IMF Executive Board Approves FY2026–FY2028 Medium-Term Budget

Source: IMF – News in Russian

May 2, 2025

Washington, DC—On April 18, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved the 2026-28 financial years (FY26-28) medium-term budget. While proving resilient in the post-pandemic period, the global economy is at a pivotal juncture amidst transformations in the economic landscape and shifting policy priorities around the world. Reflecting this complex economic backdrop, member countries continue to look to the IMF for support across the range of its operations.

While the issues that the Fund has been called on to address have become increasingly complex over the years, the Fund’s budget is roughly the same in real terms as it was two decades ago, reflecting the Fund’s longstanding emphasis on budget discipline. In the current context, budget management remains challenging given elevated demands and high budget execution rates, requiring difficult tradeoffs. In this context, the Board emphasized the importance of continued prudent stewardship of members’ resources and continued reprioritization to ensure that the Fund can keep responding with agility to the needs of its membership.

The approved net administrative budget for FY26 (May 1, 2025–April 30, 2026) totals US$1,551.7 million, consistent with projected income and the path for the precautionary balances target. The maximum amount of unused budget resources that can be carried forward from previous years will be reduced from 5 to 4 percent in FY26, with this level expected to decline further to 3 percent in FY27.

The FY26 capital budget is set at US$132.5 million and will support both facilities-related needs and IT-intensive investments, supporting end-of-life facilities replacements, field office support, ongoing IT-intensive modernization and legacy replacements, as well as investment in Artificial Intelligence and in the Fund’s cyber-security posture.

Additional information can be found in the staff paper on the FY26-28 Medium-Term Budget.

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Camila Perez

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/02/pr-25127-imf-executive-board-approves-fy2026-fy2028-medium-term-budget

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IMF Executive Board Completes Review of the Fund’s Income Position for FY 2025 and FY 2026

Source: IMF – News in Russian

May 2, 2025

  • The Fund’s General Resources Account (GRA) net income is projected to remain strong for FY 2025, and is estimated at about US$3.0 billion (SDR 2.3 billion). The positive net income trend is expected to be maintained in FY 2026.
  • The Executive Board approved the first annual distribution of net income, transferring about US$1.81 billion (SDR 1.38 billion) from the GRA into the Interim Placement Administered Account (IPAA) established in October 2024 as part of a framework to facilitate the generation of Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) subsidy resources.
  • Precautionary balances are expected to remain above the medium-term target of SDR 25 billion and to reach SDR 25.9 billion (US$34.4 billion) by end FY 2025, after the distribution into the IPAA.

Washington, DC: On April 18, 2025, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed its annual review of the Fund’s income position for the financial year (FY) ending April 30, 2025.

FY 2025 Income Position and Related Decisions

GRA net income, before the distribution and related transfer of about US$1.81 billion (SDR 1.38 billion) into the IPAA, is anticipated at about US$3.0 billion (SDR 2.3 billion). Total comprehensive income for FY 2025, including the estimated pension-related remeasurement gain[1] and the estimated retained income in the investment account of about US$1.3 billion (SDR 1.0 billion) in addition to GRA net income, is expected to reach US$4.5 billion (SDR 3.4 billion).

Given the strong income position, the Fund’s precautionary balances, after the distribution into the IPAA, are expected to increase to US$34.4 billion (SDR 25.9 billion) at the end of FY 2025, above the medium-term target of SDR 25 billion.

The Executive Board adopted several decisions that are relevant to the Fund’s finances. These included decisions to: (i) reimburse costs to the GRA for the expenses of conducting the business of the SDR Department and for the operational cost of administering the Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST); (ii) transfer a portion of the income from the Fixed-Income Subaccount and the Endowment Subaccount to the GRA for meeting FY 2025 administrative expenses; (iii) place any pension-related remeasurement gain[2] to the Special Reserve; (iv) distribute US$1.81 billion (SDR 1.38 billion) from net income to facilitate new PRGT subsidy contributions and to place the distribution amount in the IPAA; (v) place residual GRA net income to the Special Reserve; and (iv) transfer currencies equivalent to the increase in the Fund’s reserves from the GRA to the Investment Account.

Projections of the Fund’s income and precautionary balances remain susceptible to risks stemming from the uncertain global economic environment and financial market volatility. The FY 2025 annual financial statements will update the income position for the impact of changes in key assumptions made at the time of the April projections.

FY 2026 Income Position and Lending Rate

GRA net income for FY 2026 is expected to remain strong, with projected annual net income of about US$2.3 billion (SDR 1.7 billion), before any distribution. However, these projections remain susceptible to financial market volatility, intensifying downside risks to global growth, and uncertainties around the global interest rate environment that are expected to impact the performance of the Fund’s investment and retirement plan asset portfolios. The projections are also sensitive to the timing and amounts of disbursements under approved and projected lending arrangements.

The IMF’s basic lending rate for member countries’ use of GRA credit is the SDR interest rate plus a fixed margin. The Executive Board agreed to keep the margin for the rate of charge at 60 basis points over the SDR interest rate, the level set by the Executive Board in October 2024 for the rest of FY 2025 and FY 2026.

[1] IAS 19 ‘Employee Benefits’, requires the actuarial remeasurement of post‑employment obligations.

[2] In case of a remeasurement loss, such loss up to SDR 1,020 million would be charged against the General Reserve and any loss exceeding that amount would be charged against the Special Reserve.

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Camila Perez

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/02/pr-25128-imf-executive-board-completes-review-of-the-funds-income-position-for-fy-2025-and-fy-2026

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Tajikistan: Staff Concluding Statement for the 2025 Article IV Mission

Source: IMF – News in Russian

May 2, 2025

A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

Washington, DC: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission led by Mr. Matthew Gaertner held the 2025 Article IV consultation and discussions on the second review under the Policy Coordination Instrument (PCI) with the Tajikistan authorities during April 2-15, 2025, in Dushanbe. At the conclusion of the mission, Mr. Gaertner issued the following statement:

Economic Developments, Outlook and Risks

Strong broad-based growth continued in 2024, and the external position remained favorable. Real GDP increased 8.4 percent in 2024, marking the fourth consecutive year of growth above 8 percent, as strong momentum in mining, manufacturing and agriculture was underpinned by public and private investment. Strong financial inflows, including remittances, have also supported domestic demand and liquidity and contributed to a current account surplus of 6.2 percent of GDP in 2024. This alongside the NBT’s purchases of domestic gold production has boosted FX reserves from $3.6 billion at end-2023 to $4.7 billion at the end of February 2025, amounting to 7 months import coverage.

