IMF Staff Completes 2025 Article IV Mission to Vietnam

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 24, 2025

End-of-Mission press releases include statements of IMF staff teams that convey preliminary findings after a visit to a country. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF’s Executive Board for discussion and decision.

  • Vietnam’s economy started 2025 strongly, with 6.9% year-on-year growth in the first
  • quarter. However, the outlook is more challenging amid global trade tensions and high uncertainty.
  • There is room for greater support by fiscal policy to cushion the impact of global shocks if needed. Allowing more flexibility in the exchange rate and strengthening the financial system will be important.
  • Implementation of the ambitious reform agenda encompassing institutional overhauls, private sector strengthening, and infrastructure improvements present an opportunity to raise medium-term growth. Further reforms to boost productivity, strengthen governance, and improve the business environment are also critical.

Hanoi: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) team, led by Mr. Paulo Medas, held discussions for the 2025 Article IV consultation with the Vietnamese authorities from June 11-24, 2025. The team exchanged views with Deputy Prime Minister Ho Duc Phoc, senior officials of the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV), the Ministry of Finance, the National Assembly, and other government agencies. It also met with representatives from the private sector, think tanks, and other stakeholders.

At the conclusion of the mission, Mr. Medas issued the following statement:

“The Vietnamese economy rebounded strongly in 2024, growing at 7.1 percent backed by robust exports, resilient foreign direct investment (FDI), and supportive policies. This momentum continued into the first quarter of 2025, with economic activity expanding by 6.9 percent (y/y). Inflation remained contained. The current account surplus reached a record 6.6 percent of GDP in 2024.

“The outlook is heavily dependent on the outcome of trade negotiations and is constrained by elevated global uncertainty on trade policies and economic growth. Our projections, in line with the IMF April 2025 World Economic Outlook, assumes high tariffs take effect in the third quarter. In such a scenario, economic growth is projected to slow to 5.4 percent in 2025 and decelerate further in 2026.  However, if global trade tensions subside, the economic outlook would improve significantly.

“Downside risks are high. A further escalation in global trade tensions or a tightening of global financial conditions could weaken further exports and investment. Domestically, financial stress could re-emerge from tighter financial conditions and high corporate indebtedness. On the upside, achieving nondiscriminatory trade agreements and successfully implementing planned infrastructure and structural reforms could significantly boost medium-term growth.

“Given the uncertain outlook, policy priorities should focus on preserving macro-financial stability while navigating economic adjustments. Fiscal policy, supported by low level of public debt, should take the lead in cushioning the near-term impact especially under downside scenarios. Accelerated implementation of public investment and strengthening social safety nets would be important.

“Monetary policy has much more limited room and should be decisively focused on anchoring inflation expectations. Allowing the exchange rate flexibility will be critical as the economy adjusts to the external shock. Some monetary easing could be considered if global interest rates decline as expected and inflation falls. Vigilance is needed to monitor and act against inflation pressures arise, including due to external shocks. These challenges underscore the importance of modernizing the monetary policy framework to enhance its effectiveness and anchor stability, including by replacing credit growth limits with an improved prudential framework.

“Further efforts are needed to strengthen financial sector soundness. To bolster banking system resilience, priorities include strengthening bank supervision, build liquidity and capital buffers, and further improving the bank resolution framework.

“The government’s plans for an ambitious reform agenda are very welcome and could boost medium-term growth, but implementation will be key. The government’s focus on institutional reforms to enhance efficiency, strengthen private sector development, and plans to scale up public investment is a major step forward. It will be important to develop and implement concrete reforms to improve key infrastructure (e.g., logistics, energy), functioning of capital markets, education and training, and productivity.  To maximize the return on large investments, it is critical to strengthen public investment management and adopt a sound macro-fiscal strategy to preserve the health of public finances. Efforts to strengthen economic governance are essential, including strengthening the AML/CFT regime, and efforts in this regard are welcome. Vietnam’s rapid economic growth is outpacing the development of its economic statistics and urgent efforts are needed to close data gaps to support effective policymaking and risk management.

“The team is grateful to the authorities for their warm hospitality and the candid and insightful discussions.”

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Pavis Devahasadin

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/24/pr-25214-vietnam-imf-staff-completes-2025-article-iv-mission

MIL OSI

Chile Can Grow Faster – But it Won’t Be Like the 1990s Again

Source: IMF – News in Russian

Faster investment approvals, greater labor force participation, public-private R&D collaboration and steps to harness critical minerals and renewable energy can support higher growth

Many of Chile’s current socioeconomic debatessuch as those related to fiscal sustainability, pension adequacy and college loanscan be attributed to the country’s growth slowdown over the past two decades. Back in the 1990s, Chile grew 6.2 percent per year on average and was Latin America’s posterchild success story. Over time, this robust growth trend steadily waned, and by the 2020s, growth barely went above 2 percent. The IMF’s recent annual economic health check of the country (Article IV consultation) addresses how Chile can reverse this trend.

Comparing Chile to its peers, there is scope to grow faster. Higher-income countries that were once at a comparable income level to Chile grew at a rate of around 2.9 percent per year. However, Chile faces challenges that most of those economies did not encounter at the same stage of development: such as an aging population and a global slowdown, both of which will make it more difficult for Chile to reach this pace.

Historical patterns

As countries get richer, sustaining rapid growth simply becomes harder because of diminishing gains from investment and less scope for technology catch-up. To evaluate Chile’s growth potential, we compared its trajectory with other countries when they reached similar income levels, such as Australia in the late 1980s and Korea in the 2000s. According to the Penn World Table and our calculations, Chile’s GDP per person tripled from US$8,200 in 1990 to around US$26,000 in 2025, in constant 2017 U.S. dollars after purchasing power parity (PPP) adjustment.

Among 28 economies that crossed the US$26,000 real GDP per capita threshold between 1950 and 2010, median annual GDP growth over the subsequent decade was 2.9 percent. This benchmark is well below Chile’s 1990s boom, but still above its current trend.

Demographic and external drags

While the comparison is useful and offers some optimism, Chile faces an aging population and a less favorable global growth environment – impediments that many of these other higher-income economies did not face during their development stage.

Though still relatively young, Chile’s population is aging. According to the UN’s median population projection, Chile’s working-age population (15-64) will grow by just 0.15 percent per year during 2025-35. With modest gains in labor participation, employment will likely grow by 0.2-0.3 percent annually – below the 0.8 percent seen in the comparison group. This demographic drag alone saps ¼ percentage point from Chile’s potential growth.

