. KOZACK: What I can say with respect to Russia is that we are, our Staff, are analyzing data and economic indicators that are reported by the Russian authorities.  We are also looking at counterparty data that is provided to us by other countries, and this is particularly true for cross-border transactions, as well as data from third-party sources. So, this data collection using official and other sources does allow us to put together a picture of the Russian economy.  

We did provide an assessment in the 2025 April WEO, the one that we just released about a month ago.  In this WEO, we assess Russia’s growth at — we expect Russia to grow at 1.5 percent in 2025, 0.9 percent in 2026, and we expect inflation to come down to 8.2 percent in 2025 and 4.4 percent in 2026.  And I don’t have a timetable for the Article IV at this time.  

 

QUESTIONER: I’d like to ask about Deputy Management Director Okamura’s visits to Japan.  So, my question is, what economic topics will be on the agenda during his stay?  Could you tell me a bit more in detail?  

MS. KOZACK: Deputy Managing Director Okamura will travel to Japan, as I said, from June 11th to 12th, and he will be attending the Tokyo Fiscal Forum.  So, this will be the 10th Tokyo Fiscal Forum.  It’s an annual conference that we co-host in Japan every year and the focus is on issues of fiscal policy. In this particular one, Deputy Managing Director Okamura will be discussing fiscal frameworks. It’s very important for all countries to have sound fiscal frameworks so they can implement sound fiscal policy.  He will also be discussing GovTech not only in Japan but in the Asia Pacific region.  And of course, GovTech is very important for countries because it’s a way of modernizing and making government both provision of services in some cases but also potentially collection of revenue more effective and more efficient.  So, those will be the focus of his discussions in Tokyo.  

 

QUESTIONER: I have a question on the recent bailout package by IMF to Pakistan.  The Indian government has expressed a lot of displeasure with Pakistan planning to use this package to build — rebuild — areas that allegedly support cross-border terrorism.  Does the IMF have any assessment of this?  Secondly, I also have another question.  Could you please provide information on the majority vote that was received in approving this bailout package for Pakistan on May 9th?  If you can disclose the information.  

MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Pakistan?  

 

QUESTIONER: Just adding to that, do you have an update on the implications of the escalation of facilities in that border between Pakistan and India on both economies.  

 

QUESTIONER: Thanks a lot.  I guess the only spin I would put on is generally what safeguards does the IMF have that its funds won’t be used for military or in support of military actions, not only there but as a general matter.  And I also, if you’re able to, there was some controversy about the termination of India’s Executive Director of the IMF, K.V. Subramanian.  Do you have any insight into–there are reports there–what it was about but what do you say it’s about?  Thanks a lot.  

MS. KOZACK: With respect to the Indian Executive Director who had been at the Fund, all I can say on this is that the appointment of Executive Directors is a member for the — is a matter for the member country.  It’s not a matter for the Fund, and it’s completely up to the country authorities to determine who represents them at the Fund.  

With respect to Pakistan and the conflict with India, I want to start here by first expressing our regrets and sympathies for the loss of life and for the human toll from the recent conflict.  We do hope for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.  

Now, turning to some of the specific questions about the Board approval of Pakistan’s program, I’m going to step back a minute and provide a little bit of the chronology and timeframe.  The IMF Executive Board approved Pakistan’s EFF program in September of 2024.  And the First review at that time was planned for the first quarter of 2025.  And consistent with that timeline, on March 25th of 2025, the IMF Staff and the Pakistani authorities reached a Staff-Level Agreement on the First Review for the EFF.  That agreement, that Staff-Level Agreement, was then presented to our Executive Board, and our Executive Board completed the review on May 9th.  As a result of the completion of that review, Pakistan received the disbursement at that time.  

What I want to emphasize here is that it is part of a standard procedure under programs that our Executive Board conducts periodic reviews of lending programs to assess their progress.  And they particularly look at whether the program is on track, whether the conditions under the program have been met, and whether any policy changes are needed to bring the program back on track.  And in the case of Pakistan, our Board found that Pakistan had indeed met all of the targets.  It had made progress on some of the reforms, and for that reason, the Board went ahead and approved the program.  

With respect to the voting or the decision-making at our Board, we do not disclose that publicly.  In general, Fund Board decisions are taken by consensus, and in this case, there was a sufficient consensus at the Board to allow us to move forward or for the Board to decide to move forward and complete Pakistan’s review.  

And with respect to the question on safeguards, I do want to make three points here.  The first is that IMF financing is provided to members for the purpose of resolving balance of payments problems.  

In the case of Pakistan, and this is my second point, the EFF disbursements, all of the disbursements received under the EFF, are allocated to the reserves of the central bank.  So, those disbursements are at the central bank, and under the program, those resources are not part of budget financing.  They are not transferred to the government to support the budget. 

