Category: Russia

Source: IMF – News in Russian

May 15, 2025

End-of-Mission press releases include statements of IMF staff teams that convey preliminary findings after a visit to a country. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF’s Executive Board for discussion and decision.

• Singapore’s economy recovered in 2024 but is forecast to slow down in 2025 due to the recent escalation of global trade tensions. Inflation is expected to stay muted.
• Fiscal and monetary policies are appropriately supporting the economy. Singapore has ample fiscal space to provide additional temporary and targeted support in case downside growth risks materialize.
• Singapore’s financial sector remains sound and resilient, underpinned by well-capitalized and liquid banks. Potential financial sector risks from tightening global financial conditions should continue to be closely monitored.

Washington, DC: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) team, led by Mr. Masahiro Nozaki, conducted discussions on the 2025 Article IV Consultation with the Singaporean authorities and other stakeholders from May 5 to May 15, 2025. At the conclusion of the discussions, Mr. Nozaki issued the following statement:

“Singapore’s economy recovered strongly in 2024 and disinflation advanced. Growth increased to 4.4 percent in 2024, from 1.8 percent in 2023, supported by an upturn in the global technology cycle. Headline inflation decreased to 1.5 percent in end-2024 and further to 0.9 percent in March 2025, reflecting disinflation in both tradable and non-tradable prices.

“However, the recent escalation of trade tensions and an associated spike in global policy uncertainty—as highlighted in the April 2025 World Economic Outlook—have sharply weakened Singapore’s economic outlook. Growth is projected to slow to 1.7 percent in 2025. Inflation is expected to stay muted, with headline inflation and Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) Core Inflation forecast at 1.1 percent and 1.0 percent in 2025, respectively, due to emerging slack in the economy and projected declines in commodity and other tradables prices from slower global growth.

“There is a high degree of uncertainty around this forecast, reflecting elevated global economic and policy uncertainty. Risks to growth are firmly tilted to the downside, stemming from a possible further escalation of global trade tensions and a sharp tightening of global financial conditions. While risks to inflation are tilted to the downside due to weaker-than-expected global and domestic growth, potential upside inflation risks, including from possible supply chain disruptions, should also be monitored.

“Against this backdrop, MAS appropriately loosened monetary policy in January and April 2025. In view of weak inflation, slowing growth, and emerging slack in the economy, staff sees scope for further monetary policy easing in the near term. However, MAS should remain vigilant and data dependent with respect to the speed and magnitude of easing in light of the large uncertainty, as well as both upside and downside risks around the inflation outlook.

“The expansionary fiscal stance for FY2025 (April 2025-March 2026) is appropriate against the backdrop of slowing growth, increasing economic slack, and elevated downside risks. Continued support to households and firms will provide ongoing relief, while enhanced infrastructure spending will support domestic demand and help promote long-term growth. Singapore has ample fiscal space that can be deployed to provide targeted and temporary fiscal support in the event of downside risks materializing. Over the medium term, currently untargeted transfers should be phased out or better targeted to vulnerable households and firms. With strong fiscal institutions and buffers, Singapore is well positioned to meet its medium-term fiscal spending needs, including for rising healthcare costs due to an aging population, scaling up high-quality public infrastructure, and strengthening social safety nets.

“Singapore’s financial sector is resilient. Banks are well capitalized, have ample liquidity, and are profitable. The authorities’ regulatory and supervisory efforts have contained existing financial sector vulnerabilities, including from cross-border exposure, reliance on foreign exchange funding, residential and commercial real estate exposures, interconnectedness between banks and nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs), and exposures to relatively small segments of highly leveraged corporates and households. Nonetheless, in view of the risk of a sharp tightening of global financial conditions, continued vigilance is warranted against these vulnerabilities.

“We welcome the steady implementation of the authorities’ Forward Singapore initiative, including enhanced paid parental leave to support young families; enhanced grants for low-income first-time home buyers to improve housing affordability; and additional transfers to improve the retirement adequacy for low-income workers and retirees. The introduction of temporary financial support for involuntarily unemployed individuals has helped strengthen Singapore’s social safety nets. The government continues to make progress with helping workers to reskill and firms to adopt AI technologies.

“The IMF team would like to thank the authorities and other counterparts for their close collaboration and productive discussions.”

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/15/pr25147-singapore-imf-completes-2025-aiv-mission

MIL OSI

Source: IMF – News in Russian

Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director, IMF

May 14, 2025

Good morning and a very warm welcome to everybody, those who are in the room and those who join us online.

It is my great pleasure to join you because the topic that you will be discussing truly affects countries, businesses, communities, in a way that slows down progress and makes it harder for countries that are still falling behind to catch up.

We all know the data. Global public debt is expected to approach 100 percent of global GDP by the end of the decade. In other words, we would owe as much as we generate in one year. And this is worse than what we had during the pandemic.

You all know that governments are wrestling with tight budgets. And now with trade policy uncertainty, the fiscal trade-offs are going to be even more complicated. This is a problem everywhere in countries rich and poor, but it is particularly painful for emerging markets and developing economies, where the mounting cost of servicing debts is squeezing their ability to make investments and to respond to shocks.

It is against this backdrop that at the Fund we have been doing extensive work on issues of global debt architecture and sovereign debt restructurings. These efforts have intensified since the pandemic, and you are all aware we came up with the Common Framework, and then we realized we needed to have an inclusive space for debtors and creditors, both public and private, so we created the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable. I see people who are members, and I want to appreciate all those who are engaged in it.

