Category: Russian Finance

Source: IMF – News in Russian

July 19, 2025

Washington, DC: Europe’s economy remains resilient with record-low unemployment, headline inflation broadly at target, and a stable financial system. However, policymakers face mounting challenges, including trade tensions, rising demand for defense spending, and the need to ensure energy security, all while addressing subpar productivity, rapid aging, and weak medium-term growth. The most effective solutions require decisive EU actions. Deepening the EU single market is the key tool available to policymakers to enhance investment, innovation, and productivity. A better-integrated EU single market, in turn, calls for a joint provision of key public goods including for energy connectivity and defense—including through the multiannual financial framework. This can help internalize positive cross-border externalities of investments, leverage economies of scale, and avoid costly duplicative national efforts. Ensuring orderly growth-friendly fiscal consolidations designed to address country-specific risks is critical to preserving fiscal sustainability and managing long-term spending pressures associated with aging and increased spending on security. Diversifying economic ties and expanding rule-based trade integration can further bolster competitiveness and strengthen economic resilience. Safeguarding price and financial stability continues to be the bedrock for addressing these longer-term challenges. 

Outlook and Risks

The euro area economy is navigating an increasingly challenging global environment of higher tariffs, elevated trade policy uncertainty, and geopolitical risks. The April 2025 World Economic Outlook (WEO) projected growth to remain moderate at 0.8 percent in 2025, picking up to 1.2 percent in 2026. Trade tensions and elevated uncertainty have dimmed the outlook for domestic demand and exports, outweighing an anticipated boost from higher defense and infrastructure spending. In addition, the geopolitical situation in Europe is expected to dampen sentiment and weigh on investment and consumption, despite looser monetary policy and projected gains in real income.   

Headline inflation is close to 2 percent and, under staff’s April WEO projections, is expected to remain broadly at target with weak energy and core goods inflation offsetting elevated services inflation. Ongoing nominal wage growth moderation amid subdued activity and firmly anchored inflation expectations is expected to gradually lower services inflation. As a result, core inflation is projected to decline to 2 percent later than headline inflation, in 2026.

Risks to growth are on the downside. Trade policy uncertainty, further tariff escalation, or geopolitical tensions could weigh on demand and growth more than expected. These would likely outweigh possible positive impacts of unanticipated further fiscal easing if more countries were to boost defense spending. The April 9^th announcements of a pause in US tariffs constitutes a small upside risk to the April 2025 WEO projections as they lower the effective tariff rate on EU exports to the US.

Risks to inflation are two-sided. Lower-than-expected non-energy goods prices because of trade diversion, weaker-than-expected activity and wages, as well as the recent euro appreciation could pull inflation lower than in the baseline. On the other hand, fiscal spending could turn out larger or more inflationary than assumed in the baseline, while geopolitical tensions, supply chain disruptions and tariff escalation could lead to faster increases in import prices, and wage growth may not moderate as strongly as expected. 

Structural constraints weigh on the medium-term outlook. Risks of persistently elevated trade policy uncertainty, an escalation of tariffs, still high and volatile energy prices, and the shifting geopolitical context all add to pre-existing challenges from aging, skills shortages, and weak productivity trends.

Policy Priorities

Given the challenges outlined above, a comprehensive policy strategy for decisive EU level actions on multiple fronts is needed. The goals include strengthening potential growth amidst aging and a more difficult external environment, ensuring new public spending priorities are met without risking fiscal sustainability, and safeguarding broader macro and financial stability.

Structural and Trade Policies

To bolster productivity growth and resilience in the EU, it is crucial to enhance innovation and facilitate the scaling up of firms (Draghi 2024; Letta 2024; Adilbish and others 2025). The key lever available to achieve this is deeper integration of the EU single market. Staff analysis finds that remaining barriers within the single market are equivalent on average to a 44 percent tariff on goods and 110 percent on services (Adilbish and others 2025). More integration will unlock gains from specialization within the EU, as global value chains reconfigure and enable firms to capitalize on economies of scale. 

Staff analysis highlights four key actionable priorities to help complete the single market and realize these ambitions (Arnold and others 2025). First, lowering regulatory fragmentation. For instance, a 28^th corporate regime—alternative to national regimes—that establishes uniform regulations and legal rules crucial for not only the formation and operation of firms, but also their dissolution can provide a voluntary EU-wide legal framework to support firms’ expansion without requiring them to navigate divergent national regulations. By offering an alternative viable solution to simplify the regulatory landscape, the 28^th regime can facilitate firms’ scaling up and enhance the efficiency of cross-border capital allocation, ultimately fostering innovation. Second, advancing the Capital Markets Union (CMU) to facilitate more efficient channeling of savings to risk capital for firms. For instance, increasing institutional investors’ familiarity with venture capital (VC) as an asset class and addressing remaining undue restrictions on their ability to invest in it can help meaningfully increase VC investment in the EU from a very low level currently (Arnold and others 2024). This, together with continued efforts to complete the Banking Union (BU)—critical for a more resilient and efficient banking sector—will build a well-functioning Savings and Investments Union (SIU). Lowering barriers to cross-border bank mergers and acquisitions would help augment bank finance, address long-standing concerns of structurally low profitability and high costs, and spur competition within the euro area’s banking sector. Third, enhancing intra-EU labor mobility (such as through extending the automatic system of professional qualification recognition) can offer productive firms greater access to talent and improve skills matching. Last, integrating the EU energy market, guided by a coordinated strategy for an energy system transformation, can help provide lower and more stable energy prices. Simulation results suggest that a few actionable steps along these dimensions could jumpstart the process of deeper integration and deliver a meaningful payoff by increasing the EU potential GDP level relative to baseline by around 3 percent over 10 years, benefiting every country. In this regard, the digital euro also has an important role to play. In addition to reinforcing monetary sovereignty in the growing presence of private digital currencies, the digital euro can help deepen the integration of financial services within the European market by streamlining and unifying cross-border retail payments. It can improve payment system efficiency, reduce transaction costs, and complement the SIU and the single market more broadly.

