Сечин: санкции подрывают доверие к доллару – растет привлекательность золота и криптовалют

Source: Роснефти – Rosneft – Важное заявление об отказе от ответственности находится в нижней части этой статьи.

Применение доллара в качестве санкционного оружия подрывает его позиции и создает предпосылки к использованию альтернативных инструментов, таких как золото, криптовалюты, а также национальные валюты других стран, заявил Главный исполнительный директор ПАО «НК «Роснефть» Игорь Сечин, выступая с ключевым докладом на Энергетической панели в рамках XXVIII Петербургского международного экономического форума

В своем докладе Сечин обратил внимание, что причины и развитие серьезных катаклизмов и проблем возникают не в одночасье, а формируются на протяжении определенного времени, а потом достаточно одного толчка: «К 1971 году США подошли с дефицитом государственного бюджета, однако вместо того, чтобы затянуть потуже пояса, они разорвали Бреттон-Вудское соглашение и практически объявили дефолт. В результате отказа от золотого обеспечения доллара США получили возможность бесконечно, как им казалось, финансировать растущие бюджетные и торговые дефициты за счет необеспеченной эмиссии и наращивания долга. Основанная на монополии доллара мировая финансовая система нуждается в дополнительной устойчивости».

Глава «Роснефти» напомнил об исследованиях бельгийско-американского экономиста Роберта Триффина, который в сформулированной им в 1960 году одноимённой дилемме доказал, что функционирование доллара как международной резервной валюты создает постоянный дефицит платежного баланса США. «Его увеличение, в свою очередь, ведет к избытку долларов в мире, таким образом накапливая противоречия в глобальной финансовой системе. А противоречащее здравому смыслу применение доллара в качестве санкционного оружия подрывает его позиции и создает предпосылки к использованию альтернативных инструментов, таких как золото, криптовалюты, а также национальные валюты других стран»,- рассказал Игорь Сечин.

По его мнению, снижение кредитного рейтинга и неопределенность прогнозов бюджетной стабильности США приводят к тому, что американские казначейские облигации постепенно теряют свой статус «безопасной гавани». Их место занимает золото, цена которого, как правило, растет накануне глобальных кризисов».

Глава «Роснефти» отметил, что по данным Всемирного совета по золоту, только за последние три года доля золота в мировых золотовалютных резервах выросла на 7 % и превысила 20%, а согласно последнему опросу Всемирного золотого совета, 95% мировых центральных банков планируют увеличить свои резервы золота в течение следующих 12 месяцев.

«Ярким подтверждением существенного увеличения спроса на золото является рост его относительной стоимости. Сегодня на 1 унцию золота можно купить примерно в 4 раза больше нефти, в 9 раз больше стали и в 35 раз больше пшеницы, чем в 1950 году. А губернатор Флориды подписал закон, признающий золото и серебро законным платежным средством в этом штате»,- рассказал он.

Сечин также обратил внимание на рост использования криптовалют. «Объем торговли криптовалютами вырос в десять раз – до 18,5 триллионов долларов за последние пять лет. А в штате Нью-Йорк рассматривается законопроект, разрешающий государственным учреждениям принимать платежи в криптовалюте», – сказал Игорь Сечин.

Кроме того, он отметил рост использования национальных валют – юаня, дирхама и индийской рупии в международной торговле. «Доля юаня в международных расчетах уже превысила 6%, догнав евро», – заявил Сечин.

Говоря о сложившейся ситуации с подрывом доверия к доллару из-за санкций Игорь Сечин процитировал первые строки из «Одиссеи» Гомера, написанной в VIII веке до н.э.: 

«Муза, скажи мне о том многоопытном муже, который
Долго скитался с тех пор, как разрушил священную Трою,
Многих людей города посетил и обычаи видел,
Много духом страдал на морях, о спасеньи заботясь
Жизни своей и возврате в отчизну товарищей верных
Все же при этом не спас он товарищей, как ни старался.
Собственным сами себя святотатством они погубили….»

Департамент информации и рекламы
ПАО «НК «Роснефть»
21 июня 2025 г

Обратите внимание; Эта информация является необработанным контентом непосредственно из источника информации. Это точно соответствует тому, что утверждает источник, и не отражает позицию MIL-OSI или ее клиентов.

Глава «Роснефти» объявил о формировании нового облика мировой энергетики

Source: Роснефти – Rosneft – Важное заявление об отказе от ответственности находится в нижней части этой статьи.

Текущее состояние мировой энергетики находится на этапе формирования нового облика, заявил Главный исполнительный директор ПАО «НК «Роснефть» Игорь Сечин в ходе своего выступления с ключевым докладом «Одиссея мировой экономики в поисках золотого руна. Новый облик мировой энергетики» в рамках XXVIII Петербургского международного экономического форума.

«Текущее состояние мировой энергетики находится на этапе формирования нового облика, обусловленного многократным ростом потребления электроэнергии, генерация которой будет обеспечена как ископаемым топливом, так и возобновляемыми источниками», – отметил глава Компании на Энергетической панели.

В своем докладе Сечин рассказал об основных факторах, влияющих на изменение этого облика, среди которых необходимость обеспечения энергобезопасности и коммерческой эффективности источников энергии, дефицит бюджета и лавинообразный рост уровня госдолга, а также демография развивающихся стран. По словам Игоря Сечина в ближайшие 25 лет население стран Африки и Азиатско-Тихоокеанского региона увеличится на 1,4 млрд человек.

Еще одним фактором, который по мнению главы «Роснефти» влияет как на производство энергии, так и на рост потребления является цифровая революция с применением искусственного интеллекта и работой с большими данными.

«Особую роль приобретает электроэнергетика, которой предстоит преодолеть риск дефицита в силу скачка роста потребления в Китае, Индии, развивающихся странах и гигантской потребности в электроэнергии для обеспечения центров обработки данных и тяжелой промышленности», – заявил Сечин. По его словам, рост потребления будет сопровождаться качественным увеличением производительности труда, основанным на новых технологиях. «Процесс запущен. Уже сегодня уровень выработки электроэнергии в Китае более чем в два раза превышает её производство в США, а 20 лет назад было наоборот», – добавил он.

Игорь Сечин в своем докладе процитировал одного из самых авторитетных ученых современности, сторонника реалистичного подхода к переходу на новые источники энергии Вацлава Смила: «Энергия – это универсальная валюта. Без её трансформации в какой-либо форме невозможны никакие свершения». «Именно поэтому современные общества с высоким уровнем потребления энергии предпочитают использовать ресурсы с наивысшей полезной энергоотдачей, в первую очередь ископаемое топливо», – заявил Сечин.

По словам главы «Роснефти», энергия и прогресс неотделимы друг от друга – на всём протяжении истории, чем выше человек поднимался по лестнице прогресса, тем больше энергии ему требовалось.

«Тот, кто сможет на практике принять участие в формировании нового облика энергетики, получит возможность опережающего экономического и технологического роста. Напрашивается аналогия с легендой о поиске золотого руна аргонавтами, преодолевшими невероятные препятствия и беды на пути к достижению счастья и благополучия», – подытожил Игорь Сечин.

Департамент информации и рекламы
ПАО «НК «Роснефть»
21 июня 2025 г

Обратите внимание; Эта информация является необработанным контентом непосредственно из источника информации. Это точно соответствует тому, что утверждает источник, и не отражает позицию MIL-OSI или ее клиентов.