And the third point is that the program provides additional safeguards through our conditionality.  And these include, for example, targets on the accumulation of international reserves.  It includes a zero target, meaning no lending from the central bank to the government.  And the program also includes substantial structural conditionality around improving fiscal management.  And these conditions are all available in the program documents if you wanted to do a deeper dive.  And, of course, any deviation from the established program conditions would impact future reviews under the Pakistan program.  

 

QUESTIONER: I have a question on Egypt.  There is a mission in Egypt for the First Review of the EFF loan program.  So, can you please update us on the ongoing discussions, especially since the Prime Minister of Egypt announced yesterday that the program could be concluded in 2027 rather than 2026?  

MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Egypt?  I have a question from the Press Center on Egypt, which I will read aloud.  The question is when will the Fifth Review currently underway with the Egyptian government be concluded, and when will the Executive Board approve this review?  And how much money will Egypt receive once the review is approved?  

So, here’s what I can share on Egypt.  First, let me start here.  So first, I just want to say that the Fund remains committed to supporting Egypt in building its economic resilience and fostering higher private sector-led growth.  Egypt has made clear progress on its macroeconomic reform program, with notable improvements in inflation and foreign exchange reserves.  For the past few weeks, IMF Staff has had productive discussions with the Egyptian authorities on economic performance and policies under the EFF.  As Egypt’s macroeconomic stabilization is taking hold, efforts must now focus on accelerating and deepening reforms that will reduce the footprint of the state in the Egyptian economy, level the playing field, and improve the business environment.  Discussions will continue between the IMF and the Egyptian authorities on the remaining policies and reforms that could support the completion of the Fifth Review.  

 

QUESTIONER: My question is about Sri Lanka.  Sri Lanka’s program is subject to IMF Board approval.  The review is subject to IMF Board approval, but we still haven’t got any word on when that would be.  Is there any delay in this?  And is this delay attributed to the pending electricity adjustments, tariff adjustments, that the Sri Lankan government has committed to?  

MS. KOZACK: So just stepping back for a minute.  On April 25th, IMF Staff and the Sri Lankan authorities reached Staff-Level Agreement on the Fourth Review of Sri Lanka’s program under the EFF.  And once the review is approved by our Executive Board, Sri Lanka will have access to about $344 million in financing.  Completion of the review is subject to approval by the Executive Board, and we expect that Board meeting to take place in the coming weeks.  

The precise timing of the Board meeting is contingent on two things.  The first is implementation of prior actions, and the main prior actions are relating to restoring electricity, cost recovery pricing and ensuring proper function of the automatic electricity price adjustment mechanism.  And the second contingency is completion of the Financing Assurances Review, which will focus on confirming multilateral partners, committed financing contributions to Sri Lanka and whether adequate progress has been made in debt restructuring.  So, in a nutshell, completion of the review is subject to approval by the Executive Board.  We expect the Board meeting to take place in the coming weeks.  And it’s contingent on the two matters that I just mentioned.  

 

QUESTIONER: Thank you for having my questions on Ecuador.  Since the IMF is still completing the second review under the EFF program for Ecuador, do you think it’s going to be time to change the program, the goals, or maybe the amount of the program?  Because Ecuador is now facing different challenges compared to 2024.  The oil prices are falling, so that is going to affect the fiscal situation for Ecuador.  And also, I would like to know if Ecuador is still looking for a new program under the RSF.  And the last one, I would like to know if, do you think that Ecuador is going to need to make some important changes this year on oil subsidies and a tax reform?  I think, as I said, Ecuador now is facing some important challenges in the fiscal situation, so do you think it’s going to be possible because of, you know, all the social protests and all that kind of stuff?  Do you think it’s going to be possible to do that in Ecuador?  

 

QUESTIONER: Is there a request, an official request, in place to modify the program?  And if there is, of course, details of the new one, you can share.  

MS. KOZACK: And then I have one question online from the Press Center regarding Ecuador.  Is the sovereign negotiating new targets, given their fiscal position deteriorated compared to last year?  Our understanding is that $410 million was not dispersed under the First Review.?

So let me share what I can on Ecuador.  So, right now, representatives from the IMF, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank are in Quito this week to meet with the authorities and discuss the strengthening of financial and technical support to the country.  As part of this tripartite visit, we have a new IMF Mission Chief who is participating, and she is also using that opportunity to have courtesy meetings with the authorities and to continue discussions and advance toward a Second Review under Ecuador’s EFF.  

What else I can add, just as background, is that the Executive Board in December approved the First Review of Ecuador’s 48-month EFF.  About $500 million was disbursed after the approval of that Frist Review.  And at that time, the Executive Board also concluded the Article IV Consultation.

I can also say that the authorities have made excellent progress in the implementation of their economic program under the EFF.  And regarding the precise timing of the Second Review, we will provide an update on the next steps in due course and when we’re able to do so.  

 

QUESTIONER: Just a quick question on tariffs.  I’m just wondering if the IMF has a response to the U.S.-China deal that was struck in Geneva earlier this month.  You know, if the deal holds, I appreciate it’s a 90-day pause, but if the deal holds, how would you foresee that changing the Fund’s current economic forecast for the U.S. and China and for the global economy?  Thanks.  

