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Tuvalu: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission

Source: IMF – News in Russian

May 27, 2025

A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

Washington, DC: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) team held discussions for the 2025 Article IV consultation for Tuvalu in Funafuti, during May 20-27. The team issued the following statement at the conclusion of the mission.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, OUTLOOK, AND RISKS

Tuvalu’s economy has experienced a strong recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. After falling for three consecutive years in 2020-22, GDP growth rebounded strongly at 7.9 percent in 2023, driven by the resumption of construction activity, the trade recovery, and higher government spending. GDP growth in 2024 is estimated to have reached 3.3 percent, supported by continued effects of reopening and major infrastructure projects. Since peaking at 14.2 percent in 2022Q3, inflation has been trending down and slowed to 1.2 percent in 2024, in line with global food and commodities prices and continued easing of shipping bottlenecks.

The economic recovery is expected to continue, but growth is projected to moderate gradually over the medium term. Growth in 2025 is projected at 3 percent, driven by the construction of the new phase of Tuvalu Coastal Adaptation Project and an increase in public spending. While externally-financed projects are expected to continue to support economic activities, growth is projected to decline gradually to around 1.8 percent over the medium term, due to sluggish productivity growth, increasing emigration, and vulnerability to climate events. Inflation is expected to remain below 2 percent in 2025, reflecting the negative CPI at end-2024 and lower global commodity prices, and to rise gradually to 2.5 percent over the medium term, aligning with inflation dynamics of Tuvalu’s trading partners.

The fiscal balance is projected to turn to a surplus in 2025 reflecting higher grants but would deteriorate again starting in 2026. Higher grants are expected to more than offset the increase in expenditures and improve the fiscal balance from a deficit of 7 percent of GDP in 2024 to a surplus of 2.9 percent of GDP in 2025. Over the medium term, grants are projected to gradually decline to historical levels of around 27 percent of GDP, while current expenditure pressures would remain elevated. As a result, fiscal balances are expected to deteriorate gradually and reach -6.8 percent of GDP by 2030. Because the projected withdrawals from Tuvalu’s sovereign funds are not sufficient to fully finance the fiscal deficits, foreign financing will be required to close the financing gap. Under these baseline projections, Tuvalu is assessed to remain at a high risk of debt distress.

Downside risks to the outlook remain high. The global environment has significantly changed this year, reflecting escalated trade tensions, heightened policy uncertainty, and tighter financial conditions.  While Tuvalu’s export exposure is limited, heightened global uncertainty and volatility could affect Tuvalu’s external revenues, including from its internet domain, fishing licenses, and development assistance, and significantly impact Tuvalu’s public finances, external position, and growth outlook. Global risks of heightened trade tensions and higher commodity prices could also increase inflation. A sharp downward correction in financial market returns could affect the performance of Tuvalu’s sovereign funds. Under-performance of public corporations could cause fiscal risks, and further loss of CBRs would severely disrupt cross-border payments. An acceleration of outward migration would exacerbate labor shortages. Extreme climate events and climate change remain major risks to Tuvalu’s economic outlook. Upside risks include higher fishing licenses and grants and greater structural reform momentum, which could accelerate economic growth.

FISCAL POLICY

Fiscal policy should balance ensuring fiscal sustainability and supporting Tuvalu’s development priorities. Tuvalu’s high vulnerability to external shocks requires fiscal sustainability and adequate buffers against downside risks. Meanwhile, the government faces significant near-term spending pressures in order to deliver essential public services, while also having to address medium-term climate adaptation costs and labor shortages stemming from increasing emigration.

A multi-pronged fiscal strategy is required to address these challenges. Given persistent fiscal deficits and Tuvalu’s limited fiscal space, the main elements of the strategy should include: i) gradually reducing fiscal deficits; ii) increasing spending for priority areas; and iii) appropriately using fiscal buffers to stabilize fiscal accounts, cushion against shocks, and address long-term challenges. IMF staff’s simulations show that reducing the fiscal deficit gradually to around 2.3 percent of GDP by 2030 (compared to 6.8 percent of GDP in the baseline scenario) by utilizing the returns of the Tuvalu Trust Fund and the Consolidated Investment Fund (CIF) to finance deficits would keep public debt on a downward path. The domestic current balance would provide an appropriate anchor and is expected to improve to -40 percent of GDP by 2045 under the consolidation scenario, and the value of the buffer fund (CIF) would stabilize at around 40 percent of GDP, which is needed to cover major shocks and downside risks.

The recommended fiscal strategy entails a combination of revenue mobilization, expenditure rationalization, and resource reprioritization measures. Expenditure measures should primarily focus on unwinding the recent increases in current expenditure, including containing the increase in the wage bill, implementing cost-saving measures for the Medical Referral Scheme and overseas scholarships, unwinding the increase in goods and services spending, and cutting broad-based utility subsidies. Revenue mobilization should prioritize strengthening the compliance and efficiency of tax collection, while considering reviewing tax policies and exploring options to boost tax revenue and streamline tax incentives. Part of the savings from the above measures should be redirected to areas such as targeted protection for the most vulnerable, infrastructure, human capital, and climate resilience.

Improving public financial management (PFM) can help manage revenue volatility and fiscal risks. The authorities have made progress in PFM, including introducing the new Financial Management Information System and formulating the Medium-Term Fiscal Framework. The publication of Tuvalu’s Fiscal Risk Reports is also welcome. Further efforts are needed to improve budget reliability, strengthen investment management to enhance absorption capacity, implement climate budget tagging, enhance fiscal reporting and transparency on extra-budgetary funds and SOEs, and reinforce procurement management.