While deeper intra-Europe integration is one key element in boosting growth prospects, complementary policy actions are needed at the national level. Recently published staff analysis (Budina and others 2025) identifies domestic structural reform priorities for individual European countries. Successful implementation—by which countries aim to close 50 percent of their prioritized policy gaps with respect to the most growth-friendly regulatory settings—would entail sizable gains in GDP level of around 5.7 percent for the EU in the medium term. The prioritized reforms cover labor market and human capital (e.g., education and training), fiscal structural issues (e.g., tax policy), business regulation, and credit and capital markets.

An escalation of trade tensions poses important challenges to the EU. The EU would benefit from its continued advocacy for a stable, rules-based global trading system. Further diversifying economic ties can help strengthen supply chain resilience and capture efficiency gains from trade. Any new industrial policies should be limited to well-defined market failures and be coordinated at the EU level.

Fiscal Policy

Fiscal risks and optimal fiscal policy strategies differ across countries. For countries with high debt and limited fiscal space, significant fiscal adjustments are needed to mitigate risks, while countries with fiscal space can implement a more back-loaded fiscal adjustment. For the euro area economies excluding Germany, staff recommends improving the structural primary balance to a surplus of 1.4 percent of GDP in 2030—a cumulative improvement of 2.9 percentage points from a deficit of 1.5 percent of GDP in 2024. Achieving this requires an additional cumulative deficit reduction of close to 2 percentage points over 2024–30 relative to the baseline (typically predicated on current budgets and specified, concrete measures under consideration).

The needed deficit-reduction creates challenging tradeoffs because, at the same time, Europe faces high and rising spending pressures that are crystallizing faster than previously anticipated. Pressures from interest costs, an aging population, climate transition and energy security, and defense would reach 4.4 percent of GDP annually for the euro area economies in 2050 (Eble and others 2025). Member states should transparently account for rising spending pressures to lay out trade-offs within the fiscal framework and develop credible plans to ensure sustainability. 

The use of escape clauses to support member states’ ramp-up in defense spending should be restricted to its initial phase. Member states and the Commission should assess the impact of increased defense spending on debt sustainability on an ongoing basis and develop plans to put debt on a stable/declining path over the medium term. Also, it is crucial that care be taken in implementing the EU fiscal rules to ensure that countries with low fiscal risks that intend to increase spending to boost potential growth and enhance resilience should not be constrained from doing so by the rules. Eventually, a broader reassessment of key parameters may be needed to achieve an optimal balance between allowing countries with low fiscal risks to fulfill spending objectives that can also have favorable EU-wide spillovers, and ensuring that debt remains sustainable.

Coordinated efforts at the EU level and targeted investments can help address shared challenges in a cost-effective manner, supporting member states in managing fiscal tradeoffs (Busse and others 2025). Identifying existing investment gaps and areas where joint EU-level initiatives would deliver cost-effective solutions can provide a blueprint for priority actions—for instance, public goods investment including on innovation, clean energy transition, and collective defense. To support investments in these areas, the EU budget size will need to increase by at least 50 percent, if existing programs are to be maintained. Coordinated investments that better internalize positive cross-border externalities and minimize duplicative national efforts will generate net budgetary savings for member states. In the area of the clean energy transition, for instance, our recent work estimates that better EU-level coordination and planning can lower investment costs by 7 percent (IMF 2024). In addition, reforms are needed to make the budget more streamlined, responsive to evolving needs, and more effective by incentivizing good performance. A performance-based approach that links financial support to implementing national-level reforms that support EU priorities and enhance growth potential can deliver objectives more effectively, particularly in areas where incentives are currently weak, and outcomes are closely linked to efforts. Lastly, strengthening the financing framework of the budget with borrowing capacity and increased own resources will help meet the growing demand for EU level investment in shared priorities in a timely manner while spreading the fiscal burden over time.

Monetary and Financial Sector Policies

Since headline inflation is broadly at target, core inflation is slightly above 2 percent, and the output gap is mildly negative, a monetary policy stance close to neutral is justified. Barring further shocks that materially revise the inflation outlook, maintaining the policy rate at 2 percent will help keep inflation around target in the second half of 2025 and beyond. But the outlook is highly uncertain, and the policy path may need to be adjusted on the basis of incoming data or developments.

The concurrent Financial Stability Assessment Program (FSAP) found that the banking system generally appears adequately capitalized and liquid, but the authorities should closely monitor the vulnerabilities from the growing NBFI sector. Although financial stability risks linked to past monetary tightening are easing, a deteriorating business environment for corporates, especially those with trade exposures to the US, could weigh on banks’ otherwise healthy balance sheets. Moreover, new systemic risks have emerged, particularly from market volatility due to higher tariffs and banks’ exposures to NBFIs. Authorities should stand ready to address potential liquidity stress, including by preparing a framework for the provision of emergency liquidity assistance to NBFIs, paired with closer oversight.

Facilitating better data sharing among EU and national authorities will improve risk monitoring, particularly to close gaps that hinder system-wide analyses. A key policy priority is to improve system-wide risk monitoring of the financial sector beyond banks, including by closing data gaps arising from legal restrictions for sharing or timely access by supervisors, which currently limit the ability to undertake complete system-wide analyses.

Fragmentation continues to hinder the full benefits of the banking union and the development of a more resilient, deeper and integrated EA-wide financial system. Further steps to strengthen the euro area financial architecture include completing the Banking Union with the introduction of a common deposit insurance system; allowing a greater use of national deposit guarantee funds for resolution and making bail-in requirements more flexible; putting in place arrangements for the Single Resolution Fund to provide guarantees to enhance the provision of central bank liquidity in resolution, ideally with an EU fiscal backstop; fully implementing the international capital standard for banks (Basel III); and strengthening the resources and prudential powers of the European authorities overseeing NBFIs, including empowering ESMA to top-up national measures for substantially leveraged investment funds and to enforce cross-border reciprocation.