We are also actively working with authorities in Paris Club and non-Paris Club countries to bring everybody to the table for debt restructuring. Our engagement seeks to improve coordination, ensure that countries play by global rules, and very important, that there is comparability of treatment across creditors during debt restructuring.

Five years ago, much less was known about the magnitude and nature of lending from non-Paris club creditors, or how to encourage their involvement in debt restructuring. Since then, we need to recognize that significant progress has been made in helping improve transparency in lending practices and encouraging fair burden sharing across creditors, including the non-Paris Club countries.

Overtime, the G20 Common Framework has become more efficient and work in this regard continues. We are not done. We also see that the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable plays a significant role as evidenced by the recent publication of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Playbook. You play by the book, you get things done fast. It spells out steps to speed up the restructuring process, and it defines countries’ accountability for their actions. Importantly, this also includes compiling data to give a clear picture of domestic and external debt and the creditors who hold this debt.

So why is debt transparency so important? For the reasons we were describing – Yan in her introduction, then we saw the little movie and now me.

We have high level of debt and on top of it, countries are increasingly using complex forms of financing that are often opaque. New debt instruments have emerged such as guaranteed, securitized and collateralized debt contracts linked to. public-private partnerships, state-owned enterprises and pension funds. And because of the novelty and complexity of these instruments, our experience is that too much debt remains hidden from the eyes of policymakers and from the public. And too often it comes to light only when it is late, through the debt restructuring process.

Hidden debt inflicts real costs. It saps investor confidence. It increases borrowing costs. And it puts debt sustainability at risk, which can lead to a debt crisis.

Simply put, you cannot manage what you cannot see. And this is why we need light to cut through the fog surrounding the mountain of debt. We need the right laws and requirements in both borrower and creditor countries to defer the decision-making to competent bodies so they can do what is right for debt reporting and debt management. And that is the topic of today’s conference, this is what you will be doing here.

Let me say a little bit about our work at the Fund.

As we heard from Yan, we have identified debt transparency as a public good, and we have done a lot of work already.

Even if it is not labeled as debt transparency at the heart of it, when we support debt management in countries, this is what we do. Let me give you three examples.

First, back in 2023, we published a paper on ‘Making Public Debt Public.’ It looked at factors that underlie the lack of disclosure and the IMF’s role in reforms. We found that debt disclosure in boring low-income countries and emerging market economies falls way short due in large part to the increasing share of non-marketable and SOE debt. And in keeping with the theme of today’s conference, gaps in borrowing countries’ domestic, legal, institutional, and operational frameworks hinder transparency. We ought to close those gaps.

Second, our debt limit policies now require more detailed transparency on debt information. Including for the first time, we require the publication of the holders of a country’s public debt.

Third, in our Article IV consultations, we introduced a more structured and transparent assessment of data adequacy on debt, where broader and more granular debt data will be required. And this assessment will inform not just us, it would inform countries, and it would inform those interested to invest in countries.

We have scaled up our training on debt transparency. We have delivered over 200 capacity development projects just on debt management in the last two years.

How many of you have been following our spring meetings this year? So, for those who were here and for those who weren’t, a very important message that came out of this meeting was, countries need to put their own house in order. It was a line I used in my curtain raiser speech. And then I was so delighted to hear it played back to me by country delegations. They would say, it is tough, we have to get our own house in order and getting your own house in order absolutely requires transparency.

Good law drives good practices, and it drives good arrangements. There are many questions countries need to answer. They need to answer ‘who has the authority to borrow on behalf of the country,’ ‘who can sign a valid contract,’ ‘can the state’s resources be used as collateral?’ We look at the law for answers to these questions and I can tell you, they seem obvious and yet there are so many countries in which they still need to be answered.

Our Legal Department reviews debt-related legislation, as we heard from the movie, from the little clip. They did the review for 85 countries and we found several areas for improvement in legal frameworks. Less than half of the country surveyed require debt management and fiscal reporting. It’s a big gap we have to close. In many cases, the legal definition of public debt is too narrow. It excludes SOEs or it excludes types of borrowing and as a result some forms of that fall outside the sovereign’s awareness. When we are in a situation like this, we do have to (a) recognize what the gaps are, (b) work together to close these gaps, and I can tell you at the Fund we are at the disposal of our members to do exactly that.

We have in this conference policymakers from 72 countries. We have representatives of civil society organizations, from private sector and academia. And I am very uplifted because I think together we can make a difference. And from our side, we intend to work hard to be part of making that difference.

First, our upcoming review of debt sustainability analysis for low-income countries will consider how we can better support debt transparency. It complements the completion of a similar review of that sustainability analysis for market access countries. And I would welcome engagements as we go with this review.

Second, our work on the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable and the Common Framework will engage constructively all relevant parties so they do their part for debt transparency. In the recent meeting of the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable, there was a very strong commitment to it, let’s get it done. Debtors can be more transparent about the debt on their books. Creditors can be more forthcoming in outlining what they are lending for. And I think we can, working together, get really good data. So good debt management becomes the norm, not the exception.

And third, we will systematically draw lessons from experience in our surveillance program and capacity development engagements to develop and share best practices in advancing debt transparency. We will periodically report on progress in strengthening legal frameworks for debt transparencies as part of our reporting on progress with the multi-pronged approach to reduce debt vulnerability. In other words, we concretely commit specifically to how we are going to act to advance this agenda.

Accurate information is so critical. I’m sure you know the saying ‘garbage in, garbage out.’ What we want is to clean the garbage.

Benjamin Franklin, to paraphrase his words, we can say ‘transparency is always good policy.’

Enjoy your work here. Have fun, get things done. Thank you.

