Финансовые новости: Решение Совета директоров Банка России о внесении изменений в режим лицевого счета типа «С» номинального держателя

Source: Центральный банк России – Central Bank of Russia (2) –

Совет директоров Банка России 6 июня 2025 года принял решение:

1. Внести в решение Совета директоров Банка России от 3 октября 2024 года «Об установлении режима лицевого счета типа „С“ номинального держателя» следующие изменения:

1.1. Подпункт 1.1 пункта 1 дополнить подпунктами 1.1.10 и 1.1.11 следующего содержания:

«1.1.10. списанные с эмиссионного счета эмитента;

1.1.11. списанные с казначейского лицевого счета, открытого акционерному обществу, являющемуся экономически значимой организацией, в связи с вступлением в прямое владение акциями экономически значимой организации лицами, указанными в части 1 статьи 7 Федерального закона от 4 августа 2023 года № 470-ФЗ „Об особенностях регулирования корпоративных отношений в хозяйственных обществах, являющихся экономически значимыми организациями“ (далее — Федеральный закон № 470-ФЗ).».

1.2. В подпункте 1.2 пункта 1:

подпункт 1.2.2 после слов «для их зачисления» дополнить словами «на лицевой счет номинального держателя (лицевой счет номинального держателя центрального депозитария),»;

в подпункте 1.2.10 слова «указанный депонентом такого депозитария» исключить;

дополнить подпунктами 1.2.12 — 1.2.15 следующего содержания:

«1.2.12. в связи с осуществлением автоматической конвертации ценных бумаг иностранных эмитентов, удостоверяющих права в отношении акций российских акционерных обществ, в том числе акционерных обществ со статусом международной компании, права на которые учитываются в российских депозитариях, в акции таких акционерных обществ в соответствии с частями 13 — 19 статьи 6 Федерального закона от 16 апреля 2022 года № 114-ФЗ «О внесении изменений в Федеральный закон „Об акционерных обществах“ и отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации» или частями 15 — 19 статьи 5 Федерального закона от 4 августа 2023 года
№ 452-ФЗ «О внесении изменений в отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации» (далее — Федеральный закон № 452-ФЗ);

1.2.13. в связи с осуществлением принудительной конвертации ценных бумаг иностранных эмитентов, удостоверяющих права в отношении акций российских акционерных обществ со статусом международной компании, в акции таких акционерных обществ в соответствии с частями 20 — 26 статьи 5 Федерального закона № 452-ФЗ;

1.2.14. для их зачисления на казначейский лицевой счет, открытый акционерному обществу, являющемуся экономически значимой организацией, в связи с переходом к такому акционерному обществу акций, принадлежащих иностранной холдинговой компании, в соответствии со статьей 6 Федерального закона № 470-ФЗ;

1.2.15. для их зачисления на лицевой счет номинального держателя (лицевой счет номинального держателя центрального депозитария), на другой лицевой счет типа «С» номинального держателя в связи с прекращением обращения акций российских акционерных обществ, в том числе акционерных обществ со статусом международной компании, за пределами Российской Федерации, организованного посредством размещения в соответствии с иностранным правом ценных бумаг иностранных эмитентов, удостоверяющих права в отношении акций таких акционерных обществ, в случае если сделки (операции) с такими ценными бумагами иностранных эмитентов были совершены в соответствии с разрешениями, выданными на основании указов Президента Российской Федерации, при предоставлении депозитарием, с лицевого счета типа «С» номинального держателя которого списываются ценные бумаги, подтверждения (заверения) о наличии такого разрешения и совершении сделки (операции) в соответствии с ним.».

2. Применять настоящее решение со дня его опубликования на официальном сайте Банка России в информационно-телекоммуникационной сети «Интернет».

Обратите внимание; Эта информация является необработанным контентом непосредственно из источника информации. Это точно соответствует тому, что утверждает источник, и не отражает позицию MIL-OSI или ее клиентов.

Финансовые новости: Банк России разработал новое регулирование кредитования проектов государственно-частного партнерства

Source: Центральный банк России – Central Bank of Russia –

Обновленные подходы позволят банкам снизить нагрузку на капитал при кредитовании проектов государственно-частного партнерства (ГЧП). Банки смогут учитывать возможность государства отвечать по кредиту, если это предусмотрено прямым соглашением между участниками проекта ГЧП.

Регулирование коснется только проектов, где в качестве публичной стороны выступает Российская Федерация, а также ее субъекты или муниципалитеты с национальным кредитным рейтингом не ниже «А». Учитывать кредитные требования по проектам ГЧП по новым правилам планируется с октября 2026 года.

Более подробно читайте в докладе Банка России. Ответы на вопросы, представленные в материале, а также замечания и предложения просим направлять до 16 июля 2025 года включительно.