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/18/mcs-06182025-euro-area-imf-cs-of-2025-mission-on-common-policies-for-member-countries

MIL OSI

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 18, 2025

• The IMF Executive Board today completed the Sixth Reviews of Benin’s Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) and the Third Review under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF). The decision allows for an immediate disbursement of about US$ 90 million.
• Benin’s successful fiscal reforms supported the convergence to the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) fiscal deficit norm of 3 percent of GDP one year ahead of schedule, with sustained domestic revenue mobilization and prioritized social spending. The 2025 budget is designed to sustain this achievement.
• A key challenge ahead for Benin is to preserve the reform momentum and strengthen policies that foster inclusive growth and an economic transformation that benefits all Beninese.

Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has completed the Sixth Reviews under the 42-month blended Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangements, and the Third Review under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangement. The EFF/ECF was approved by the IMF Executive Board in July 2022 (see PR 22/252) and complemented by the RSF in December 2023 (see PR 23/452).

The completion of the reviews allows for the immediate disbursement of about US$ 36 million (SDR 26.2 million) under the EFF/ECF—bringing total disbursements under the program to about US$ 623 million (SDR 457.6 million)—and of about US$ 54 million (SDR 39.616 million) under the RSF arrangement.

Economic activity in Benin accelerated over the past five years, and markedly in 2024. Growth reached 7.5 percent year-over-year—its highest level yet— and it is expected to remain strong in the medium term. The current account of the balance of payments deteriorated temporarily, due to large professional services imports related to the Glo-Djigbé Industrial Zone (GDIZ). It is expected to recover gradually, as exports from the special economic zones increase and the services deficit continues to moderate over time. 

Program performance under the EFF/ECF has been strong, with all end-December 2024 quantitative targets met and structural benchmarks completed. On the RSF front, the authorities adopted new regulations for water resources monitoring, construction, and renewable energy. They also revised electricity tariff regulations to improve the financial sustainability of electricity production and distribution companies. Benin’s partners have pledged financial support for the country’s climate agenda following COP29 and the 2024 climate finance roundtable. Accordingly, the authorities are working on a climate-related taxonomy that is aimed at further catalyzing climate finance.

Following the Executive Board discussion on Benin, Mr. Okamura, Deputy Managing Director, and acting chair, issued the following statement:

“Benin’s performance under its Fund-supported arrangements has been strong. Its strong institutional foundation and the authorities’ economic reform drive and sound macroeconomic management have yielded tangible dividends, with high and more stable growth, favorable access to international markets, and continued support from development partners. The authorities should nonetheless remain vigilant to regional and global risks, maintain fiscal discipline and reform momentum, and strengthen inclusive policies.

“Frontloaded fiscal consolidation in 2024 supported Benin’s convergence to the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) fiscal deficit norm of 3 percent of GDP, one year in advance. The 2025 budget continues to target compliance with the deficit norm, while the fiscal adjustment remains anchored in the Medium-Term Revenue Strategy. In that context, maintaining the tax collection efforts coupled with prudent spending will preserve fiscal discipline. Rebalancing the debt portfolio toward domestic debt over time while remaining cognizant of refinancing risks, in line with the authorities’ Medium-Term Debt Strategy, and together with continued proactive debt management, will help mitigate external rollover risks.

“The authorities should continue laying the foundation for inclusive private sector-led growth to entrench the ongoing economic transformation. Fiscal transparency and good governance are key to maintaining market confidence. Further efforts are needed to support the development of SMEs. Regularly updating the social registry and developing a comprehensive mapping of social protection programs will improve the efficiency and targeting of social assistance initiatives toward vulnerable households across the country.

“Continued vigilance by supervisory authorities vis-à-vis public and non-public financial sector risks will help safeguard financial stability and limit contingent liability risks.

“The authorities have revised regulations for water resources monitoring, construction, electricity tariffs, and renewable energy in line with their climate agenda. The authorities should accelerate the reforms aimed at enhancing resilience to climate change and continue to advance their agenda under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF), to promote long-term balance of payments stability and catalyze private-led climate finance.”

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/18/pr-25207-benin-imf-executive-board-completes-6th-reviews-of-eff-and-ecf-and-3rd-review-of-the-rsf

MIL OSI

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 18, 2025

• The Mauritian economy continues to exhibit resilience with growth at 4.7 percent in 2024 and contained inflation. The growth outlook remains favorable, though risks are to the downside.
• Mauritius needs to recalibrate the macroeconomic policy mix to rebuild fiscal space. The monetary policy framework needs to be strengthened while continued monitoring of macro-financial risks is essential to maintain financial stability.
• Advancing key reforms to foster external competitiveness and private sector-led growth while enhancing climate resilience will reduce external imbalances.

Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the Article IV Consultation for Mauritius.[1]

Mauritius’ economy remains resilient. Real GDP grew by 4.7 percent in 2024, from 5.0 percent in 2023, driven by services, construction, and tourism. Headline inflation (12-month average) declined to
2.5 percent in March 2025 from 7.0 percent in 2023, helped by easing international food and energy prices and lower fuel excise duties. The external current account deficit widened in 2024 to
6.5 percent of GDP, mostly reflecting higher imports and freight costs. Gross foreign reserves increased to US$8.5 billion by end-2024, covering almost 12 months of imports. Looking ahead, the country needs to address fiscal and structural challenges, notably the high public debt, significant public investment needs, low productivity, and an ageing society.

The outlook for growth is favorable. Real GDP growth is projected to soften to 3.0 percent in 2025 due to weakening external demand, easing tourism activity, and the drought. Over the medium term, growth is expected at around 3.4 percent, reflecting demographic headwinds and labor shortages. Inflation is projected to average 3.6 percent in 2025 and remain within BOM’s target range over the medium term. The external current account deficit is projected to reduce to 4.7 percent of GDP in 2025—reflecting lower oil prices, as exports grow modestly amid the slowdown in global demand—and to increase in 2026 due to subdued exports, but gradually decline thereafter. The primary fiscal deficit (excluding grants) for FY24/25 is projected to worsen by 3.4 ppt of GDP relative to FY23/24, to 6.5 percent of GDP, mostly driven by higher compensation of employees, social benefits, and grants and transfers. The stock of public sector debt is projected at around 88 percent of GDP at end-June 2025, and to gradually decline in the medium term.