MS. KOZACK: As you noted, earlier in May, China and the U.S. announced a 90-day rollback of most of the bilateral tariffs imposed since April 2nd, and they established a mechanism to discuss economic and trade relations.  The two sides reduced their tariff from peak levels, leaving in place 10 percent additional tariffs.  So, the additional tariffs before this agreement were 125 percent.  Now, the additional tariff has agreed to be 10 percent, you know, for the 90 days.  This is obviously a positive step for the world’s two largest economies.

What I can also add is that for the U.S., you may recall, during the Spring Meetings, we talked a lot about the overall effective tariff rate for the U.S.  At that time, we assessed it at 25.5 percent.  This announcement and the reduction in tariffs will bring the U.S. effective tariff rate down to a bit over 14 percent.  

Now, with respect to the impact, what I can say is that the reduction in tariffs and the easing of tensions does provide some upside risk to our global growth forecast.  We will be updating that global growth forecast as part of our July WEO.  And so that will give us an opportunity to provide a full assessment.  All of this said, of course, the outlook, the global outlook in general does remain one of high uncertainty.  And so that uncertainty is still with us.  

 

QUESTIONER: I have a broad question regarding the following – at the IMF World Bank Spring Meeting, the recent one,  the Treasury Secretary Bessent called for the IMF and the World Bank to refocus on their core mission on macroeconomic stability and development.  Did the IMF start any discussion on this topic with the U.S. administration?  And my second question, do you foresee any changes to your lending programs to take into account the views of the Trump Administration regarding issues like climate change and international development?  Thank you.  

MS. KOZACK: What I can say on this is the U.S. is our largest shareholder, and we greatly value the voice of the United States.  We have a constructive engagement with the U.S. authorities, and we very much appreciate Secretary Bessent’s reiteration of the United States’ commitment to the Fund and to our role.  The IMF has a clearly defined mandate to support economic and financial stability globally.  Our Management Team and our entire Staff are focused exactly on this mandate, helping our 191 members tackle their economic challenges and their balance of payments risks.  

What I can also add is that at the most recent Spring Meetings, the ones we just had in April, our membership identified two areas where they’ve asked the IMF to deepen our work.  And the first is on external imbalances, and the second is on our monitoring of the financial sector.  So they’re looking for us to really deepen our work in these two areas.  

As far as taking that work forward, we will continue working with our Executive Board on these areas, as well as to carry out some important policy reviews.  And I think the Managing Director referred to these during the Spring Meetings.  The first is the Comprehensive Surveillance Review, which will set out our surveillance priorities for the next five years.  And the second is the review of program design and conditionality.  And that will carefully consider how our lending can best help countries address low growth challenges and durably resolve their balance of payments weaknesses.  

I have a slight update for you on Ukraine, which says — so the eighth — so if we look at the documents that were published at the time of the Seventh Review program, the one that was approved by the Executive Board a little while ago, based on that, the Eighth Review disbursement would be about $520 million.  And, the discussions of the Eighth Review are ongoing, and any disbursement, as always, is subject to approval by our Executive Board. 

And with that, I will bring this press briefing to a close.  So first, let me thank you all for your participation today.  As a reminder, the briefing is embargoed until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time in the United States.  As always, a transcript will be made available later on IMF.org.  In case of any clarifications or additional queries, please do not hesitate to reach out to my colleagues at media@imf.org.  This concludes our press briefing, and I wish everyone a wonderful day.  I look forward to seeing you next time.  Thanks very much.

 

  

*  *  *  *  *

 

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MEDIA RELATIONS

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https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/22/tr-05222025-com-regular-press-briefing-may-22-2025

MIL OSI

France: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission

Source: IMF – News in Russian

A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

Paris, France – May 22, 2025

An International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission, led by Manuela Goretti and comprising Florian Misch, Rasmane Ouedraogo, Maryam Vaziri, and Torsten Wezel, conducted discussions during May 12-22 for the 2025 Article IV Consultation with France. At the end of the visit, the mission issued the following statement:

The French economy has demonstrated resilience despite high uncertainty, with disinflation progressing well and the labor market remaining robust. However, high and rising public debt, combined with significant domestic and external headwinds to the recovery, highlights the need to strengthen public finances and pursuing structural reforms to foster sustainable growth. The French authorities’ commitment to bring the deficit below 3 percent of GDP by 2029 is welcome and should be supported by a credible and well-designed package of measures. Advancing France’s structural reform agenda will be crucial to boost productivity and facilitate fiscal consolidation. While the financial sector remains resilient, strong supervisory practices need to continue adapting to an increasingly complex financial landscape. France’s sustained efforts to deepen the European single market remain critical to support the economy and strengthen its ability to withstand shocks.