Фото на превью: Михаил Метцель / ТАСС

Обратите внимание; Эта информация является необработанным контентом непосредственно из источника информации. Это точно соответствует тому, что утверждает источник, и не отражает позицию MIL-OSI или ее клиентов.

Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

https://www.cbr.ru/press/event/?id=24691

Финансовые новости: В прошлом году ломбарды выдали гражданам займы на 302 млрд рублей

Source: Центральный банк России – Central Bank of Russia –

Это на четверть больше, чем годом ранее. Основная причина такого роста — устойчивое повышение цен на золото. Именно под залог золотых изделий выдается 94% займов. В то же время количество заключенных договоров осталось на прежнем уровне — 16,6 млн за год.

За счет роста цен на золото увеличилась и средняя сумма займа — с 16 до 21 тыс. рублей. Полная стоимость займов (ПСК) ломбардов не превышала 120% годовых. Ставки существенно различаются в зависимости от вида залога — например, по займам под залог автомобиля они традиционно ниже. Для отдельных групп граждан — пенсионеров, людей с ограниченными возможностями, многодетных — ломбарды предлагают льготные условия займов.

Крупные сетевые ломбарды активно развивают цифровые каналы взаимодействия с клиентом: более половины выдают безналичные займы и принимают платежи онлайн.

Большинство заемщиков стремится погасить заем самостоятельно, чтобы вернуть себе предмет залога. Таким образом погашается 84% займов. У небольших ломбардов, ориентированных на сохранение своей клиентской базы, эта доля еще больше. Остальная часть займов погашается за счет реализации заложенной вещи. Если цена продажи превысила обязательства заемщика, у клиента в течение трех лет сохраняется право обратиться в ломбард, чтобы вернуть себе разницу.

Подробнее читайте в публикации «Тенденции развития рынка ломбардов в 2024 году».

Фото на превью: Vasanty / Shutterstock / Fotodom

Обратите внимание; Эта информация является необработанным контентом непосредственно из источника информации. Это точно соответствует тому, что утверждает источник, и не отражает позицию MIL-OSI или ее клиентов.

Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

https://www.cbr.ru/press/event/?id=24692

Финансовые новости: Банк России предупреждает о рисках реализации застройщиками жилья в рассрочку

Source: Центральный банк России – Central Bank of Russia –

Банк России рекомендует банкам при кредитовании застройщиков комплексно оценивать все риски по проекту строительства, в котором существенная доля жилья реализуется по договорам, условиями которых предусмотрена оплата в рассрочку от застройщика (далее — рассрочка).

В I квартале 2025 года, по опросу крупнейших застройщиков, рассрочка была одним из основных способов оплаты. Ее доля в сделках купли-продажи жилья на первичном рынке составляла порядка 40%, тогда как в предыдущие годы не превышала 10–20%. Объем накопленной задолженности по рассрочке достиг 1 трлн рублей. Поскольку застройщики, как правило, не оценивают уровень платежеспособности покупателя при предоставлении ему рассрочки, распространение такой практики увеличивает риски закредитованности граждан. Люди могут столкнуться с отказом банка в предоставлении ипотеки или сложностями в обслуживании кредита. Продажи в рассрочку зачастую предполагают завышение стоимости жилья. Это может привести к финансовым потерям граждан, если понадобится продать жилье на вторичном рынке.

При покупке жилья в рассрочку граждане находятся в более уязвимом положении, чем заемщики по ипотечным кредитам. Например, не могут воспользоваться механизмом кредитных каникул, а также мерами господдержки для погашения части задолженности по рассрочке. Помимо рисков для потребителя, есть риски как для самих застройщиков, так и для банковской системы. Они связаны с тем, что покупатель может отказаться от договора по предоставлению рассрочки или будет неспособен ее погашать. Документ Банка России призван ограничить риски, связанные с этой практикой.

Фото на превью: Валерий Шарифулин / ТАСС

Обратите внимание; Эта информация является необработанным контентом непосредственно из источника информации. Это точно соответствует тому, что утверждает источник, и не отражает позицию MIL-OSI или ее клиентов.

Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

https://www.cbr.ru/press/event/?id=24688

IMF Staff Conducts 2025 Article IV Consultation and Reaches Staff-Level Agreement on the Fifth Review of the Extended Credit Facility with Zambia

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 9, 2025

End-of-Mission press releases include statements of IMF staff teams that convey preliminary findings after a visit to a country. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF’s Executive Board for discussion and decision.

  • The Zambian authorities and the IMF team have reached a staff-level agreement on the economic policies and reforms needed to conclude the Fifth Review under the 38-month Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement.
  • Zambia’s economy proved resilient to the drought, and growth is projected at 5.8 percent in 2025. Rising fiscal pressures and external headwinds call for decisive domestic revenue mobilization and steadfast fiscal discipline to preserve fiscal and debt sustainability.
  • Sustaining reform momentum will consolidate gains of Zambia’s homegrown reform agenda to achieving higher and more inclusive growth, promoting job creation and building resilience amid a challenging external environment and declining official support.