Risks to the outlook are on the downside, including from global uncertainty, tariff wars, higher-than-anticipated fuel and food prices, and extreme climate shocks.

 

Executive Board Assessment^[2]

The economy has recovered solidly from the pandemic and the outlook is favorable, but fiscal and structural challenges remain. The recovery has been driven by services, construction, and tourism. The medium-term outlook is favorable but held back by demographic headwinds and labor shortages. Mauritius is facing fiscal and structural challenges from high public debt, significant public investment needs for climate, low productivity, and an ageing society. Risks to the outlook are on the downside including from high global uncertainty, highlighting the importance of addressing fiscal and external imbalances to increase the resilience of the economy.

Fiscal policy should pursue frontloaded growth-friendly consolidation to shore up fiscal credibility, helping rebuild fiscal space while protecting the most vulnerable. Tax revenue should be increased and current and ESFs’ spending contained while safeguarding critical social spending and growth-enhancing capital spending. Pension system reform remains key to support fiscal sustainability, especially given the ageing of Mauritius’ population. Strengthening public financial management, including by streamlining ESFs, will support fiscal consolidation, transparency, and good governance.

BOM should start to gradually phase out its ownership of MIC and strengthen the implementation of the monetary policy framework by resuming uncapped issuance of 7-Day BOM bills (at the key policy rate). BOM should stand ready to tighten the monetary policy stance should inflationary pressures reemerge. BOM should adopt amendments to the BOM Act, including to ensure fiscal backing, to protect central bank independence. Ministry of Finance and BOM are encouraged to strengthen the commitment on their mutual agreement for BOM independence. Mauritius should continue to rely on exchange rate flexibility and FX purchases when opportunities arise, and in line with the monetary policy framework, to help further build foreign reserves buffers to ensure ability to respond to large external shocks. 

Mauritius’ external position at end-2024 is assessed as weaker than the level implied by fundamentals and desirable policies, and structural reforms to foster external competitiveness are needed to reduce external imbalances. Steady progress in strengthening the AML/CFT framework is welcome and should be sustained, including provisions related to non-resident and cross-border activity. Financial sector risks should continue to be closely monitored including of the real estate sector. Ongoing efforts to improve external sector statistics, including measurement of the GBCs sector, should be sustained. Statistical gaps and discrepancies should be addressed to improve the quality and credibility of macroeconomic statistics.

Mauritius should advance structural reforms that boost investment and innovation to secure longer-term private sector-led growth. Priorities include strengthening workers’ skills through better education and narrowing gender gaps as well as advancing climate adaptation efforts to support economic resilience.

 

Mauritius: Selected Economic Indicators

2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030           Est. Proj. Proj. Proj. Proj. Proj. Proj.                                   (Annual percent change, unless otherwise indicated)     National income, prices and employment                           Real GDP   -14.5 3.4 8.7 5.0 4.7 3.0 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4   Real GDP per capita   -14.6 3.6 8.9 5.1 4.9 3.2 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.8   GDP per capita (in U.S. dollars)   9,011 9,087 10,235 11,188 11,883 12,448 13,287 14,183 15,128 16,131 17,190   GDP deflator   2.6 3.2 9.6 6.6 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.6   Consumer prices inflation (period average)   2.5 4.0 10.8 7.0 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5   Consumer prices inflation (end of period)   2.7 6.8 12.2 3.9 2.9 3.9 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5   Unemployment rate (percent)   9.2 9.1 6.8 6.1 5.8 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9                                   (Annual percent change)     External sector                           Exports of goods and services, f.o.b.   -23.8 5.2 45.7 4.0 3.0 1.7 2.3 7.1 6.2 6.5 7.4   Of which: tourism receipts   -73.8 -23.8 313.1 29.7 6.0 -4.6 5.3 7.7 8.6 8.1 7.7   Imports of goods and services, f.o.b.   -29.1 16.0 32.9 -0.3 6.4 0.7 4.7 5.3 4.9 4.3 5.3   Nominal effective exchange rate (annual average)   -8.0 -8.0 3.6 0.5 -1.4 … … … … … …   Real effective exchange rate (annual average)   -7.6 -7.5 6.2 1.7 -0.6 … … … … … …   Terms of trade   5.1 -12.0 -5.1 8.3 0.0 2.3 2.0 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4                                         Money and credit                           Net foreign assets   16.4 18.6 -3.6 -0.3 18.3 1.5 2.7 2.5 2.1 2.2 3.0   Domestic credit   7.9 15.6 13.1 9.7 13.7 7.2 6.5 6.3 6.1 6.0 5.9   Net claims on government   8.8 34.8 24.6 26.1 31.3 13.2 7.7 6.0 5.3 4.5 3.7   Credit to non-government sector   2.7 0.4 -0.6 8.0 8.3 6.0 6.9 7.2 7.1 7.1 7.1   Broad money   17.7 8.6 4.1 7.8 12.9 6.4 7.6 8.5 8.4 8.4 7.9   Income velocity of broad money (M2)   0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9                                   (Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)     Central government finances 1                           Overall borrowing requirement 2   -22.1 -5.5 -4.7 -6.1 -10.4 -5.4 -3.7 -3.4 -2.9 -2.4 -2.0   Primary balance (excluding grants)    -16.5 -4.9 -2.7 -3.1 -6.5 -3.0 -1.3 -0.3 0.1 0.4 0.5   Revenues (incl. grants)   21.6 24.2 24.5 24.0 25.7 27.0 27.3 27.5 27.5 27.5 27.4   Expenditure, excl. net lending   40.4 31.1 29.4 29.7 35.2 32.3 31.2 30.3 29.9 29.4 28.9   Domestic debt of central government   67.5 61.9 57.3 58.7 64.4 65.8 65.7 65.3 64.5 64.0 63.7   External debt of central government   15.8 14.0 13.8 12.7 14.8 14.9 14.8 14.7 14.6 14.3 13.9                               Investment and saving 4                           Gross domestic investment   18.2 19.8 19.8 20.2 21.0 22.0 22.4 22.5 22.5 22.5 22.5   Public   4.1 4.1 3.9 3.9 3.8 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3   Private 3   14.1 15.7 15.8 16.3 17.2 17.9 18.2 18.2 18.2 18.2 18.2   Gross national savings   11.6 12.6 17.1 22.4 23.4 23.8 25.0 26.1 26.5 26.2 26.4   Public   -7.9 -5.6 -2.0 -2.4 -4.5 -4.0 -1.7 -0.7 -0.1 0.4 0.8   Private   19.5 18.2 19.2 24.8 28.0 27.8 26.7 26.8 26.6 25.9 25.6   External sector                           Balance of goods and services   -10.7 -16.1 -14.8 -11.7 -13.2 -12.3 -13.0 -12.2 -11.6 -10.5 -9.6   Exports of goods and services, f.o.b.   35.1 36.7 47.6 45.3 43.9 42.7 41.0 41.2 41.1 41.2 41.7   Imports of goods and services, f.o.b.   -45.8 -52.7 -62.4 -56.9 -57.2 -55.0 -54.0 -53.4 -52.7 -51.7 -51.2   Current account balance   -8.9 -13.1 -11.1 -5.1 -6.5 -4.7 -6.1 -5.0 -4.3 -3.7 -3.0   Capital and financial account   3.3 23.3 13.4 -0.9 14.5 6.1 9.1 6.7 5.9 5.2 4.6   Overall balance   -4.4 10.2 2.8 -5.5 7.3 1.4 2.9 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.6   Total external debt   110.7 134.0 132.2 131.6 139.2 128.9 119.3 110.8 102.2 94.1 87.1   Gross international reserves (millions of U.S. dollars)   7,242 7,805 7,740 7,254 8,510 8,675 9,163 9,475 9,781 10,083 10,420   Months of imports of goods and services, f.o.b.   14.3 11.6 11.6 10.2 11.8 11.6 11.6 11.4 11.3 11.2 11.1                               Memorandum items:                           GDP at current market prices (billions of Mauritian rupees)   448.9 478.8 570.3 638.3 694.0 742.3 796.0 853.3 914.0 979.0 1,048.7   GDP at current market prices (millions of U.S. dollars)   11,408 11,484 12,908 14,101 14,953 15,641 16,662 17,748 18,890 20,082 21,326   Public sector debt, fiscal year (percent of GDP)4   91.9 86.1 81.8 81.5 88.3 89.1 88.1 86.9 85.3 83.9 82.7                               Foreign and local currency long-term debt rating (Moody’s)   Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Baa3 Baa3 Baa3 … … … … …                             Sources:  Country authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.                           1 GFSM 2001 concept of net lending/net borrowing, includes special and other extrabudgetary funds. Fiscal data reported for fiscal years (e.g, 2019=2019/20).       2 Following the GFSM 2014, Sections 5.111.5.116, the transfers from the BOM to the Central Government are considered as financing.             3  Excludes changes in inventories in 2022 and outer years.                                                                                               4 The public debt series has been reclassified starting in the 2024 AIV Mission to allow consolidation of central government securities held by non-financial public corporations