Игорь Сечин открыл работу Энергетической панели в рамках ПМЭФ

Source: Роснефти – Rosneft – Важное заявление об отказе от ответственности находится в нижней части этой статьи.

Главный исполнительный директор ПАО «НК «Роснефть» Игорь Сечин представил ключевой доклад «Одиссея мировой экономики в поисках золотого руна. Новый облик мировой энергетики» на Энергетической панели в рамках XXVIII Петербургского международного экономического форума.

В мероприятии принимают участие Председатель Совета директоров «Роснефти» Мухаммед Бин Салех Аль-Сада, исполнительный вице-президент Республики Венесуэла Делси Родригес, вице-президент CNPC Чжан Даовэй, исполнительный директор Reliance Industries Панда Мадхусудана Шива Прасад, главный исполнительный директор Pertamina Симон Алойсиус Мантири,  президент Schlumberger  в Азии  Шериф Шохди, академик Российской академии наук Александр Дынкин, министр энергетики Республики Узбекистан Журабек Мирзамахмудов, председатель Наблюдательного совета некоммерческой инициативы правительства Японии по разработке низкоуглеродных технологий Нобуо Танака,  президент компании ГК «ТОФС» Давид Гаджимирзаев, а также  представители органов власти, крупнейших российских и зарубежных компаний различных отраслей, ученые, академики, эксперты и аналитики.

Модератором Энергетической панели стал известный американский журналист, ведущий телеканала RT Рик Санчес.

Департамент информации и рекламы
ПАО «НК «Роснефть»
21 июня 2025 г

Обратите внимание; Эта информация является необработанным контентом непосредственно из источника информации. Это точно соответствует тому, что утверждает источник, и не отражает позицию MIL-OSI или ее клиентов.

IMF Executive Board Completes the Third Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement for Burkina Faso

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 20, 2025

  • The IMF Executive Board completed today the third review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement for Burkina Faso. This enables an immediate disbursement of about US$32.8 million.
  • Supportive policies and favorable weather conditions boosted agricultural output in 2024; however, widespread insecurity continues to weigh on economic activity in other sectors, especially gold mining, the primary source of export earnings for the country.
  • Program performance has been broadly satisfactory. While end-December 2024 performance criteria for the primary fiscal deficit and net domestic financing were missed by 0.6 percent of GDP, the 2025 budget includes adequate corrective measures. On this basis, the Executive Board approved waivers of nonobservance of these performance criteria. All continuous performance criteria were met. Seven out of eight structural benchmarks were achieved, with the remaining one implemented later as a prior action.

Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the third review under the 48-month Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement that was approved on September 21, 2023. The completion of the review enables the immediate disbursement of SDR 24.08 million (about US$32.8 million), bringing total IMF financial support under the arrangement to SDR 96.32 million (about US$131.3 million). 

Real GDP growth is estimated to have reached 5.0 percent in 2024. Strong growth in agriculture and services outweighed contractions in mining and manufacturing. Real GDP growth is projected to average 4.2 percent in 2025, as growth in the agricultural output is expected to soften in line with average rainfall conditions. Inflation is projected to ease to 3.0 percent in 2025 amid moderating food prices.

Balance of payments strengthened, reflecting a positive shift in terms of trade. The current account deficit rose from 5.0 percent of GDP in 2023 to 5.7 percent in 2024 but is expected to narrow to 3.4 percent in 2025 due to record-high gold prices. Trade policy turbulences will likely have a marginal impact as the United States are not a major trading partner.   

Elevated capital spending affected fiscal performance in 2024. Nonetheless, the overall fiscal deficit narrowed from 6.7 percent of GDP in 2023 to 5.8 percent in 2024. Building on the 2025 budget, fiscal policy is expected to be tightened considerably in 2025, with the overall fiscal deficit projected in the 3.3 to 4.0 percent of GDP range, depending on the availability of external concessional financing. Risks to the outlook are tilted to the downside due to terrorist threats.

Progress under the ECF arrangement has been broadly satisfactory. Due to fiscal pressures in late 2024, the end-December performance criteria (PCs) on the primary fiscal deficit and net domestic financing were missed by 0.6 percent of GDP, while all other PCs were met. Three out of six indicative targets (ITs) were missed by small margins. All three continuous PCs and five end-March 2025 ITs, including on the primary fiscal deficit and net domestic financing were met, while the remaining four ITs were missed by small margins.

The Burkinabè authorities advanced their structural reform agenda under the program. They met seven out of eight structural benchmarks (SBs) and have addressed the missed SB on the preparation of the clearance plan for domestic arrears as a prior action for the third review. They have also implemented two other prior actions: they shared a list of treasury deposit accounts and cleared all domestic arrears outstanding at end-2023. Three new SBs under the program aim to strengthen the governance in public procurement, uphold integrity in revenue administration, and increase control over the public wage bill.

At the conclusion of the Executive Board’s discussion, Mr. Kenji Okamura, Deputy Managing Director, and Acting Chair, issued the following statement:

“Burkina Faso’s economy has proven resilient notwithstanding security challenges, a difficult humanitarian situation, and weather shocks. A lasting improvement in socio‑economic conditions will require progress on security and structural reforms to foster diversification, fiscal governance, and resilience.

            “While the policy framework remains strong, fiscal pressures affected program performance in 2024. For the first time, and in difficult circumstances, performance criteria on the primary fiscal deficit and net domestic financing were missed. The margin of nonobservance—while not negligible—did not undermine the fiscal consolidation trend. The authorities counteracted the slippage with strong measures on the expenditure side and remain committed to reducing the overall fiscal deficit to three percent of GDP by the end of the ECF arrangement, while safeguarding fiscal space for poverty-reducing social spending. This commitment is reflected in the 2025 budget and fiscal performance through end-March.

            “The authorities are on track and have expanded their structural reform agenda, focusing on fiscal governance and transparency. They have provided a list of treasury deposit accounts, adopted an arrears’ clearance plan, and cleared all arrears outstanding at end-2023 following their audit. These measures are informed by the preliminary findings of the IMF’s Governance Diagnostic Assessment (GDA). The GDA report is being finalized. The authorities intend to publish the final report in coming weeks and adopt, within four months from publication, an action plan reflecting its key recommendations. Structural conditionality for the fifth review has been strengthened with the addition of benchmarks on implementing the action plan from the procurement audit and strengthening further wage bill control and governance in revenue services.”

Table 1.  Burkina Faso: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2023–29

Population (2023): 23.3 million  

  Gini Index (2021): 37.4

Per capita GDP (2023): 910 USD

     

Life Expectancy (years): 60

Share of population below the poverty line (2022): 43.7%

Literacy rate (2022): 34%

2023

2024

2024

2025

2025

2026

2027

2028

2029

 

Act.

ECF 2nd Review

Prel.

ECF 2nd Review

Proj.

Proj.

Proj.

Proj.

Proj.