FINANCIAL SECTOR POLICIES

Establishing effective regulatory and supervisory frameworks is urgently needed. Priorities include strengthening the statutory role and expanding the supervisory perimeter of the Banking Commission of Tuvalu (BCT), issuing the proposed new prudential standards, enforcing the timely submission of prudential returns, and addressing delays in the audits of the financial statements of the financial institutions. These measures should be supported through adequate resourcing of the BCT to conduct both on-site and off-site supervision.

Continued efforts are needed to strengthen Tuvalu’s connectivity to the global payment system and improve financial inclusion. Tuvalu’s membership of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering is a welcome step, and the authorities should continue strengthen the legal framework and compliance. Efforts to address Correspondent Banking Relationship pressures should also take into account potentially low ML/TF risk environment in Tuvalu and focus on the outreach to the key foreign regulatory authorities, including a corridor risk assessment. The ongoing efforts to modernize banking services, including the recent launch of Tuvalu’s first ATMs, can help overcome geographical barriers and improve efficiency. Improving financial literacy and establishing a reliable national digital ID system are also crucial for financial inclusion. Meanwhile, introducing digital services should consider supervisory capacities and ensure financial integrity.

STRUCTURAL REFORMS

Structural reforms need to be carefully prioritized, focusing on addressing development bottlenecks and attaining higher growth potential. Priorities should include: i) collaborating with local communities to effectively develop the reclaimed land; ii) improving internet connectivity and leveraging IT technology to deliver more public services; iii) ensuring proper maintenance of key infrastructure assets, particularly transportation and utilities including renewable energy; iv) strengthening SOE governance and performance, accompanied by reviewing utility pricing to ensure cost recovery; and v) exploring economic diversification in sectors with higher potential, including agricultural products such as coconut, eco-tourism, and commercial fishery.

Mitigating the impact of emigration and enhancing climate resilience are crucial. While outward emigration has supported remittances and consumption, measures to enhance both human capital and labor supply are required to address labor shortage issues. The authorities should focus on improving education access and quality, enhancing training, and attracting returning migrants and promoting skill transfer. Facilitating female labor force participation could help bridge significant gender gaps in employment, while alleviating labor shortages. Tuvalu should continue to engage with development partners to secure climate financing and implement major climate resilient projects. In addition, the authorities need to further enhance disaster management through enforcement of amended building codes, use of risk maps to inform planning, and strengthening community disaster preparedness. Accelerating renewable energy production can lower Tuvalu’s energy costs, reduce its external sector vulnerability, and enhance energy security.

***

The mission would like to thank the Tuvaluan authorities and various stakeholders for their excellent hospitality and cooperation and candid discussions during the mission.

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Pemba Sherpa

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/27/mcs-tuvalu-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2025-article-iv-mission

MIL OSI

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В список могут попасть даже небольшие банки – ЦБ РФ изменит подход к оценке системной значимости кредитных учреждений

Source: Mainfin Bank –

Как ЦБ РФ будет оценивать системную значимость банков?

Масштабная реформа по изменению подхода к оценке важности российских банков запланирована на ближайшие годы – регулятор планирует ввести несколько новых критериев для анализа кредитных организаций. Так, ЦБ РФ будет проверять:

  • число клиентов – наивысший балл получат банки с клиентской базой свыше 30 млн. чел.;
  • наличие собственной экосистемы – непрофильные активы должны занимать свыше 10% капитала, чтобы регулятор присвоил высший балл;
  • присутствие на платежном рынке – у банка проверят подключение к СБП, эквайринг, возможность выпуска карт и наличие устройств самообслуживания;
  • сотрудничество с другими банками – оценят, насколько негативными окажутся последствия для других игроков, если у проверяемого учреждения возникнут сложности;
  • долю крупных вкладов клиентов, средства которых не защищены АСВ (остаток на счетах свыше 1,4 млн. руб.);
  • региональное присутствие – высокую оценку получат банки, работающие в населенных пунктах с населением до 100 человек.

Введение дополнительных критериев проверки позволит даже небольшим банкам с развитой экосистемой либо присутствием на платежном рынке попасть в перечень системно значимых учреждений.

Чем для банков грозит попадание в список СЗКО?

Включение банка в список СЗКО повлечет применение повышенных надбавок к нормативам достаточности капитала. Так, для крупных банков указанный норматив составляет 2,5%, а для системно значимых – 3,5%. В ближайшее время ЦБ РФ разработает новую матрицу надбавок, которые станут дифференцированными для разных организаций.

«Повышенные надбавки необходимы, чтобы при ухудшении финансового положения банка было больше возможностей для выхода из кризиса», – отметили представители регулятора.

Вместе с тем, с 2022 года в России действуют сниженные надбавки на капитал – послабления были обусловлены кризисными явлениями и стремлением регулятора сократить нагрузку на бизнес. К 2028 году все послабления планируется снять.

Источник:

Обратите внимание; Эта информация является необработанным контентом непосредственно из источника информации. Это точно соответствует тому, что утверждает источник, и не отражает позицию MIL-OSI или ее клиентов.

Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

https://mainfin.ru/novosti/v-spisok-mogut-popast-daze-nebolsie-banki-cb-rf-izmenit-podhod-k-ocenke-sistemnoj-znacimosti-kreditnyh-ucrezdenij

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United Kingdom: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission

Source: IMF – News in Russian

May 27, 2025

A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

  • An economic recovery is underway. Growth is projected at 1.2 percent in 2025 and will gain momentum next year, although weak productivity continues to weigh on medium-term growth prospects.
  • The authorities’ fiscal plans strike a good balance between supporting growth and safeguarding fiscal sustainability. It will be important to stay the course and deliver the planned deficit reduction over the next five years to stabilize net debt and reduce vulnerability to gilt market pressures. Further refinements of the fiscal framework could help minimize the frequency of fiscal policy changes. In the longer term, the UK will face difficult choices to align spending with available resources, given ageing-related expenditure pressures.
  • The Bank of England (BoE) should continue to ease monetary policy gradually, while remaining flexible in light of elevated uncertainty. Calibrating the monetary policy stance has become more complex, given the recent pickup in inflation, still fragile growth, and higher long-term interest rates.
  • The authorities’ Growth Mission focuses on the right areas to lift productivity. Given the breadth of the agenda, prioritizing and sequencing of structural reforms, along with clear communication, will be key to success.

Washington, DC – May 27, 2025:

Economic Outlook

After a slowdown in the second half of 2024, an economic recovery is underway and is expected to gain momentum. Economic activity decelerated during 2024 H2, partly reflecting weaker export performance in the challenging global environment. In recent months, high frequency indicators have shown signs of improvement. Growth is projected at 1.2 percent in 2025 and 1.4 percent in 2026, as monetary easing, positive wealth effects, and an uptick in confidence bolster private consumption, while the boost to public spending in the October budget will also help support growth. The forecast assumes that global trade tensions lower the level of UK GDP by 0.3 percent by 2026, due to persistent uncertainty, slower activity in UK trading partners, and the direct impact of remaining US tariffs on the UK. The authorities’ structural reforms, including to planning, and the increase in infrastructure investment could increase potential growth if properly implemented. However, medium-term growth is still forecast to remain subdued relative to the pre-GFC trend, at 1.4 percent, given weak productivity.

Risks to growth remain to the downside. Tighter-than-expected financial conditions, combined with rising precautionary saving by households, would hinder the rebound in private consumption and slow the recovery. Persistent global trade uncertainty could further weigh on UK growth, by weakening global economic activity, disrupting supply chains, and undermining private investment.

Fiscal Policy

The authorities’ fiscal strategy for the next five years appropriately supports growth while safeguarding fiscal sustainability. The new spending plans are credible and growth-friendly, taking account of pressures on public services and investment needs. They are expected to provide an economic boost over the medium term that outweighs the impact of higher taxation. As revenue is projected to increase, deficits are set to decline and stabilize net debt.

It will be important to stay the course and reduce fiscal deficits as planned over the medium term. There are significant risks to the successful implementation of the fiscal strategy, from the high level of global uncertainty, volatile financial market conditions, and the challenge of containing day-to-day spending. Materialization of these risks could result in market pressures, put debt on an upward path, and make it harder to meet the fiscal rules, given limited headroom. To this end, staff recommends adhering to the current plans, and implementing additional revenue or expenditure measures as needed if shocks arise, to maintain compliance with the rules.

In the longer term, difficult fiscal choices will likely be needed to address spending pressures and rebuild fiscal buffers. Under current policies, staff analysis suggests spending to be around 8 percent of GDP higher by 2050, mainly due to additional outlays on health and pensions from population ageing. There is limited space to finance this spending through extra borrowing, given high debt and elevated borrowing costs. Unless revenue is increased, for which there is scope, tough policy decisions on spending priorities and the role of the state in certain areas will be needed to better align the coverage of public services with available resources.

While recent reforms of the fiscal framework enhance its credibility and effectiveness, further refinements could improve predictability and reduce pressure for frequent fiscal policy changes. The new current balance rule helps preserve space for investment, while the debt rule safeguards fiscal sustainability. The transition to a three-year rule horizon, aligned with the spending reviews, is expected to make the rules more credible, while allowing time to adjust gradually to shocks. Staff welcomes the authorities’ commitment to hold a single annual fiscal event, but notes that there is still significant pressure for frequent fiscal policy changes, given that small revisions to the economic outlook can erode the headroom within the rules, which is the subject of intense market and media scrutiny. Refinements to the fiscal framework could promote further policy stability. Options include (1) de-emphasizing point estimates of headroom in OBR assessments of rule compliance; (2) establishing a formal process so that small rule breaches do not trigger corrective fiscal action outside of the single fiscal event; or (3) assessing rules only once per year at the time of the fiscal event.

Monetary Policy and Operations

A gradual and flexible approach to monetary easing continues to be appropriate to support the economy and protect against inflationary risks. The pickup in inflation that began in 2024 is expected to last through the second half of this year, with a return to target later in 2026 as underlying inflationary pressures continue to recede. Although monetary policy calibration has become more difficult due to still-weak growth, the temporary rise in inflation and high long-term interest rates, staff sees the BoE’s gradual pace of easing as appropriate. Given the elevated uncertainty, the MPC is encouraged to retain flexibility to adjust the monetary stance in either direction if needed.

The BoE should continue to strengthen its forecasting capacity and communications. Staff welcomes the implementation of the Bernanke Review and the use of scenarios and conditional guidance in the BoE’s communications. The BoE will benefit from continuing to invest in modeling capacity, data and personnel, to be able to tailor scenarios promptly as economic conditions change. In the scenarios, interest rates should be allowed to adjust to economic developments, so that the scenarios are more informative and consistent, rather than assume that interest rates follow current market expectations. Lastly, MPC members could make greater use of the information from the central forecast and the alternative scenarios to justify the MPC decision and explain their personal views.