 

[1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

[2] The Executive Board takes decisions under its lapse-of-time procedure when the Board agrees that a proposal can be considered without convening formal discussions.

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/18/pr-25204-mauritius-imf-concludes-2025-article-iv-consultation

MIL OSI

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 18, 2025

• Uzbekistan’s economic performance has remained strong, with robust growth, narrowing consolidated fiscal and current account deficits, and ample international reserves.
• Despite elevated external uncertainty, growth is projected to stay robust amid ongoing reforms and strong remittances, while inflation is expected to moderate under tight macroeconomic and macroprudential policies.
• The priorities ahead are to cement macro-financial stability and continue with the economic reform agenda to reduce the state’s footprint while fostering private sector-led and inclusive growth.

Washington, DC: On June 16, 2025, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the Article IV Consultation for the Republic of Uzbekistan.[1] The authorities have consented to the publication of the Staff Report prepared for this consultation.[2]

Uzbekistan’s economic performance has remained strong. Real GDP growth stood at 6.5 percent in 2024, underpinned by robust domestic demand, and remained buoyant at 6.8 percent year-on-year in the first quarter of 2025. Inflation had trended downward through end-April 2024 but rose to 10.6 percent year-on-year in May 2024 that saw the implementation of needed energy price reform. By end-April 2025, it has only marginally eased to 10.1 percent. The current account deficit narrowed by 2.6 percentage points of GDP to about 5.0 percent in 2024, driven by strong remittances, rapidly growing non-gold exports, favorable commodity prices, and the unwinding of a one-off spike in imports in 2023. International reserves have remained ample. The consolidated fiscal deficit narrowed by 1.7 percentage points of GDP to 3.2 percent of GDP in 2024, largely on the back of growth-friendly expenditure measures, although borrowing and spending from the broader public sector were higher than anticipated.  

The outlook remains broadly positive. Despite heightened global trade policy uncertainty, real GDP growth is projected to remain robust under the baseline, at close to 6 percent this year and next, supported by sustained strength in private consumption, investment, and advancement of structural reforms. The latter, continued tight monetary and macroprudential policies, and solidified fiscal discipline are expected to reduce inflation to the Central Bank of Uzbekistan’s (CBU) 5 percent target by end-2027. The external current account deficit is foreseen to stay at or slightly below 5 percent over 2025-26 while international reserves are expected to remain adequate, at 9.2 months of imports by end-2026.

Downside risks to the outlook include prolonged and deeper trade policy shocks, more volatile commodity prices, tighter external financing, and contingent liabilities from state-owned enterprises and banks, and public-private partnerships. On the upside, opportunities stem from faster implementation of structural reforms, stronger inflows of income and capital, and favorable commodity prices.