Washington, DC: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) team led by Ms. Mercedes Vera Martin, IMF Mission Chief for Zambia, visited Lusaka from April 29 to May 13, 2025, to conduct discussions for the 2025 Article IV Consultation and the Fifth Review under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF). Discussions continued virtually subsequently.

At the end of the discussions, Ms. Vera Martin issued the following statement:

“The Zambian authorities and the IMF team reached a staff-level agreement on economic policies and reforms for the Fifth Review under the ECF arrangement. The agreement is subject to approval by IMF management and the Executive Board in the coming weeks. Once approved by the Executive Board, Zambia will gain access to SDR 139.9 million (about US$194 million) in financing.

“The Zambian economy demonstrated resilience in 2024, despite a severe drought and global headwinds. Real GDP growth is estimated at 4 percent in 2024—up from 1.2 percent projected at the time of the Fourth Review—driven by stronger-than-projected mining and non-mining activity, especially in ICT, financial services and construction, as well as a less severe contraction in agriculture than initially envisaged. Fiscal performance in 2024 was tighter than initially planned, with a primary surplus of 2.9 percent of GDP, driven primarily by spending compression amid tight financing conditions. Social protection spending helped cushion the impact of the drought and rising prices on vulnerable households.

“Growth momentum is expected to continue in 2025, with real GDP growth projected at 5.8 percent. Economic activity would be supported by a rebound in agricultural output, increased copper production, and a gradual recovery in electricity generation, although electricity shortages and reliance on energy imports are expected to persist. Driven by higher food prices and kwacha depreciation, inflation averaged 15 percent y/y in 2024 and peaked at 16.8 percent y/y in February. Inflationary pressures have started to show signs of easing since then, partly reflecting hikes in the policy rate, at 14.5 percent since February 2025. The current account deficit narrowed in 2024, while gross international reserves have continued to increase, to $4.7 billion by mid-May 2025 (4.1 months of prospective imports). The medium-term outlook remains favorable, but downside risks to the outlook dominate given increasing global uncertainty. Advancing the external debt restructuring would help lower risk premia and catalyze investment.

“The overall fiscal balance is expected to widen to 5.3 percent of GDP, with the primary balance (cash basis, program target) projected at 1.1 percent in 2025. Higher-than-initially projected debt service and new social spending needs are adding fiscal pressures. To this end, the authorities have committed to revising the 2025 Budget, to include additional revenue measures and reprioritize expenditures to partly accommodate additional spending needs. Going forward, sustained revenue mobilization and stronger expenditure controls will be critical to safeguarding priority spending and supporting fiscal and debt sustainability. Continued efforts to strengthen tax administration and expenditure efficiency, broaden the tax base, and monitoring fiscal risks will help improve fiscal policy implementation.  

“While inflation is projected to gradually decline in 2025 as food and fuel prices ease, continued vigilance is needed given elevated uncertainty and persistent inflationary pressures. Preserving a data-driven and forward-looking monetary policy stance will be essential to steer inflation toward the target band and support macroeconomic stability. Enhancing the monetary transmission will help develop interbank money markets. Strengthening the financial legal and regulatory framework in line with international best practices, including for bank resolution, and developing an effective deposit protection scheme, will support financial stability.  

“Accelerating reform implementation is needed to lay the foundations for higher and more inclusive growth. Continued efforts to improve the business environment and strengthen governance are critical to boosting investor confidence, reducing the state footprint, particularly in agriculture, and fostering a level-playing field for private sector-led growth. These reforms are key to unlocking investment and creating job opportunities needed for Zambia’s rapidly growing youth population. While the open access regime in the fuel sector is being somewhat implemented, renewed efforts to enhance enforcement and transparency in fuel supply will further promote fair competition.

“The IMF team met with His Excellency President Hakainde Hichilema; Minister of Finance and National Planning, Dr. Situmbeko Musokotwane; Governor of the Bank of Zambia, Dr. Denny Kalyalya; Secretary to the Treasury, Mr. Felix Nkulukusa; Deputy Governor, Dr. Francis Chipimo; senior government officials; and representatives from the private sector, civil society, and development partners. The IMF team extends its sincere gratitude to the Zambian authorities and stakeholders for their warm hospitality and constructive engagement throughout the mission.”