The BoE’s transition to a repo-based framework will mitigate balance sheet risks. QT continues to be conducted in a gradual and predictable manner. As the balance sheet normalizes, transitioning to a demand-driven approach, with reserves provided to banks mainly through repo operations, will reduce the market footprint of the BoE and limit its exposure to interest and credit risks. This will also maintain monetary control and the flexibility for new QE in the future, while providing sufficient reserves for financial stability reasons. The transition is being accompanied by a timely review of BoE instruments to consider the relative role of repo operations and asset purchases, as well as the balance between short and long-term repos.

Financial Sector Policies

The banking sector remains broadly resilient and macroprudential settings are appropriate, despite global financial stability risks increasing over the past year. The banking system is adequately capitalized and liquid with healthy levels of profitability, and the 2024 desk-based stress test showed that it can support households and businesses during times of severe stress. Macroprudential settings remain appropriate, as indicators of financial vulnerabilities are close to their long-term average, although global risks have risen in the past year given more volatile asset prices and credit spreads.

Significant progress has been made assessing and reducing vulnerabilities in the non-bank sector and work should continue at the domestic and international levels. Managing risks in the sector is critical, as it accounts for over half of UK financial assets. The system-wide exploratory scenario (SWES) has improved understanding of linkages with the banking sector and contagion risks, while the BoE’s new repo facility for non-banks is in line with previous AIV recommendations. The BoE could, in the future, consider expanding access to this facility so as to include a broader range of non-banks with a large gilt market footprint, provided they are adequately supervised and regulated. Ongoing work, including with the FSB, is essential to better monitor and manage non-bank leverage, concentration, and liquidity risks. Work should also continue on closing data gaps to enhance financial system surveillance.

Recent episodes of global bond market turbulence underscore the importance of enhancing gilt market resilience. Gilt market functioning has remained orderly. Vulnerabilities have nonetheless risen, given increased supply and the reduction in demand by more patient investors, with hedge funds and non-residents playing a greater role, and the BoE reducing its holdings as part of QT. Staff recommends close monitoring as well as regular stress testing and engagement with market participants to detect and manage future risks. In this regard, the shift of issuance toward shorter-dated securities for FY2025/26 has been well received by the market. The authorities are considering policies to enhance structural resilience, such as central clearing for gilt repo transactions, which is welcome.

Reforms to the financial sector and its regulation should balance promoting growth with preserving continuity and financial stability. While staff supports the government’s aim of enhancing the role of financial services as a driver of growth, risks will need to be carefully managed. Regulatory reforms should balance simplification and modernization with mitigating vulnerabilities, while being well-communicated. Consolidating pension funds has the potential to reduce fees and expand access to diverse asset classes, but it will be important to guard against possible unintended side-effects, including from reduced competition. Staff supports the FPC’s recommendation that the Pensions Regulator has the remit to take financial stability considerations into account. This would strengthen its ability to oversee the evolving pensions landscape and help manage potential risks from consolidation of funds and changes in investment strategies.

Structural Policies

Persistently weak productivity remains the UK’s primary obstacle to lifting growth and living standards. The UK has faced a decline in trend productivity growth since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), further widening the gap with the US. Along with adverse shocks, including Brexit, the pandemic and the energy price crisis, the slowdown has left the level of UK GDP around one quarter below what the pre-GFC trend would imply. This slowdown has multiple causes, including chronic under-investment, low private R&D, limited access to finance for businesses to scale up, skill gaps, and a deterioration in health outcomes.

While the authorities’ Growth Mission focuses on the right areas, careful prioritizing and sequencing of policies will be key to success. The agenda is ambitious and impacts many parts of the economy. Reforms are broadly aligned with past IMF recommendations, although many of them are still at the formulation and consultation stage. Delivering on the Growth Mission involves significant challenges given limited fiscal space, the breadth of the reforms, and the volatile external environment. In refining their strategy, the authorities will thus need to carefully sequence reforms, ensure internal coherence among them, and prioritize early wins to build momentum and garner support for more complex initiatives. Continued clear communication with the public and markets will also be essential.

Stability, capital, and skills are the most important aspects of the Growth Mission. Staff recommends prioritizing the following three most binding constraints to growth. First, policy stability is critical to support business confidence in an increasingly uncertainty global environment. In this context, recent efforts to strike trade agreements with key partners, including the EU, India, and the US, demonstrate the authorities’ commitment to finding common ground and establishing a more predictable environment for UK exporters. Second, the planning reform and complementary public infrastructure projects can lift the chronically-low private investment, which has weighed on productivity. Finally, boosting people’s skills, enhancing their health, and incentivizing work will address shortages in sectors like construction and healthcare, while providing the productive workforce needed by growth industries. Reforms in these three areas are likely to deliver the largest growth benefits, while laying a strong foundation for progress on other fronts.

Industrial policy can play a complementary role to support particular sectors, but economy-wide reforms should remain the main tool to boost competitiveness and growth. Structural reforms that apply horizontally across the whole economy, such as easing planning restrictions, are likely to have the greatest impact. These reforms are prerequisites to realize the full potential of vertical interventions at the sectoral level, such as investments by the National Wealth Fund and initiatives under the new industrial strategy. Sectoral interventions should be focused on addressing market failures, identified using an evidence-based approach, and supported by rigorous appraisal processes, while being subject to strict budgetary limits, prudent risk management, and comprehensive risk reporting.

The mission thanks the authorities and other counterparts for open discussions, productive collaboration, and constructive policy dialogue.