 

(Annual percentage change, unless otherwise indicated)

GDP and Prices

           

GDP at constant prices

3.0

4.2

5.0

4.3

4.2

4.9

4.7

4.7

4.7

GDP deflator

2.0

7.2

8.9

5.6

5.9

4.0

3.3

2.8

2.3

Consumer prices (annual average)

0.7

3.6

4.2

3.0

3.0

2.5

2.1

2.0

2.0

Consumer prices (end of period)

1.0

3.4

4.9

2.8

3.0

2.5

2.1

2.0

2.0

             

Money and Credit

           

Net domestic assets (banking system) 1/

5.3

18.7

0.4

14.7

6.1

8.8

8.7

7.5

7.0

Credit to the government (banking system) 1/

3.0

9.8

3.7

8.1

3.8

3.4

3.3

2.3

2.1

Credit to private sector

5.9

13.1

-2.2

9.5

2.6

8.2

8.3

7.9

7.5

Broad money (M3)

-3.0

20.8

7.2

15.6

6.1

9.1

8.1

7.6

7.1

Private sector credit/GDP

31.6

30.7

27.0

30.5

25.1

24.9

24.9

25.0

25.1

             

External Sector

           

Exports (f.o.b.; valued in CFA francs)

-3.1

10.5

2.0

10.5

25.3

7.8

5.3

4.2

2.7

Imports (f.o.b.; valued in CFA francs)

-1.5

5.3

4.8

3.5

10.8

6.3

6.5

6.4

5.7

Current account (percent of GDP)

-5.0

-5.2

-5.7

-3.5

-3.4

-3.1

-3.4

-3.7

-4.4

 

(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

Central Government Finances

           

Current revenue

20.6

20.1

20.6

18.6

19.8

20.1

20.4

20.8

20.9

 of which: Tax revenue

18.2

17.8

18.3

16.9

18.1

18.4

18.8

19.1

19.3

Total expenditure and net lending

29.0

26.3

27.7

24.1

25.0

24.7

24.6

24.9

25.1

 of which: Current expenditure

17.9

16.5

16.3

15.4

16.0

15.5

15.1

14.7

14.3

Overall fiscal balance, incl. grants (commitments)

-6.7

-5.0

-5.8

-4.3

-4.0

-3.5

-3.0

-3.0

-3.0

Total public debt 2/

56.2

53.0

56.9

52.2

56.1

55.0

54.0

53.0

52.3

        of which: External debt

25.9

23.7

25.4

22.2

24.8

24.0

23.7

23.3

23.1

        of which: Domestic debt

30.3

29.4

31.6

29.9

31.3

30.9

30.3

29.7

29.2

             

Memorandum Items:

           

Nominal GDP (CFAF billion) 3/

12,328

14,330

14,098

15,791

15,561

16,973

18,355

19,755

21,153

Nominal GDP per capita (US$)

874

990

975

1,050

1,002

1,063

1,120

1,175

1,227

Nominal exchange rate (CFAF/US$, period average)

606

602

606

598

635

637

637

637

637

Gold price (USD/troy ounce)

1,943

2,342

2,387

2,608

2,821

2,963

3,096

3,198

3,244

Sources: Burkinabé authorities; IMF staff estimates and projections.

1/ Percent of beginning-of-period broad money.

2/ The 2nd review total public debt data has been retroactively adjusted to correct an exchange rate calculation error starting in 2023. In addition, the denominator (GDP) in the table has been revised (see footnote 3 below). Previously, total public debt in 2024 was estimated at 52.6 percent of GDP, while it was assessed to have reached 53.6 percent of GDP in 2023.

3/ Historical nominal GDP figures have been revised down, in line with the most recent publication of official estimates by the National Institute of Statistics.

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MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Tatiana Mossot

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/20/pr-25211-burkina-faso-imf-completes-the-3rd-review-under-the-ecf-arrangement

MIL OSI

IMF Executive Board Concludes the Fifth Reviews Under the Extended Fund Facility and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility with Barbados

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 20, 2025

  • The IMF Executive Board concluded the fifth and final reviews under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangements with Barbados, allowing an immediate disbursement of about US$19 million under the EFF arrangement and about US$39 million under the RSF arrangement.
  • Implementation of the home-grown Barbados Economic Recovery and Transformation (BERT 2022) plan has remained strong and the broad objectives of the EFF and RSF arrangements have been achieved. Macroeconomic stability has been reinforced, and reforms have been implemented to boost fiscal sustainability, enhance growth, and build resilience.
  • Barbados’ economy has continued to perform well. Growth has been robust, inflation has moderated, the fiscal and external positions have improved, and the public debt-to-GDP ratio has continued to decline. The outlook is stable but subject to downside risks, given heightened global uncertainty and vulnerabilities to external shocks and natural disasters.

Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) today concluded the fifth and final reviews of the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangements with Barbados. The completion of the reviews allows the authorities to draw the equivalent of SDR 14.175 million (about US$19 million) under the EFF arrangement and SDR 28.35 million (about US$39 million) under the RSF arrangement, bringing total disbursements under the EFF arrangement to SDR 85.05 million (about US$116 million) and SDR 141.75 million (about US$193 million) under the RSF arrangement. The authorities have consented to the publication of the staff report prepared for these reviews.[1]

Economic activity in 2024 remained robust, with growth estimated at 4 percent, driven by tourism, construction, and business services. Inflation moderated to an average of 1.4 percent due to easing global commodity prices and prices of domestic goods and services. The external position strengthened further, with the current account deficit narrowing to 4.5 percent of GDP, supported by tourism receipts, declining import prices, and one-off current transfers. Gross international reserves reached US$1.6 billion at end-2024, equivalent to over 7 months of import cover, providing continued strong support to the exchange rate peg.

The near-term outlook is stable. Growth is expected to reach 2.7 percent in 2025, supported by construction of tourism-related projects and government investment. Inflation is expected to pick up in 2025 due to the rising cost of non-fuel imports and some domestic agricultural products. Nevertheless, risks to the outlook are tilted to the downside, amidst the highly uncertain external economic environment and Barbados’ continued vulnerability to global shocks and natural disasters.

Program performance has remained strong. All quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets were met. The authorities exceeded the primary fiscal surplus target for FY2024/25 and are targeting 4.4 percent of GDP for FY2025/26. Public debt has fallen below 105 percent of GDP, and the authorities remain committed to bringing it down to 60 percent of GDP by FY2035/36. The authorities met the EFF structural benchmarks for the review, including completing the assessment of human resource needs at the Barbados Customs and Excise Department, preparing a public-private partnership (PPP) framework, and developing a daily liquidity forecasting framework. Both reform measures for the RSF fifth review were also implemented. Key elements to strengthen the integration of climate concerns into public financial management have been completed, including the development of project appraisal guidelines, the deepening of fiscal risk analysis, and the preparation of the PPP framework. The Central Bank of Barbados has also included physical climate risk analysis in its bank stress testing.

Following the Executive Board discussion on Barbados, Mr. Bo Li, Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chair, issued the following statement:

“The implementation of Barbados’ homegrown Economic Recovery and Transformation program has remained strong, supported by the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangements. The completion of the fifth and final reviews marks the successful conclusion of the Fund arrangements.

“While the outlook is stable, risks remain tilted to the downside, given the highly uncertain external economic environment and Barbados’ vulnerability to shocks and natural disasters. The authorities remain strongly committed to ensuring macroeconomic stability and implementing structural reforms to boost potential growth and build resilience.