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Wafa Amr

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/09/pr-25187-zambia-imf-conducts-2025-art-iv-consult-reaches-agreement-on-5th-rev-of-ecf

MIL OSI

Republic of Latvia: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 8, 2025

A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

Washington, DC – June 9, 2025

Latvia’s economy is navigating a complex global environment while addressing structural challenges at home. Geoeconomic fragmentation, geopolitical tensions, higher trade barriers and trade policy uncertainty, and labor and skills shortages are adding to challenges to productivity growth. Meanwhile, Latvia faces significant medium- and long-term spending pressures driven by population aging, defense needs, and investments for energy security. To address these spending needs, staff recommends the mobilization of additional revenue and the acceleration of structural fiscal reforms. Improving pension adequacy requires strengthening the second and third pillars of the pension system. The authorities should continue to monitor risks in the financial sector, including banks’ exposure to the commercial real estate sector, and reassess the solidarity contribution on banks. To strengthen resilience and growth—which will also support public finances—the authorities should consider measures to boost productivity. These include increasing the quantity and quality of corporate investment (e.g., by improving firms’ access to finance), supporting the reallocation of labor and capital toward higher value-added products and services, and enhancing digital technology adoption in traditional sectors.

Outlook and Risks

Growth is projected to rebound in 2025. Real GDP growth is projected to recover to about 1 percent in 2025, underpinned mainly by higher public investment, but also a recovery in private consumption and a gradual recovery of external demand. Headline inflation is projected to increase to about 3 percent in 2025, reflecting higher energy prices in the early months of 2025 and higher food prices, and core inflation is expected to moderate but remain above headline reflecting persistent services inflation.

Risks to the outlook are tilted to the downside. Rising geopolitical tensions, and higher tariffs and trade policy uncertainty may dampen the recovery. Although direct trade and financial exposures to the United States are small, weaker demand in key European trading partners and lower consumer and business confidence could affect economic and financial stability through financial contagion. Other downside risks to growth include a further slowdown of growth in Latvia’s trading partners, delays in the absorption of EU funds, new increases in global energy and food prices, and an increase in electricity prices. At the same time, a strong economic recovery in Latvia’s main trading partners, a boost in confidence from improved security, a faster-than-expected disbursement of EU funds, and a swift implementation of structural reforms may contribute to higher-than-expected economic growth. Latvia has a strong track record, solid commitment to fiscal discipline, and strong fiscal institutions. Despite that, the fiscal balance is subject to downside risks from higher spending in defense, contingent liabilities with state-owned enterprisesthat could be in excess of the Fiscal Safety Reserve, and higher capital expenditure with large infrastructure projects.

Fiscal Policy: Addressing Public Spending Pressures

The moderately expansionary budget in 2025 is appropriate, given the currently negative output gap. The headline fiscal deficit is projected to increase to about 3 percent of GDP in 2025, because of higher defense and investment spending needs. At the same time, the 2025 budget includes tax reforms to simplify the personal income tax that will generate minimal revenue gains.

Latvia’s government faces significant medium- and long-term spending pressures.These include rising costs for pensions and health care, increased defense spending, and investments for energy security. The government has recently committed to increasing defense spending to 5 percent of GDP from 2026 onwards. In the absence of measures to raise fiscal revenues and reprioritize government spending, Latvia’s structural fiscal deficit (including one-off expenses) is projected to average about 3 percent of GDP in the medium-term. This would raise public debt close to 50 percent of GDP in 2030, eroding fiscal space and limiting the authorities’ ability to address large adverse shocks in the future.

Going forward, the authorities should proactively preserve fiscal buffers. Staff estimates that bringing public debt to its pre-Covid level of 40 percent of GDP in 2030 requires a fiscal consolidation of about ½ percent of GDP per year between 2026 and 2030.

The government should therefore mobilize additional revenue. Revenue measures could include (i) strengthening tax compliance; (ii) broadening the bases of corporate and personal income taxes (e.g., by reducing the shadow economy); (iii) continuing to improve VAT collection efficiency through further narrowing the compliance gap; (iv) reducing tax exemptions and fossil fuel subsidies; and (v) raising property tax revenue. The government should also consider improving the efficiency of public spending by further improving procurement, eradicating rent-seeking activities, simplifying regulation, reducing bureaucracy, and increasing the efficiency of public administration and public investment management.

The government should adopt measures to support medium- and long-term pressures arising from higher spending with pensions. The government needs a comprehensive approach to improve pension adequacy while ensuring the financial balance of the pension system. This may include pursuing active labor market policies to increase labor force participation, incentivizing pensioners to work, and linking the retirement ages to future life expectancy gains. The authorities should also strengthen pension adequacy by increasing the contribution rates and the returns to the mandatory defined contribution pension pillar and strengthening incentives for higher voluntary savings for retirement through a more flexible and accessible system design.

Financial Policies: Countering Risks and Building Resilience in the Financial Sector

The authorities should monitor loan exposure to commercial real estate (CRE) and reassess the solidarity contribution on banks. If remaining in place for long, the solidarity contribution could distort bank lending toward less productive uses such as real estate and reduce lending to corporates. This is because banks can spread the increased tax costs over the full term of a mortgage, unlike for corporate loans which have shorter maturities. Considering structural changes in the office CRE segment globally, and given that loans to the CRE sector are around 31 percent of banks’ total corporate loan portfolio, CRE developments should be closely monitored.