Global technological trends could also weigh on Chile’s outlook. In the 1990s, information technology boosted productivity across countries. Our comparison group of countries benefitted from a U.S. GDP growth rate – taken as a proxy for global technological trends – of 3.1 percent per year on average. In contrast, economists now expect more modest U.S. growth of 2.1 percent for the next decade. We estimate that a one-percentage point reduction in 10-year U.S. annual growth translates to a further 0.8 percentage point restraint on Chile’s potential growth.

Transformational reforms

While these are rough estimates, and outcomes could vary widely, the exercise suggests a long-term growth trend of around 1.9 percent, if Chile were to perform in line with the median country and the demographic and external headwinds persisted.

So, how can Chile increase its potential and defy these drags on growth? Short-run macroeconomic stimulus is not the answer, and Chile’s economy is already balanced. The solution lies in deepening supply-side structural measures, consistent with the policy messages in our latest annual review of Chile’s economy (the Article IV consultation).

First, it is critical to make regulatory requirements more efficient. As an extreme example, it can take up to 10 years to sort out permits and navigate bureaucracy to get a large mining project off the ground. Streamlining this lengthy process would help reduce barriers to investment and support technology adoption. Similarly, modernizing regulations related to maritime transport could lower trade costs and improve Chile’s competitiveness. 

To address demographic challenges, Chile could stimulate labor participation, for example by improving the access to quality childcare that would enable more women to enter the labor force.

Chile’s R&D spending is also substantially below the OECD average. Greater public-private collaboration here is essential, given limited budgetary resources. The proposed technology transfer bill, enabling university researchers to create tech companies and commercialize their work, could help narrow this gap.

Finally, as the world’s largest copper producer, second largest lithium producer, and as a nation richly endowed with solar and wind resources, Chile can benefit from the high global demand for these critical minerals and through use of low-cost renewable energy.

While there is no silver bullet for growth, together these reforms improve the chances of a better outcome. Lifting Chile’s growth potential is critical for improving living standards and addressing social and fiscal pressures. Chile has an established track record of prudent macroeconomic management. Building on this solid foundation, the country can achieve stronger growth in a challenging global environment.

*****

Si Guo is a senior economist and Andrea Schaechter is an assistant director in the Western Hemisphere Department.

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/24/cf-chile-can-grow-faster-but-it-wont-be-like-its-the-1990s-again

MIL OSI

IMF Executive Board Completes the Fourth Review Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement with the Union of the Comoros

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 24, 2025

  • The IMF Executive Board completed today the fourth review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement with the Union of the Comoros. Approval of the fourth review enables an immediate disbursement of SDR 3.56 million (about US$ 4.87 million).
  • Program performance remains broadly on track despite setbacks in 2024 linked to a lengthy political transition and external shocks. The authorities have reaffirmed their commitment to the ECF-supported reform agenda and are determined to demonstrate stronger program ownership in the period ahead.
  • Economic conditions remain broadly stable, supported by adequate external buffers and continued program engagement, despite persistent inflationary pressures. Implementation of the ECF-supported program is helping to safeguard macroeconomic stability, advance critical structural reforms, and mobilize concessional financing to address Comoros’s significant development and financing needs.

Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed today the fourth review under the Union of the Comoros’ Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement. The Executive Board’s decision allows for an immediate disbursement of SDR 3.56 million (about US$ 4.87 million), bringing the total disbursements so far under the arrangement to about $23.7 million. The 4-year ECF arrangement was approved on June 1, 2023 (See Press Release No. 23/194) with an access of SDR 32.04 million (about US$ 43 million).  

In completing the review, the Executive Board also approved the authorities’ requests for (i) waivers of nonobservance of the quantitative performance criteria (QPCs) on tax revenue and the domestic primary balance at end of 2024 and the continuous QPC on the non-accumulation of external arrears and (ii) modifications to the end of December 2025 QPCs on tax revenue and domestic primary balance to reflect corrective actions for missing these QPCs at end-2024.

While there is considerable progress towards the achievement of program objectives, significant and continued effort is required to maintain the reform momentum. The authorities have reiterated their strong commitment to the ECF-supported program and despite recent setbacks. Two of five QPCs were met as of end of December 2024 and 8 of the 11 structural benchmarks (SBs) expected between end of November 2024 and end of May 2025 were also met. 

Comoros’ economic reform program supported by the ECF arrangement seeks to reduce fragility and increase economic resilience by building fiscal buffers, reducing debt vulnerabilities, strengthening the financial sector, and enhancing governance. Key policy priorities for the program remain unchanged and include: (i) mobilizing domestic revenue through reforms to strengthen tax and customs administration and streamline tax exemptions; (ii) stabilizing the financial sector including through the restructuring of the state-owned postal bank SNPSF and enhancing the Central Bank’s banking supervision and resolution capacities; and (iii) strengthening governance through PFM and anti-corruption reforms.

Economic conditions remain broadly stable, though risks persist. Growth is estimated at 3.3 percent in 2024 and projected to rise to 3.8 percent in 2025, supported by public investment and recovering private sector credit. Inflation averaged 5 percent in 2024 and reached 7.3 percent (y/y) in March 2025, driven by food price pressures linked to cyclone-related supply disruptions and strong seasonal demand. As a result, average inflation for 2025 has been revised upward from 1.8 to 3.8 percent. Fiscal consolidation was weaker than expected in 2024 largely due to revenue shortfalls, but a stronger adjustment is planned for 2025, supported by corrective measures. The external position remains stable, with the current account deficit estimated at 2.2 percent of GDP and international reserves covering 7.4 months of imports in 2024. Reserves are projected to exceed 8.5 months over the program period.

Following the Executive Board’s discussion, Mr. Nigel Clarke, Deputy Managing Director, and Acting Chair, issued the following statement:

“The Comorian authorities remain committed to their reform agenda under the Extended Credit Facility-supported program, despite setbacks in 2024 linked to a lengthy political transition and external shocks. While the external position remains stable—supported by continued reserve accumulation—economic momentum softened amid elevated food inflation and cyclone-related supply shocks. These challenges highlight Comoros’s structural vulnerabilities as a small, fragile island state with limited fiscal space, weak diversification, and exposure to external and climate risks.

“Fiscal policy continues to focus on a medium-term consolidation agenda to safeguard debt sustainability. Although 2024 fiscal outturns were weaker than expected driven largely by underperformance in tax revenue, the authorities are addressing the revenue shortfalls through corrective measures aimed at strengthening customs enforcement, improving taxpayer compliance, and recovering tax arrears.