“Maintaining strong fiscal surpluses will be necessary to achieve the public debt target of 60 percent of GDP by FY2035/36. The authorities’ focus on strengthening revenue mobilization and improving public financial management is appropriate. These measures will be key to preserving fiscal sustainability and creating space for public investment. Finalizing ambitious reforms of state-owned enterprises is a priority. The authorities are taking the necessary steps to mobilize external financing.

“The exchange rate peg remains a critical anchor for macroeconomic stability, supported by ample international reserves. Measures have been taken to strengthen the monetary policy framework and financial safety nets. Efforts to enhance the local payments market and infrastructure are advancing, with the goal of moving to a digital payments system in 2026.

“Reforms to improve the business environment and boost growth potential are key. Important measures include advancing the digitalization of government services and investing in skills and education. The authorities focus on boosting macroeconomic resilience to natural disasters and facilitating the transition to renewable energy is welcome.”

[1] Under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, publication of documents that pertain to member countries is voluntary and requires member consent. The staff report will be published shortly on the www.imf.org/Barbados page.

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Meera Louis

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/20/pr-25210-barbados-imf-concludes-5th-reviews-under-the-eff-and-resil-and-sustainability-facility

MIL OSI

Hungary: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 20, 2025

A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

Washington, DC: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission, led by Anke Weber and comprising Aleksandra Alferova, Jakree Koosakul, Moheb Malak, Augustus Panton, and Atticus Weller, visited Budapest during June 5-17 to conduct discussions on the 2025 Article IV Consultation with the Hungarian authorities. At the end of the visit, the mission issued the following statement:

The Hungarian economy is at a challenging juncture. Output has stagnated over the past 3 years, while inflation remains well above the central bank’s 3 percent target. Regulatory measures—such as price, interest and margin caps, along with windfall taxes and subsidized lending schemes—have distorted market signals and added uncertainty. Despite significant fiscal adjustment in recent years, public debt remains elevated given high financing costs. Timely domestic policy reforms are needed to reinforce resilience amid an unsettled external environment. Key to this will be well-designed fiscal measures to strengthen public finances, a continued tight monetary policy to bring down inflation, and structural reforms to raise productivity and safeguard growth against trade tensions and heightened uncertainty.    

 

Economic Outlook

High domestic and external uncertainty are expected to continue weighing on the outlook. Modest consumption-driven growth of 0.7 percent is expected in 2025, underpinned by favorable wage dynamics. Growth is projected to increase to 2 percent in 2026—on a recovery in investment and a positive impulse from German fiscal expansion—and to converge to its long-term potential of around 2½ percent by 2030. Inflation is forecast at 4.5 percent in Q4:2025, and to gradually decelerate to the MNB’s 3 percent target by 2027. The current account surplus is expected to fall to around 1¼ percent of GDP in 2025 and to increase gradually over the medium term as battery and electric vehicle production expands. These projections are based on the IMF’s April World Economic Outlook global assumptions.

Risks to growth remain on the downside. Deepening geoeconomic fragmentation and rising trade tensions would affect Hungary’s exports directly, while indirect effects may be even larger, arising from prolonged trade uncertainty undermining private investment and further weakening global economic activity. Geopolitical tensions could lead to commodity price volatility, intensifying inflationary pressures and negatively impacting fiscal and external balances. On the domestic front, a delay in the needed fiscal adjustment could heighten market concerns about debt sustainability, further increase risk premia, and exacerbate sovereign-bank linkages. A lack of progress on governance reforms being discussed with the EC could further delay or result in cancellation of EU funds with negative consequences for growth and market confidence. Inflation could be more persistent than projected, including from larger-than-anticipated effects of minimum wage hikes necessitating tighter monetary policy for longer.

Strengthening Fiscal Sustainability for Future Growth

Staff estimates that currently announced policies fall short of achieving the authorities’ budget targets. The authorities remain committed to reaching their 2025 and 2026 deficit targets of 4.1 and 3.7 percent of GDP, respectively. Their medium-term fiscal structural plan (MTFSP) envisages a further deficit reduction to below 2 percent of GDP by 2028. Under staff’s baseline scenario, which incorporates only legislated or officially endorsed measures, the deficit is projected to decline slightly to 4.8 percent of GDP in 2025 and 4.6 percent of GDP in 2026. In the medium term, the deficit would remain around 4½ percent of GDP, while the debt-to-GDP ratio would rise to about 79 percent in 2030 from 73½ percent in 2024. Debt dynamics have deteriorated since last year, following fiscal slippages and a weaker outlook, and remain sensitive to the real interest and growth path.

Significant additional fiscal efforts are needed to preserve fiscal space and rebuild buffers. Over the medium term, a surplus of around 1¾ percent of GDP excluding debt servicing and adjusting for economic cycles would appropriately balance debt sustainability and output stabilization objectives. The implied cumulative adjustment of around 2 percent of GDP over 2025-2028 would bring the deficit below 3 percent of GDP by 2027 and reduce the public debt ratio below 70 percent by 2029. Any additional defense spending should be accommodated within staff’s recommended path.

Measures underpinning the adjustment should be well-designed and growth-friendly.

  • Revenue enhancements: The recent doubling of family tax allowances and expansion of personal income tax exemptions for mothers will significantly reduce revenues. In staff’s view an alternative that would minimize fiscal costs and labor market distortions would be to provide capped tax credits per child for both parents. A more targeted tax regime with fewer exemptions would raise revenue, improve efficiency, and simplify administration. Staff notes that a higher marginal personal income tax rate for high earners would increase revenue and fairness while taxation of corporates could be made more equitable and efficient by rationalizing tax incentives. A reduced reliance on distortionary windfall and financial transactions taxes would be more conducive to investment and growth.
  • Expenditure rationalization: A phaseout of distortive retail energy subsidies and their replacement by targeted cash transfers would free up fiscal resources. A review of procurement and government employment would help the authorities to better target a reduction of administrative expenditures, which are high relative to peers, while a strategy is needed to limit transfers to SOEs and other public organizations. The realized savings from these measures could be used to bolster underfunded areas—health, primary education, and social protection. Public financial management reforms and a strengthened expenditure review process could enhance spending efficiency and support better fiscal governance. Relying on capital spending cuts to achieve targets would weaken growth and should be avoided.

Further efforts will be needed to reduce long-term spending pressures. Population aging is expected to add roughly 3.5 percent of GDP in additional pension and healthcare costs by 2050. An increase in the retirement age, adjustment of benefit levels, and a limited increase in the social security contribution rate would help to control pension costs in the long term. mproved digitalization and efficient procurement would help to contain health expenditures.  

Fiscal risk monitoring and mitigation could be improved. A comprehensive, consolidated and regular risk assessment of SOEs would provide early warning of potential vulnerabilities. The issuance of new guarantees should be capped by ceilings, and the stock of guarantees, risk of their activation, and performance of underlying liabilities assessed on an annual basis. Channeling public resources into fund management structures or private equity undermines budgetary transparency, risks resource misallocation and could result in unforeseen contingent liabilities. Finally, to mitigate distortions, it would be beneficial to limit the use of subsidized lending by state-owned banks to addressing market failures.