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/14/sp051425-managing-director-remarks-public-debt-transparency

MIL OSI

Source: IMF – News in Russian

May 14, 2025

Washington, DC:  After concluding the 2025 Article IV consultation with Costa Rica on May 12, 2025, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Executive Board met on the same day in an informal session^[1] to discuss a request from the authorities for a two-year arrangement under the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) with the IMF in an amount equivalent to SDR 1.1082 billion (300 percent of quota or about US$1.5 billion). The authorities intend to treat the credit line as precautionary.

The FCL is reserved for countries with very strong policy frameworks and track records in economic performance. It helps safeguard countries by providing them with upfront access to IMF resources in case needed if future external shocks materialize. The FCL also permits qualifying countries to signal continued commitment to very strong institutional frameworks and macroeconomic and financial policies. Unlike the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement, which the authorities completed in 2024, the FCL has no ex-post conditionality.

On the basis of Costa Rica’s very strong economic fundamentals, institutional policy frameworks, and track record, IIMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva intends to recommend approval of the FCL arrangement for Costa Rica when the IMF Executive Board meets again to take a decision in the following weeks. The IMF stands ready to continue its fruitful engagement with Costa Rica.

^[1] During an informal session, IMF staff engages with Executive Board Members to discuss country matters where no formal board decision is expected.

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/14/pr25146-costa-rica-imf-receives-request-for-fcl-arrangement

MIL OSI

Source: IMF – News in Russian

Keynote Speech by IMF Financial Counsellor and Director of the Monetary and Capital Markets Department
IMF Conference: Public Debt Transparency—Aligning the Law with Good Practices

May 14, 2025

Opening – Scope of the Speech

Good afternoon, everyone. It is a privilege to be here with you. Behind many sovereign debt crises there is often a simple, but difficult truth: the full picture of public debt and contingent liabilities which migrated to sovereign balance sheets was not visible to the public until it was too late. Transparency, therefore, is not just ideal—it is essential.

This Conference demonstrates the Fund’s shared commitment to turning transparency from a goal into a reality in our member countries. I want to thank our IMF Legal Department for this timely initiative and inviting me to speak today.

I would like to address the importance of transparency from the vantage point of the markets and the sovereign borrowers—specifically, the debt managers. I’ll first address why transparency matters, and why now more than ever. I’ll then delve into where countries stand today, the obstacles we face, and some possible solutions. I’ll give you a brief tour of how the Fund works to improve transparency in our three core activities of surveillance, lending, and capacity development—and finally, offer some thoughts on the path forward.

The Difficult Backdrop Calls for Greater Transparency

As you have already heard from our IMF Managing Director this morning, ensuring public debt transparency remains critical to monitor debt vulnerabilities, at a time of historically high public debt in emerging market (EM) and developing economies.

The current global environment presents challenges for many countries to access capital markets. EMs are already facing the highest real financing costs in a decade and will have to continue issuing government debt, including meeting new fiscal spending needs. Small middle-income countries and frontier economies face a more difficult situation. Several frontier economies would find it difficult to issue a Eurobond at current levels. Meeting external financing needs will be challenging for many frontier borrowers if official development assistance is reduced. Domestic market funding may not be sufficient to substitute for external borrowing. So, the stakes are high.

Why Transparency Matters

Transparency is foundational—in periods of both calm and stress.

In normal times, it builds credibility and fosters trust. It helps countries reduce borrowing costs and reinforces accountability to a country’s citizens. Transparent debt management operations, backed by clear strategies, predictable borrowing plans, and regular reporting pays off in improved market confidence and lower credit risk. Transparency also pays off by providing better access to sovereign debt markets.

Even under sovereign stress, transparency acts as a stabilizing force. Opacity might offer short-term breathing space, but it raises long-term borrowing costs. “Debt surprises” damage trust, increase the cost of borrowing and increase the severity of crises. Conversely, sovereigns that disclose the full picture early—and align this with credible fiscal plans—can stabilize expectations. And at the extreme, for countries facing default, when public debt becomes too high and the government cannot borrow at sustainable terms, transparency also has a role to play in negotiations with creditors by enabling a faster resolution of debt problems during debt restructuring

To ensure adequate public debt transparency, stakeholders should be able to count on the availability of timely, accurate, and comprehensive information on public debt stock and flows. You can think of this as the outcome of a country’s debt management. But from the perspective of Fund work, the concept of public debt management transparency is broader—it also encompasses the availability of key procedures and policies on public debt and of sound legal frameworks to support them. This should cover both the central and the general government.

The Current State of Public Debt Transparency in EMDEs

Evaluated against these metrics, sovereigns in advanced economies generally abide to high standards of debt transparency. Advanced economies typically finance themselves in markets, which impose market discipline. The process for sharing information on their borrowings is well established and institutionalized, and as a result, data on public debt is readily accessible. Some emerging markets are as transparent as advanced economies on their general government debt. However, governments in many emerging markets and developing economies rely significantly on external loans as well as on non-marketable domestic debt which can make their debt less transparent.

Many factors explain the opaqueness of government borrowings in emerging markets and developing economies. These include lenders’ preferences, persistently large borrowing needs, low accountability, aversion to transparency, shallow bond markets, and lack of capacity. While inadequate public debt transparency is often the result of an interplay between several factors, analyzing them separately allows identifying potential solutions that are most urgently needed. Allow me to highlight a few key factors and what can be done to address them.

First, lender preferences. Some resource-exporting countries use collateralized debt structures at the behest of creditors, involving special purpose vehicles that conceal the nature and seniority of these debt structures. Importantly, collateralized debt is often undertaken with confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements that impede reporting and disclosure.