Inflation remains well contained within the NBT’s target range. Twelve-month inflation stood at 3.7 percent in February, within the NBT’s updated target range of 5 percent (±2 percent) for 2025, reflecting stable prices for imported food and fuel and an appreciation of the somoni against key trading partner currencies. Reserve money growth has moderated since mid-2024 as the NBT stepped up its sterilization efforts but remained strong at 32 percent (y/y) in February, boosted by the NBT’s gold purchases.

Banks’ asset quality continued to improve in 2024, amid strong growth in consumer lending. Banks’ NPL ratio declined to 7.0 percent in February as they continued to clean up their balance sheets, largely through write-offs of legacy NPLs. Credit to the private sector grew at 29 percent (y/y) in February, boosted by a continued expansion of banks’ deposit base. This has been primarily driven by household loans in local currency, supported by the introduction of new retail lending products.

The medium-term outlook appears positive. Real GDP is projected to increase by 7 percent in 2025, retaining the current strong momentum. Twelve-month inflation (y/y) is projected to remain close to the mid-point of the NBT’s target range in 2025 and 2026, in line with stable inflation expectations. The current account surplus is expected to narrow in 2025 as financial inflows stabilize, with FX reserves projected to remain at comfortable levels. Financial inflows are expected to normalize over the medium term after the strong inflows experienced since 2022, heightening the importance of continuing to advance structural reforms to strengthen potential growth over the medium-term.

Risks to the outlook are tilted to the downside, in the context of significant regional and global uncertainty. A pronounced decline in financial inflows due to a less favorable environment for remittances or a slowdown in Tajikistan’s key trading partners would adversely affect growth, fiscal performance, and the banking sector. More frequent and severe natural disasters and heightened security risks can also strain budget resources. On the upside, continued strength in gold prices and rising demand for rare earth metals could attract increased investment in the mining sector.

Fiscal Policy

Fiscal performance remained well within the program target in 2024, with a fiscal surplus of 0.3 percent. The favorable fiscal outturn was underpinned by stable revenue growth despite a reduction in the VAT rate from 15 to 14 percent, while externally financed capital spending was lower than planned. Revenue collection reflected continued improvements in tax and customs administration supported by digitalization measures. The 2025 budget envisages a fiscal deficit of up to 2.5 percent of GDP, conditional on available financing. In this context, continuing to expand the domestic debt market is key to diversifying sources of financing. The MOF successfully launched market-based auctions of government securities in 2024; establishing a robust secondary market for these instruments will help to expand the investor base and further deepen the market.

The fiscal deficit target of 2.5 percent of GDP remains an important anchor to ensure that debt remains on a favorable medium-term trajectory. Prudent fiscal policy coupled with strong GDP growth has contributed to a notable reduction in the public debt ratio over the past few years, with public debt declining to 25 percent of GDP at the end of 2024. Public debt is assessed as sustainable but remains at high risk of distress due to large debt service obligations during 2025-2027; the first semi-annual Eurobond repayment was completed as planned in March. Building fiscal buffers is key to mitigating fiscal risks from potential shocks to revenue and expenditure in the context of the uncertain external environment, with contingency plans for spending reprioritization to protect social assistance and other critical spending.

Improved revenue mobilization and spending efficiency are key to increasing fiscal space for priority social and development projects. The Medium-Term Revenue Plan (MTRP) aims to raise total revenues by at least 2 percentage points to 26 percent of GDP in 2026 through a combination of tax policy, tax administration and SOE reform measures. In line with the MTRP, the MOF has taken steps to improve revenue mobilization through the expansion of digitalization of payments. Moreover, tax exemptions granted to several large investment projects were discontinued in 2024. A time-bound action plan is essential to anchor a further streamlining of tax exemptions and customs preferences over the medium-term. On the expenditure side, strengthening appraisal, selection and oversight of internally financed capital projects are crucial for enhancing the efficiency of public investment.

Strong corporate governance and oversight is essential to strengthen SOE efficiency and minimize fiscal risks. Recent reforms include the expansion of the MOF’s financial monitoring coverage from 27 SOEs to 77 entities with state participation, and amendments to the regulations for SOE board composition to ensure that board members are appointed through transparent and competitive procedures in line with best practices. The MOF has also continued to expand the scope of the annual fiscal risk statement, which provides an overview of SOE performance, including profitability, leverage, and budget allocations to SOEs. The publication of an updated SOE list and completion of the ongoing sectorization exercise will also improve monitoring and oversight.

Greater efforts are needed to improve the financial performance of the electricity sector. Low collection rates for key electricity consumers, together with high technical and commercial losses and end-user tariffs that are below cost recovery levels has led the state electricity generation company Barki Tojik to accumulate sizable arrears to suppliers and creditors. Reducing quasi-fiscal losses in the electricity sector will require sustained efforts to improve collection rates for the largest electricity consumers, as well as implementation of the authorities’ strategy to roll-out smart metering, increase penalties for electricity theft and improve cost controls across the electricity sector. The electricity tariff was increased by about 15 percent in April 2025, and further annual tariff adjustments are envisaged to reach cost recovery by 2027.

Monetary, Exchange Rate and Financial Sector Policies

Inflation remains well contained, but strong credit growth warrants continued vigilance. The NBT lowered its inflation target from 6 to 5 percent (±2 percent) for 2025 to reflect well-anchored inflation expectations, and the policy rate was lowered by 25 basis points to 8.75 percent in February 2025 as inflation remains close to the lower bound. Although the real policy rate is still relatively high at about 5 percent (based on realized inflation), monetary policy should remain data-driven and vigilant to potential upward demand pressure on inflation from strong credit growth and robust financial inflows. Proactive liquidity management also remains essential to moderate the impact of the NBT’s gold purchases and FX interventions on the money supply.