Bringing Inflation Durably Back to Target

The monetary policy stance will need to remain tight into next year to durably return inflation to target. Monetary policy has been appropriately cautious, with the MNB signaling that maintaining tight monetary conditions is warranted. With average inflation expected to remain above the tolerance band in 2025, staff sees limited scope for rate cuts this year. However, the balance of risks to growth and inflation is evolving. Given exceptional uncertainty, the MNB should thus maintain a data-driven approach. The flexible exchange rate regime and adequate reserve coverage can continue to help reduce Hungary’s vulnerability to external shocks. Price, fee, and margin controls are not a sustainable path to lasting disinflation and should be phased out.

Staff welcomes ongoing efforts to refine the MNB’s focus on the core objectives of price and financial stability. The proposed change to the MNB Act—prohibiting foundations from engaging in asset management activities—is a step in the right direction. In this context, a broader review of the MNB’s non-core functions is warranted, including measures relating to its secondary goal of environmental sustainability. While the MNB should play an active role in climate-risk supervision, prudential regulation should remain risk focused, and all climate-related initiatives be consistent with the MNB’s price and financial stability mandates.

Safeguarding Financial Sector Stability

Systemic risks in the financial sector are assessed as broadly contained. Overall, the banking system remains well-capitalized, liquid, profitable, and resilient to external shocks. But emerging pockets of vulnerability merit continued vigilance, including an increase in the share of FX corporate loans, banks’ growing sovereign exposure and significant FX positions, elevated commercial real estate (CRE) vacancies, and buoyant house prices.

The capital-based macroprudential toolkit is broadly appropriate, though further refinements may be warranted. The planned introduction of a one percent positive neutral countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) in July 2025 amid heightened uncertainty is welcome, as was the reactivation of the systemic risk buffer (SyRB) for banks’ CRE exposures in 2024. While risks arising from banks’ growing sovereign exposures are partially mitigated by their high leverage ratio (capital-to-total exposure), consideration could be given to incorporating appropriate sovereign-bank nexus stress scenarios into regular supervisory stress testing.

Differentiation in borrower-based macroprudential limits should be introduced only on financial stability grounds. Recent relaxations of loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-service-to-income (DSTI) limits for first-time buyers and green homes appear to be partly driven by housing affordability and energy efficiency concerns. Such considerations should instead be tackled through appropriate structural and fiscal policies. Moreover, DSTI limits of 60 percent for first-time home buyers and for energy-efficient homes appear high relative to the overall limits in some peers. The reintroduction of voluntary APR ceilings for housing loans, while more restricted in scope, distorts risk pricing and should be reversed. Scaling back housing-related fiscal incentives would help contain future price pressures and safeguard financial stability.

Boosting Productivity Through Reforms

Boosting productivity growth will require comprehensive reforms that foster firm dynamism. Firm entry and exit rates remain low amid high regulatory barriers and an insolvency framework that impedes the timely exit of non-viable firms. Streamlining licensing and overlapping permits and enabling creditor-initiated and out-of-court restructuring would enhance capital and labor mobility toward more productive business ventures. Public R&D support should be performance-based and policy efforts aimed at promoting entrepreneurship and technology adoption better targeted, especially toward young, high-growth firms.

Productivity gains from industrial policy interventions remain elusive, underscoring the need for more effective horizontal reforms. Hungary has implemented repeated waves of industrial policies (IP) to boost competitiveness and productivity in targeted sectors. Yet, their impact on sustained productivity growth remains elusive. Given their high fiscal cost, IP should not substitute for broader structural reforms. Where used, such measures must be appropriately targeted to address market failures and be time-bound and transparent. As a small, open economy, Hungary would benefit most from a coordinated approach to state aid and IP at the EU-level.

Strengthening energy security can enhance competitiveness and facilitate the green transition. Ongoing efforts to diversify energy supply and increase renewable energy generation are commendable. Still, the Hungarian economy remains energy-intensive with high corporate energy prices weighing on cost competitiveness. EU-wide policy measures—including regional electricity market integration—should be complemented with domestic reforms such as targeted phaseout of household fossil fuel subsidies, enhanced energy efficiency standards, and accelerated permitting procedures for renewable energy investment.

Governance reforms are foundational for fostering a predictable business environment and boosting potential growth. Hungary has taken some important steps, including the 2023 judicial reforms aimed at strengthening the National Judicial Council. Further governance reforms and their effective enforcement—including related to public procurement, scope of the asset declaration system, conflict-of-interest rules, regulatory oversight, and functioning of the Integrity Authority—could unlock EU funds and amplify the growth dividends of other reforms.

The mission thanks the Hungarian authorities and our other interlocutors in Hungary for the productive collaboration, constructive policy dialogue, and warm hospitality.

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Eva-Maria Graf

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/20/hungary-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2025-article-iv-mission

MIL OSI

IMF and South Sudan Reach Staff-Level Agreement on a Nine-Month Staff-Monitored Program

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 20, 2025

Staff-Monitored Programs (SMPs) are informal arrangements between national authorities and IMF staff to monitor the authorities’ economic program. As such, they do not entail endorsement by the IMF Executive Board. SMP Staff reports are issued to the Board for information.

  • IMF staff and the South Sudanese authorities have reached a staff-level agreement on a nine-month Staff-Monitored Program (SMP), which is expected to start in August 2025, pending approval from the IMF’s Management.
  • The SMP aims to support South Sudan in designing and implementing policies and key reforms to strengthen its economic resilience to shocks, enhance macroeconomic stability, restore sustainability, and improve governance and transparency.
  • The South Sudanese economy is projected to start recovering as oil production has resumed from the oil pipeline damaged in February 2024 due to the war in Sudan. This disruption had halted oil exports, fiscal revenues, and foreign exchange (FX) proceeds for over a year, leading to liquidity and financing constraints. The recovery is expected to be gradual and hinges on continued improvement in the security environment and political stability.

Washington, DC: Upon request from the authorities, an International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff team, led by Ms. Mame Astou Diouf, held meetings in Juba, South Sudan, from June 11 to 20, 2025 to negotiate a Staff-Monitored Program (SMP) in support of the authorities’ economic and financial reform program. This SMP request follows the conclusion of South Sudan’s Staff Monitored Program with Board Involvement (PMB) on November 15, 2024 (See Press Release No. 24/434).

At the end of the mission, Ms. Diouf issued the following statement:

“The South Sudanese authorities and the IMF team have reached a staff-level agreement on the economic and structural policies and reforms that will underpin a nine-month SMP, pending approval by the IMF’s Management.

“Since early 2014, South Sudan has faced severe shocks that have exacerbated the country’s post-conflict fragility and humanitarian situation. Due to the war in Sudan, the country’s main oil pipeline was damaged in February 2024, halting related oil exports, fiscal revenues, and FX proceeds for over a year. The conflict also triggered a large influx of refugees, compounding an already-dire social and humanitarian situation caused by recurrent floodings, agricultural production losses, widespread food insecurity, and large-scale population displacement. The recent steep decline in international aid flows risks exacerbating the humanitarian challenges facing the country.

“The short- and medium-term economic outlook is moderately favorable and improving, contingent on a continuously improving security environment and political stability. The resumption of oil exports through the main pipeline since April 2025 is promising. While real GDP growth is projected to have contracted during FY2024/25 due to the lower oil production, it is expected to recover in FY2025/2026 as oil exports gradually strengthen. The rebound in oil exports is expected to significantly improve the current account balance, helping rebuild external buffers. The parallel foreign exchange (FX) market premium stood at 30.8 percent on June 11, 2025.