Solutions to address this type of opacity require establishing a legal and policy framework that discourages such borrowing structures. Legal frameworks can also help tackle this problem by limiting the scope of confidentiality agreements the executive can enter into and mandating a minimum level of disclosure regarding the financial terms of these debt liabilities.

Second, the reticence of sovereign borrowers to disclose their borrowings. This can be an intentional under-reporting of public debt liabilities. However, it is often more subtle: some sovereigns rely on financing by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or other entities that are effectively backed by the government, but whose debt liabilities are kept off-budget.

Finding solutions to this problem is a difficult challenge. The solution is stronger governance, supported by stronger legal frameworks around the entire public financial management ecosystem. Such frameworks would warrant disclosure of all public debt liabilities and new borrowings, including by SOEs, and extra-budgetary entities supplemented with full fiscal transparency of the government and the SOEs balance sheets.

Third, there can be gaps in the framework for public debt transparency. Such gaps mostly reflect shortcomings in the governance, reporting, and the institutional and policy framework of public debt. In many countries, this is a function of fragmented debt management responsibilities even within the central government. Inadequate transparency in such countries does not imply a lack of willingness by the sovereign to disclose its debt liabilities, but rather a deficiency in its ability to be adequately transparent. We see many such cases in our work.

Addressing these gaps requires a broad-based approach, starting from the legal and governance framework, and weaving through institutional arrangements and the policy framework for public debt management. We have seen some countries make tangible progress that we have supported with capacity development, although more needs to be done across our membership.

Leveraging Marketable Debt for Transparency and Sound Financing

While much of the global discussion related to transparency has focused on external debt. I will take this opportunity to speak about debt issued in the local market and how greater reliance on marketable debt could drive better transparency and sound financing. Domestic debt transparency is an overlooked issue in the debt discussions on low-income countries (LICs).

Large emerging markets typically have well-developed domestic government securities markets characterized by strong transparency practices. As in advanced economies, the cost of borrowing in large EMs reflect market forces. In the last decade or so, sovereigns from smaller emerging markets and LICs have relied more heavily on domestic debt. However, in these countries, transparency practices in domestic debt markets are often weak. And since in some cases the development of local debt markets is still evolving, many borrowers rely on non-marketable debt to fill part of their domestic financing needs. Non-marketable borrowing tends to be more insulated from price signals and inherently less transparent.

There is a solution: accepting market prices. Transparency is a prerequisite for markets to operate well. Transparency on primary market issuances is crucial for price discovery and predictability for investors. And transparency in secondary market pricing and transactions is important for market liquidity. Such steps could create a self-reinforcing dynamic to improve transparency.    

IMF Work on Debt Transparency

Against this background, let me now give you a brief account of what we do in the Fund to promote debt transparency by sovereign borrowers. These efforts span the three key areas of Fund activity: bilateral surveillance, lending, and capacity development.

Within bilateral surveillance, the IMF last year decided to expand the scope of mandatory reporting on debt by member countries. Members will be required to report on general government debt stock from this year (2025) and to report its detailed composition from 2027.

In the context of our lending programs, the IMF Debt Limits Policy has raised the bar on debt disclosure. Where countries have critical debt data disclosure gaps, these should be addressed upfront in IMF-supported programs. And every IMF program staff report is now required to provide granular information on debt holders and debt service by creditor for a period of three years as well as information on the stock of collateralized debt.

Our work on Capacity Development (CD), supports efforts to enhance transparency by sovereign borrowers. Over the years, debt transparency has increasingly been mainstreamed across many areas including support on public debt management, fiscal transparency assessments, debt sustainability assessments, the domestic legal framework on public debt management, and statistical dissemination of public debt. Further, debt transparency has now been added as an explicit outcome in our Results-based Management framework, which we use to monitor the effectiveness of our CD delivery.

The Fund has stepped up its CD work on public debt reporting and monitoring, publication of medium-term debt management strategies and annual borrowing plans, and fiscal risk assessments—all of which will contribute to enhance transparency by our member countries. For this purpose, staff from different departments—including staff from MCM, as well as the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs, Statistics and Legal Departments—work closely with officials across our membership from the Ministries of Finance, Debt Management Offices, Central Banks, and Audit Institutions.

Our policy and analytical work—including papers like Making Public Debt Public, and those on Sovereign Investor Relations and Legal Foundations of Public Debt Transparency—shape global thinking and inform Fund policy. At the same time, our longstanding guidance—like the IMF-World Bank Guidelines on Public Debt Management and the Fund’s Fiscal Transparency Codeas well as statistical standards—continues to provide an anchor for sound debt transparency practices across our membership.

Conclusion

As you carry forward your discussion today and tomorrow on the legal reforms needed to promote transparency of sovereign debt, I would like to leave you with four key messages.

First, public debt transparency helps a sovereign, both in good and bad times.

Second, enhancing debt transparency is all the more critical under the current global environment.

Third, debt transparency must be designed and not assumed as a default setting.

Fourth, it must be embedded in law, institutions, and incentives—across the full spectrum of public borrowing.

To achieve this, countries should develop a strong governance mechanism on public debt supported by robust legal and institutional frameworks. Such frameworks should not only cover central government debt but also extend across the general government and state-owned enterprises. The goal is clear. However, we must acknowledge that this would be a big ask and long-term project, especially given the capacity constraints in many emerging and developing economies.