Economic Outlook

High domestic and external uncertainty is expected to continue weighing on the short-term economic outlook. Real GDP growth is projected to slow to 0.6 percent in 2025 and reach 1 percent in 2026. These projections reflect a delayed recovery in private consumption and investment due to weak confidence and fiscal tightening this year, despite some uplift from monetary policy easing. Weaker external demand, amid trade tensions, market volatility, and geo-economic uncertainty, is expected to further dampen exports and investment prospects. These projections are based on the April World Economic Outlook global assumptions and do not reflect the latest trade policy announcements. Over the medium term, growth is projected to converge to around 1.2 percent, before decelerating towards its long-term potential of 1 percent reflecting both demographic trends and need for further structural reforms. The disinflationary process is progressing well, with average headline inflation projected at 1.2 percent in 2025, due to base effects and lower energy prices, and core inflation at 1.9 percent.

The outlook remains subject to significant downside risks, notwithstanding potential upsides. Deepening geoeconomic fragmentation and rising trade tensions could disrupt trade and financial flows and dampen economic activity. In such an environment, uncertainty would increase, and financial conditions could tighten further, reducing domestic demand and worsening debt dynamics. Political fragmentation and social tensions could delay fiscal consolidation and reform efforts, further weighing on confidence and the outlook, raising fiscal risks. On the upside, easing trade tensions and renewed structural reform momentum could improve growth prospects over the medium term. Domestic reforms could be strengthened through deeper coordination and integration at the EU level. Consumption could be stronger if household saving rates eased more rapidly on the back of dissipating uncertainty. Business investment and export performance could also surprise on the upside, driven by higher demand—in France and in the rest of Europe—including for defense as well as digital and green technologies.

Fiscal Policy: Reducing Debt while Refocusing Spending Priorities

Building on the 2025 budget, the authorities are committed to implementing their Medium-term Fiscal Structural Plan (MTFSP) to bring the deficit below 3 percent of GDP by 2029. While the envisaged adjustment is appropriate to improve debt dynamics and strengthen France’s resilience to shocks, it needs to be supported by a credible and well-designed package of measures and remains subject to implementation risks, as evidenced by recent setbacks. Under staff’s current policy baseline scenario, which incorporates only legislated and clearly specified measures, the deficit is projected to decline to 5.4 percent of GDP in 2025, in line with the budget target. However pending approval of significant additional measures, it would remain around 6 percent of GDP in the medium-term, keeping debt on an upward trend until 2030. While short-term risks remain manageable, debt dynamics have weakened significantly, following consecutive fiscal slippages in 2023 and 2024, and remain highly sensitive to the real interest rate and growth path. In this context, France’s commitment to undertake further fiscal consolidation, as per EU rules, represents an important mitigating factor.

Significant additional fiscal efforts will be crucial to preserve fiscal space and create room to absorb rising spending demands, while placing debt on a downward path. Staff recommends a frontloaded structural fiscal effort of 1.1 percent of GDP in 2026, followed by an average of about 0.9 percent of GDP per year over the medium term, broadly in line with the authorities’ plans. The recommended adjustment would allow the country to exit the excessive deficit procedure by end-2029, as targeted. Staff’s debt sustainability analysis indicates that the recommended fiscal path would markedly reduce medium-term debt sustainability risks, with the debt-stabilizing primary balance being reached in 2027.

Achieving this substantial fiscal consolidation will require decisive actions and difficult decisions to ensure equity and fairness amid challenging trade-offs:

  • Given France’s already high tax-to-GDP ratio, any new tax measures should be focused on reducing inefficient tax expenditures and tackling tax avoidance while improving equity. While exceptional temporary revenue measures can help kickstart much needed fiscal adjustment, France’s level of taxation—among the highest in the EU—indicates that sustained tax-based fiscal consolidation, of the magnitude necessary to advance France’s medium-term plans, would hamper business confidence, household consumption, and growth potential. Building on recent experiences, the authorities should continue to monitor and evaluate tax expenditure programs to address inefficiencies vis-à-vis intended objectives and generate savings. This approach would also simplify the tax system and facilitate revenue forecasting.

  • The authorities should focus on rationalizing spending and strengthening its efficiency, with concerted action across all government levels: central government, social security, and local governments. France has the highest spending-to-GDP ratio among EU countries. There are several avenues to rationalize spending and improve its quality, while preserving growth-enhancing investment in key priority areas and mitigating distributional impacts on the most vulnerable. The planned expansion of spending reviews and efforts to minimize overlaps across government entities, including local governments, can streamline spending by addressing inefficiencies and reducing red tape. There is also scope to further improve the targeting of social benefits, including by reviewing eligibility and duration of unemployment benefits, to better target active labor market initiatives, as well as to further simplify and harmonize pension schemes, while ensuring a balanced system, building on the 2023 pension reform. These efforts would foster less fragmented and longer careers while enhancing the sustainability and intergenerational equity of the social security system. Enhanced monitoring and financial coordination can also generate savings at the local and national levels.