“Monetary policy remains focused on preserving external stability through the euro peg, alongside gradual improvements in liquidity management. While inflation remains elevated, the BCC stands ready to tighten its stance if inflation or reserve pressures persist. The central bank has expanded liquidity absorption capacity and begun publishing its operations calendar, with further reforms planned. Progress in financial supervision, resolution planning, and recapitalization—and sound operationalization of the new postal bank (BPC)—will be key to reinforcing financial sector resilience.

“Governance and institutional reforms are progressing, though unevenly. Key achievements include operationalizing the Anti-Corruption Chamber, enhancing fiscal transparency, and adopting budget management regulations. Nonetheless, challenges persist in liquidity forecasting and cash management, accuracy in budget execution reporting, and reform implementation capacity. Strengthening the Treasury Committee, improving SOE oversight, and sustaining the PFM reform strategy remain essential to bolstering fiscal credibility.

“Program implementation has regained momentum following a slowdown in late 2024. Continued engagement with the IMF and donor partners will be essential to safeguard macroeconomic stability, advance reforms, catalyze grants and concessional financing, and address capacity gaps.”

Comoros Selected Economic Indicators (2024-28)

 

Population (2018, thousands): 856

Main products and exports: Cloves, ylang-ylang, vanilla

Key export markets: Asia, European Union

2024

2025

2026

2027

2028

Est.

proj.

proj.

proj.

proj.

Output

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Real GDP growth (%)

3.3

3.8

4.3

4.5

4.3

Employment

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Unemployment (%)

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Prices

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Inflation, period average (%)

5.0

3.8

1.7

2.1

2.1

Central government finances

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Revenue and grants (% GDP)

16.2

17.8

17.2

16.8

16.7

Expenditure (% GDP)

19.2

19.6

18.9

18.7

18.8

Fiscal balance (% GDP)

-3.6

-1.9

-1.7

-1.9

-2.1

Public debt (% GDP)

33.7

36.3

37.7

37.9

39.3

Money and Credit

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Broad Money (% change)

5.1

6.0

5.5

7.0

5.0

Credit to private sector (% change)

1.6

8.7

5.2

5.7

5.5

Balance of Payments

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Current account (% GDP)

-2.2

-3.1

-4.1

-3.6

-3.0

FDI (% GDP)

0.4

0.6

0.6

0.6

0.6

Reserves (months imports)

7.4

7.7

8.4

7.8

9.5

External debt (% GDP)

30.0

31.3

33.8

34.7

36.5

Exchange rate

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  KMF/US$ (period average)

449.7

Sources: country authorities; and IMF staff’s estimates.

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Pavis Devahasadin

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/24/pr25215-comoros-imf-completes-the-fourth-review-under-the-extended-credit-facility-arrangement

MIL OSI

Поводов для паники нет – раскрыты условия блокировки мелких переводов россиян

Source: Mainfin Bank –


Как работает временная блокировка средств на картах и счетах?

Росфинмониторинг начал блокировать операции банковских клиентов для борьбы с дропперами – ведомство получило право напрямую ограничивать транзакции. С 1 июня:

  • финансовая разведка может самостоятельно обращаться в банк для блокировки средств;
  • приостановка операций возможна только при наличии подозрений, что лицо использует счет для финансирования экстремизма либо легализации преступных доходов;
  • срок ограничений составляет не более 10 суток, а в исключительных ситуациях – до 30 дней;
  • блокировка проводится на основании 115-ФЗ – такой механизм ранее уже существовал и в ряде банков был автоматизирован, т.е. срабатывал при наличии индикаторов риска.

Борьба с мошенничеством ведется и по другим направлениям – финразведка совместно с ЦБ РФ создает платформу по обмену информацией о клиентах банков, а МВД разрабатывает поправки в УК РФ, предусматривающие уголовную ответственность для дропперов.

Когда Росфинмониторинг может ограничить операции по картам?

В ведомстве пообещали, что откажутся от практики массовых блокировок. Эксперты полагают, что в зоне риска будут находиться клиенты банков, которые:

  • часто получают переводы от разных людей, друзей, родственников вне зависимости от суммы;
  • получают деньги без объяснений или с назначением платежа, например, «возврат долга»;
  • планируют поездку за рубеж и при этом по карте зафиксирована подозрительная активность, включая множественные операции;
  • в силу профессиональной занятости получают частые переводы – речь идет о фрилансерах, блоггерах, домашних кондитерах и т.д.

«Регулярные переводы, донаты, участие в сборах, получение дохода на личную карту физического лица – факторы риска. Для подтверждения легальности средств придется представить соответствующие документы», – отметил эксперт.

Нововведения приведут к учащению жалоб на банки – россияне будут обращаться в суды на фоне блокировок. Вместе с тем, закон работает уже почти месяц – и за это время массовых жалоб на действие Росфинмониторинга зафиксировано не было.

Источник:

Обратите внимание; Эта информация является необработанным контентом непосредственно из источника информации. Это точно соответствует тому, что утверждает источник, и не отражает позицию MIL-OSI или ее клиентов.

Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

https://mainfin.ru/novosti/povodov-dla-paniki-net-raskryty-uslovia-blokirovki-melkih-perevodov-rossian

Финансовые новости: Информация об операциях РЕПО (13:33).

Source: Центральный банк России – Central Bank of Russia (2) –

Тип аукциона РЕПО. Объем спроса на операции РЕПО, млн руб.2 427 348,2. Общий объем заключенных сделок РЕПО, млн. руб. 1 090 000,0.

Ставка отсечения, % годовых 20,2122. Средневзвешенная ставка, % годовых 20,2312. Минимальная заявленная ставка, % годовых 20,0720. Максимальная заявленная ставка, % годовых 20,2901. Объем заключенных сделок РЕПО в рамках лимита, млн. руб. 1 090 000,0. Средневзвешенная ставка по заявкам, удовлетворенным в рамках лимита, % годовых 20,2312. Срок 7 дней. Дата исполнения первой части сделки 25.06.2025.

Дата исполнения второй части сделки 02.07.2025.

Обратите внимание; Эта информация является необработанным контентом непосредственно из источника информации. Это точно соответствует тому, что утверждает источник, и не отражает позицию MIL-OSI или ее клиентов.

Финансовые новости: Сообщение о ликвидации, ООО “ЮМК банк”.