The macroprudential policy stance remains broadly appropriate. The implementation of a positive neutral countercyclical capital buffer requirement, which will be raised to 1 percent in June 2025, helps build up releasable macroprudential buffers. However, the looser debt-to-income and debt service-to-income limits implemented in 2024 to promote loans for the purchase of energy-efficient housing should be reconsidered. Latvia has made further progress in strengthening its AML/CFT framework.

Structural Reforms: Policies to Boost Investment and Productivity

Latvia’s low productivity growth is driven by sluggish capital accumulation and an inefficient allocation of productive resources. The low capital stock results from inadequate investment in part driven by financial constraints and low risk-adjusted expected returns. Structural bottlenecks like costly and lengthy insolvency processes (despite improvements) or limited occupational and regional mobility of the labor force have hindered the flow of resources from low- to high-productivity firms. Boosting productivity would help to increase the tax base and sustainably lift incomes, while preserving Latvia’s external competitiveness.

Corporate reforms can improve capital allocation and enhance access to finance. Insolvency reforms with a focus on micro companies and timely initiation of insolvency cases that facilitate the exit of firms that are not economically viable could help to reallocate resources to more viable businesses. Initiatives to develop the capital market could help improve the access to finance by smaller firms. Expanding venture capital and equity financing would improve access to finance, therefore boosting opportunities for startups and allowing young firms to scale up. All these reforms will be more successful if combined with deepening the EU’s single market, which will allow Latvia’s firms to leverage economies of scale and greatly improve access to capital markets.

Addressing labor and skills shortages would sustain investment and productivity growth in Latvia. High-quality education and training systems, and targeted upskilling and reskilling measures are key to reducing the labor and skills shortages, improving competitiveness, and boosting productivity. The facilitation of skilled migration and the use of targeted active labor market policies will also help to enhance participation in the labor market.

Product and service market reforms can enhance competition and productivity. The regulatory framework could be improved by reducing the use of retail price regulation, streamlining spatial planning and construction regulations, and further simplifying administrative procedures and digitalization efforts in the construction sector.

The authorities should enhance support for innovation, technology adoption, and digital transformation, as well as strengthen energy security. Despite a modest rise in the past decade, Latvia’s R&D spending as a share of GDP remains among the lowest in Europe, hampering innovation and productivity growth. The authorities should accelerate the digital transformation by centralizing the governance of digital platforms and systems in the public sector, expanding digital training to public employees, promoting digitalization in businesses and in the education sector, and enhancing the broadband infrastructure. Finally, Latvia should continue to enhance its energy security by increasing the share of renewable energy, including biomass, and improving interconnections to other European power grids.

An IMF team conducted meetings in Riga during May 26–June 6, 2025. The mission was led by Mr. Luis Brandao-Marques and includes Gianluigi Ferrucci, Bingjie Hu, and Keyra Primus (all EUR). Carlos Acosta and Anjum Rosha (all LEG) participated virtually in meetings. Gundars Davidsons (OED) participated in the meetings. The mission would like to thank the authorities for their open collaboration, generous availability, and the candid and constructive discussions.

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Boris Balabanov

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/06/mcs060925-Latvia-Staff-Concluding-Statement-2025-Article-IV-Mission

MIL OSI

Democratic Republic of Congo Implements the Enhanced General Data Dissemination System (e-GDDS)

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 6, 2025

With the successful launch of the new data portal—the National Summary Data Page (NSDP) — the Democratic Republic of Congo has implemented a key recommendation of the IMF’s Enhanced General Data Dissemination System (e-GDDS) to publish essential macroeconomic and financial data. The e-GDDS is the first tier of the IMF Data Standards Initiative that promotes transparency as a global public good and encourages countries to voluntarily publish timely data that is essential for monitoring and analyzing economic performance.

The launch of the NSDP is a testament to the Democratic Republic of Congo’s commitment to data transparency. It serves as a one-stop portal for disseminating various macroeconomic data compiled by multiple statistical agencies. The published data includes statistics on national accounts, prices, government operations, debt, the monetary and financial sector, and the external sector.

The launch of the NSDP was supported by an IMF technical assistance mission, financed by the Government of Japan through the Japan Administered Account for Selected Fund Activities, and conducted in collaboration with the African Development Bank from June 2 to 6, 2025. The mission was hosted by the Ministry of Finance – Comité de Pilotage et d’Orientation de la Réforme de Finances,” in close collaboration with the Banque Centrale du Congo and the Institut National de la Statistique.

With this reform, the Democratic Republic of Congo will join 76 countries worldwide and 34 countries in Africa that are using the e-GDDS to disseminate standardized data.  