Enhancing exchange rate flexibility is essential to build resilience to external shocks. The NBT has taken several measures to modernize the local FX market, including ending auctions of inward transfers improving the mechanism for executing public sector FX transactions; enhancing the dissemination of information on FX rates; and introducing price-based auctions for FX interventions to facilitate price discovery. The NBT should also aim to limit its FX operations only to avoid disorderly market conditions to facilitate development of the FX market and further support greater exchange rate flexibility.

Strong macroprudential oversight and banking supervision are key to mitigating external risks to financial stability. The banking system has strengthened its balance sheet following the resolution of two troubled banks but may face possible challenges from the volatile external environment and any reversal of recent inflows. Strong lending to households warrants careful oversight of macroprudential norms to ensure prudent lending standards, and close monitoring of maturity mismatches and funding- and asset-side concentration risk. The planned introduction of macroprudential tools and forward-looking stress tests is essential to manage risks posed by strong credit growth.

Structural Reforms

Governance and transparency reforms across economic sectors aim to foster sustainable and inclusive growth. Structural reforms are underway to close existing governance gaps across the public and private sectors through upgrades to the legal and regulatory frameworks. The reforms aim to (i) improve public sector efficiency; (ii) foster financial and private sector development; and (iii) promote an enabling investment climate for private sector-led growth.

Transparent governance and policy frameworks and robust financial safety nets are key to further strengthen trust in public institutions. Good governance fosters macro-financial stability both directly and indirectly by enhancing the credibility and effectiveness of macroeconomic policies. Transparent corporate ownership is critical to promote an enabling business climate based on the rule of law and prudent AML-CFT standards.

Timely and comprehensive macroeconomic data is essential to economic policymaking. The authorities have started publishing fiscal statistics in line with GFS standards and broadened the coverage of state-owned enterprises. Compilation of quarterly demand-side GDP data and expanding the use of GFS-based fiscal data would further strengthen data quality.

Discussions on the policies to complete the second review under the PCI are well advanced and will continue following this mission. The mission would like to thank the Tajik authorities for their hospitality and close collaboration and express its appreciation for the constructive and insightful discussions.

 

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Angham Al Shami

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/02/mcs-tajikistan-staff-concluding-statement-for-the-2025-article-iv-mission

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IMF Management Approves the First Review New Staff Monitored-Program with Haiti

Source: IMF – News in Russian

May 1, 2025

Staff Monitored Programs (SMPs) are informal arrangements between national authorities and IMF staff to monitor the authorities’ economic program. As such, they do not entail endorsement by the IMF Executive Board. SMP Staff reports are issued to the Board for information.

  • Management of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has approved the First Review of the Staff-Monitored Program (SMP) with Haiti.
  • The SMP takes into account Haiti’s fragility and capacity constraints, linked to security. It is designed to support the authorities’ economic policy objectives and build a track record of reform implementation.
  • Fund management welcomes the authorities’ publication of the Governance Diagnostic Report.

Washington, DC: Management of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved on April 15, 2025 the first review of Haiti’s Staff-Monitored Program (SMP). SMPs are arrangements between country authorities and the IMF to monitor the implementation of the authorities’ economic program and to establish a track record of policy implementation that could pave the way for financial assistance from the Fund under the Upper Credit Tranche (UCT).

Haiti faces a multidimensional crisis with a challenging outlook which is highly uncertain. The country is affected by both global and country-specific shocks, which have worsened its fragility, since the negotiation of the SMP. Risks to the outlook are tilted to the downside and include worsening insecurity that would constrain further activity and the ability to implement reforms and attract aid and the foreign direct investment. The supply-side shock caused by the security crisis will continue to suppress growth and feed inflation unless the security outlook improves. Therefore, restoration of security is the priority.

Despite domestic and global difficulties, the authorities are firmly committed to implement this SMP and have managed to contain the impact of the various shocks, thereby averting even worse economic outcomes. Net international reserves were valued at over US$1.1 billion at the end of December 2024. Despite the political transition and insecurity both the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of the Republic of Haiti (the Central Bank) have remained continuously engaged. They have consistently attempted to adopt feasible measures to limit macroeconomic imbalances and have been able to demonstrate full ownership and support for the SMP through the high-level Program Monitoring Committee which meets with IMF staff on a continuous basis.

Implementation under the SMP has been broadly satisfactory and its objectives remain achievable. All quantitative targets have been met, with a comfortable margin. Of the seven structural benchmarks assessed under this review, six were implemented and one is expected to be met by June (due to constraints related to insecurity).

The SMP is an important anchor for signaling the authorities’ commitment to continue making progress toward macroeconomic stabilization and strengthen governance, and locking in macroeconomic gains accumulated over recent years, despite the many headwinds.

An urgent government priority is re-starting the mobilization of revenue to support the country’s massive development needs and boost well-targeted spending. The measures under the SMP should help achieve these goals. Continued strengthening of the social safety net is essential to cushion the impact of the shocks on the population and alleviate widespread poverty. The spending commitments previously indicated by the authorities using Food Shock Window resources should be audited in line with SMP commitments.

The fiscal and monetary authorities’ commitment to keeping monetary financing of the deficit at zero is commendable and should continue. The FY2023 financial audit of the BRH is urgent and its eventual publication by August 2025 would be important for demonstrating transparency.

In addition to addressing insecurity, advancing governance reforms is paramount to help Haiti exit from fragility, ensure macroeconomic stability and build trust with the private sector and development partners. In this vein, the authorities’ publication of the Governance Diagnostic Report and action plan is commendable. The report should provide a road map for reforms to enhance governance and will require capacity development support not only from the Fund but also from development partners.

A government-led strategy to continue to strengthen the economy’s resilience to multiple shocks requires the financial support of the international community. This assistance is indispensable to allow quality spending, over the short, medium, and long term. Without it, Haiti will continue to suffer large import compression. External assistance should take the form of grants. The authorities should avoid contracting non-concessional loans, to ensure consistency with the SMP commitments. Non-concessional loans would not only be against SMP commitment. It would also undermine debt sustainability.