The authorities’ initiatives to reinforce public finances forecasting and budget controls, in response to recent fiscal slippages, are welcome. The March 2025 Action plan by the authorities aims at enhancing monitoring of tax revenue, fostering greater transparency, and reinforcing the role of the High Council for Public Finances. Sustained efforts in these areas are essential to identify and proactively address fiscal risks, strengthen public finance management, and enhance fiscal policy credibility. Contingency plans will be also needed to ensure that pressing priority spending needs, including in defense, are met without compromising public finances.

Macrostructural Policies to Support Jobs and Productivity Growth

Raising weak productivity growth is critical for sustaining France’s economic prospects, in the face of substantial fiscal consolidation needs. The per capita income gap between France and the US has increased since the early 2000s and now exceeds 20 percent, primarily due to lower productivity and employment in France. Macro-structural reforms can play a critical role in lifting potential output, while facilitating fiscal consolidation efforts. For example, an increase in potential GDP growth of 0.3 percentage points could help reduce public debt by nearly 10 percent of GDP over the long term.

France is well-positioned to capitalize on the green and digital transitions through greater efforts to support innovation and access to capital. France’s comparative advantage in low-carbon technologies and its potential to become a European hub for Artificial Intelligence can foster the development of new technologies and support growth. Ongoing efforts by the authorities to review and rationalize state aid and R&D tax expenditures by focusing on the most impactful schemes and better targeting eligibility criteria can boost innovation and help close gaps with peers. Enhancing access to finance and reducing financing costs for productive but credit-constrained firms is crucial and should be supported by advancing the EU Savings and Investment Union which can increase the availability of capital and its efficient allocation.

To support entrepreneurship, policies should focus on easing entry barriers and reducing the regulatory burden. France performs relatively well in terms of product market regulation, but reducing administrative market entry barriers for firms, especially in some services sectors, is crucial for boosting business dynamism and productivity growth. The Simplification Bill, currently under discussion, would be an important step towards further reducing the regulatory burden and streamlining requirements, particularly for small and medium size firms. At the European level, deepening the single market through the removal of remaining intra-EU trade barriers and greater harmonization of regulations can help firms achieve economies of scale and incentivize innovation by expanding market size.

Sustained efforts to promote employment and job quality remain critical to facilitate green and digital transitions, amid an aging workforce, and boost productivity growth. While employment rates have increased, they remain low in segments of the population compared to other countries. Possible areas for policy intervention include further social benefit reforms to enhance work incentives and reduce career fragmentation, particularly among younger and older individuals. These measures can be complemented by efforts to further raise labor force participation of women, including through recent initiatives to support STEM careers, and better integrate migrants into the labor market. Promoting workforce skills and healthy aging would also contribute to job quality.

Adapting to a Complex Financial Landscape

The banking sector has demonstrated resilience to recent shocks, supported by prudent lending standards and strong precautionary buffers. While profitability remains below the EU average, banks’ solvency and liquidity positions are robust, with adequate buffers. Sound prudential measures are mitigating housing market risks as property prices stabilize, while risks to the banking sector from corporate indebtedness and sovereign exposures remain manageable. Notwithstanding high uncertainty, financial stability risks remain contained, with French banks showing resilience under severe geopolitical and recessionary stress test scenarios, applied in the context of the IMF’s 2025 Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP).

The connections between the banking system, insurance firms, and domestic funding markets warrant continued close monitoring. The FSAP stress test indicates that investment funds possess sufficient liquidity to withstand large redemption shocks, and French banks’ liquidity buffers can absorb potential market shocks from associated fixed-income sell-offs. Moreover, liquidity management tools to contain redemption risks have been widely adopted. Nevertheless, amid global uncertainty and episodes of high market volatility, there is scope to further strengthen oversight through greater monitoring and data sharing on fund liability structures as well as closer collaboration among non-bank financial institutions supervisors in France and at the EU level.

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/22/CS-France-2025

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Kingdom of the Netherlands–The Netherlands: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission

Source: IMF – News in Russian

May 20, 2025

A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

An IMF team, led by Mr. Fabian Bornhorst, visited the Netherlands during May 7–20 to conduct the 2025 Article IV consultation. The following statement was issued at the end of the visit:

The Dutch economy is among the most developed countries globally and has drawn strength from integration in global value chains. In recent years, it has weathered shocks well, yet its resilience is being tested, again—this time by trade tensions and geoeconomic fragmentation. Fiscal buffers are ample, and the financial system is well-positioned to absorb shocks. At the same time, the economy is operating at capacity and inflation is elevated. And increasingly binding constraints—in the labor market, housing, emissions space, and the electricity grid—are limiting the ability to grow and adapt. Futureproofing the economy will therefore require policies that both tackle bottlenecks and expand supply capacity, and align with a long-term vision for sustainable growth. Reforms, complementary to EU initiatives, should aim to increase labor input and firm productivity, expand the availability of SME financing, and effectively manage the green and demographic transitions.