Mr. Bert Kroese, Chief Statistician and Data Officer, and Director of the IMF’s Statistics Department, welcomed this as a major milestone in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s statistical development. “I am positive that the Democratic Republic of Congo will gain substantial advantages from deploying the e-GDDS as a framework to enhance its statistical system.” Mr. Kroese stated.

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Boris Balabanov

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/06/pr-25185-democratic-republic-of-congo-dem-repub-of-congo-implements-the-e-gdds

MIL OSI

Финансовые новости: Автоматическая конвертация депозитарных расписок: второй раунд

Source: Центральный банк России – Central Bank of Russia –

С 9 июня 2025 года возобновляется автоматическая конвертация депозитарных расписок на акции российских эмитентов, программы которых были прекращены в соответствии с законом. Банк России определил порядок ее проведения.

Конвертация затронет только тех инвесторов, чьи бумаги на момент ее проведения учитываются российскими депозитариями. Не позднее 17 июня 2025 года эмитенты обязаны направить уведомление о запуске процедуры депозитарию, где хранятся акции, на которые выпущены депозитарные расписки. Все операции с депозитарными расписками до завершения расконвертации приостанавливаются.

Депозитарии спишут со счетов депо расписки и зачислят вместо них акции российских эмитентов. Инвесторам, вне зависимости от того, являются они резидентами или нерезидентами, не нужно предпринимать никаких действий. Весь процесс займет не более одного месяца.

Автоматическая конвертация коснется и тех депозитарных расписок, программы которых были продлены в установленном Правительством порядке. Она будет проведена после того, как программа прекратит свое действие.

Фото на превью: Muanpare Wanpen / Shutterstock / Fotodom

Обратите внимание; Эта информация является необработанным контентом непосредственно из источника информации. Это точно соответствует тому, что утверждает источник, и не отражает позицию MIL-OSI или ее клиентов.

Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

https://www.cbr.ru/press/event/?id=24684

IMF Executive Board Concludes 2025 Article IV Consultation with Spain

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 6, 2025

  • The Spanish economy has been performing strongly, supported by services exports and labor force growth. Growth is expected to remain significantly above the euro area average in the near term, before slowing gradually as its recent drivers normalize and demographic aging intensifies. Most risks are to the downside, including from a further escalation of trade measures and domestic political fragmentation.
  • The authorities should seize the growth momentum to more swiftly rebuild fiscal space and reduce sovereign debt risks through a clearer consolidation strategy grounded in well-identified tax increase and spending reduction priorities. Additional measures should also be taken to address fiscal pressures from rising future pension expenditures, and to improve the pension system’s safeguard clause.
  • Raising productivity is key to boosting income per capita gains, which have been modest since the pandemic. This should be achieved through a new wave of reforms to facilitate firms’ scaling-up and strengthen innovation.

Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the Article IV Consultation for Spain.[1] The authorities have consented to the publication of the Staff Report prepared for this consultation.[2]

With a growth rate of 3.2 percent in 2024, Spain has been one of the fastest-growing economies in the euro area. Growth has been fueled by robust services exports and labor force growth, including due to immigration. Because high GDP growth has been accompanied by high employment growth, GDP per capita gains have been more modest. Despite recent progress, Spain still has one of the lowest employment rates in Europe, and a persistent gap in (hourly labor) productivity vis-à-vis the euro area and—even more so—the US.

Growth is projected to reach 2.5 percent in 2025 before slowing to 1.8 percent in 2026 as export and working-age population gains normalize. Growth will be primarily supported by private domestic demand, including due to a decline in the household saving rate and a pickup in investment. Inflation is projected to decline further and return close to the ECB’s target by end-2025.

Executive Board Assessment[3]

The Spanish economy has continued to outperform the euro area but per-capita income gains have been more modest. Two major drivers of Spain’s strong growth have been, on the supply side, labor force growth, and on the demand side, services exports. Labor force growth has particularly benefitted from recent migration inflows, which have risen sharply above pre-pandemic levels. Services exports have been fueled by the strong post-COVID recovery in tourism, but also by improvements in the performance of Spanish exporters in non-tourism services. Amid strong exports and still subdued imports, the external position in 2024 is preliminarily assessed to be stronger than implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies. Because high GDP growth has been accompanied by high employment growth, GDP per capita gains have been more modest. Still, Spain reduced its per-capita income gap vis-à-vis the highest-income euro area economies by over 3 percentage points during 2022-24, helped by an acceleration in productivity growth. Despite recent progress in reducing the unemployment rate, it remains the highest in the euro area at about 11 percent. Looking through recent volatility, disinflation has continued to proceed steadily.