Source: Центральный банк России – Central Bank of Russia (2) –

Полное фирменное наименование:

Общество с ограниченной ответственностью “Банк Южной многоотраслевой корпорации”

Сокращённое фирменное наименование:

ООО “ЮМК банк”

Регистрационный номер:

3495

Дата регистрации Банком России:

12.05.2009

Основной государственный регистрационный номер:

1172375051936 (30.06.2017)

Адрес из устава:

350080, г. Краснодар, ул. Уральская, 95

Адрес фактический:

350080, г. Краснодар, ул. Уральская, 95

Телефон:

(861)210-05-17, (861)210-05-53

Устав:

Дата согласования последней редакции устава: 21.04.2017 , cогласованные изменения в уставe: прочие изменения (04.10.2017)

Уставный капитал:

1 000 000 000,00 руб., дата изменения величины уставного капитала: 24.03.2014

Лицензия (дата выдачи/последней замены)
Банками с базовой лицензией являются банки, имеющие лицензию, в названии которой присутствует слово «базовая». Все остальные действующие банки являются банками с универсальной лицензией

Лицензия отозвана приказом Банка России ОД-424 от 19.03.2021

Участие в системе страхования вкладов:

Нет

Фирменное наименование на английском языке:

OOO (Limited Liability Company) “Bank Ujnoy mnogootraslevoy korporation”; OOO (LLC) “UMK bank”

Обратите внимание; Эта информация является необработанным контентом непосредственно из источника информации. Это точно соответствует тому, что утверждает источник, и не отражает позицию MIL-OSI или ее клиентов.

Финансовые новости: Интервью Ильи Кочеткова журналу «Банковское обозрение».

Source: Центральный банк России – Central Bank of Russia –

МФО используют различные способы обхода требований регулятора.

В 2024 году рынок МФО в России показал неожиданный всплеск — рекордное количество граждан обратилось за микрозаймами впервые. По итогам года число уникальных клиентов микрофинансовых организаций достигло 14,8 млн человек. Директор департамента небанковского кредитования ЦБ Илья Кочетков рассказал «Б.О» о том, что повлияло на этот рост, каковы структура займов, динамика по просрочке, а также о мерах, принимаемых регулятором для охлаждения рынка займов МФО.

— Илья Александрович, как вы оцениваете текущие темпы роста рынка микрофинансирования в России и влияние маркетплейсов на увеличение клиентской базы МФО? Устойчив ли этот тренд или обусловлен разовыми всплесками потребительской активности?

— Если говорить об итогах прошлого года, темпы роста объемов выдач увеличились по отношению к 2023 и 2022 годам. Активность сохраняется как в секторе потребительских займов (их выдано на 1,4 трлн рублей, рост составил 55% за год), так и в секторе займов бизнесу (130 млрд рублей, рост на 23% за год).

Драйвером роста потребительского сегмента МФО в прошлом году стал выход на рынок новых, более доступных для граждан, продуктов отдельных крупных компаний с умеренной процентной ставкой на покупку товаров в торговых точках и на маркетплейсах. Более половины новых заемщиков, пришедших на рынок МФО в 2024 году, получили именно такие займы.

Мы относимся к этому вопросу с особым вниманием, определить тренд таких изменений на данном этапе сложно. Пока ни указанные процентные ставки, ни цели, на которые граждане берут эти займы, у нас особого волнения не вызывают. Уровень просроченной задолженности по их портфелю низкий. Но будем, конечно, наблюдать за развитием ситуации.

— Рост объема микрозаймов связан прежде всего с увеличением спроса на краткосрочные «займы до зарплаты»? Есть ли свежие данные о распределении сроков по выданным займам?

— Что касается прироста объемов выдач новым заемщикам, около 60% в его структуре — это займы для покупки на маркетплейсах или pos-займы в торговых точках. При этом в совокупном объеме за год такие займы составляют чуть более 30%. ПСК (полная стоимость кредита. — Ред.) по таким займам ниже, чем по традиционным продуктам МФО, и в среднем не превышает 100% годовых, а сроки варьируются от полугода до года (иногда более).

Несмотря на развитие более доступных продуктов, краткосрочные дорогие займы с ПСК 250+ по-прежнему занимают значительную долю в потребительских выдачах. Под такую процентную ставку заемщики берут займы на маленькие суммы (около 10 тыс. рублей) на неотложные нужды. Сроки по таким займам ниже: от 1 до 2,5 месяцев.

— Как изменились портрет заемщика МФО и цели, на которые он берет заем?

— Большинство заемщиков в 2024 году брали в МФО займы для покупки товаров на макретплейсах. Среди клиентов, обратившихся повторно, преобладают заемщики, получившие краткосрочные займы на неотложные покупки, в том числе товары первой необходимости: продукты питания, одежду и т.д.

Мы также отмечаем, что значительный объем полученных средств заемщики тратят на погашение прежних займов. Это приводит к росту закредитованности граждан. Именно поэтому требуется комплексно пересмотреть регулирование в сфере потребительских займов и ввести дополнительные ограничения. Мы писали об этом в Докладе о перспективных направлениях развития рынка МФО на 2025–2027 годы, опубликованном в августе прошлого года.

— Каковы долгосрочные последствия роста популярности микрозаймов?

— Высокая доступность займов МФО формирует повышенные риски в этом сегменте. Заемщики не всегда реально оценивают свои возможности выполнить взятые обязательства.

Мы как регулятор принимаем меры для предупреждения реализации этих рисков. Мы ввели для МФО обязанность расчета показателя долговой нагрузки заемщика, поэтапно ужесточаем макропруденциальные лимиты, повысили резервы для наиболее дорогостоящих займов, установили повышенные надбавки к коэффициентам риска по обязательствам граждан с высоким показателем долговой нагрузки. Эти меры принимались, чтобы стимулировать МФО более качественно оценивать платежеспособность и долговую нагрузку заемщиков.

Однако надо признать, что МФО используют различные способы обхода этих требований, ожидаемого охлаждения рынка потребительских займов не произошло. Решить проблему, на наш взгляд, могут дальнейшее снижение уровня переплаты по займу для гражданина и «разрыв цепочек» дорогих займов.

В начале апреля в Госдуму был внесен законопроект, в разработке которого принимал участие Банк России (проект ФЗ № 887449-8). Он предусматривает ограничение количества одновременно действующих у заемщика дорогих (с ПСК более 100%) займов. На первом этапе — «два займа в одни руки», далее — «один заем в одни руки». Такое ограничение не позволит МФО формировать «цепочки» займов и закредитовывать заемщика.