Outlook

  1. After a weak start, domestic demand is projected to drive growth in 2025 even as trade tensions affect momentum. Real GDP growth is projected to reach 1.1 percent this year. Fundamentals remain strong: unemployment is low, wage growth is robust, and real household purchasing power is solid—supporting private consumption. However, tariffs, trade tensions, and lower trading partner growth are expected to dampen external demand. Combined with uncertainty over future trade policies and less favorable financial conditions, these factors hold back investment and weaken consumer confidence. With a cooling economy, the small positive output gap is expected to close next year; medium-term growth will converge to its estimated potential of 1.2 percent.
  2. Elevated inflation is projected to decline gradually and reach the 2 percent target in late 2026. Inflation is projected at 3 percent in 2025. Wage growth has been robust, although real wages have not reached pre-pandemic levels. Going forward, wage growth is projected to moderate as indicated by recent collective wage agreements and early signs of easing labor market tightness. Fiscal measures, on net, will contribute positively to inflation in 2025 and 2026, as the roll-back of some reduced VAT rates and the increase in excise rates are partly offset by energy subsidies and the freeze on social housing rents. As the trade shock reverberates through the global economy, deflationary forces are expected to arise from lower global growth and energy prices, and appreciation of the euro.

Risks

  1. Downside risks to growth dominate and arise mainly from trade tensions. Possible direct effects from new/higher U.S. tariffs on currently exempt items (e.g., pharmaceuticals) would lower exports. More generally, rising geoeconomic fragmentation and stronger-than-expected indirect effects from global trade disruptions pose downside risks to growth. The disruption to supply chains could be more severe than expected, leading to upward price pressures even in the context of subdued growth. Policy makers should stay vigilant and nimble. Barring more extreme scenarios, automatic stabilizers in the fiscal framework are sufficient to weather shocks. Domestically, uncertainties in economic policy and the extent to which growth bottlenecks are binding represent risks to the outlook. These can be addressed by implementing consistent, forward-looking, and confidence-building measures.

Fiscal Policy

  1. Fiscal policy is geared to supporting households in the near term, while aiming to keep the deficit below 3 percent of GDP by 2030. In view of many, and competing, demands, it is welcome that revised plans in the Spring Memorandum adhere to the trend-based fiscal policy (the Dutch Medium-Term Fiscal Framework) and are in line with national fiscal rules. Key measures in 2025 to support household purchasing power include income tax relief, extending reduced fuel excise duties, energy subsidies, and rent support. To meet the deficit target by 2030, spending cuts in public administration, international cooperation, education, and asylum are proposed. The plans, however, are more backloaded than before, and, in many cases, specific measures have yet to be formulated.
  2. Pivoting fiscal policy from stimulating demand to expanding supply would help the economy grow and adapt. Fiscal policy is set to provide an impulse of around 1 percent of GDP in 2025-26. As household real incomes now exceed pre-pandemic levels and the economy is operating at capacity with elevated inflation, broad fiscal support is no longer needed. Scaling back demand support is timely and advisable. While underspending and revenue overperformance could deliver a neutral fiscal stance—as in 2024—proactively identifying and implementing measures would allow for steering the adjustment. To boost the supply capacity of the economy, the government should invest in infrastructure, education, and R&D, foster investment to increase the housing supply and productivity, implement growth-enhancing tax reforms, and tackle bottlenecks from nitrogen and electricity grid congestion. Fostering private and increasing public investment will also contribute to reducing the high external current account surplus.
  3. Better aligning policies with long-term goals would improve the effectiveness of fiscal policy. For example, while freezing social rents provides immediate support to some households, it weakens the financial health of housing associations and limits investment to expand and upgrade the housing stock—key to addressing shortages. Extending the reduction of fuel excises disincentivizes the clean energy transition, countering efforts to reduce implicit fuel subsidies and foster EV adoption through subsidies. Limited inflation adjustment of income tax brackets—including to finance reduced VAT rates—offsets previous income tax relief, disproportionately affects poorer households, and disincentivizes labor supply. Education and R&D spending cuts are at odds with fostering high levels of human capital and innovation. In this context, the announced tax and benefits system reform is welcome, offering an opportunity to simplify and align policies.
  4. Tackling medium-term spending pressures through structural fiscal reforms will increase fiscal room to maneuver. With a low debt-to-GDP ratio of 43.4 percent, the fiscal position is strong. Moreover, deficits and debt are projected to remain structurally below 3 and 60 percent of GDP through 2030. However, projections also indicate that, by 2050, spending on health, ageing, and climate change will increase by about 4 percent of GDP. Ambitions to scale up defense spending beyond 2 percent of GDP adds to these pressures. Addressing cost drivers early would free fiscal room to maneuver, including: (i) reversing the reduction of health deductibles, increasing health care co-payments, and adjusting the basic policy package while supporting solidarity; (ii) linking the retirement age one-to-one to greater life expectancy for tax-funded old-age pensions; and (iii) moving away from fuel subsidies to revenue-generating carbon pricing and taxation.
  5. Implementing the planned tax reforms would support growth. The Building Blocks Tax report rightly recommends streamlining inefficient and ineffective tax expenditures, including abolishing reduced VAT rates. This would lower compliance costs, broaden the tax base, and may open the door to a lower tax rate. Speedy implementation of the proposed capital income taxation reform (‘Box 3’) would align investment incentives by taxing capital income more consistently. and encouraging better resource allocation. Together, the reforms will foster higher investment, productivity, and growth.