Growth is projected to remain robust in the near term and to slow gradually thereafter as its recent drivers normalize, with risks predominantly to the downside. Growth should remain strong at 2.5 percent in 2025 before declining to about 1.8 percent next year, close to its medium-term potential. On the demand side, tourism is expected to expand at a slower rate, while a weaker global environment—including elevated trade policy uncertainty and US tariffs—will also weigh on external demand. This drag is expected to be partly offset by robust domestic demand, including a pick-up in investment. On the supply side, a gradual slowdown in net migration and demographic aging will slowly weigh on labor force gains. Key downside risks include an escalation of trade measures, particularly those involving the EU, and domestic political fragmentation, which could hamper the response of fiscal policy in the event Spain’s deficit reduction fell short of its commitments or market concerns about sovereign risks were to emerge.

The authorities should seize upon the strong growth momentum to more swiftly rebuild fiscal space and reduce sovereign debt risks, in the context of an enhanced medium-term fiscal plan. Staff projects that, in the absence of further consolidation measures besides social security contribution increases from the 2021-2023 pension reforms and the non-indexation of PIT brackets (about 1 percent of GDP overall over 2025-29), the deficit would stabilize above 2 percent of GDP by 2030, while the debt-to-GDP ratio would remain above 90 percent before rising again in the longer term as fiscal pressures from aging intensify. Weighing fiscal risks on the one hand, and the economy’s strong cyclical position on the other, staff recommends frontloading the authorities’ planned 3 percent of GDP adjustment over 2025-2029 rather than 2025-2031. This effort, which would require about 2 percentage points of GDP in new measures, should be underpinned by an enhanced medium-term fiscal plan that lays out well-identified tax increase and spending reduction priorities. Harmonizing VAT and enhancing environmental taxation would deliver the recommended effort while reducing economic distortions. Given the widening projected gap between pension expenditures and social security contributions over the coming decades, pension reforms should also be undertaken, prioritizing employment-friendly options. Should downside risks materialize, fiscal policy should remain flexible, letting automatic stabilizers play out. Temporary discretionary support should be considered only in the event of a severe shock and provided sovereign funding costs remain low.

Systemic risks in the financial system remain low but ongoing efforts to further bolster its resilience should be maintained. Banks are well-capitalized, liquid, and profitable, though capital ratios are still somewhat below euro area peers. Household and corporate balance sheets are sound, supported by low debt and rising incomes. The rapid growth in house prices has eroded affordability and should be primarily addressed through measures that stimulate housing supply. While it does currently not raise financial stability risks, pre-emptive borrower-based measures should be considered if there were early signs of an easing in lending standards. Staff supports the ongoing phasing-in of the one-percent positive neutral CCyB and encourages continued implementation of other 2024 FSAP recommendations to further enhance resilience.

Fostering income-per-capita convergence toward higher-income advanced economies requires further raising the employment rate and boosting productivity. Despite recent progress, Spain still has one of the lowest employment rates in Europe, and its (hourly labor) productivity gap vis-à-vis the euro area—which has itself been falling behind the US—remains about as wide as it was 25 years ago. Enhancing activation policies and financial incentives for jobseekers is key to durably reducing unemployment to single digits. The planned reduction of the working week in the private sector should be carefully designed to mitigate adverse effects on output and workers’ incomes, with a major role for collective bargaining including in setting the level and remuneration of overtime. Closing the productivity gap will require reforms that facilitate firms’ scaling-up and innovation. These include completing both the Spanish and EU single markets for goods and services, streamlining firm size-related tax and regulatory thresholds, boosting venture capital through progress toward the CMU complemented by domestic incentives, and promoting excellence in higher education—including through greater autonomy and performance-based funding of universities.

Spain: Selected Economic Indicators

(Annual percentage change, unless noted otherwise)

Projections 1/

2022

2023

2024

2025

2026

2027

Demand and supply in constant prices

Gross domestic product

6.2

2.7

3.2

2.5

1.8

1.7

Private consumption

4.8

1.8

2.9

2.1

2.0

1.9

Public consumption

0.6

5.2

4.1

3.5

1.7

1.9

Gross fixed investment

3.3

2.1

3.0

5.0

2.1

1.2

Total domestic demand

3.9

1.7

2.9

2.9

2.0

1.8

Net exports (contribution to growth)

2.5

1.2

0.4

-0.2

-0.1

0.0

Exports of goods and services

15.0

3.3

3.4

2.2

2.5

3.1

Imports of goods and services

7.8

0.4

2.6

3.0

3.2

3.4

Potential output 

2.1

2.7

2.6

2.6

2.3

2.1

Output gap (percent of potential)

1.1

1.1

1.6

1.6

1.1

0.7

Prices

GDP deflator

4.7

6.2

3.0

2.4

2.4

2.4

Headline Inflation (average)

8.3

3.4

2.9

2.2

2.0

2.1

Headline Inflation (end of period)

5.5

3.3

2.8

1.9

1.9

2.1

Core inflation (average)

5.2

5.8

3.0

1.9

2.0

2.0

Core inflation (end of period)