На этапе разработки изменений и их обсуждения с рынком мы рассматривали также альтернативные варианты регулирования, однако в итоге пришли к выводу, что только прямые ограничения позволят прекратить негативные практики.

Также будет введен период охлаждения между дорогими займами, и это позволит заемщику более взвешенно подходить к заключению нового договора.

Кроме того, предусмотрено снижение переплаты по займу: сейчас ее размер ограничен 130%, мы предлагаем установить порог в 100% от суммы займа. То есть по займу в 10 тыс. рублей весь долг в итоге, с учетом суммы самого займа, а также всех процентов и других платежей по договору, не сможет превысить 20 тыс.

— Как вы оцениваете уровень кредитных рисков в текущих условиях? Растет ли доля проблемных долгов?

— По итогам 2024 года доля просроченной задолженности NPL 90+ в потребительском сегменте составила 35%, что на 3 п.п. ниже значения предыдущего квартала и на 7 п.п. меньше, чем годом ранее.

Основной причиной снижения доли NPL 90+ в целом по рынку стал опережающий рост портфеля займов в четвертом квартале 2024 года, просрочка по которым к концу года еще не успела вызреть.

Также позитивное влияние на структуру портфеля оказало последовательное ужесточение макропруденциальных лимитов. Доля займов, выданных заемщикам с предельной долговой нагрузкой в диапазоне 50–80%, снизилась до 11%, с ПДН свыше 80% — до 3%.

Для предупреждения рисков в сегменте автозаймов мы установили по ним на третий квартал 2025 года макропруденциальные лимиты: 20% квартальных выдач для заемщиков с ПДН 50–80% и 5% для заемщиков с ПДН 80%+.

— Можно ли сказать, что микрозаймы частично замещают кредитные карты, по которым стало сложнее получить одобрение или были снижены лимиты? Если да, то какие категории заемщиков сильнее всего перетекли из банковского сектора в МФО?

— Лимиты на займы наиболее закредитованным заемщикам для МФО и банков сейчас установлены на одном уровне, поэтому нельзя говорить о прямом перетоке банковских клиентов в МФО.

Скорее мы наблюдаем активный рост макретплейсов и одновременно быструю цифровизацию микрофинансовых услуг, которые привлекают на рынок МФО новых клиентов. Для них оформление займа на покупку товара — удобный и быстрый способ получить нужную сумму, а ставки по таким займам сопоставимы с банковскими и существенно ниже, чем по традиционным займам МФО.

— Какие прогнозы на 2025 год по объему и количеству выдач займов МФО?

— Мы видим, что за первый квартал 2025 года МФО выдали гражданам 461 млн рублей. Это практически столько же, сколько в четвертом квартале 2024 года, прирост составляет 0,2%. При этом в январе-феврале наблюдалось снижение спроса на микрозаймы, а в марте — его рост.

Значительное влияние на показатели рынка окажет введение предложенных нами ограничений на количество одновременно действующих дорогих займов. Сроки вступления в силу изменений зависят от принятия соответствующего федерального закона.

Мы рассчитываем на существенное охлаждение рынка потребительских займов в результате введения этих мер. Сейчас на граждан, имеющих на руках три и более зай­ма, приходится 49% потребительского портфеля МФО. Это много. С момента введения ограничений компании не смогут выдавать заемщику третий (а затем и второй) заем при одновременно действующих других. Новые ограничения окажут заметное влияние на структуру и объемы выдач МФО и помогут снизить закредитованность граждан.

Александр Садчиков, Банковское обозрение

Обратите внимание; Эта информация является необработанным контентом непосредственно из источника информации. Это точно соответствует тому, что утверждает источник, и не отражает позицию MIL-OSI или ее клиентов.

Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

https://www.cbr.ru/press/event/?id=24724

Финансовые новости: Почти в половине российских регионов рост цен в мае был вблизи 4% в пересчете на год

Source: Центральный банк России – Central Bank of Russia –

В 59 из 85 российских регионов цены в мае выросли меньше, чем в апреле, а в 6 регионах снизились. По оценке Банка России, в 41 регионе прирост цен с исключением сезонности сложился вблизи 4% и ниже в пересчете на год.

Рост цен на продовольствие замедлился в 49 регионах. Заметно дешевле стали плодоовощная продукция и сахар, продолжилось снижение цен на макароны и крупы.

Непродовольственные товары подешевели в 41 регионе, значительнее всего — техника и электроника.

Наиболее заметно темпы роста цен снизились в сфере услуг. Динамика цен замедлилась в 65 регионах — в основном за счет услуг транспорта.

По данным Росстата, годовая инфляция в России снизилась в мае до 9,9%. В подавляющем числе регионов (в 66) она также замедлилась. Банк России продолжит снижать инфляцию, удерживая высокие ставки в экономике. По нашему прогнозу, годовая инфляция вернется к 4% в 2026 году.

Более подробно об инфляции в каждом регионе читайте в информационно-аналитических материалах, опубликованных на сайте Банка России.

Фото на превью: Mariia Orlovskaya / Shutterstock / Fotodom

Обратите внимание; Эта информация является необработанным контентом непосредственно из источника информации. Это точно соответствует тому, что утверждает источник, и не отражает позицию MIL-OSI или ее клиентов.

Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

https://www.cbr.ru/press/event/?id=24722

IMF Executive Board Concludes Bangladesh Combined Third and Fourth Reviews under the Extended Credit Facility, Extended Fund Facility, and Resilience and Sustainability Facility

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 23, 2025

  • The IMF Executive Board concluded the combined third and fourth reviews of Bangladesh’s arrangements under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) and Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and approved an extension, augmentation and rephasing of access. This decision provides Bangladesh with immediate access to about US$884 million.
  • The IMF Executive Board also concluded the combined Third and Fourth Reviews of Bangladesh’s arrangement under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF), making available about US$453 million to support the Bangladesh economy’s resilience to climate change.
  • Bangladesh’s program performance has been broadly satisfactory despite the difficult political and economic context and increased downside risks. Advancing the reform agenda is critical to restoring economic stability, protecting the vulnerable, and supporting inclusive and environmentally sustainable growth.

Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund completed the combined Third and Fourth Reviews of Bangladesh’s arrangements under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF), the Extended Fund Facility (EFF), and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF). The Executive Board also approved an augmentation of SDR 567.19 million (53.2 percent of quota) for the ECF/EFF arrangements and a six-month extension. Completion of these reviews allows the authorities to immediately withdraw SDR 650.5 million (about US$884 million) under the ECF/EFF, and SDR 333.3 million (about US$453 million) under the RSF.[1]

Further, the IMF Executive Board approved a modification of performance criteria and granted a waiver for the non-observance of the performance criterion related to the non-imposition and non-intensification of exchange restrictions, based on the temporary nature of the non-observance and the implementation of corrective measures.

Bangladesh’s arrangements under the ECF/EFF/RSF  were approved on January 30, 2023, in an amount equivalent to SDR 2.5 billion (154.3 percent of quota or about US$3.3 billion) under the ECF/EFF and SDR 1 billion (93.8 percent of quota or about US$1.4 billion) under the RSF (PR no. 23/25)

The augmentation approved by the Executive Board today brings the total financial assistance under the ECF and EFF arrangements to SDR 3,035.65 million (about US$ 4.1billion), alongside concurrent RSF arrangements of SDR 1 billion (about US$1.4 billion). The enlarged enhanced ECF/EFF is aimed at restoring macroeconomic stability, promoting inclusive growth, and protecting the vulnerable. The RSF arrangement has secured fiscal space needed to build resilience against climate risks.

Bangladesh’s macroeconomic challenges have increased since the popular uprising in the summer of 2024, which led to the ouster of the previous government. The timely formation of an interim government has helped stabilize political and security conditions, fostering a gradual return to economic stability. However, the economic outlook has worsened due to persistent political uncertainty, continuation of tighter policy mix, rising trade barriers, and increasing stress in the banking sector.

Program performance for the third and fourth reviews remains broadly satisfactory despite the difficult political and economic context. The authorities are fully committed to implementing necessary policies under the program and have recently pressed forward with critical reforms to increase exchange rate flexibility and boost tax revenues.

The authorities have consented to the publication of the Staff Report prepared for this consultation.[2]

Executive Board Assessment[3]

Following the Executive Board’s discussion, Mr. Nigel Clarke, Deputy Managing Director, and Acting Chair, made the following statement:

“Bangladesh’s economy continues to navigate multiple macroeconomic challenges. Despite a difficult environment, program performance has remained broadly on track, and the authorities are committed to implementing necessary policy actions and reforms. The IMF-supported programs are helping safeguard macroeconomic stability and protect the most vulnerable, while accelerating reforms to support resilient and inclusive growth.

“Near-term policies should prioritize rebuilding external resilience and reducing inflation. The authorities’ recent steps to implement a new exchange rate regime and include revenue-enhancing measures in the FY2026 budget are welcome. A balanced policy mix—anchored in maintaining a tight monetary policy stance, greater exchange rate flexibility, and revenue-based fiscal consolidation—will support efforts to restore both external and internal balances.

“Efforts to raise tax revenues and rationalize expenditures—including through subsidy reduction—are critical for creating the fiscal space needed to strengthen social, development, and climate initiatives. Sustained progress in reducing government subsidies to a fiscally sustainable level, along with enhanced public financial management, is essential to improving spending efficiency and mitigating fiscal risks.

“Financial sector policy should prioritize safeguarding stability and addressing rising vulnerabilities. Developing a comprehensive, sequenced strategy to guide reforms is an immediate priority, followed by the swift implementation of the new legal frameworks to enable orderly bank restructuring while protecting small depositors.

“Sustained structural reforms are essential for Bangladesh to achieve its goal of attaining upper middle-income status. Key priorities include diversifying exports, attracting greater foreign direct investment, strengthening governance, and enhancing data quality.

“Building resilience to natural disasters is essential for achieving high and inclusive growth. The RSF’s focus on strengthening institutions and policy coordination as well as on enhancing the efficiency of climate-related spending remains critical, including in helping mobilize climate finance.”

Bangladesh: Selected Economic Indicators, FY2022-27 1/

 

FY22

FY23

FY24

FY25

FY26

FY27

             
       

Projections

             
             

Real GDP

7.1

5.8

4.2

3.8

5.4

6.2

    Consumption

           

     Private

7.5

2.0

6.0

6.0

5.4

5.4

     Public

6.2

8.5

9.8

4.1

-4.3

16.1

Gross Capital Formation

11.7

2.2

3.3

-0.1

5.8

6.8

     Private

11.8

2.9

4.3

0.3

3.3

5.2

     Public

11.1

0.0

-0.2

-1.3

14.9

11.9

Trade

           

     Exports of goods and services

29.4

8.0

-17.1

5.2

19.8

12.7

     Imports of goods and services

31.2

-9.8

-4.6

5.8

11.6

11.9

             

 

Prices

           

   GDP deflator

5.0

6.9

6.9

10.3

6.2

6.5

   CPI inflation (annual average)

6.1

9.0

9.7

9.9

6.2

6.3

   CPI inflation (end of period)

7.6

9.7

9.7

8.3

6.5

5.9

             
             
             

 

Central government operations (in percent of GDP)

Total revenue and grants

8.9

8.2

8.3

8.7

9.5

10.0

Of which: Tax revenue

8.0

7.3

7.4

7.7

8.6

9.2

Total expenditure

13.0

12.7

12.1

12.8

13.5

14.5

Of which: Annual Development Program (ADP)

4.7

4.3

3.8

             

Overall balance (including grants)

-4.1

-4.5

-3.8

-4.2

-4.1

-4.5

(excluding grants)

-4.2

-4.6

-3.9

-4.3

-4.1

-4.6

Primary balance (including grants)

-2.1

-2.5

-1.5

-2.0

-2.0

-2.2

             

    Public sector total debt 2/

37.9

39.7

41.0

40.7

41.8

42.1

Of which: External debt

15.4

17.5

18.6

18.6

19.2

18.6

             
             

 

Balance of Payments (in percent of GDP)

           

     Current account balance

-4.0

-2.6

-1.4

-1.0

-0.7

-0.9

          Trade balance

-8.0

-4.7

-5.9

-5.9

-5.1

-5.3

    Capital account balance

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

    Financial account balance

3.6

1.5

1.0

1.1

1.4

1.7

               Foreign direct investment, net

0.4

0.4

0.4

0.2

0.5

0.6

Gross international reserves (billions of U.S. dollars)

33.4

24.8

21.7

23.6

29.0

        in months of next year’s imports

5.0

4.1

3.3

3.2

3.5

3.7

             

 

Monetary and Credit (in percent of GDP)

           

Reserve money

8.7

8.5

8.2

8.2

8.9

9.1

Broad money (M2)