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Camila Perez

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/27/cs-uk-aiv-2025

MIL OSI

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Финансовые новости: Банк России пересмотрел параметры лимита для иммобилизованных активов

Source: Центральный банк России – Central Bank of Russia –

Регулятор планирует ограничить риски вложений банков в непрофильные активы, не имеющие требований по возвратности, ограниченно ликвидные и несущие акционерные риски (иммобилизованные активы). К ним относятся в том числе вложения в долевые инструменты, материальное имущество, избыточные основные средства, экосистемы.

Для этого будет введен риск-чувствительный лимит (РЧЛ): иммобилизованные активы, превышающие РЧЛ, банк должен будет покрывать капиталом. В результате риски избыточных инвестиций в такие активы будут переложены с вкладчиков и кредиторов на акционеров банка.

Новое регулирование будет распространяться на банки с универсальной лицензией. Планируется, что оно заработает с 2026 года.

Механизм расчета РЧЛ, изначально опубликованный в 2021 году, был доработан по итогам анкетирования банков и оценки эффекта от введения лимита на сектор. В результате уточнен и дополнен состав активов, входящих в РЧЛ, снижен максимальный коэффициент иммобилизации, смягчен график достижения целевого уровня лимита. Обновленные параметры РЧЛ приведены в докладе Банка России.

Ответы на вопросы, представленные в материале, а также замечания и предложения можно направлять в Банк России до 27 июня 2025 года включительно.

Фото на превью: ARVD73 / Shutterstock / Fotodom

Обратите внимание; Эта информация является необработанным контентом непосредственно из источника информации. Это точно соответствует тому, что утверждает источник, и не отражает позицию MIL-OSI или ее клиентов.

Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

https://www.cbr.ru/press/event/?id=24632

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Финансовые новости: Банк России рекомендовал банкам реструктурировать кредиты корпоративных заемщиков и индивидуальных предпринимателей

Source: Центральный банк России – Central Bank of Russia –

Регулятор рекомендовал банкам идти навстречу корпоративным заемщикам, столкнувшимся с временными трудностями, и реструктурировать их кредиты.

Чтобы снизить регуляторные издержки для банков и заемщиков, Банк России временно смягчил требования к резервам по реструктурированным ссудам, по которым банк и заемщик оценивают вероятность восстановления финансового положения как значительную.

К таким заемщикам относятся компании и индивидуальные предприниматели с не очень высокой долговой нагрузкой, исправно обслуживавшие долг последние полгода и предоставившие банку реалистичный бизнес-план на ближайшие 3 года. Банки, в свою очередь, будут регулярно проверять соответствие фактических результатов заемщика контрольным показателям и в случае отклонения должны будут досоздать резерв.

Фото на превью: LedyX / Shutterstock / Fotodom

Обратите внимание; Эта информация является необработанным контентом непосредственно из источника информации. Это точно соответствует тому, что утверждает источник, и не отражает позицию MIL-OSI или ее клиентов.

Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

https://www.cbr.ru/press/event/?id=24633

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Финансовые новости: Каким будет депозитарный учет ценных бумаг: предложения Банка России

Source: Центральный банк России – Central Bank of Russia –

Регулятор предлагает пересмотреть подходы к организации системы учета иностранных ценных бумаг в России и взаимодействию наших депозитариев с зарубежными организациями при учете российских активов, чтобы снизить риски для инвесторов и повысить их защиту. Доклад «Депозитарный учет: новый взгляд на привычные вещи» представлен на общественное обсуждение.

В последние годы российская учетная система столкнулась с серьезными сложностями при взаимодействии со своими зарубежными контрагентами. Это произошло в том числе из-за того, что допуск иностранных ценных бумаг к учетной системе в каждой юрисдикции происходит по-разному.

В России владельцем актива выступает непосредственно сам инвестор. Однако в других странах может действовать модель опосредованного владения, когда полный объем прав по ценной бумаге находится у посредника (номинального держателя). В этом случае не инвестор, а депозитарий, который открыл за рубежом счет для учета иностранных бумаг своих клиентов, будет признаваться собственником активов.

Банк России предлагает допускать на рынок для учета в российских депозитариях только те зарубежные активы, принципы учета которых схожи с нашими. Если же иностранная ценная бумага учитывается «на родине» по иным правилам, она может обращаться на российском рынке в виде депозитарных расписок.

При этом нельзя полностью исключать со стороны иностранного государства вероятности ограничения прав на свои локальные ценные бумаги в силу регуляторных причин. Поэтому в докладе особое внимание уделяется ответственности учетного института перед клиентом. Депозитарий может освобождаться от ответственности, если он докажет, что предпринял все доступные меры для восстановления нарушенных прав депонента, а при заключении договора оценил финансовое положение и деловую репутацию своего иностранного контрагента.

Что касается учета прав иностранных инвесторов на российские ценные бумаги, то рассматриваются разные сценарии. Во-первых, модернизация института иностранного номинального держателя. Она может предусматривать либо обязательное и регулярное раскрытие информации о владельцах ценных бумаг, либо ведение раздельного их учета (сегрегация) с зеркальным отражением операций по каждому инвестору в российских учетных институтах. Во-вторых, предлагается также оценить возможность полного отказа от посредников. Тогда активы будут учитываться непосредственно на счетах иностранных инвесторов в российских депозитариях.

Предложения по докладу принимаются до 01.07.2025 включительно.