“While the budget execution of FY2024/2025 has been constrained by the financing constraints, non-oil domestic revenue collection was strong. This has allowed the resumption of government salary payments. However, structural bottlenecks partly hinder the effective distribution of salaries to civil servants due to cash shortages. For FY2025/2026, oil revenue is expected to recover substantially. Non-oil revenue will remain strong, benefiting from the continued implementation of tax policy reforms approved under the FY2024/2025 budget and broader revenue administration improvements. This will gradually ease liquidity constraints and provide some fiscal space for cautious repayment of salary arrears and a gradual increase of priority social spending and debt service repayments, while maintaining prudent fiscal management and cautious investment plans, given the continued risks to the outlook.

“Inflation has remained high. Average inflation is projected at about 143 percent in FY2024/2025, and expected to slow down in FY2025/26, thanks to ongoing tight monetary policy and a reduction in monetary financing. The debt-to-GDP ratio is forecast at about 58 percent of GDP in FY2024/2025, with large debt vulnerabilities. With the easing liquidity constraints, debt sustainability is projected to strengthen.

“Against this background, the South Sudanese authorities have requested a nine-month SMP to help strengthen economic resilience to shocks and foster macroeconomic stability through sound and prudent policies conducive to sustained growth. Key priorities under the SMP include:

“Restoring fiscal and public debt sustainability in the near term and laying the groundwork for positive medium-term prospects through prudent debt management and improved domestic revenue mobilization to increase fiscal space for priority spending, including salary and social programs. Enhancing spending efficiency, including through public financial and investment management reforms, will support public service delivery against the backdrop of high spending needs and limited availability of domestic and external financing.

“Maintaining a tight monetary policy stance to curb inflationary pressures and exchange rate depreciation. This includes containing monetary financing and continuing liquidity mop-up operations. While the official exchange rate has gradually decreased since August 2024 to narrow the parallel FX market premium, further policy adjustment is required to unify the official and parallel FX markets and increase FX reserves.

“Steadfast implementation of the governance and accountability reform agenda will be critical to addressing the country’s sources of fragility and creating an environment conducive to strong, diversified, and sustained growth and improved living standards. This includes the governance and transparency of oil-related investment programs.

“The mission met His Excellency, Dr. Benjamin Bol Mel, Vice President and Chairperson of the Economic Cluster, the Minister of Finance and Planning, Honorable Dr. Marial Dongrin Ater, the Governor of the Bank of South Sudan, Dr. Addis Ababa Othow, and other senior government officials, as well as representatives from civil society, private sector, and development partners.

“The mission takes the opportunity to thank the authorities and stakeholders for their warm hospitality, strong cooperation, and for open and productive discussions.”

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Wafa Amr

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/20/pr-25200-south-sudan-imf-and-south-sudan-reach-agreement-on-9-month-staff-monitored-program

MIL OSI

IMF Executive Board Concludes 2025 Article IV Consultation with Fiji

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 20, 2025

Washington, DC: On June 17, 2025, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation[1] with Fiji, and considered and endorsed the staff appraisal without a meeting.

The economic recovery continued in 2024. Staff estimates aggregate GDP growth in 2024 to have reached 3.7 percent. While employment has recovered to pre-pandemic levels, investment has recently been held back by labor shortages and supply-chain challenges. Inflation decelerated though 2024 as the impact of the 2023 value-added tax increase faded and the nominal exchange rate appreciated. The public debt-to-GDP ratio has continued to decline from the peak reached in 2022, but remains elevated, at 80 percent. Likewise, the current account balance has improved, but the deficit in 2024 is estimated to be around 6.7 percent.

Monetary and financial conditions remain accommodative, while the fiscal stance has tightened. The Reserve Bank of Fiji (RBF) has maintained the policy rate at 0.25 percent since early 2020. The fiscal stance tightened in FY2024, with the overall deficit declining from 7.2 percent of GDP in FY2023 (August-July) to 3.5 percent of GDP in FY2024, compared to a budgeted deficit of 4.8 percent of GDP.

Executive Board Assessment

In concluding the 2025 Article IV consultation with Fiji, Executive Directors endorsed staff’s appraisal, as follows:

The economy has been recovering from the pandemic but is facing new setbacks. Growth is expected to fall in 2025, to about 2.6 percent, mostly because of slowing external demand, and to take a couple of years to recover to its medium-term potential rate. The baseline projection implies that public debt would remain elevated. In addition, FX reserve coverage would fall, implying that the external position remains moderately weak. Growth would be higher with successful structural reforms, or should the external environment be more favorable than assumed. But the balance of risks appears to be mostly to the downside, both in the near term, if trade tensions were to worsen or their effects be more severe than assumed in the baseline, or over the medium term, mostly given vulnerabilities to natural disasters.

 

Fiscal and monetary policies should focus on addressing macroeconomic imbalances.

  • Fiscal policy should focus on lowering public debt while continuing with growth-friendly fiscal consolidation, oriented toward capital spending. Significant progress has been achieved in recent years, but additional adjustment measures are needed to put public debt on a clear downward path. Targeted and temporary social protection measures should be used to protect the vulnerable. Fiscal tightening would also contribute to reducing external imbalances.
  • Over the medium term, given potential pressures on the exchange rate peg, monetary conditions should be gradually tightened, raising the policy rate and reducing excess liquidity.
  • Financial policy should be attentive to emerging credit risks and to safeguard against money laundering risks.
  • The authorities should avoid using exchange rate restrictions and CFMs in place of macroeconomic adjustment and focus on a gradual, sequenced capital account liberalization to support high long-run growth objectives.

Raising potential growth calls for sustained structural reforms.

  • Progress has been achieved in enhancing the business environment and addressing near-term constraints to growth. Immediate concerns include addressing ageing infrastructure in electricity, water, and waste utilities, and improving the transport network and digital connectivity. Ongoing concerns include training and human capital. Successful measures would also encourage more foreign investment, ease external imbalances, and reduce “brain drain.”
  • As for other Pacific states, Fiji faces ongoing challenges from natural disasters and climate change. Increasing resilience adds to the motivation to shift away from current toward capital spending.

Such issues require sustained political consensus and good governance. The government’s recognition of the importance of institutional reform, commitment to the rule of law, and reducing corruption and bribery is welcome. Recent legislative progress will need to be matched by proper enforcement and addressing capacity constraints in the civil service.

Fiji: Selected Economic Indicators, 2022–30

2022

2023

2024

2025

2026

2027

2028

2029

2030

Est.

Proj.