A well-sequenced approach to upgrade the transparency framework will be crucial. For many countries, starting with central government debt and expanding outward in a phased, realistic way could be the right approach. Enhancing transparency on general government debt and the wider public sector would be the next priority.

The Fund remains a committed partner in this journey—helping countries move from fragmented systems and hidden risks to integrated frameworks and informed policy choices.

Thank you—and I wish you a productive remainder of the conference.

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/14/sp051425-the-quest-for-public-debt-transparency-in-emdes

MIL OSI

Source: IMF – News in Russian

May 14, 2025

End-of-Mission press releases include statements of IMF staff teams that convey preliminary findings after a visit to a country. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF’s Executive Board for discussion and decision.

• IMF staff and the Bangladesh authorities have reached staff-level agreement on the policies needed to complete the combined third and fourth reviews of the authorities’ reform program supported by the IMF’s Extended Credit Facility, Extended Fund Facility, and Resilience and Sustainability Facility. The staff-level agreement is subject to approval by the IMF Executive Board, contingent on the completion of prior actions.
• The Bangladeshi economy remains under pressure from ongoing challenges and rising external financing requirements. As announced in December 2024, the authorities have requested an augmentation of IMF support of about US$760 million to help preserve macroeconomic stability and enhance the country’s resilience to external shocks.
• The authorities reiterated their commitment to the objectives of the reform program including fiscal reforms to address the emerging external financing gap, calibrating monetary policy to bring down inflation, and fully implementing exchange rate reforms to enhance flexibility. They have also pledged to foster a sound and competitive financial sector and are advancing their climate agenda to support sustainable, inclusive, and green growth.

Washington, D.C.:  Following constructive discussions with Bangladesh authorities in Dhaka, continued engagement during the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank Spring Meetings in Washington, D.C., and subsequent virtual follow-up discussions, Mr. Papageorgiou, the IMF Mission Chief for Bangladesh, issued the following statement:

“IMF staff and the Bangladesh authorities have reached a staff-level agreement on the policies needed to complete the combined third and fourth reviews under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF), Extended Fund Facility (EFF), and Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF). The staff-level agreement is subject to approval by the IMF Executive Board and is contingent on the completion of prior actions related to tax revenue mobilization and full implementation of exchange rate reforms.

“Amid significant macroeconomic challenges, the authorities requested an augmentation of SDR 567.2 million (approximately US$762 million) in IMF financial support to Bangladesh under the ECF and EFF arrangements. This increase would bring the total financial assistance under the ECF and EFF arrangements to SDR 3,035.65 million (about US$4.1 billion), alongside concurrent RSF arrangements of SDR 1 billion (about US$1.3 billion). Upon completion of the combined third and fourth reviews, SDR 983.8 million (about US$1.3 billion) will be made available, comprising SDR 650.5 million (about US$874 million) under the ECF and EFF and SDR 333.3 million (about US$448 million) under the RSF.

“Impacted by disruptions from the popular uprising, real GDP growth slowed to 3.3 percent year-on-year (y-o-y) in the first half of FY25; however, it is projected to rebound in the second half reaching 3.8 percent for the full fiscal year. Inflation, which has approached double digits, has begun to decline and is projected to be around 8 ½ percent (y-o-y) by end of FY25. Nonetheless, domestic factors such as stress in the banking sector and elevated global uncertainty tilt risks to the downside.

“To address the emerging external financing gap and support a continued decline in inflation, near-term policy tightening is essential. Fiscal consolidation should focus on the prompt implementation of additional revenue measures—such as streamlining of tax exemptions—while containing non-essential expenditures. Alongside monetary tightening, enhanced exchange rate flexibility and reinforced foreign exchange reserve buffers will bolster the economy’s resilience to external shocks. In this regard, steadfast implementation of the new exchange rate regime will remain critical.

“Bangladesh’s low tax-to-GDP ratio underscores the urgent need for tax reforms to build a fairer, more transparent, and simpler system while sustainably boosting revenues. Key priorities include streamlining exemptions, enhancing compliance, and delineating tax policy from administration. In parallel, a comprehensive approach is required to rein in subsidy expenditures in the electricity sector. Increased revenues will also provide more fiscal resources to support the most vulnerable. 

“A carefully designed strategy for dealing with weak banks is essential to ensuring stability. Swift action is needed to operationalize new legal frameworks that facilitate orderly bank restructuring while safeguarding small depositors. Robust asset quality reviews for all large and systemic banks, bank restructuring aimed at forward-looking viability, strengthened risk-based supervision, and enhanced governance and transparency will be key to rebuilding trust and supporting the sector’s soundness. At the same time, institutional reforms to bolster the independence and governance of Bangladesh Bank will be essential for ensuring long-term macroeconomic and financial stability and for the effective implementation of broader financial sector reforms.

“Strengthening governance and promoting greater transparency are essential to improving the business environment, attracting foreign direct investment, and broadening the export base beyond the ready-made garment sector.

“Enhancing resilience to climate change is crucial for mitigating macroeconomic and fiscal risks. Investing in institutional capacity and improving the efficiency of public spending will support progress toward climate objectives. The government should prioritize climate-responsive fiscal reforms and channel investments into sustainable, climate-resilient infrastructure. In addition, effective management of climate-related risks will help safeguard financial sector stability.

“The team thanks the authorities for the productive discussions and excellent collaboration.”