Executive Board Assessment[3]

Executive Directors agreed with the thrust of the staff appraisal. They welcomed Uzbekistan’s positive economic outlook amid continued progress in the transition to a market-oriented economy. Directors noted, however, that significant vulnerabilities persist, including from the still large state footprint in the economy and rising external uncertainty. Against this background, they emphasized the importance of sustaining the momentum in structural and institutional reforms, supported by Fund technical assistance, to entrench macroeconomic stability and maintain robust and resilient growth.

Directors commended the authorities for the significant fiscal consolidation achieved. They broadly called for reversing the decline in the tax-to-GDP ratio and improving expenditure efficiency to create fiscal space for priority social and development needs. Directors stressed the importance of adhering to external borrowing limits and avoiding government spending procyclicality in response to high gold prices to support inflation reduction. They also advised improving monitoring and management of fiscal risks from SOEs and public-private partnerships and further strengthening PFM and fiscal transparency.

Directors welcomed the commitment of the Central Bank of Uzbekistan (CBU) to reduce inflation. They agreed that monetary policy should remain data driven and be tightened further if core inflation or inflation expectations do not decline. Directors encouraged the CBU to continue strengthening communication and monetary policy transmission. They also recommended adopting greater exchange rate flexibility and implementing outstanding safeguards recommendations to strengthen central bank governance and independence. 

Directors called for enhancing bank supervision and regulation to safeguard financial stability, while reducing the state’s role in the financial sector. In this regard, they recommended bolstering the commercial orientation of state banks and their corporate governance, phasing out directed and preferential lending, and expediting and expanding privatization efforts. Directors also advised the authorities to strengthen asset classification, NPL reporting and resolution, and the regulatory, supervisory, crisis management, and AML/CFT frameworks following the recommendations of the country’s first Financial Sector Assessment Program. Additional macroprudential measures could help mitigate risks from rapid growth in microcredit. 

Directors encouraged deepening and accelerating structural reforms. While welcoming the progress with WTO accession and energy sector reform, they emphasized that it will be essential to complete price and trade liberalization, phase out support to SOEs, and accelerate privatizations while carrying them out in line with international best practices. Directors called on the authorities to make further progress in governance reforms, including improvements in transparency and accountability and the approval of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy. Closing data gaps and improving data quality remain priorities. 

It is expected that the next Article IV consultation with Uzbekistan will be held on the standard 12-month cycle.

Uzbekistan: Selected Economic Indicators 2022-2026
	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026
			Est.	Proj.	Proj.
National income 1/
Real GDP growth (percent change)	6.0	6.3	6.5	5.9	5.8
Nominal GDP (in trillions of Sum)	996	1,204	1,455	1,733	2,005
GDP per capita (in U.S. dollars)	2,555	2,849	3,113	3,487	3,805
Population (in millions)	35.3	36.0	36.9	37.7	38.5
Prices	(Percent change)
Consumer price inflation (end of period) 2/	12.3	8.7	9.8	8.4	6.5
GDP deflator	14.5	13.8	13.3	12.5	9.4
External sector	(Percent of GDP)
Current account balance	-3.2	-7.6	-5.0	-5.0	-4.8
External debt	49.2	54.5	56.2	55.4	55.2
	(Level)
Exchange rate (in sums per U.S. dollar; end of period)	11,225	12,339	12,920	…	…
Real effective exchange rate
(ave, 2015 =100, decline = depreciation)	61.8	58.8	55.4	…	…
Government finance	(Percent of GDP)
Consolidated budget revenues	28.8	26.7	26.5	26.3	26.4
Consolidated budget expenditures	32.3	31.6	29.7	29.3	29.4
Consolidated budget balance	-3.5	-4.9	-3.2	-3.0	-3.0
Adjusted revenues 3/	27.7	25.9	25.5	25.3	25.5
Adjusted expenditures 3/	31.3	29.9	27.8	27.3	27.8
Adjusted fiscal balance	-3.7	-4.0	-2.3	-2.0	-2.3
Policy-based lending	-0.1	0.9	0.9	1.0	0.7
Overall fiscal balance 3/	-3.5	-4.9	-3.2	-3.0	-3.0
Public debt	30.5	32.2	32.6	33.3	33.2
Money and credit	(Percent Change)
Reserve money	31.4	4.9	9.5	9.2	8.8
Broad money	30.2	12.2	30.6	19.4	16.3
Credit to the economy	21.4	23.2	4.0	19.3	16.0
Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff estimates.
1/ Incorporates latest revision to national accounts data, which raised the average nominal GDP for 2017-2023 by about 11 percent.  2/ The CPI projection incorporates the effect of the announced increases in energy prices in 2024 and 2025. 3/ IMF staff adjusts budget revenues and expenditures for financing operations, such as equity injections, policy lending, and privatization of state enterprises. The overall fiscal balance until 2021 is more negative than the consolidated budget balance as the latter excluded privatization receipts. Since 2022, there is no difference as the authorities started including all privatization receipts as financing.

[1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

[2] Under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, publication of documents that pertain to member countries is voluntary and requires the member consent. The staff report will be shortly published on the www.imf.org/Uzbekistan page.

[3] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chair of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/18/pr-25206-uzbekistan-imf-executive-board-concludes-2025-article-iv-consultation

MIL OSI

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 18, 2025

Washington, DC: With the successful launch of the new data portal—the National Summary Data Page (NSDP)—Djibouti has implemented a key recommendation of the IMF’s Enhanced General Data Dissemination System (e-GDDS) to publish essential macroeconomic and financial data. The e-GDDS is the first tier of the IMF Data Standards Initiatives that promote transparency as a global public good and encourages countries to voluntarily publish timely data that is essential for monitoring and analyzing economic performance.

The launch of the NSDP is a testament to the Djibouti’s commitment to data transparency. It serves as a one-stop portal for disseminating various macroeconomic data compiled by multiple statistical agencies. The published data include statistics on national accounts, prices, government operations, debt, the monetary and financial sector, and the external sector.

The launch of the NSDP was supported by an IMF technical assistance mission, financed by the Government of Japan through the Japan Administered Account for Selected Fund Activities, and conducted in collaboration with the African Development Bank from June 9 to 12, 2025. The mission was hosted by the Central Bank of Djibouti in close collaboration with the Ministry of Budget, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, as well as the National Statistics Institute of Djibouti.