In line with the Fund Strategy for Fragile and Conflict-Affected States, IMF staff will also continue to coordinate closely with Haiti’s main development partners, particularly on governance and capacity development.

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Brian Walker

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/01/pr-25126-haiti-imf-approves-1st-review-new-staff-monitored-program

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Press Briefing Transcript: Staff Level Agreement on the Fourth Review of the Sri Lanka’s Reform Program Supported by the IMF’s Extended Fund Facility Arrangement

Source: IMF – News in Russian

April 29, 2025

PARTICIPANTS: 

EVAN PAPAGEORGIOU, Mission Chief for Sri Lanka, IMF

PAVIS DEVAHASADIN, Communications Officer, IMF

MARTHA TESFAYE WOLDEMICHAEL, Resident Representative in Sri Lanka, IMF

*  *  *  *  * 

DEVAHASADIN: I welcome you to the press conference on Sri Lanka, the Staff-Level Agreement of the Fourth Review of the economic program support by the EFF.  Today we have here Mr. Evan Papageorgiou, IMF Mission Chief for Sri Lanka.  He’s joined by Martha Woldemichael, IMF Representative in Sri Lanka. 

Again, this is on the record.  The transcript will be available later.  We have a lot of people here, so we’re just going to start with Mr. Evan giving the brief remarks and then we move on to the Q&A session.  All right, Evan, over to you on the remarks.

PAPAGEORGIOU: Yeah, thank you. Thank you, Pavis. Thank you also to Martha for being here.  And hello, everybody.  Good evening to those of you in Sri Lanka and good morning to the few folks here in Washington.  I thank you all for being here today.  I would have preferred to be with you in Colombo, but unfortunately this is not feasible this time.  We will have to talk through a screen. 

By way of short introduction, as you heard, my name is Evan Papageorgiou.  I am the new Mission Chief for Sri Lanka for the IMF.  And some of you may know already that there has been a change in Mission Chief with this review, which is part of a routine rotation of people in the team.  I look forward to seeing some of you again.  I already had a chance to meet you a few weeks ago, or otherwise to meeting you all next time we’re in the country.  We had the opportunity to be in the country.  I led a team of economists visiting Colombo earlier this month, where we had productive discussions with the authorities.  These discussions continued here last week here in Washington, D.C., on the occasion of our Spring Meetings. 

Okay.  So, as you may be aware, we have reached a staff-level agreement with Sri Lankan authorities on key economic policies, marking an important milestone toward concluding the Fourth Review of Sri Lanka’s reform program supported by the IMF’s Extended Fund Facility. 

The staff-level agreement is contingent on two conditions.  First, the implementation of prior actions relating to restoring electricity cost-recovery pricing and ensuring proper function of the automatic electricity price adjustment mechanism.  And second, the usual completion of financing assurances review by multilateral and bilateral partners.  After successful implementation of these conditions and approval from the IMF Executive Board, Sri Lanka will unlock approximately USD $344 million in financing.  This funding will be crucial as the country navigates the recovery from economic challenges. 

We are now halfway through the four-year EFF program, and I’m very pleased to stand before you today to share significant development regarding Sri Lanka’s economic journey.  The performance of the reform program has remained strong overall.  Economic growth is on the rebound.  We are seeing advancements in revenue mobilization, reserve accumulation is proceeding, and structural reforms continue, and some of them are well underway. 

Very important to note also that debt restructuring is nearly complete and the government’s commitment to program objectives remains steadfast, and we got new assurances of this as recently as last week.  However, we must also acknowledge the significant downside risks posed by global trade policy uncertainty.  Should these risks materialize, we are prepared to work collaboratively with the authorities to assess their impact and formulate appropriate policy responses within the framework of the IMF-supported program.

The country’s achievements under the ambitious reform agenda have been commendable.  The rebound in growth, for example, 5 percent year-on-year real growth in 2024, is a testament to the country’s resilience and determination and remarkable turnaround.  Furthermore, there has been significant improvement in the revenue performance, with revenue to the GDP climbing to 13.5 percent in 2024 from 8.2 percent in 2022.  Gross official reserves have also risen to $6.5 billion in end of March 2025, given the very good and strong FX purchases by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.

Now, as we move forward, it is essential that the government continues to prioritize sustained revenue mobilization efforts and prudent budget execution.  These measures are vital in preserving and continuing to build fiscal space and ensuring that there is room to respond to any shocks that may arise.  To that end, restoring cost-recovery electricity pricing is essential to minimize fiscal risks and enable appropriate electricity infrastructure and investments. 

The tax exemption framework should be well designed to reduce fiscal costs and corruption risks while at the same time enabling necessary growth for the country.  Reforms to boost tax compliance are important to deliver revenue gains without resorting to additional tax measures. 

We also recognize the critical responsibility of the government to protect the most vulnerable members of society during these uncertain times.  Improving the targeting adequacy of social safety nets will be a priority as they strive to provide support where it’s needed the most. 

In conclusion, the sustained commitment of the government to the program objectives is commendable.  It ensures continuity and puts Sri Lanka on a path to continuing success and strong recovery.  We are determined to continue working with the authorities to safeguard their hard-won gains and pave the way forward towards robust and inclusive growth.  Thank you for your attention.  Martha and I look forward to your questions.  Thank you.  Pavis, back to you. 

DEVAHASADIN: Thank you, Evan. We now move on to the Q&A section. But before we begin, I would like to say that for those who just joined, this session is being recorded.  Therefore, the transcript will be posted later, and otherwise we move on to the Q&A, and I just want to remind you to keep your questions short because we have a full house so we can give opportunity to other participants as well and stay on topic.  We can also follow up with you afterwards.  But please be mindful that we are discussing the SLA – the Fourth Review, today. 

May I call — actually I saw your hand was up earlier, and then you put it down.  May I call you for the first question from Economy Next?