Фото на превью: YAKOBCHUK VIACHESLAV / Shutterstock / Fotodom

Обратите внимание; Эта информация является необработанным контентом непосредственно из источника информации. Это точно соответствует тому, что утверждает источник, и не отражает позицию MIL-OSI или ее клиентов.

Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

https://www.cbr.ru/press/event/?id=24635

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IMF Executive Board Concludes 2025 Article IV Consultation with New Zealand

Source: IMF – News in Russian

May 26, 2025

Washington, DC – May 26, 2025: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation [1] with New Zealand on May 19, 2025.

Tight monetary policy has helped bring inflation back to target, but at the expense of growth. Real GDP contracted by 0.5 percent y/y in 2024, as investment fell by 4.1 percent y/y, household consumption stagnated. The slowdown has been particularly pronounced in interest-rate-sensitive sectors including retail trade, construction, and manufacturing. The financial sector remains resilient despite rising non-performing loans. A recovery in external demand and improved terms of trade have helped narrow the current account deficit to 6.2 percent of GDP, though it remains above long-term trends. Despite a challenging economic backdrop, the government delivered modest fiscal consolidation in FY2023/24, with the primary deficit narrowing to 2.4 percent of GDP. Tight monetary policy helped bring inflation within the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ)’s 1–3 percent target band in 2024Q3, after 13 consecutive quarters, with headline inflation reaching 2.5 percent y/y in 2025Q1. The RBNZ has thus eased the Official Cash Rate (OCR) several times since August 2024, bringing it closer to the neutral rate.

The return of inflation to target is enabling monetary policy easing and a return to growth. Inflation is forecast to remain within the target band, allowing monetary policy to gradually move to a neutral stance. Real GDP is projected to expand by 1.4 percent y/y in 2025, with monetary policy easing providing a boost to consumption and investment. Growth is expected to accelerate to 2.7 percent y/y in 2026, as the lagged impact of lower interest rates is fully realized. Fiscal policy is expected to continue to balance needed medium-term consolidation with growth considerations. The government’s broad-based structural reform agenda is aimed at boosting medium-term productivity growth, including via reforms to attract foreign investment, enhance competition, reduce regulatory burdens, accelerate housing supply growth, and progress toward closing of the infrastructure gap.

Risks to the outlook are tilted to the downside. Downside risks stem from a softer-than-expected recovery due to elevated global uncertainty and a weak labor market or the occurrence of a natural disaster. Upside risks include a stronger rebound in growth due to faster-than-expected monetary policy transmission. As a small open economy, New Zealand is vulnerable to trade disruptions, geoeconomic fragmentation, or a global economic slowdown.


Executive Board Assessment[2]

Executive Directors agreed with the thrust of the staff appraisal. They welcomed that the economy is showing signs of a nascent recovery and that inflation has returned to the Reserve Bank of New Zealand’s target, after a prolonged period of significant price pressures. Noting the country’s exposure to trade and investment shocks, Directors underscored the importance of maintaining prudent policies to safeguard macroeconomic stability and implementing ambitious structural reforms to address medium‑ and long‑term economic challenges.

Directors commended the role of monetary policy in helping bring inflation back to target. They agreed that the current monetary policy easing is appropriate and should continue until reaching a neutral level, while remaining data‑dependent and responsive to economic conditions. Directors welcomed the expanded macroprudential toolbox and concurred that macroprudential tools should continue to be used to address financial risks that may emerge as policy rates are reduced.

Directors agreed that fiscal policy should focus on growth‑friendly, medium‑term consolidation, while supporting the most vulnerable. They called for comprehensive revenue reforms that enhance efficiency and incentivize long‑term investment. Directors also encouraged the authorities to pursue expenditure reforms, including to the pension system, that are grounded in a cost‑benefit analysis.

Directors agreed that financial stability risks are contained and recommended that household and financial balance sheets continue to be monitored closely. They welcomed progress in key reforms, notably the Depositor Compensation Scheme and the Deposit Takers Act. Directors noted the authorities’ efforts to increase banking competition and emphasized that prudential settings should remain adequately calibrated to guard against financial stability risks. Given housing shortages, they called for improving affordability and expanding housing supply and welcomed the reform efforts around resource management in these areas.

Directors commended ongoing structural reforms to overcome slow productivity growth and boost long‑term growth. They welcomed the authorities’ plans to boost competition and innovation, reduce barriers to overseas financing, and deepen capital markets. Investing in infrastructure and enhancing resilience to natural disasters will also be needed.

It is expected that the next Article IV Consultation with New Zealand will be held on the standard 12‑month cycle.



[1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

[2] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chair of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm .

Table 1. New Zealand: Main Economic Indicators, 2021-30

(Annual percent change, unless otherwise indicated)

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

2026

2027

2028

2029

2030

Est.

Projections

NATIONAL ACCOUNTS

Real GDP (production)

5.7

2.9

1.8

-0.5

1.4

2.7

2.7

2.2

2.2

2.2

Domestic demand

10.0

4.5

-0.8

-0.8

1.8

2.6

2.4

2.1

2.1

2.0

Private consumption

7.9

4.1

1.0

0.2

1.0

3.1

3.0

2.4

2.4

2.3

Public consumption

7.9

5.2

0.8

0.0

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.7

0.8

0.8

Investment

17.2

4.1

-5.4

-4.1

2.4

3.2

2.7

2.3

2.1

2.1

Public

6.2

3.6

10.2

0.5

0.3

2.3

2.5

2.8

2.8

2.8

Private

12.6

4.3

-3.2

-6.5

1.9

3.5

2.7

2.1

1.7

1.8

Private business

14.5

7.3

-2.2

-5.0

2.6

3.5

2.8

2.1

1.6

1.6

Dwelling

8.6

-2.3

-5.6

-10.1

0.0

3.6

2.3

2.4

2.1

2.4

Inventories (contribution to growth, percent)