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/14/pr25145-bangladesh-imf-reaches-sla-on-combined-3rd-and-4th-reviews-ecf-eff-and-rsf-arrangements

MIL OSI

Source: IMF – News in Russian

May 13, 2025

• IMF staff and Cabo Verdean authorities reached a staff-level agreement on the sixth ECF review and third RSF review, and a fifteen-month extension of both arrangements with an augmentation equivalent to thirty percent of quota under the extended ECF.
• The ECF-supported program aims to strengthen public finances, ensure debt sustainability, minimize fiscal risks from public enterprises, modernize monetary policy, and raise potential growth. The RSF supports government climate reforms and catalyzes private climate finance. Extension to December 2026 supports the continued success of the authorities’ economic policy and reform agenda.
• All end-December 2024 ECF structural benchmarks (SB) and quantitative performance criteria (PCs) were met. The implementation of reform measures (RMs) under the RSF has been progressing, but some reforms will take more time than expected.

Praia, Cabo Verde: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) team led by Mr. Martin Schindler held meetings with the Cabo Verdean authorities during May 5 – 13, 2025, to discuss the sixth review under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement, the third review under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangement, and economic policies and reforms to be supported under an extension of both arrangements. Access under the existing ECF is 190 percent of quota (SDR 45.03 million, approximately US$ 63.3 million) and access under the RSF is 100 percent of quota (SDR 23.69 million, approximately US$ 31.69 million). The augmentation of 30 percent of quota (SDR 7.11 million) will bring the total ECF arrangement to SDR 52.14 million.

At the conclusion of the mission, Mr. Schindler issued the following statement:

“I am pleased to announce that the IMF team and the Cabo Verdean authorities reached staff-level agreements on the policies needed to complete the sixth review under the ECF-supported program and the third review of the RSF arrangement as well as on economic policies and reforms that could be supported by an extension. Upon approval by the IMF’s Executive Board, completion of the sixth ECF review will allow disbursement of SDR 4.51 million (approximately US$ 6.09 million), while the completion of the third RSF review will allow disbursement of up to SDR 7.896 million (approximately US$ 10.66 million), depending on reform progress under the RSF.

“Cabo Verde’s economy continues to perform well, underpinned by tourism, robust export performance and private consumption growth. Increasing the execution of the government’s capital budget would enhance potential growth. Economic growth in 2024 was strong at 7.3 percent, with 1.0 percent inflation and a current account surplus. The 2024 fiscal balance exceeded program targets, driven by lower primary expenditures and strong tax revenue growth. The public debt-to-GDP ratio continues to decline.

“All end-December 2024 structural benchmarks (SB) and quantitative performance criteria (PCs) were met. The implementation of reform measures (RMs) under the RSF has been progressing, but some reforms will take more time than expected.

“Cabo Verde’s economic outlook remains solid. GDP growth in 2025 is projected at 5.2 percent, while inflation is expected to converge to about 2 percent in 2025 and over the medium-term, broadly in line with euro area inflation. The current account balance is projected to gradually return to a deficit of 1.3 percent of GDP in 2025, and then stabilize at around -3.5 percent over the medium term.

“Fiscal performance is forecast to be strong in 2025. Cabo Verde aims to maintain a fiscal path aligned with debt reduction goals, targeting a higher primary balance than foreseen under the previous review. Tax revenue is expected to increase reflecting ongoing tax reforms.

“The mission welcomed the BCV’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) decision to raise the deposit rate by 30 basis points to 2.25 percent to fully close the gap with the ECB. Continued data-driven adjustments in monetary policy may be needed to protect the exchange rate peg and appropriate reserves buffers. Data for end-March 2025 suggests that the financial system is liquid, profitable, and well capitalized.

“The macroeconomic outlook remains favorable but is subject to substantial downside risks. Cabo Verde is vulnerable to external shocks, including in energy, food prices, and tourism, especially in the context of heightened uncertainties in global trade frameworks. A global growth slowdown and supply chain disruptions would have a negative impact on tourism, inflation, and growth. Climate-related risks, such as rising sea levels and extreme weather events, pose long-term threats to infrastructure and economic stability. Delays in SOE reforms and increasing public debt could undermine fiscal sustainability. On the upside, continued strength in tourist arrivals could lift growth. Legislative and Presidential elections will take place in 2026.

“The IMF team is grateful to the Cabo Verdean authorities and other stakeholders for the productive discussions, hospitality, and candid discussions.”

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/13/pr25144-cabo-verde-imf-reaches-sla-on-the-6th-rev-under-the-ecf-and-3rd-rev-under-the-rsf-arr

MIL OSI

Source: IMF – News in Russian

May 13, 2025

Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the Article IV Consultation for St. Kitts and Nevis[1] The authorities have consented to the publication of the Staff Report prepared for this consultation.

Following the post-pandemic rebound, the economy is facing challenges. Real GDP growth moderated to 1.5 percent in 2024, reflecting lower contributions from tourism and government services, while inflation eased to 1 percent. The fiscal deficit increased to 11 percent of GDP in 2024, mainly driven by a sharp decline in Citizenship-by-Investment (CBI) revenue amid recent reforms aimed at strengthening the CBI program. The current account deficit widened due to lower CBI inflows. Meanwhile, credit growth accelerated on the back of pent-up demand, especially in mortgage loans, amid increasing competition. Groundwork is ongoing for a potentially transformative geothermal project.

In 2025, economic growth is projected to strengthen to 2 percent supported by expanding tourism, while inflation is expected to remain stable.[2] In the medium term, growth is forecast to rise to 2½ percent, benefiting from large energy projects. Nonetheless, fiscal deficits are forecasted to remain high in the medium term, driven by expectations of structurally lower CBI revenue, resulting in public debt exceeding 70 percent of GDP by 2030.