QUESTIONER: Thank you.  Yes, my question is there has been some delay on the restructuring.  How concerned is the IMF on SOE restructuring?

DEVAHASADIN: On the restructuring, debt restructuring, right?

QUESTIONER: SOE.

DEVAHASADIN: SOE.

QUESTIONER: state-owned enterprise, yeah. 

DEVAHASADIN: Okay. Anyone else on state-owned enterprise? And you can also just jump in.  I see some hands up, but I’m not sure if those participants are talking about — would like to talk about SOE, but otherwise we want to take questions on SOE first. 

QUESTIONER: If I may add on the SOEs?  Just to add to that, specifically about Sri Lankan Airlines.  How concerned are you about Sri Lankan Airlines?  Because this is something that has been discussed for several years with a lot of other people as well as with the IMF.  Thank you. 

DEVAHASADIN: Okay. Thank you so much.

PAPAGEORGIOU: Yes, thank you. These are good questions. So let me start in general to make some points. 

So under the program there has been, in general, commitment by the government from the beginning of the program until now to strengthen the governance of SOEs, to get to the bottom of their outstanding debt and resolving legacy debt that they — that’s out there — and implementing those that’s relevant to implementing cost recovery pricing to ensure that they remain financially viable.  These are all very important conditions because they will reduce fiscal risks to the government, to the states, and avoid that they become a burden for public finances, ultimately taxpayers, and all Sri Lankans. 

So, within those commitments, it’s important to highlight a few that, under the program, these include also containing risks from the guarantees issued to SOEs.  For example, the EFF program includes indicative targets, which are setting ceilings on total and foreign currency treasury guarantees for SOEs.  Another condition is to refrain from new FX borrowing by non-financial state-owned enterprises that already have limited FX revenue so that we don’t introduce more wrong-way risk into these entities.  And also, another one, obviously very important one, is making SOEs more transparent.  You may be aware that we have been advocating and mandating to publishing audited financial statements for the 52 largest SOEs in a timely manner, and that will help bring more light and greater scrutiny. 

It is also important to ensure that consumers of services of these SOEs receive the best value for the price they pay.  And obviously, that relates to a wider range of SOEs, including also the electricity and the fuel sector.  And this is the same thing as you would expect from a private company.  In other words, you would want SOEs run in the most efficient manner purely on commercial basis and ensuring that they are dependable and, of course, that they are free of corruption.  That is greater big disclosure, good disclosure to that extent. 

There was a question on Sri Lankan Airlines.  So, we understand that the authorities are underway in preparing a medium-term strategic plan to restore Sri Lankan Airlines’ operational viability and to resolve its legacy debt.  We know that the current budget, the 2025 budget, has set aside 20 billion rupees to pay off some of the debt of the airline.  And we are also aware that Sri Lankan Airlines has also hired a financial advisor to restructure its international bond.  So, these are all steps in the right direction.  But we think these need to pick up pace and take up a little bit faster pace so we can have a good resolution of all these outstanding issues.  So, in general with SOEs, we think there is a way forward, and we want to see more progress there. 

Thank you.  That was a good question.  Pavis, back to you. 

DEVAHASADIN: Thank you, Evan. We have hands up.

QUESTIONER: Thank you, Pavis, and thank you, Evan, for your presentation.  From News 1st here.  The conditions of the Fourth Review include implementing fire actions related to electricity cost-recovery pricing and ensuring that the automatic electricity price adjustment mechanism functions properly.  In your meetings with the government, do you see this realizing anytime soon?  Because according to the statement that was released earlier, it says that this condition is yet to be met.  Thank you. 

PAPAGEORGIOU: Thank you. Thank you, I don’t know if — should we take another question? Maybe related to electricity to bunch them up a little bit? 

DEVAHASADIN: Yep. Anyone else on electricity just come in please.

QUESTIONER: What we expected the timeline to complete the required by actions such as electricity pricing and financing assurance for Board approval?

QUESTIONER: I have also question on electricity.  Now, the current problem seems to have been coming from, because of a price cut by the regulator, which the utility didn’t ask for.  So, is there any attempt to give technical assistance or something so that the way the regulator calculates the profits or how they deal with the price proposal of the utility is improved so that this kind of thing doesn’t happen again?

PAPAGEORGIOU: Thank you for the question. Let me first say that the issue of electricity is one where both the government and us see eye to eye, and there’s strong commitment in seeing these reforms take place because, as you know very well, electricity and dependability of electricity and the high price of electricity have been an issue for a very long time in Sri Lanka. So, government is committed to seeing, to taking the reforms and owning those reforms and making significant progress. 

So yes, during the review mission discussions that we had in Colombo earlier in April, earlier this month, and here in Washington last week, we discussed many issues.  Our assessment is as early as back in February, when we went to the Board for our Third Review, our assessment of the time, and still is the same, is that the continuous structural benchmark on electricity cost recovery pricing is still not met.  And that means that the price of the tariff – it does not match, does not create enough of an ability for the utility, for the CEB, to be able to meet its costs, the generation costs, and transmission and distribution. 

In addition to that, the automatic tariff adjustment mechanism based on the bulk supply transaction account, the BSTA, has not operated as we envisaged.  And the April tariff revision that was meant to take place in the second quarter of this year was not implemented.  So as a result of that, given the criticality of electricity cost recovery and under the program, we have proposed, IMF has proposed, the introduction of prior actions relating to restoring electricity cost-recovery pricing and ensuring proper function of the automatic electricity price adjustment mechanism, the BSTA, that I mentioned a few moments ago. 

The implementation of these prior actions is an important milestone as a requisite, if you will, for the completion of the Fourth Review.  And in terms of the timing; there was a question — of course, we defer to the authorities and to the regulator, the PUCSL, on the exact timing for implementing these actions, these prior actions. But we urge them to do so as soon as possible so that the utility company, CEB, is not incurring financial losses on a forward-looking basis.  In other words, we should avoid, the authorities should avoid, a situation where debt is building up at the CEB, so that the utility company does not become again a significant contingent liability to the government and a burden to the taxpayer. so, it doesn’t become a fiscal drought. 