With this reform, Djibouti will join 75 countries worldwide and 35 countries in Africa using the e-GDDS to disseminate standardized data.  

Mr. Bert Kroese, Chief Statistician and Data Officer, and Director of the IMF’s Statistics Department, commended the authorities for this major milestone in the Djibouti’s statistical development. He also emphasized that Djibouti would benefit from using the e-GDDS participation as a tool to further improve data transparency. The IMF stands ready to “continue supporting the authorities in further developing their statistical systems.”

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/18/pr-25205-djibouti-djibouti-implements-the-e-gdds

MIL OSI

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 18, 2025

End-of-Mission press releases include statements of IMF staff teams that convey preliminary findings after a visit to a country. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF’s Executive Board for discussions and decision.

Harare, Zimbabwe: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff team led by Mr. Wojciech Maliszewski visited Harare from June 4 to June 18, 2025, to conduct the 2025 Article IV Consultation.

At the conclusion of the IMF mission, Mr. Maliszewski issued the following statement:

“Zimbabwe is experiencing a degree of macroeconomic stability despite lingering policy challenges. Following successive bouts of hyperinflation over the past few years, more disciplined policies—including halting and transferring to the Treasury the quasi-fiscal operations (QFOs) of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) and tighter monetary policy despite fiscal pressures—have helped stabilize the local currency (the ‘ZiG’) and reduce inflation. Growth this year is recovering following a sharp slowdown in 2024, which was affected by a drought that lowered agricultural output by 15 percent. Electricity production also fell, and declining prices for platinum and lithium weighed on the mining output. During the first half of 2025, better climate conditions and historically high gold prices have boosted agricultural and mining activity, strengthening the current account and contributing to the recovery, with growth projected at 6 percent in 2025.

“Buoyed by the growth recovery and policy measures—a reduction in VAT tax reliefs, increased fees and levies, taxation of the COVID public servant allowance, and steps to reduce smuggling—revenue ratio increased sharply to 18 percent of GDP. That said, fiscal pressures intensified in 2024 and in the first months of 2025 as higher revenues proved insufficient to meet growing spending needs. These came notably from higher public sector wages, capital outlays related to a SADC summit, debt servicing costs on past QFOs by the RBZ taken over by the Treasury, and servicing liabilities related to the acquisition of assets for the Mutapa Investment Fund. The fiscal deficit was financed by T-bills issuance and direct borrowing from the RBZ’s overdraft facility to service debt, contributing to the expansion of domestic liquidity and an overnight drop in the value of the ZiG in September 2024, and a significant buildup of expenditure arrears that continued into 2025.

“Following the overnight drop in the value of the ZiG, inflation spiked in October 2024 then declined significantly as both the willing-buyer willing-seller (WBWS) and parallel market rates have since stabilized, helping to bring month-on-month inflation down to an average of 0.5 percent over the period February to May 2025. At the same time, the gap between the WBWS and parallel market rates has narrowed significantly, but remains at around 20 percent. In this context, the mission welcomed the repeal of Statutory Instrument 81A of 2024—which had mandated the formal sector to use the WBWS rate in the pricing of goods and services, contributing to an increase in dollarization and informality.

“To support the authorities’ stabilization efforts, key Article IV recommendations include: in the near term, fiscal policy actions to center on closing the financing gap without recourse to monetary financing and further domestic arrears buildup, while safeguarding social spending, and delivering a durable fiscal adjustment in the longer term; monetary and FX policy to focus on supporting a transition to stable national currency, with an effective monetary policy framework and market-determined exchange rate policy; and, to boost growth, structural and economic governance reforms. In this context, policy priorities include:

• Fiscal. Closing a substantial fiscal financing gap for 2025 in a way consistent with available sustainable and non-inflationary financing. This would require rationalizing spending and increasing the effectiveness of the authorities’ strategy to run a cash budget through better planning and stronger political commitment to control spending. This would also require strengthening the public spending commitment control system to avoid further arrears accumulation; and a close monitoring of domestic arrears (including through an audit of remaining arrears). The 2026 Budget will be critical to establish a policy track record, and measures will be needed to close the fiscal gap in 2026. Over the medium term, fiscal adjustment should be accompanied by fiscal-structural policies to strengthen public financial management (PFM), expenditure controls, and budget credibility.
• Monetary and FX. The mission recommends improving the functioning of the WBWS market through a more transparent price-setting mechanism and by gradually replacing surrender requirements with a requirement to convert export proceeds directly into the market through Authorized Dealers, while focusing the RBZ’s FX interventions to managing excessive volatility in the exchange rate. Monetary policy can be enhanced by the introduction of an effective deposit facility at the RBZ, followed by fully introducing indirect market instruments and phasing out direct instruments. In the longer-term, a comprehensive package of macroeconomic, financial, and structural policies should be pursued to allow for a gradual relaxation of other Capital Flow Management Measures (CFMs) and elimination of undesirable exchange restrictions noted by the Article VIII mission.
• Mutapa Investment Fund and State-owned enterprises (SOEs). To mitigate fiscal risks, the mission recommends strengthening the governance framework for the Mutapa Investment Fund—including strengthening its reporting, audit, disclosure, and oversight requirements in line with international best practices—and the overall public sector transparency and reporting.

“The authorities have also announced their plan to transition to a mono-currency system by 2030. The mission emphasized the need to continue strengthening the monetary and FX market framework in line with IMF staff recommendations. This should be complemented by measures to enhance the demand for ZiG in the domestic economy—most notably, increasing the share of Treasury’s operations (revenues and expenditures) in ZiG. To reduce any uncertainty weighing on financial intermediation, the authorities should provide more clarity on the operational implications of the transition plan, including clarifying that the use of a mono-currency will be limited to domestic transactions, allowing for bank deposits to remain denominated in both currencies.

“In the context of the requested SMP, IMF staff stands ready to resume discussions in due course once decisive steps have been taken by authorities to address the key policy issues highlighted by the mission.