1.4

0.0

-1.4

0.2

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Net exports (contribution to growth, percent)

-4.8

-1.6

2.6

0.3

0.3

-0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Real gross domestic income

5.0

2.3

1.1

0.3

2.9

3.1

2.8

2.4

2.3

2.3

Investment (percent of GDP)

25.0

26.3

24.2

23.1

23.4

23.4

23.3

23.2

23.1

23.1

Public

5.7

5.9

6.5

6.4

6.3

6.2

6.2

6.2

6.2

6.2

Private

19.4

20.4

17.8

16.7

17.1

17.2

17.1

17.0

16.9

16.8

Savings (gross, percent of GDP)

19.0

17.1

17.3

16.9

18.3

18.8

19.0

19.2

19.4

19.6

Public

-3.5

-4.2

-3.5

-4.4

-5.1

-3.9

-2.5

-1.4

-0.4

0.0

Private

22.5

21.3

20.9

21.3

23.4

22.7

21.5

20.6

19.9

19.6

Potential output

1.5

1.9

2.2

2.2

2.2

2.2

2.2

2.2

2.2

2.2

Output gap (percent of potential)

1.8

2.7

2.4

-0.3

-1.1

-0.6

-0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

LABOR MARKET

Employment

2.2

1.7

3.3

-0.1

0.7

1.5

2.0

1.7

1.3

1.5

Unemployment (percent of labor force, ann. average)

3.8

3.3

3.7

4.7

5.3

5.2

4.7

4.3

4.5

4.4

Wages (nominal percent change)

3.8

6.5

7.0

4.6

4.3

3.9

3.3

3.3

3.0

3.0

PRICES

Terms of trade index (goods and services, % change)

-1.0

-3.1

-3.4

2.9

1.9

1.3

0.5

0.4

0.2

0.1

Consumer prices (avg, % change)

3.9

7.2

5.7

2.9

2.4

2.3

2.2

2.0

2.0

2.0

GDP deflator (avg, % change)

3.0

5.8

5.1

3.6

3.2

2.8

2.2

2.2

2.2

2.1

MACRO-FINANCIAL

Official cash rate (policy rate, percent, avg)

0.3

2.2

5.2

4.7

3.6

3.3

3.3

3.3

3.3

3.3

Credit to the private sector (percent change)

6.1

4.3

0.1

1.6

3.2

5.6

4.5

4.0

3.9

4.0

Interest payments (percent of disposable income)

5.3

6.3

8.5

8.1

7.3

7.2

7.0

6.9

6.9

6.9

Household savings (percent of disposable income)

3.6

3.3

2.7

2.5

2.4

2.3

2.9

3.6

4.4

5.1

Household debt (percent of disposable income)

174

173

168

166

160

160

159

158

157

157

GENERAL GOVERNMENT (percent of GDP) 1/

Revenue

37.6

38.8

37.0

38.7

37.6

37.5

37.5

37.7

37.9

38.0

Expenditure

40.0

43.3

40.9

41.9

43.1

42.3

40.5

39.7

38.8

38.0

Net lending/borrowing

-2.5

-4.4

-3.9

-3.2

-5.5

-4.8

-3.1

-2.0

-0.9

0.0

Operating balance

-0.3

-2.2

-1.7

-0.7

-3.0

-2.5

-0.8

0.1

1.1

1.9

Cyclically adjusted primary balance 2/

-2.8

-4.2

-3.7

-3.4

-3.6

-2.9

-1.4

-0.2

1.1

2.0

Gross debt

46.0

48.6

45.8

48.4

53.2

56.4

59.0

58.8

57.5

55.1

Net debt

10.6

17.0

19.0

19.8

23.5

26.4

28.0

28.6

28.0

26.4

Net worth

94.6

102.0

96.3

94.4

87.1

81.3

77.3

74.8

73.5

73.0

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

Current account (percent of GDP)

-6.0

-9.2

-6.9

-6.2

-5.1

-4.6

-4.3

-3.9

-3.7

-3.5

Export volume

-2.3

-0.5

11.0

4.1

3.9

3.9

4.1

4.0

4.2

4.2

Import volume

14.5

4.7

-0.4

2.4

2.0

3.5

3.2

3.3

3.4

3.4

Net international investment position (percent of GDP)

-47.9

-52.5

-51.3

-49.4

-52.1

-54.0

-55.8

-57.3

-58.6

-59.6

Gross official reserves (bn US$)

16.4

13.7

14.8

23.2

…

…

…

…

…

…

MEMORANDUM ITEMS

Nominal GDP (bn NZ$)

353

385

413

427

448

472

496

518

540

564

Percent change

9.0

9.2

7.1

3.4

4.9

5.5

4.9

4.4

4.4

4.3

Nominal GDP per capita (US$)

48,845

47,819

48,360

48,448

47,158

49,022

50,472

51,643

53,044

54,378

Real gross national disposable income per capita (NZ$)

54,586

55,293

54,662

53,632

54,724

55,635

56,458

57,044

57,611

58,081

Percent change

3.7

1.3

-1.1

-1.9

2.0

1.7

1.5

1.0

1.0

0.8

Population (million)

5.1

5.1

5.2

5.3

5.4

5.5

5.5

5.6

5.7

5.8

US$/NZ$ (average level)

0.708

0.636

0.614

0.605

…

…

…

…

…

…

Nominal effective exchange rate

109.9

106.5

105.0

104.9

…

…

…

…

…

…

Real effective exchange rate

107.6

105.5

105.7

106.1

…

…

…

…

…

…

Sources: Authorities’ data and IMF staff estimates and projections.