52.9

50.7

48.4

45.0

45.5

46.4

Credit to private sector

36.6

35.3

34.5

32.0

31.7

32.2

Credit to private sector (percent change)

13.7

9.1

8.8

6.2

10.7

14.8

             

 

Savings and Investment (in percent of GDP)

           

    Gross national savings

29.3

29.9

28.3

28.7

28.8

28.8

    Public

1.2

0.3

0.5

0.3

1.4

1.5

    Private

28.2

29.7

27.9

28.4

27.4

27.2

             

     Gross investment

32.0

31.0

30.7

29.6

29.5

29.7

     Public

7.5

6.8

6.7

6.4

7.0

7.3

     Private

24.5

24.2

24.0

23.2

22.5

22.4

             

 

Memorandum item:

           

Nominal GDP (in billions of taka)

39,717

44,908

50,027

57,246

64,116

72,509

             

Sources: Bangladesh authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

1/ Fiscal year begins on July 1 and ends on June 30.

2/ Includes central government’s gross debt, including debt owed to the IMF, plus domestic bank borrowing by nonfinancial public sector and public enterprises’ external borrowing supported by government guarantees, including short-term oil-related suppliers’ credits.

[1] SDR figures for the disbursed are converted at the market rate of U.S. dollar per SDR on the day of the Board approval.

[2] Under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, publication of documents that pertain to member countries is voluntary and requires the member consent. The staff report will be shortly published on the www.imf.org/bangladesh page.

[3] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chair of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Randa Elnagar

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/23/pr-25213-bangladesh-imf-concludes-combined-3rd-and-4th-reviews-under-the-ecf-eff-and-rsf

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Guatemala: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 23, 2025

A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

An International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission led by Mr. Alexander Culiuc visited Guatemala City during June 10-20, 2025 for the 2025 Article IV consultation. At the end of the visit, the mission issued the following statement:

  • Prudent macroeconomic management has supported Guatemala’s resilience, delivering low inflation, robust policy buffers and a sustained current account surplus. With rising external uncertainty and mounting risks, stronger, more inclusive growth and poverty reduction can be achieved by accelerating reform implementation and enhancing policy coordination.
  • Raising private investment from current low levels requires complementary public inputs—infrastructure, educated and healthy labor force, security—which can only be adequately delivered by simultaneously raising public spending and improving its quality.
  • Improving quality and efficiency of spending entails better budget formulation, targeting, execution and control, and swift implementation of the anti-corruption agenda. We welcome the authorities’ efforts in this regard.
  • In the short term, existing fiscal space enables financing higher levels of spending with debt, with greater reliance on domestic borrowing.
  • In the medium term, raising revenues—primarily via comprehensive tax policy reform—would revert deficits to around 2 percent of GDP to preserve debt sustainability while maintaining priority spending at adequate levels.
  • Other structural and governance reforms pursued by the authorities, including in the financial and labor sectors—particularly urgent in the case of the AML/CFT law—will help support private sector growth. Continued commitment to dialogue and consensus-building can sustain progress on key legislative initiatives.

Recent Economic Developments, Outlook, and Risks

Guatemala’s economy remains resilient despite rising external risks and domestic challenges. Real GDP grew by 3.7 percent in 2024, supported by strong private consumption. Inflation has eased significantly, with headline inflation falling to 1.7 percent in May 2025, while core inflation remains near 4 percent, and inflation expectations are well anchored. The current account surplus narrowed to 2.9 percent of GDP in 2024 as imports picked up, while remittances stabilized at 19 percent of GDP and international reserves reached US$27.1 billion. Public debt remains low—under 27 percent of GDP—and Guatemala is now only one notch below investment grade. Banguat kept its policy rate unchanged at 4.5 percent since the 25bps cut in November 2024.

Guatemala endeavors an investment-biased fiscal expansion. The August 2024 supplementary budget prioritized infrastructure and social spending and targeted a deficit of 2.7 percent of GDP; the realized deficit was significantly lower at 1 percent of GDP. The 2025 budget continues this expansionary approach, with a further increase in infrastructure and social allocations. While the original budget targeted a deficit of 3.2 percent of GDP, a supplementary budget, specifying carryovers from 2024 and one-off pension payments, raised the budget deficit to a notably high 3.8 percent of GDP.

The outlook for 2025 is encouraging; sustaining the growth momentum over the medium term will require steadfast policy implementation. Real GDP growth is projected at 3¾ percent in 2025, with the fiscal impulse expected to help cushion the effects of softening global demand and high uncertainty. Beyond 2025, growth is projected to slightly exceed 3½ percent, although an acceleration in public infrastructure execution and structural reforms could push both actual and potential growth higher in the outer projection years. Headline inflation is expected to gradually converge toward the monetary policy target, while the fiscal deficit is projected to remain elevated by historical standards at just below 3 percent of GDP through the medium term. The current account surplus is expected to narrow and eventually close, while public debt is projected to climb above 30 percent of GDP in the medium term.

The balance of risks is tilted to the downside. On the domestic front, there is a risk that ongoing political tensions could impede progress on legislative initiatives. Nonetheless, important progress has been made over the past year—including the approval of the 2025 budget and the competition law—demonstrating the capacity for reform even in a complex environment. Externally, intensified and/or protracted global trade disputes would weigh further on investment sentiment, although Guatemala is somewhat better positioned to weather additional trade shocks than some regional peers. Further changes in U.S. migration policy—including the proposed 3.5 percent excise tax on remittances—could disrupt remittance-supported consumption. On the upside, lower net emigration also offers a window to boost domestic employment if accompanied by targeted efforts to expand job opportunities in the formal private sector.

Fiscal Policy

The 2025 expansionary fiscal stance is appropriate, as private demand is projected to soften in the remainder of the year. Structural bottlenecks and recently strengthened anti-corruption controls are likely to limit the execution of capital spending, with the deficit projected at around 2½ percent of GDP, well below the revised budget of 3.8 percent. The historically high (1.3 percent of GDP) transfers to Departmental Development Councils (CODEDEs) require close oversight and monitoring amidst concerns of elevated risks of misallocation and inefficient use. The authorities’ ongoing multi-institutional efforts to strengthen the transparency, accountability, monitoring of CODEDEs transfers and capacity of municipalities are welcome and should be sustained.