I think this is well understood by the authorities.  It has been explained time and time again.  It’s a core pillar of the program that once it is resolved and properly held, it will help fiscal sustainability, and it will make electricity price generation more dependable.  And down the road this will allow for more stability, for more investment, and for the necessary steps to see electricity prices coming down. 

Hopefully that answers your question, but I’m happy to follow up on anything else.  Thank you.  Pavis, back to you. 

DEVAHASADIN: Thank you, Evan.

QUESTIONER: I don’t think my question about whether you consider technical assistance to the regulator was answered.  I also have another question if you can answer. 

PAPAGEORGIOU: Sure, sure. So yeah, thank you. There’s no technical assistance at the moment in terms of the electricity price generation or any other issues related to this.  In general, the energy policy and the policy for the energy sector, we think the pillars are — there should be a cost reflective energy pricing which is a building block of the program, and we think that within that there should be a greater stability, but it will allow for more reforms. 

So now we know we understand that there are some proposed amendments to the Electricity Act that are underway, and these are expected to reflect the authority’s strategy to reform the electricity sector.  We understand also there is an intention to have unbundling of generation of transmission and distribution of power.  We obviously take note that there has been action and proposals for greater investment, including also for solar energy projects.  Again, we’re not advising exactly on these issues, but we look forward to seeing more. 

Now, of course, on the strategy that should be supported by the key stakeholders.  I know that other multilateral, several development partners such as the World Bank and ADB are closely involved on electricity, and they are providing technical assistance to Sri Lanka. 

So I think that goes to your point. Did you have another question as well? 

QUESTIONER: Yes.  Regarding the — can you give us any idea about the timing of the review that might take place?  And also, when you said, policy responses that may be needed to meet the tariff problem, what kind of things were you thinking on?  Is it likely to jeopardize the targets and were you planning to give any waivers or what kind of policy responses?

PAPAGEORGIOU: When you say tariffs do you mean not electricity tariffs, you mean export tariffs, right?

QUESTIONER: No, no, sorry.  You said because of the tariff shock, from possible tariffs from the U.S. 

PAPAGEORGIOU: Yes, that’s right.

DEVAHASADIN: U.S. tariffs.

QUESTIONER: Yeah.  So then that Sri Lanka might have to do some policy responses.  What kind of policy responses were you thinking?  And also, it jeopardizes the targets in the IMF performance criteria, will they be kind of given waivers? 

PAPAGEORGIOU: Thank you.

DEVAHASADIN: Before you begin, I would like to read this question. How do you see the impact U.S. labor tariff on Sri Lanka’s ability to secure and sustain the SLA with global partners?

PAPAGEORGIOU: Yeah, great. Thank you; these are good questions. In terms of the timing, obviously things are still underway.  This is only a staff-level agreement, which means we have agreed on principle on many things of the underlying Fourth Review and conditions of the prior actions that I mentioned a few minutes ago.  I think there’s good momentum from the authorities’ and everybody else’s point of view in completing the review.  That takes a little while because we understand a lot of these issues are still being discussed and there is more work to be done, both from the authority side and from our side as well.  It’s a long process, as you probably know, in terms of us consulting and redrawing our numbers and our assumptions and having a great confidence in the direction of policy reforms and of the outlook and everything else.  I would say that it will take a little while, maybe a couple more months at least, in terms of finalizing the review.  So hopefully in two months’ time or so, by, let’s say, June, we should be able to have some more news for you on this front. 

Now, on the issue of U.S. tariffs and how does it affect the country?  Obviously, as I mentioned, trade policy uncertainty is one of the issues that we have discussed quite extensively with the authorities on what could that mean for Sri Lanka’s economy and economic performance.  We know that, obviously, the authorities are committed to achieving program objectives and to see how the targets are being met.  They have also committed to addressing any sort of underperformance or deviation for program targets with remedial measures.  So, we think that we take this commitment very seriously, and we note their strong impetus for delivering on those. 

Obviously, the global trade policy uncertainties, as I mentioned, is a significant risk.  All I can say at this point is that if these risks materialize, we will work with the authorities to assess the impact of those shocks, and we will support the country in formulating specific policy responses within the contours of the existing IMF program.  We have very frequent discussions with the authorities.  We were discussing, we were talking to them as recently as last Friday, as a few days ago.  We continue talking to them on a daily basis.  Martha talks to them on a constant basis.  And we continue conducting weekly monitoring meetings with the entire team, both here in Colombo as well, so that we can ensure that program performance remains on track. 

This is all I can say for the moment, but it is very important to note also that the Sri Lankan authorities, the Sri Lankan government, have made great progress in establishing greater connection with bilateral trade partners, including the United States.  And we encourage more action and greater discussion in ensuring that there is a good outcome from these discussions and that the trade policy uncertainty gets resolved and there’s greater certainty. 

DEVAHASADIN: Thank you. I just got the five minutes remaining warning. I would like to open the floor to anyone who hasn’t asked any questions.  Please feel free to jump in.  Otherwise, I’ll go back to the hand.  Anyone else who hasn’t asked any question?  Well, all right, I see one hand up.

DEVAHASADIN: Thank you. We’ll come back to you.

QUESTIONER: Thank you.  I just have a question.  It’s kind of a follow-up to Evan’s previous answer.  You talked about a very limited response that you can give talking about trade policy and the impact of the U.S. tariffs.  But you did say that Sri Lanka had expressed a sort of a commitment to work and work towards the targets it has agreed with the IMF.  But in the most recent weeks post those tariff announcements, targets, as much as you said that they have expressed a willingness to work within the framework – I think you said, within the contours of the agreement – has Sri Lanka expressed concerns about reaching those targets, particularly because these tariffs are believed broadly to have a potential impact on its export earnings?  Obviously, it’s foreign currency earnings and things like that.  So how much of a concern have you heard from the Sri Lankan authorities?  And what is the sort of leeway or the kind of flexibility that Sri Lanka would have within the agreement with the IMF?  I’m sure you have this with a lot of sort of your agreements, but, yeah, where Sri Lanka is concerned, how do you see it?  Thank you. 