Financial Sector Policies

  1. Risks to financial stability are elevated and have risen, warranting continued close monitoring. Trade policy tensions and uncertainty have increased financial market volatility and weighed on investor confidence in recent months. More volatility in asset prices could trigger periodic margin calls, particularly on pension funds’ derivatives. Elevated inflation still poses non-negligible risks for insurers. While household and corporate indebtedness is declining, it remains well above the euro area average. In real estate, developments in the commercial sector signal reduced risks. However, the residential market shows renewed signs of overheating. Nominal and real house prices, as well as sales, have picked up again, and housing valuations remain among the highest in Europe.
  2. Even so, the financial sector remains resilient to shocks as buffers are ample and commensurate to risks, and the macroprudential policy stance is broadly appropriate. Banking, insurance, and pension fund (PF) fundamentals remain sound. Banks are well capitalized and liquid. Bank profits remain robust and loan delinquencies low, despite a pick-up in corporate bankruptcies, which reflects normalization following phasing out of pandemic support. The countercyclical capital buffer has been maintained at the 2 percent positive neutral rate since May 2024. Other buffers for the largest banks remain in a 0.25‑2 percent CET1-to-risk-weighted-assets ratio range. The insurance sector is profitable and solvent. Funding ratios of occupational PFs have declined as interest rates fell but are rebounding ahead of the system’s transition to defined-contribution schemes and stood comfortably at 120 percent, on average, at end-2025Q1. PFs are resilient to liquidity risks in adverse stress scenarios and can raise cash at short notice if needed from repo or other money markets to meet margin calls on interest derivatives.
  3. Addressing access to homeownership through policies that increase housing supply would allow recalibrating borrower-based macroprudential measures towards minimizing financial risks. Housing market risks continue to be mitigated by structural factors including rising real disposable incomes, the large share of fixed-rate mortgages, and full legal recourse in case of default. The maximum LTV limit was lowered to 100 percent in 2018. Eligibility for, and duration of the mortgage interest deductibility were tightened, and the maximum rate reduced. Mortgage risks are further mitigated by the recent extension of risk-weight floors until November 2026. Efforts to ensure a clear legal basis for supervisory authorities’ regular access to granular transaction and loan-level data for risk monitoring and analysis—to identify pockets of vulnerability as they emerge—should continue. Still, as recommended in the 2024 IMF Financial Stability Assessment Program (FSAP) report, to cool the housing market, maximum LTV limits should be progressively lowered even more, to 90 percent, mortgage interest deductibility gradually removed, and borrowers further incentivized to lower exposures to interest-only mortgages. A significant increase in housing supply is needed to boost housing affordability, facilitate broad access to the property ladder, and to reduce banking and insurance risks from residential mortgage exposures. This will require reconsideration of the roles of housing associations and private investors, revisiting rent controls, revising land-use policies and streamlining building regulations.
  4. The pension reform will strengthen PFs financial sustainability, and offers an opportunity to improve intergenerational fairness, and rebalance portfolios. Most defined-benefit schemes (DBs) have faced financial pressure since 2008. Many have struggled to index benefits in the low-interest-rate environment, and some were forced to cut benefits. Also, DBs asset allocations do not reflect age-related risk preferences. This has raised concerns about intergenerational fairness. Together, these factors weakened confidence in the system. The transition to defined-contribution schemes will alleviate pressures from ageing on PFs sustainability. It will also allow for portfolio allocations that better align with risk preferences of age cohorts, including more investments in equity, while maintaining a high degree of solidarity and collective risk-sharing. Notably, about 80 percent of plans are expected to combine individual investment accounts with collective investments that bundle assets and distribute returns across individual accounts.

Addressing Growth Bottlenecks

  1. A legally-robust and future-oriented nitrogen strategy is urgently needed. Developers now face permit uncertainty, investors lack confidence, and farmers remain in limbo, as environmental targets slip further out of reach. Recognizing the urgency, the government is developing a strategy that includes shifting from deposition to direct emission measurement and extending the timeline to halve emissions by 5 years. More details on possible measures are paramount. Economic considerations suggest that fees on emitters are the most cost-effective and efficient way to reduce emissions. To avoid tax increases for the average farmer, a system of feebates—where emissions-intensive farming pays fees that fund rebates for lower emission practices—offers a balanced approach. Socially-acceptable solutions and emission reductions have been achieved through a combination of taxation, regulation, subsidies, and science-based guidance.
  2. Plans to relieve electricity grid bottlenecks and ready the grid for the green transition should be accelerated and paired with dynamic pricing. The government’s strategy focuses on expediting high-voltage grid extensions and streamlining permitting. There are plans to guarantee debt issuance by the grid operator of about 4.4 percent of GDP to facilitate grid expansion. However, in the meantime, connection wait-times remain too long. Efforts to manage grid pressures should also include increasing storage capacity and incentivizing energy efficiency of households and industry, while helping the energy-poor adapt. To better manage demand, energy savings could be further incentivized by promoting greater use of dynamic metering and pricing. These are effective in shifting consumption to off-peak periods, help consumers save money, and reduce the need for extra capacity to meet peak demand.