Near-term risks to growth are tilted to the downside, but progress in fostering renewable energy provides upside potential over the medium term. The uncertainty and volatility of CBI revenue pose a significant two-sided risk, but a further decline in CBI revenue would pressure fiscal accounts. Downside risks include a slowdown in key source markets for tourism, global financial instability, and commodity price volatility. The economy is highly exposed to natural disasters. On the other hand, the energy projects could foster growth and fiscal revenue in the medium term.

Executive Board Assessment[3]

Executive Directors welcomed the authorities’ commitment to prudent policy reforms and stressed that the significant challenges the economy is facing require a multipronged approach to address low growth and fiscal sustainability, while safeguarding financial stability and the external position.

Directors encouraged the authorities to implement a prompt and decisive fiscal consolidation to keep public debt below the regional debt ceiling and reduce reliance on the Citizenship‑by‑Investment Program (CBI). This would create space for capital expenditure, resilience against natural disasters, and contingent liabilities. Directors stressed that fiscal consolidation should be driven by tax revenue mobilization and reductions in current expenditures, anchored by fiscal rules. Greater diversification of funding sources would also help to lengthen debt maturities and lower financing costs. Directors supported the authorities’ plan to establish a Sovereign Wealth Fund to absorb upsides in CBI revenue and called for continuing improvements in the CBI framework, including its transparency. They also welcomed the authorities’ initiatives to implement reforms to improve the sustainability of the Social Security Fund.

Directors underscored that further progress is needed to strengthen the financial sector, including to reduce NPLs and meet the ECCB’s prudential requirements. They emphasized the importance of continuing to strengthen the balance sheet of the systemic bank and to revitalize its business model. Directors also called for reforms of the Development Bank, building on the authorities’ work in this area. They stressed the need to monitor rapid credit growth and further strengthen the regulation and oversight of credit unions. It will also be important to make additional progress in strengthening the AML/CFT framework.

Directors emphasized that structural reforms and improved preparedness for natural disasters are crucial to boost potential growth. They stressed that reforms are necessary to enhance the efficiency of government services, improve credit access, and better align labor skills with market demands. Directors noted that accelerating the energy transition would help increase competitiveness. Finally, they underscored the need to enhance the investment and the multi‑layered insurance frameworks to strengthen natural disaster preparedness.

St. Kitts and Nevis: Selected Economic Indicators 2020-26 1/
						Est.			Proj.
	2020	2021		2022	2023			2024			2025		2026
	(Annual percentage change, unless otherwise specified)
National income and prices
Real GDP (market prices) 2/	-14.6	-1.7		10.5	4.3			1.5			2.0		2.2
Real GDP (factor cost) 2/	-13.4	-1.0		8.0	5.0			4.3			0.7		0.5
Consumer prices, period average	-1.2	1.2		2.7	3.6			1.0			1.7		2.0
Real effective exchange rate appreciation (+) (end-of-period)	-1.0	-3.1		-1.4	-0.7			-2.4			…		…
Money and credit 3/
Broad money	-8.1	8.9		3.7	-1.9			2.5			13.5		8.9
Change in net foreign assets	-0.4	9.1		-7.0	-6.4			-12.8			-2.3		-2.0
Net credit to general government	-18.4	-4.8		4.9	0.3			9.3			10.3		6.6
Credit to private sector	-4.0	7.7		5.8	5.2			9.8			8.1		6.4
	(In percent of GDP)
Public sector 4/
Total revenue and grants	33.5	46.6		45.2	43.0			31.1			32.5		33.2
o/w Tax revenue	18.8	19.0		18.4	19.3			18.7			18.2		19.0
o/w CBI fees	11.3	23.4		25.3	21.7			8.1			9.0		9.0
Total expenditure and net lending	36.5	41.2		49.4	43.3			41.7			42.2		39.8
Overall balance	-3.1	5.4		-4.2	-0.3			-10.6			-9.8		-6.6
Total public debt (end-of-period)	68.0	69.1		60.2	55.9			52.2			61.4		65.6
General government deposits (percent of GDP) 5/	21.6	30.4		21.6	20.4			10.4			10.3		9.9
External sector
External current account balance	-10.8	-3.4		-11.4	-11.6			-15.1			-13.1		-12.8
Trade balance	-28.0	-24.8		-34.7	-32.8			-32.7			-32.3		-33.3
Memorandum items
Net international reserves, end-of-period
(in millions of U.S. dollars)	365.4	312.8	270.3		262.4		270.7			269.0		267.3
Nominal GDP at market prices (in millions of EC$)	2,387	2,318	2,650		2,850		3,017			3,048		3,171
Sources: St. Kitts and Nevis authorities; ECCB; UNDP; World Bank; and IMF staff estimates and projections.
1/ The staff report projections are based on the information available as of March 27, 2025. Therefore, they do not reflect the impact of trade tensions since April 2, 2025. 2/ In June 2021, the National Statistics Office revised historical GDP series.
3/ The series for monetary aggregates have been revised consistent with the 2016 Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual and Compilation Guide.
4/ Consolidated general government balances. Primary and overall balances are based on above-the-line data.
5/ Includes only central government deposits at the commercial banks.

[1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

[2] Since the issuance of the Staff Report, economic growth has been marked down, reflecting the impact of trade tensions combined with their effects on global policy uncertainty and global financial conditions, primarily through tourism and FDI (see the Supplement).

[3] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chair of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/12/pr-25139-st-kitts-and-nevis-imf-executive-board-concludes-2025-article-iv-consultation

MIL OSI

Source: IMF – News in Russian

May 13, 2025

End-of-Mission press releases include statements of IMF staff teams that convey preliminary findings after a visit to a country. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF’s Executive Board for discussion and decision.