PAPAGEORGIOU: Thank you. That’s a good question. It follows through a little bit from my previous answer, as you said.  I don’t know, given that we don’t have much time, let me go ahead and answer this and maybe we can give five more minutes, Pavis, to other people to ask questions as well. 

DEVAHASADIN: Sounds good.

PAPAGEORGIOU: So, first of all, every review, now we’re on the Fourth Review, of the program is an opportunity to assess the economic developments, to review program targets, and to determine the reform agenda and the reform measures that the authorities plan for the period ahead. It just happened that in this review we have a significant trade policy shock. So, in these discussions, we’ve had an understanding of what are the concerns and what is the kind of shock.  And by the way, this is something that we also, as Fund staff, are trying to implement, to understand, to comprehend, and to put into our outlook. 

So obviously, the 44 percent tariff on Sri Lanka that was announced on April 2nd would have a significant impact, and the authorities understand this very well.  The impact obviously will be on the apparel and rubber industries.  Obviously, as you know very well, these account for a very large share of the country’s exports to the United States.  I believe it’s almost three-quarters, or over 70 percent.  And also, the real sector implications of these are very important because these two sectors, apparel and rubber, employ a lot of workers, in Sri Lanka. Just the apparel industry alone is over 300,000 workers or 320,000 workers.  So, the 90-day pause that was announced has allowed the authorities to engage constructively with the United States.  And we take, take very positive note on this. 

Now, within, in general, as I mentioned, the global trade policy uncertainty for any small open economy and definitely for Sri Lanka poses significant downside risks.  For these discussions, we understand, obviously, the issues that arise and how they should be baked into the program.  If there is any substantial risk that may pan out either on the back of tariffs or some other disruption, we will work with the authorities to incorporate them to assess their impact and put them into policy responses. 

At this point, it will be a little premature of me to talk about specific issues, but we’ve had a lot of discussions, and we think that the authorities are doing the best they can to address these issues.  It’s important to also mention that here that any time is a good time for implementing more reforms for discussing greater options towards having more trade policy responses.  And we believe that Sri Lanka should continue exploring also additional ways in making its exports more marketable and appealing to a wider range of counterparts. 

DEVAHASADIN: Thank you, Evan. I’ll give the final question. We are running out of time, but I think we have enough time for one last question.

QUESTIONER: Thank you.  It’s about the tax revenues.  According to the 2025 budget, much of the tax revenue is expected from vehicle imports, and we have — from the dealers that of the vehicles have been imported in the last two months, about 75 percent have been sold.  Of course, even though 25 percent may not have been sold, still the government has got revenue for those because they have been cleared through customs. That is no issue, but it would probably have implications for future demand.  So, the market is sort of not as vibrant, as there doesn’t seem to be a huge pent-up demand.  How concerned are you that this one single item in the budget, which is sort of going to underpin tax revenue, may not materialize this year?  Thank you.  Thank you.

PAPAGEORGIOU: So obviously the authorities have made significant progress on creating greater opportunities for revenue and for collecting more. You may very well know that the situation was far worse in terms of tax revenue, as I mentioned in my earlier remarks, as early as couple of years ago. So obviously there is definitely progress. On this year’s discussion,

I think there is a lot of the progress; has been a positive one.  There has been greater progress towards ensuring more revenue that could be collected from a range of measures.  You mentioned very accurately that the lifting of the import ban on motor vehicles is a very, very important. I would say the primary measure underpinning the revenue package.  We saw that, also in the budget, it is expected to yield 1.2 percent of GDP in 2025.  And that’s about 80 percent of the 1.5 percent of GDP in all tax revenue.  So obviously, as you mentioned, this is very important to get right and to continue with the momentum. 

We note from the latest data that we have monitoring and we’re getting is that there is actually a good momentum on those motor vehicle imports.  So as my latest data — I was trying to find them — from what I remember, there has been quite a lot of good increase in the letters of credit.  I believe it’s around USD $350 million that were open.  These are letters of credit that are attached to importing vehicles.  So, we think that the associated revenue that will be incurred from those imports is starting to come on pace, and that’s a very important and encouraging sign.  So, we look forward to seeing more. 

Of course, I mentioned a moment ago as well that if there are signs that — that there is underperformance of revenues or if there is a revenue shortfall, we have discussed with the authorities, and they are committed to implementing contingency revenue measures, and this will go a long way in ensuring fiscal sustainability and greater revenue.  Thank you. 

DEVAHASADIN: Thank you, Evan. Unfortunately, we’re at time. Before we close, Evan, do you have any parting words? 

PAPAGEORGIOU: No, I thank you very much. I thank you all for being here. I look forward to continuing to engage with you, and Martha and I know that we have a great relationship with all of you and a frequent interaction.  We are happy to continue taking your questions.  We now are moving forward completing the Fourth Review in the next couple of months, so we will certainly communicate more as we get towards that goal.  We will also try to have another similar discussion and press conference at the end of that review if all goes well.  Let me just mention again that we are fully committed in supporting the economy and the Sri Lankan authorities, both in the current issues that they are facing and just more broadly on formulating the appropriate policy responses and the necessary form.  Thank you all very much for being here.  I wish I was in Colombo, but I look forward to seeing you again in the next few months.  Thank you. 

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Pavis Devahasadin

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/04/30/tr-042925-press-briefing-sla-4th-rev-sri-lankas-reform-program-supported-by-eff-arrangement

MIL OSI

«Роснефть» провела в Самаре серию патриотических мероприятий в честь Великой Победы

Source: Роснефти – Rosneft – Важное заявление об отказе от ответственности находится в нижней части этой статьи.

Сотрудники самарской группы предприятий НК «Роснефть» организовали масштабный проект, посвященный 80-летию Победы в Великой Отечественной войне. Акция объединила более 500 участников ветеранов и сотрудников предприятий «Роснефти», студентов, волонтеров и жителей Самарского региона.

Патриотическая инициатива началась c флешмоба в г. Новокуйбышевске. Рядом с мемориальным комплексом героям Великой Отечественной войны волонтёры развернули 80-метровую Георгиевскую ленту – символ доблести, стойкости и гордости за Великую Победу. Участники почтили память павших героев минутой молчания и возложили цветы к Вечному огню.