Strengthening Labor and Firm Productivity

  1. Labor market reforms should continue to focus on enhancing human capital. Given the aging population and labor shortages, it is critical to fully utilize the potential of workers across all generations and smaller firms. Reforms should improve educational outcomes and vocational training to address skill shortages and enhance lifelong learning. Recent progress to address labor market duality, such as reducing false self-employment, are welcome. Introducing mandatory disability insurance and strengthening pension arrangements for the self-employed are important measures to be implemented.. Additionally, better integration of workers with a migratory background would be facilitated by stepped-up language training, job search support, and recognition of qualifications acquired abroad.
  2. Policies to support firm productivity should address several key areas. First, business dynamism should be promoted by reducing entry/exit barriers to enhance firm-level allocative efficiency. Second, productivity-enhancing investment should be increased by improving the investment climate and addressing growth bottlenecks, advancing digitalization, and encouraging R&D. Third, productivity spillovers should be fostered by investments with large spillover effects (e.g., research parks and networks) to build connections among firms, research institutions, and regions. Fourth, efforts are needed to support firms to grow from start-ups to scale-ups and beyond. Plans to equalize tax treatment of stock options for small firms are welcome and should be expanded to include eliminating the reduced profit tax rate for SMEs as well as providing a menu of financing options along a firm’s development stages.  

Domestic Capital Market Reforms

  1. Capital market reforms would help expand SME financing by improving valuations, stimulating investor demand for both equity and debt instruments, and simplifying debt issuances.  
  • Improving valuations—thereby increasing the amount of capital firms can raise when they issue stocks or bonds—will require increasing the size and liquidity of secondary markets. This should be combined with measures to narrow information gaps, such as easing investor benchmarking, to help reduce investor risk, and with reforming the Bankruptcy Act and securities laws to help investors shorten the settlement cycle for transferable securities and reallocate capital from failed startups more quickly. The authorities should also continue to push forward EU-level reforms, as integration into a larger, EU-wide capital market would also improve liquidity, and hence valuations.
  • Increasing PFs’ and insurers’ investments in domestic venture capital and other equity funds would also increase equity market size and raise valuations. The pension reform offers such an opportunity. Higher pension investment, including from abroad, in domestic equity may also be supported at the EU level by revised legal and supervisory requirements for pan-European private pension products that allow for more venture capital investment.
  • Standardizing and simplifying procedures for smaller-denomination corporate debt securities issuance, lowering the minimum denomination, making pricing more transparent, and leveraging online platforms and other dealer markets would help increase retail investor participation and make more debt capital available to firms.

Managing the Green Transition

  1. To meet national and European climate goals, stronger policies will be needed, including to reduce uncertainty and build public support.  The current policy settings are projected to fall short of the 2030 goals. Clear and consistent policies are required to provide investment certainty for the private sector. The EU climate agenda—including introduction of CBAM and phasing out of free ETS allowances and expansion of ETS coverage—will facilitate progress. These measures may impact purchasing power. Lower-income households may struggle to adapt even though the burdens of ETS reforms across different income groups are estimated to be uniform relative to consumption. To manage these challenges, implementing compensatory funds and other targeted fiscal tools can help balance policy trade-offs and enhance public support.
  2. Recalibrating transport policies can prevent a decline in fiscal revenues and address congestion, while meeting climate targets and managing electricity demand. By 2035, revenue from transport is projected to decline by 0.5 percent of GDP, while electricity demand could rise by 20 percent with electrification of the vehicle fleet. These challenges would be best addressed with congestion pricing in urban areas and distance-based charges.

Supporting EU Reforms

  1. The authorities should continue to push for rapid implementation of EU-wide reforms, including as the Netherlands stands to gain from these initiatives. With its mature markets, enhancing EU-wide competition by cutting intra-EU trade barriers would complement national efforts to boost business dynamism and productivity. EU-level actions to foster intra-EU labor mobility—recognition of professional qualifications, pension portability—are complementary to addressing labor and skill shortages at home. A European Savings and Investment Union (SIU) would broaden investment opportunities for Dutch savers and allow Dutch firms to more easily tap a wider pool of European savings. Finally, completing the EU energy market would ensure better connectivity and energy security, lower prices, and also lower investment needs to match increasing demand.

*   *   *   *   *

The IMF team thanks the authorities and other counterparts for the constructive policy dialogue and productive collaboration.

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Eva-Maria Graf

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/19/mcs-05192025-kingdom-of-the-netherlands-staff-concluding-statement-of-2025-art-iv-mission

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