• Angola’s economic growth for 2024 was strong, but the outlook has deteriorated posing risks.
• Staff and authorities had a productive engagement on managing emerging risks and identifying mitigation measures.
• Angola’s Post-Financing Assessment is expected to be discussed at the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in July 2025.

Luanda, Angola: An IMF team lead by Ms. Mika Saito visited Luanda between May 6-12 to conduct Angola’s 2025 post-financing assessment (PFA).[1] Angola’s economy experienced a robust recovery in 2024 driven both by stronger oil production and a rebound in the non-oil sector. Real GDP growth reached 4.4 percent, surpassing earlier projections. While inflation remains elevated, inflationary pressures also eased somewhat in the first few months of 2025. The outlook has, however, deteriorated significantly compared to the 2024 Article IV consultation, reflecting a fall in oil prices and tighter external financing conditions. As a result, the preliminary growth projection for 2025 has been revised down to 2.4 percent from 3 percent in the 2024 Article IV consultation, while inflation is expected to continue its gradual decline. This downward revision to the outlook also poses risks to fiscal performance. Staff was reassured by authorities’ strong resolve in containing emerging risks and in identifying mitigating measures critical to preserve macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability, while protecting the most vulnerable and growth momentum. The IMF team thanks the authorities for their productive engagement and hospitality. Angola’s 2025 PFA is expected to be discussed at the IMF Executive Board in July 2025.

[1] A Post Financing Assessment (PFA)¹ is expected for countries with outstanding credit above the absolute or quota-based thresholds that do not have an IMF-supported program or a staff-monitored program. It reports on the member’s policies, the consistency of the macroeconomic framework with the objective of medium-term viability and the implications for the member’s capacity to repay the Fund.

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/13/pr-25143-angola-imf-staff-completes-2025-post-financing-assessment-mission

MIL OSI

Source: IMF – News in Russian

May 13, 2025

Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the Article IV Consultation for Costa Rica on May 12, 2025. ^[1]

Costa Rica has achieved remarkable economic progress due to its very strong fundamentals, policies, and policy frameworks. GDP growth has averaged above 5 percent per year since 2021, inflation is rising toward the Banco Central de Costa Rica’s (BCCR) target of 3 percent, public debt has fallen steadily to below 60 percent of GDP, international reserves are at comfortable levels, and systemic financial stability risks are contained.

Such factors are expected to support robust growth going forward notwithstanding external headwinds. This year, growth is expected to moderate to around potential (3½ percent) and the current account deficit is expected to increase slightly to 1.8 percent of GDP, while the primary surplus is expected to rise to 1¼ percent of GDP as fiscal consolidation continues. Inflation is expected to return to the BCCR’s target in 2026.

Risks to the growth outlook have tilted to the downside while those for inflation are balanced. Weaker external demand, tighter global financial conditions, and increased policy uncertainty could reduce Costa Rica’s exports, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, and economic activity, but the country’s strategic location, high-value exports and economic diversification could drive continued strong growth momentum. Upside risks to inflation include strong credit growth and supply-side disruptions, but there are also downside risks, especially if inflation expectations soften.

Executive Board Assessment^[2]

Executive Directors commended Costa Rica’s remarkable economic progress based on its very strong fundamentals, policies, and policy frameworks. Directors welcomed the authorities’ very strong implementation of macroeconomic policies, wide‑ranging reforms in the process of becoming an OECD member, the successful completion of IMF‑supported programs, and a strategic focus on exports and economic diversification. They praised the authorities’ commitment to continued prudent policies and structural reforms to maintain resilience amid heightened external uncertainty.

Directors welcomed the sustained decline of public debt. They stressed that the medium‑term fiscal consolidation is appropriately paced but will require spending to be kept below the ceiling permitted by the fiscal rule. Directors concurred that tax reforms should aim to increase equity, efficiency, and the revenue‑to‑GDP ratio. They stressed the importance of full implementation of the public employment law by all public institutions without delay. The disputed claim by the social security system should also be resolved comprehensively, including by clarifying the central government budget’s responsibility, coupled with improvements in the registries of beneficiaries and the system’s governance and accountability. Directors also supported reforms to debt management to increase flexibility in issuing external debt.

Directors commended BCCR’s forward‑looking data‑dependent approach to monetary policy, which has proven effective. They concurred that there is scope to cut the policy rate if the convergence of inflation to the BCCR’s target weakens in the coming months. They also underscored the importance of passing legislation to further improve the BCCR’s governance, transparency, and accountability, and to institutionalize its de facto autonomy. Directors recommended that the exchange rate should be allowed to flexibly adjust to market conditions, limiting foreign exchange intervention to addressing market volatility.

Directors stressed that indicators of financial soundness remain comfortable, yet the resolution of small non‑bank financial institutions last year highlights the importance of a very strong supervisory and crisis management framework. They underscored the importance of passing the proposed amendments to the bank resolution and deposit insurance law. Directors also called for close monitoring of risks related to the rise in FX lending.

Directors welcomed the authorities’ efforts to advance supply‑side reforms to help sustain Costa Rica’s impressive economic performance. Reducing skills mismatches, enhancing infrastructure quality, and implementing legislation on public‑private partnerships would further strengthen potential growth. Better integrating climate considerations into public investment decisions will make infrastructure more resilient against natural disasters.

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/13/pr25142-costa-rica-imf-executive-board-concludes-2025-article-iv-consultation

MIL OSI