Ярким продолжением мероприятия стал автомотопробег – 30 автомобилей и мотоциклов со Знаменами Победы, отправилась в г. Самару. Во время Великой Отечественной войны Куйбышев (ныне Самара) стал «запасной столицей» страны и крупнейшим индустриальным центром. Маршрут пробега включал знаковые исторические места, в том числе пролегал через Куйбышевский район Самары, который появился на карте города в 1943 году благодаря строительству Куйбышевского НПЗ.

Торжественное открытие исторической фотовыставки под открытым небом состоялось на набережной р. Волги. Экспозиция «Самарская нефть – для Победы» отражает основные этапы становления и развития нефтяной промышленности в регионе в военные годы. Получив приказ Родины форсировать развитие нефтяной отрасли для бесперебойного снабжения фронта горючим, самарские нефтяники Куйбышевнефти (ныне «Самаранефтегаз») сумели первыми в СССР найти девонскую нефть и увеличить добычу в пять раз. Также в рекордно короткие сроки построили два нефтеперерабатывающих завода Сызранский и Куйбышевский НПЗ.

Кульминацией мероприятия стала демонстрация фильма «Война моторов», созданного по инициативе НК «Роснефть» и посвящённого самоотверженному труду советских нефтяников в годы Великой Отечественной войны. Труженики тыла проявляли мужество, стойкость и героизм, обеспечивая фронт топливом – ковали Победу в тылу.

Завершили акцию праздничным концертом, в котором прозвучали всеми любимые песни военных лет «Смуглянка», «Катюша» и «Синий платочек» в исполнении сотрудников предприятия – победителей корпоративного фестиваля «Энергия талантов».

Департамент информации и рекламы
ПАО «НК «Роснефть»
30 апреля 2025 г.

Обратите внимание; Эта информация является необработанным контентом непосредственно из источника информации. Это точно соответствует тому, что утверждает источник, и не отражает позицию MIL-OSI или ее клиентов.

При поддержке «Роснефти» на Таймыре отметили День оленевода

Source: Роснефти – Rosneft – Важное заявление об отказе от ответственности находится в нижней части этой статьи.

«РН-Ванкор» (входит в нефтегазовый комплекс «Роснефти») выступил генеральным партнером главного праздника коренных малочисленных народов Севера – Дня оленевода в таймырском поселке Носок. Мероприятие стало ключевым культурным событием уже традиционного форума «ЭкоАрктика», проходящего в Красноярском крае – территории реализации флагманского проекта Компании «Восток Ойл».

Наиболее зрелищной частью праздника стали гонки на оленьих упряжках. Более 300 участников соревновались за звание самого быстрого каюра в мужском, женском и молодежном заездах.

Коренные жители принимали участие в северных видах состязаний: прыжках через нарты, перетягивании палки и метании маута на хорей (аркан набрасывают на длинный шест, которым погоняют оленей). На этноплощадке также состоялся конкурс национальной одежды, женщины презентовали блюда северной кухни из рыбы и мяса оленя, изделия декоративно-прикладного творчества. Победители всех конкурсов получили подарки от нефтяников.

Мероприятие завершилось большим праздничным концертом с участием местных творческих коллективов.

В поселке Носок проживает более 1,5 тыс. человек, из которых почти 90% – представители коренных малочисленных народов ведущих кочевой образ жизни. Сохранение национальной культуры и традиционного уклада жизни коренных народов Севера – одно из значимых направлений социальной политики «Роснефти».

Нефтяники строят жилье для коренного населения, развивают инфраструктуру северных поселков, помогают семьям оленеводов, улучшают материально-техническую базу учебных заведений, социальных объектов и учреждений здравоохранения в районах исконного проживания коренных малочисленных народов Севера. 

Справка:

ООО «РН-Ванкор», дочернее предприятие «Роснефти», является оператором по реализации крупнейшего нефтегазодобывающего проекта «Восток Ойл» на севере Красноярского края. В него входят 60 лицензионных участков, включая месторождения Ванкорского и Пайяхского кластеров.

Департамент информации и рекламы
ПАО «НК «Роснефть»
30 апреля 2025 г.

Обратите внимание; Эта информация является необработанным контентом непосредственно из источника информации. Это точно соответствует тому, что утверждает источник, и не отражает позицию MIL-OSI или ее клиентов.

«Роснефть» высадила кленовую аллею на главной высоте России

Source: Роснефти – Rosneft – Важное заявление об отказе от ответственности находится в нижней части этой статьи.

«ВНИКТИнефтехимоборудование» (входит в научно-проектный блок «Роснефти») принял участие в озеленении склона Мамаева Кургана, приуроченном к 80-летию Победы в Великой Отечественной войне. Сотрудники волгоградского института подготовили территорию будущей аллеи и провели высадку 80 саженцев клена серебристого.

Одним из символов Победы и цены, которую заплатил за нее советский народ, является непокоренный Сталинград и известный на весь мир мемориальный комплекс «Героям Сталинградской битвы» на Мамаевом кургане. Отдавая дань глубокого уважения всем героям Великой Отечественной войны, участники мероприятия почтили память погибших воинов в Зале Воинской Славы.

Сотрудники института на протяжении многих лет занимаются благоустройством и озеленением территории мемориального комплекса, самые первые саженцы высадили в далеком 1967 году – в год открытия памятника-ансамбля.

Память о таких событиях передается из поколения в поколение: в первой высадке принимали участие сотрудники, чьи дети, продолжая династию работников и сложившиеся традиции, участвуют в памятных мероприятиях сегодня.

Почтить память погибших Героев – большая честь для каждого сотрудника «Роснефти». Мы помним! Мы гордимся!

Департамент информации и рекламы
ПАО «НК «Роснефть»
30 апреля 2025 г.

Обратите внимание; Эта информация является необработанным контентом непосредственно из источника информации. Это точно соответствует тому, что утверждает источник, и не отражает позицию MIL-OSI или ее клиентов.