“International reengagement remains critical for debt resolution and arrears clearance, which would open the door for access to external financing. In this context, the authorities’ reengagement efforts, through the Structured Dialogue Platform, are key for attaining debt sustainability and gaining access to concessional external financing.

“The IMF maintains an active engagement with Zimbabwe and continues to provide policy advice and extensive technical assistance in the areas of revenue mobilization, expenditure control, financial supervision, debt management, economic governance, as well as macroeconomic statistics. However, the IMF is currently precluded from providing financial support to Zimbabwe due to its unsustainable debt situation—based on the IMF’s Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)—and official external arrears. An IMF financial arrangement would require a clear path to comprehensive restructuring of Zimbabwe’s external debt, including the clearance of arrears and a reform plan that is consistent with durably restoring macroeconomic stability; enhancing inclusive growth; lowering poverty; and strengthening economic governance.

“IMF staff held meetings with His Excellency President Emmerson Mnangagwa; Minister of Finance, Economic Development and Investment Promotion Honorable Professor Mthuli Ncube, his Deputy Minister of Finance, Economic Development and Investment Promotion Honorable David Mnangagwa and his Permanent Secretary Mr. George Guvamatanga; Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Governor Dr. John Mushayavanhu; Mr. Willard Manungo, Deputy Chief Secretary to the President and Cabinet; other senior government and RBZ officials; honorable members of Parliament; and representatives of the private sector, civil society, and Zimbabwe’s development partners.

“The IMF staff would like to thank the Zimbabwean authorities and other stakeholders for constructive discussions and support during the 2025 Article IV consultation process.”

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/18/pr-25203-zimbabwe-imf-completes-2025-article-iv-mission

MIL OSI

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 18, 2025

• The IMF Executive Board approved a new 18-month arrangement under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) for The Gambia for an amount equivalent to about US$63.55 million, to help the authorities improve macroeconomic resilience and build policy buffers against climate shocks. The Executive Board also completed the third review under the existing Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement, enabling immediate disbursement of about US$16.95 million.
• Despite substantial downside risks, The Gambia’s economic outlook remains positive, with growth expected to reach 5.7 percent in 2025 and inflation returning to single digits.
• The Gambia has made good progress in implementing their economic reform program despite fiscal policy challenges. Key priorities include increasing domestic revenue and advancing with fiscal consolidation to safeguard debt sustainability while strengthening social and spending.

Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has approved an 18-month arrangement under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) for The Gambia in the amount of SDR 46.65 million (about US$63.55 million), with disbursements to begin when the first review of the arrangement is completed. The RSF arrangement will help the authorities tackle challenges posed by climate change and reinforce the country’s long-term resilience by strengthening the legal framework and institutional environment, green public finance management, climate data and transition taxonomy, adaptation and resilience, and the energy transition.

The Executive Board also completed the third review of The Gambia’s Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement, approved on January 12, 2024, supporting reforms to address long-standing structural impediments to inclusive growth. The completion of the review allows for the immediate disbursement of SDR 12.44 million (about US$16.95 million), bringing total disbursements under this arrangement to SDR 37.31 million (about US$50.82 million).

The Gambia’s economic outlook remains positive, with real GDP estimated to expand by 5.7 percent in 2025, supported by continuous recovery in the tourism sector and good performance in the agricultural and construction sectors. Headline inflation has gradually declined, reaching 8.1 percent by end-April 2025. The outlook is subject to significant downside risks stemming from global uncertainty.

While the authorities remain committed to the objectives set out in the ECF arrangement and revenue collection has been strong, unbudgeted spending pressures including from the National Water and Electricity Corporation (NAWEC) continue to weigh on fiscal balances. Going forward, steadfast implementation of the policy and reform agenda will be essential to safeguard macroeconomic gains and debt sustainability.

The Executive Board approved the authorities’ request for waivers of nonobservance of the performance criterion on the end-June 2024 floor on the domestic primary balance and the end-December 2024 ceiling on net domestic borrowing, based on corrective actions taken.

Following the Executive Board’s discussion, Deputy Managing Director Bo Li issued the following statement:

“The Gambia’s economic momentum remains robust, with resilient growth and gradually declining inflation. Program implementation has been mixed, showing satisfactory adherence to quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets but delays in meeting structural benchmarks. The authorities have reiterated their commitment to their reform agenda despite ongoing global geopolitical uncertainties.

“The authorities plan to offset the carryover of 2024 spending commitments and unbudgeted transfers by restraining non-priority spending in 2025. Adhering to the fiscal consolidation and fiscal targets for 2025 is vital for reducing fiscal risks and ensuring debt sustainability. Enhancing revenue collection to build additional fiscal buffers is also critical. Improving public financial management to prevent domestic arrears and better control multi-year commitments will support fiscal discipline and accountability. Furthermore, it is essential to limit fiscal risks from state-owned enterprises and public-private partnerships.

“The Central Bank of The Gambia’s tight and data-dependent monetary policy is appropriate and should ensure that inflation converges to the medium-term target. The foreign exchange market is functioning smoothly following the new foreign exchange policy implementation, and it is crucial to maintain an exchange rate that reflects market forces. The central bank’s commitment to cease direct financial support to public entities is a welcome measure to protect its balance sheet. Strengthening its regulatory capacity and risk-based supervision is essential to preserve the financial sector’s stability.

“Progress with structural reforms is necessary to enhance governance and improve the business environment, thereby promoting private sector development and job creation. Implementation of recommendations from the recent governance diagnostic and prompt appointment of an anti-corruption commission are essential. 

“Steadfast implementation of the authorities’ climate agenda under the newly approved Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangement will complement the Extended Credit Facility in bolstering economic resilience and reducing balance of payment risks. The RSF is expected to foster tighter coordination among domestic stakeholders and development partners. It will be important to carefully sequence reforms under both arrangements, supported by targeted capacity development.”

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/18/pr-25202-gambia-imf-apprv-resil-sustain-facil-arrange-completes-the-3rd-rev-under-ecf-arrange

MIL OSI