Output and prices (percent change)

Real GDP

19.8

7.5

3.7

2.6

2.8

3.2

3.2

3.2

3.2

GDP deflator

2.4

4.1

6.3

3.2

3.1

3.2

3.3

3.4

3.5

Consumer prices (average)

4.3

2.3

4.5

3.2

3.1

3.2

3.3

3.4

3.5

Consumer prices (end of period)

3.1

5.1

1.3

3.1

3.2

3.3

3.4

3.5

3.5

Central government budget on fiscal-year basis (percent of GDP)

Revenue and Grants

21.4

23.2

27.4

27.1

27.1

26.8

26.8

26.6

26.5

Expenditure

33.5

30.3

31.0

31.5

31.2

31.0

31.0

30.9

30.9

Overall balance

-12.1

-7.2

-3.5

-4.4

-4.2

-4.2

-4.2

-4.3

-4.4

Primary balance

-8.5

-3.3

0.5

-0.3

-0.3

-0.6

-0.6

-0.7

-0.8

Central government debt 

90.4

83.3

79.5

77.7

77.7

77.6

77.3

77.0

76.8

Central government external debt

33.3

30.6

28.7

26.5

26.5

26.4

26.1

25.8

25.6

External sector (percent of GDP)

Current account balance

-17.3

-7.7

-6.7

-7.0

-7.7

-7.5

-7.2

-6.9

-6.9

Trade balance

-32.9

-32.7

-30.0

-29.1

-27.7

-27.3

-27.3

-26.9

-26.4

Services balance

11.8

20.4

20.0

19.9

18.4

17.8

17.3

17.1

16.5

Primary Income balance

-5.3

-5.7

-6.4

-6.8

-6.6

-6.4

-6.0

-5.9

-5.9

Secondary Income balance

9.2

10.3

9.6

9.0

8.2

8.5

8.8

8.9

9.0

Capital account balance

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

Financial account balance (-= inflows)

-14.0

-4.9

-6.6

-4.1

-5.3

-5.7

-6.9

-6.5

-6.5

FDI

-1.8

-1.1

-1.6

-4.5

-5.4

-6.1

-7.3

-7.1

-7.2

Portfolio investment

0.5

1.0

1.7

1.7

1.7

1.7

1.7

1.7

1.7

Other investment

-12.7

-4.8

-6.7

-1.3

-1.5

-1.3

-1.3

-1.1

-1.0

Errors and omissions

5.1

4.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Change in reserve assets (-=increase)

-2.1

0.3

0.1

2.9

2.3

1.7

0.3

0.3

0.4

Gross official reserves (in months of prospective imports)

5.5

5.3

5.2

4.4

3.7

3.1

2.9

2.6

Money and credit (percent change)

Net domestic assets of depository corporations

4.9

12.1

8.0

6.4

6.1

Claims on private sector

6.7

7.5

11.4

10.0

8.0

Broad money (M3)

5.1

9.1

6.6

4.1

4.1

Monetary base

15.8

-4.0

7.5

3.6

1.4

Central Bank Policy rate (end of period)

0.25

0.25

0.25

Commercial banks deposits rate (end of period)

0.4

0.4

0.3

Commercial banks lending rate (end of period)

5.2

4.8

4.6

Memorandum items

Exchange rate, average (FJD/USD)

2.2

2.3

2.3

Real effective exchange rate, average

108.2

106.4

108.3

GDP at current market prices (in millions of Fiji dollars)

10,940

12,245

13,494

14,286

15,148

16,130

17,193

18,342

19,594

GDP at current market prices (in millions of U.S. dollars)

4,970

5,442

5,949

6,257

6,564

6,913

7,284

7,674

8,089

GDP per capita (in U.S. dollars)

5,450

5,933

6,447

6,740

7,030

7,359

7,707

8,072

8,508

Sources: Reserve Bank of Fiji; Ministry of Finance; and IMF Staff Estimates and Projections.

[1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Pemba Sherpa

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/20/pr-25208-fiji-imf-concludes-2025-article-iv-consultation

MIL OSI

Энергетическая панель в рамках XXVIII Петербургского международного экономического форума

Source: Роснефти – Rosneft – Важное заявление об отказе от ответственности находится в нижней части этой статьи.

Начало: 21 июня в 10:00

Трансляция Энергетической панели будет организована на внутреннем телевидении ПМЭФ и информационном канале «Росконгресса».

Энергопотребление и прогресс всегда были взаимосвязаны. Чем выше поднималось человечество по ступеням развития, тем больше энергии требовалось для новых свершений — начиная от костров первобытных времён до атомных электростанций современности.

Сегодня наша цивилизация находится на переломном этапе – мировая энергетика стоит перед масштабной трансформацией, происходит изменение модели потребления энергии. На этом фоне перед каждой страной остро встает вопрос необходимости обеспечения энергобезопасности.

Как будет выглядеть энергетика завтрашнего дня и какие факторы определят ее развитие? Какую роль в этом процессе сыграют новые технологии? Какая страна первой сможет обеспечить переход к новому облику энергетики? И что ждет нефтяную отрасль на фоне происходящих изменений?

Ответы на эти и другие вопросы можно будет услышать в ходе трансляции Энергетической панели.  

Ключевой доклад:
Игорь Иванович Сечин, Главный исполнительный директор ПАО «НК «Роснефть»  

Модератор:
Рик Санчес, ведущий телеканала RT

Департамент информации и рекламы
ПАО «НК «Роснефть»
20 июня 2025 г

Обратите внимание; Эта информация является необработанным контентом непосредственно из источника информации. Это точно соответствует тому, что утверждает источник, и не отражает позицию MIL-OSI или ее клиентов.

Deepening the European Single Market

Source: IMF – News in Russian

Remarks by IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva at the Eurogroup Meeting on Enhancing Competitiveness and Addressing Internal Barriers in the Single Market – Luxembourg

June 19, 2025

As prepared for delivery

Thank you, Paschal, for inviting me back to speak on the topic of Europe’s single market.

We have been urging all of our members that now is the time to get your own house in order given the global trade and other tensions and the uncertainty. Reforms delayed? Delay no more.

And our advice has been resonating. Across the globe, countries and regions are on the move, pushing to higher competitiveness, more dynamism, and faster technological transformation. For Europe it is very simple: either Europe acts, or Europe risks getting sidelined. Relative decline would not happen in a flash, it would creep in, but that would not make it less real.

There is no time for delay.

Here at the Eurogroup, I have two positive messages that I want to deliver upfront:

  • First: with the Draghi and Letta reports, with the work of the Commission, and with your work, Europe has defined a strategic agenda with single market integration at its core, yet also bringing in national reforms and a bolder vision for the EU budget. Today I will sum this up in a three-point approach—single market, national reforms, and the EU budget—where the strength of each piece rests on the strength of the others.
  • Second: Europe has all the assets it needs—the savings, the skills, and the technology. It falls to Europe’s policymakers to push—nationally, collectively, and decisively—to mobilize these assets to their full potential. The people want a Europe that creates high-value jobs, innovates, and generates cutting-edge products and services. They want opportunity. It is within reach.

I know it can be done because Europe has done it before. I think back, for instance, to the EU enlargement of 2004, which opened up many new avenues for households and firms. Today, GDP per capita in the new member states is 30 percent higher than it would have been without EU accession—30 percent! Even for the “old” member states, we estimate that GDP per capita today is some 10 percent higher, on average, thanks to the enlargement.

Our assessment is thus clear and grounded in hard data: the single market delivers.

And yet we know that internal trade barriers remain high. According to the European Commission, for every 100 euros of value added produced in EU countries, only around 20 euros of goods are flowing back and forth between EU countries. In contrast, for the United States, for every 100 dollars of value added produced, 45 dollars of goods are crossing state borders.

This shows how various factors are holding Europe back. What are they? Regrettably, the list is long: fragmented regulation, obstacles to financial integration, labor market rigidities, gaps in the energy market, parochial interests—all coming together to constrain growth.