A combination of revenue and expenditure reforms is needed in the medium term. Authorities should seek ways of reverting fiscal deficits closer to historical levels (around 2 percent of GDP) without jeopardizing the much-needed surge in public infrastructure and social spending. The tax authority (SAT) has made commendable steps in strengthening compliance through the rollout of mandatory electronic invoicing, enhanced border enforcement to combat smuggling, and more robust audits of high-income individuals and large corporations. Efforts to improve mobilization—in line with the now-public 2024 TADAT report—should continue and be complemented in the medium term by comprehensive tax policy reforms. On the expenditure side, strengthening institutional capacity for systematic expenditure reviews and embedding the National Development Plan into annual and multi-year budgets would align public spending with strategic priorities. A new Public Procurement law—currently under consideration—could alleviate bottlenecks in the execution of capital spending. Improved targeting in social programs would further increase their effectiveness. Strengthening the Medium-Term Fiscal Framework and multiannual budget planning underpinned by realistic, sector-informed projections will bolster confidence—including of market participants—in fiscal sustainability.

A well-calibrated financing strategy would help the macro-policy mix. While solid creditworthiness enables the government to borrow externally on favorable terms, greater reliance on domestic financing under a sound medium term debt management strategy (MTDS) would (i) reduce real appreciation pressures (which already weigh on Guatemala’s external competitiveness), (ii) help develop the domestic financial market, (iii) reduce currency risks, and (iv) lower costs of monetary policy operation incurred by Banguat to maintain price stability. The mission also encourages the Ministry of Finance to consolidate domestic issuances, introduce shorter-maturity instruments to help develop the yield curve, and regularly publish the MTDS and annual borrowing plans.

Monetary and Exchange Policies

The current monetary policy stance is broadly appropriate, but there is scope to further strengthen monetary policy transmission. The ex-ante real policy rate is at 1 percent, within the estimated range for the neutral real rate (1–2 percent). Given prevailing uncertainty regarding the inflationary impact of recent U.S. tariff measures and potential disruptions to global supply chains, there’s scope in maintaining the current policy stance and waiting for greater clarity before making further adjustments. Estimated passthrough of the policy rate to deposit rates has recently increased. More can be done, including by advancing financial market development and competition and reducing reliance on reserve requirements for liquidity management. These efforts should be underpinned by improvements in the legal framework and market infrastructure supporting monetary policy operations.

Banguat’s response to large remittances inflows is appropriate and requires closer coordination with MinFin to address ensuing sterilization costs. Banguat’s FX participation rule delivers a reasonable balance between enabling higher consumption and maintaining external competitiveness. The resulting external position is stronger than fundamentals and desirable policies, but this positive current account gap should be closed by raising investment. On the flip side, Banguat’s policy necessarily relies on costly liquidity sterilization operations to keep inflation in check. While recent international financial conditions have been supportive of Banguat’s profitability, these costs could be further reduced through higher reliance on domestic debt to finance the budget, and closer coordination with MinFin on liquidity management. In the long term, ensuring Banguat’s financial strength will require consistent enforcement of legal provisions mandating budget to cover central bank losses.

Financial Sector

Maintaining financial stability requires continued close monitoring of the system. Guatemala’s banking system remains sound, with solid capital and liquidity buffers and strong profitability. The authorities have made important progress in bolstering the regulatory and supervisory framework through enhanced credit risk regulations, more robust stress testing, broader regulatory coverage, and the inclusion—on a voluntary basis—of savings and credit cooperatives in the Credit Risk Information System. These efforts should be reinforced by expanding risk-based supervision and strengthening oversight of fintech and digital financial services. Adopting revisions to the 2002 Law on Banks and Financial Groups, transitioning to International Financial Reporting Standards, advancing the draft Secondary Market Law, approving the e-money law and continued implementation of other elements of the financial inclusion strategy are needed.

Governance and Structural Agenda

Strengthening governance and advancing structural reforms are critical to fostering inclusive growth and restoring public trust. Key legislative priorities include the adoption of a revised AML/CFT Law aligned with international standards, the Beneficial Ownership Law, the Public Procurement Law and the Law for the Protection of Whistleblowers to ensure secure reporting channels and legal safeguards. With GAFILAT mutual evaluation expected in 2027, further delays with the AML/CFT law could complicate Guatemala’s path to investment grade. Institutional progress—such as the creation of the National Commission Against Corruption and the rollout of probity offices across executive institutions—should be consolidated through a medium-term anti-corruption strategy. Accelerating infrastructure investment through amendments to the law on Partnerships for Development of Economic Infrastructure, and a new law on ports is essential to close persistent gaps and crowd in private investment. Continued efforts to formalize the economy and improve the business environment will help prepare the economy for the impact of lower net emigration on the labor market.

The mission wishes to thank the Guatemalan authorities for their cooperation and openness in the exchanges throughout our visit and wishes them every success in their efforts to move the country towards a new equilibrium characterized by high, inclusive and sustainable growth.

Guatemala: Selected Economic Indicators

 

 

Projections

2023

2024

2025

2026

2027

2028

2029

   (Annual percent change, unless otherwise indicated)

Income and prices

Real GDP

3.5

3.7

3.8

3.6

3.6

3.7

3.8

Inflation (average)

6.2

2.9

2.4

4.0

4.0

4.0

4.0

(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

External Sector

 

Current Account Balance

3.1

2.9

2.5

1.7

1.3

0.7

0.2

Trade Balance (goods and services)

-15.1

-15.5

-15.9

-15.8

-15.4

-15.0

-14.7

Remittances

19.0

19.0

18.8

18.0

17.1

16.3

15.5

Financial Account (“+” = net lending)

2.7

2.5

2.5

1.7

1.3

0.7

0.2

Central Government Finances

Total Revenues

12.5

12.4

12.4

12.4

12.4

12.4

12.4

Tax Revenues

11.7

11.8

11.7

11.7

11.7

11.7

11.7

Total Expenditure

13.7

13.4

15.0

15.1

15.3

15.2

15.2

Current

11.2

11.0

11.8

11.7

11.9

11.9

12.0

Capital

2.5

2.4

3.2

3.4

3.4

3.3

3.2

Primary Balance

0.4

0.7

-1.0

-1.1

-1.2

-1.0

-1.0

Overall Balance

-1.3

-1.0

-2.6

-2.8

-2.9

-2.8

-2.8

Central Government Debt

Gross Central Government Debt

27.2

26.3

27.1

28.0

28.9

29.6

30.2

Source: Bank of Guatemala; Ministry of Finance; and Fund staff estimates and projections. 

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Meera Louis

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/23/guatemala-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2025-article-iv-mission

MIL OSI