1/ Fiscal year.

2/ In percent of potential GDP.
IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Pemba Sherpa

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/23/pr25159-imf-executive-board-concludes-2025-article-iv-consultation-with-new-zealand

MIL OSI

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Финансовые новости: Банк России изменяет сроки публикации первой оценки платежного баланса (26.05.2025)

Source: Центральный банк России – Central Bank of Russia –

Банк России принял решение изменить сроки формирования и публикации на сайте ежемесячной оценки платежного баланса Российской Федерации.

Оценка будет публиковаться на 45-й календарный день после отчетного периода. Это связано с тем, что для формирования ежемесячной оценки платежного баланса необходимо получить больший набор данных.

Новые сроки соответствуют существующей международной практике публикации ежемесячных показателей статистики внешнего сектора и срокам публикации данных по внешней торговле Российской Федерации.

По новому графику уточненная оценка платежного баланса за апрель 2025 года будет опубликована 16 июня 2025 года, а первая оценка платежного баланса за май 2025 года — 11 июля 2025 года.

При использовании материала ссылка на Пресс-службу Банка России обязательна.

Обратите внимание; Эта информация является необработанным контентом непосредственно из источника информации. Это точно соответствует тому, что утверждает источник, и не отражает позицию MIL-OSI или ее клиентов.

Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

https://www.cbr.ru/press/PR/?file=638838524558837330STAT.htm

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Финансовые новости: Рынок микрофинансовых организаций трансформируется в ожидании реформы

Source: Центральный банк России – Central Bank of Russia –

Микрофинансовые организации (МФО) в I квартале 2025 года выдали микрозаймы на 497 млрд рублей, что на 1% меньше, чем кварталом ранее. Причин замедления в розничном сегменте несколько. Сроки займов стали длиннее, отдельные их категории подорожали из-за моратория на ограничение ПСК, а также сказался эффект высокой базы IV квартала 2024 года. В сегменте для бизнеса наблюдалось сезонное снижение спроса.

Рынок потребительских займов продолжает трансформироваться под влиянием макропруденциальных лимитов и в преддверии введения ограничений на количество одновременно действующих займов.

Компании стараются привлечь новых, более качественных заемщиков и предлагают финансовые решения, чтобы удерживать постоянных клиентов в течение длительного срока.

Почти половина займов в I квартале выдана на срок свыше года. Более четверти потребительских выдач — это договоры с лимитом кредитования, которые по сути аналогичны банковским кредитным картам. Увеличилась и средняя сумма потребительского займа: за год она достигла 21 тыс. рублей.

Сохранялся интерес клиентов к онлайн-займам на маркетплейсах и POS-кредитованию в торговых точках, что объясняется более доступной процентной ставкой и наличием льготного периода, в течение которого проценты могут не начисляться. Более 60% займов новых заемщиков приходится на эти финансовые продукты.

Доля автозаймов выросла в 6 раз, до 9%, причем они часто выдаются самым закредитованным заемщикам. Чтобы предупредить накопление рисков, с III квартала Банк России вводит в этом сегменте макропруденциальные лимиты.

Доля просроченной задолженности свыше 90 дней в совокупном портфеле МФО продолжала снижаться и составила 27,5%. Основные риски по-прежнему сосредоточены в рознице, при этом наблюдалось постепенное улучшение качества потребительского портфеля за счет притока новых заемщиков, а также продажи отдельными МФО просроченной задолженности на более ранних сроках.

Подробнее читайте в «Тенденциях на рынке МФО за I квартал 2025 года».

Фото на превью: R.classen / Shutterstock / Fotodom

Обратите внимание; Эта информация является необработанным контентом непосредственно из источника информации. Это точно соответствует тому, что утверждает источник, и не отражает позицию MIL-OSI или ее клиентов.

Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

https://www.cbr.ru/press/event/?id=24625

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Финансовые новости: Банк России систематизирует подходы к проведению макропруденциальной политики

Source: Центральный банк России – Central Bank of Russia –

Банк России в 2025 году существенно расширил набор инструментов макропруденциальной политики, которые применяются, чтобы ограничивать риски для финансовой системы.

Регулятор начал определять лимиты по ипотеке и автокредитам, использовать надбавки для ограничения рисков крупных компаний с высокой долговой нагрузкой, впервые установил положительную антициклическую надбавку. Чтобы показать, как все меры работают вместе, основные принципы их применения с учетом опыта, накопленного с 2013 года, были систематизированы в докладе «Основные подходы к проведению макропруденциальной политики».

В материале описывается, как Банк России выявляет системные риски, принимает решения на разных стадиях финансового цикла и учитывает взаимосвязь различных инструментов. Также показано, почему макропруденциальная политика не может служить инструментом обеспечения ценовой стабильности.

Чтобы учитывать влияние на финансовые организации всех применяемых инструментов, решения по ним теперь рассматриваются комплексно каждый квартал. С 2026 года на сайте регулятора будет публиковаться график заседаний Совета директоров Банка России по вопросам макропруденциальной политики.

Обратите внимание; Эта информация является необработанным контентом непосредственно из источника информации. Это точно соответствует тому, что утверждает источник, и не отражает позицию MIL-OSI или ее клиентов.

Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

https://www.cbr.ru/press/event/?id=24624