Too many European firms remain too small. One in five EU workers works at a company with fewer than ten employees—twice the share we see in the United States. Fragmentation and regulatory differences across member states make it hard for firms to compete, expand, and thrive. Productivity has fallen behind.

So what can be done to inject new vibrancy? Our advice is: pick a few key priorities, make sure they are the right ones, and push hard.

Let me start with the first piece of our three-point agenda—the single market. In this first piece, we see four top priorities.

Priority one: create a predictable regulatory environment to help firms grow.

Reducing regulatory fragmentation is critical: firms need clarity. Harmonizing company law and insolvency law would be the first best, but this is difficult. That is why we at the Fund put our full support behind the so-called “28th regime”—a voluntary EU-wide corporate charter. It offers a pragmatic way to slash legal complexity and compliance costs for cross-border firms: one system, applicable everywhere in the EU, for firms that opt in.

We know that our colleagues at the European Commission are working on a proposal. I say: please write up a simple set of rules covering key phases of the corporate life cycle from entry to exit, and everything in between. Create the possibility of the European Firm, enjoying legal certainty so it can focus on innovation and growth rather than navigating a maze of 27 national systems.

The goal need not be uniformity in all things, but rather, uniformity where uniformity matters most. Sensible national variations can—and must—coexist.

And to those who say corporate law is so deeply rooted in national legal tradition that a 28th regime is impossible, let me repeat what I said here two years ago: you have already done it. I am referring to the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, which is nothing other than an EU-level carveout from national frameworks for selected banks. Please now create an alternative regime for European companies.

Priority two on our list is longstanding: putting European savings to work.

This point too I raised here two years ago: Europe has the money—many trillions in private savings—but it is lazy money. Savings work harder elsewhere. Europe’s bank-centric financial system is failing to support the kind of innovative, high-growth firms that will drive the next wave of productivity and innovation.

That’s why the capital markets union needs to move—now. Europe needs deeper, more integrated capital markets to channel savings to high-risk, high-reward investments. Europe needs more venture capital. Creating a 28th regime will be key, but let it be paired with better investor access to corporate information on all firms—so market discipline can work.

And importantly, energizing finance requires positive steps in banking too. Bank dominance in Europe will persist, and there is room for more bank credit. Let banks be nudged to embrace more risk taking—prudently—to support economic growth. Done right, this can strengthen internal capital generation, strengthen risk buffers, and boost bank soundness.

Let’s recognize also that large banks, especially, serve as key players in the capital markets, including by managing investment accounts for their clients. For them to serve most efficiently and in a pan-European way, Europe must shed its reluctance to accommodate cross-border bank mergers and acquisitions. Blocking mergers on non-economic grounds—and dropping the ball on banking union more broadly—will not deliver 21st century finance.

Priority three, very briefly: improving labor mobility and access to talent.

I am told it can take up to six months for a worker relocating within the EU to become legally employable in another member country—surely not optimal. Speeding up work authorizations and streamlining the cross-border recognition of professional qualifications will help ease skills mismatches and enable firms to hire appropriate talent. This is critical to allowing firms to grow.

Fourth priority: building an interconnected and affordable energy market.

Energy is a chokepoint. Just look at the dispersion of prices across European electricity hubs—it is some three times higher than in the United States and, yes, it presents a profitable arbitrage opportunity for European energy majors that they should be grabbing.

What can be done to help this happen? For a start, as we have been emphasizing in our work, Europe needs an energy blueprint that pulls together all the parts. One part, certainly, needs to be better interconnectors between national electricity grids. High and volatile energy costs inhibit corporate investment and expansion. Conversely, improving access to reliable, affordable energy spurs growth.

Across the four areas—regulatory overload, access to finance, labor mobility, and affordable energy—we have laid out ten specific policy actions in a new paper last week. And our simulations suggest that, even by implementing a few, the dividends could be substantial—an uplift to overall EU activity on the order of about 3 percent over ten years. And there would be no question of winners and losers—every country stands to win.

Next, the second piece of our three-point agenda: reforms at the national level.

EU-level reforms are essential, but to be effective they must be paired with national reforms in many areas—and it is vital that these two layers of reform pull in the same direction.

Three examples:

  • First, capital markets union should make it easier for funds to flow to startups, but for the benefits to be fully realized national permitting processes must be streamlined.
  • Second, EU-wide initiatives aimed at enhancing talent mobility are important, but to work they require complementary labor market reforms at the national level.
  • Third, increasing the effectiveness of EU investment in cross-border infrastructure is key, but parallel actions are needed to address national infrastructure gaps.

Wherever one looks, there is a vital and complementary national element.

Finally, the third piece of the three-point agenda: making more of the EU budget.

This is about raising the level of ambition: more support from the EU budget for investments in shared priorities—European public goods—and, importantly, better coordination of national efforts around these priorities. And, if new EU borrowing could be agreed, it would help frontload investments, spread costs over time, and increase the supply of safe assets.

Bottom line: we recommend a doubling of EU budget expenditures on European public goods—electricity grids, digitalization, defense, and R&D—from 0.4 percent of EU gross national income to at least 0.9 percent, to help close investment gaps.

Not only would such investments accelerate single market deepening, they would also offer material cost savings. Our analysis shows that EU-level investments in energy infrastructure, for instance, can achieve savings of up to 7 percent relative to duplicative national efforts. With long-term spending pressures piling up, great deals like this one should be seized.

We also propose an expanded role for performance-linked disbursements to member states. I know from my time managing the EU budget that, done right, such schemes can play an important role in incentivizing necessary national reforms and investments, aligning them with shared EU priorities, and maximizing positive cross-border externalities. Famous case in point: the Recovery and Resilience Facility, with its formidable economic payoffs.

Let me conclude. My colleagues and I have put forward for your consideration a strategic agenda with three clear objectives:

  • One, remove internal barriers to deepen the single market and let firms grow;
  • Two, advance national reforms that align with and amplify EU-level initiatives; and
  • Three, use the EU budget strategically to coordinate efforts and invest in public goods.

We do not underestimate the difficulty of delivering on this agenda and the political hurdles and vested interests to be encountered along the way. But the alternative of doing nothing will deliver nothing. Key, in our view, is to push hard.

Success will require you, the policy leaders, to explain reforms to the public and exert sustained pressure at the technical level. Regulators defend their missions but are not always tasked to consider connections and externalities. Like a football coach, you will need to make all the players play as a team.

And to our colleagues at the Commission who hold the legislative pen, our advice would be, first, to prioritize speed and not let the perfect be the enemy of the good and, second, to not let the legal mindset dominate the economic mindset. Economic rationale and economic objectives must drive Europe’s developments at this crucial time. 

There is a saying that Europe is the “lifestyle superpower of the world.” Every time I return here—to my European home—I feel a sense of admiration. But please also hear this: for the European way of life to be sustained, Europe must also become a “productivity superpower.” Europe needs the growth potential that can come only from releasing its entrepreneurial energy.

And for that to happen, Europe needs its single market now more than ever. I’m told that at the Eurogroup Working Group last week one respected colleague described the internal market as “a treasure in the EU’s own hand, which now needs to be unwrapped.” I agree.

The stakes are high, the potential rewards are large, and—in this time of global tensions and uncertainty—the moment is surely now.

Thank you very much.

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER:

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/19/sp061925-deepening-the-european-single-market

MIL OSI