6.7

4.0

2.6

1.8

2.0

2.0

Employment and wages

Unemployment rate (percent of total labor force)

13.0

12.2

11.3

11.1

11.0

11.0

Labor costs, private sector

2.6

5.6

4.7

3.5

3.4

3.4

Employment

3.6

3.1

2.2

1.3

0.9

0.7

Balance of payments (percent of GDP)

Current account balance

0.4

2.7

3.0

2.5

2.4

2.2

Net international investment position

-57.7

-51.3

-44.0

-38.5

-33.5

-29.7

Public finance (percent of GDP)

General government balance

-4.6

-3.5

-3.2

-2.8

-2.4

-2.3

Primary balance

-2.5

-1.7

-1.3

-0.6

0.1

0.1

Structural balance

-5.3

-4.1

-3.1

-3.2

-2.8

-2.7

General government debt

109.4

105.0

101.8

100.7

99.1

97.7

       

Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook; data provided by the authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

1/ The projections incorporate spending financed by the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility (including the grant and the loan component) amounting to about 0.7, 1.7, 1.3 and 0.3 percent of GDP from 2024 to 2027.

                       

[1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

[2] Under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, publication of documents that pertain to member countries is voluntary and requires the member consent. The staff report will be shortly published on the www.imf.org/en/Countries/ESP page.

[3] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Camila Perez

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/05/pr25183-spain-imf-executive-board-concludes-2025-article-iv-consultation-with-spain

MIL OSI

Финансовые новости: Банк России принял решение снизить ключевую ставку на 100 б.п., до 20,00% годовых (06.06.2025)

Source: Центральный банк России – Central Bank of Russia –

 

Совет директоров Банка России 6 июня 2025 года принял решение снизить ключевую ставку на 100 б.п., до 20,00% годовых. Текущее инфляционное давление, в том числе устойчивое, продолжает снижаться. Притом что внутренний спрос по-прежнему опережает возможности расширения предложения товаров и услуг, российская экономика постепенно возвращается к траектории сбалансированного роста.

Банк России будет поддерживать такую жесткость денежно-кредитных условий, которая необходима для возвращения инфляции к цели в 2026 году. Это означает продолжительный период проведения жесткой денежно-кредитной политики. Дальнейшие решения по ключевой ставке будут приниматься в зависимости от скорости и устойчивости снижения инфляции и инфляционных ожиданий. По прогнозу Банка России, с учетом проводимой денежно-кредитной политики годовая инфляция вернется к 4,0% в 2026 году и будет находиться на цели в дальнейшем.

В апреле 2025 года текущий рост цен с поправкой на сезонность снизился до 6,2% в пересчете на год после в среднем 8,2% в 1к25. Аналогичный показатель базовой инфляции составил 4,4% после в среднем 8,9% в предыдущем квартале. При этом большинство индикаторов устойчивой инфляции находятся в диапазоне 5,5–7,5% в пересчете на год. Оперативные данные в мае указывают на дальнейшее снижение текущего роста цен, но со значимым вкладом со стороны волатильных позиций. Годовая инфляция, по оценке на 2 июня, замедлилась до 9,8%.

В снижении инфляционного давления все больше проявляется влияние жестких денежно-кредитных условий на спрос. В то же время ценовая динамика неоднородна по компонентам. Эффекты жесткой денежно-кредитной политики, в том числе через укрепление рубля, особенно сильно отражаются в снижении роста цен на непродовольственные товары. В продовольственных товарах и услугах инфляционное давление пока остается высоким.

Инфляционные ожидания с апреля менялись разнонаправленно. Ценовые ожидания бизнеса продолжили снижаться. Ожидания участников финансового рынка существенно не изменились. Инфляционные ожидания населения несколько выросли. В целом инфляционные ожидания сохраняются на повышенном уровне. Это может препятствовать более устойчивому замедлению инфляции.

Отклонение российской экономики вверх от траектории сбалансированного роста уменьшается. Оперативные данные, в том числе в 2к25, свидетельствуют о постепенном замедлении роста внутреннего спроса.

Ситуация на рынке труда с апрельского заседания существенно не изменилась. Безработица находится на исторических минимумах. Однако, по данным опросов, доля предприятий, испытывающих дефицит кадров, продолжает снижаться. Кроме того, по-прежнему наблюдаются уменьшение спроса на рабочую силу в отдельных отраслях и ее переток в другие секторы. Рост зарплат остается высоким и продолжает опережать рост производительности труда. В то же время компании, по данным опросов, сохраняют планы по более умеренной индексации зарплат в 2025 году по сравнению с 2023–2024 годами.

Денежно-кредитные условия остаются жесткими под влиянием проводимой денежно-кредитной политики и автономных факторов. С апреля номинальные процентные ставки несколько снизились в большинстве сегментов финансового рынка, но они по-прежнему высокие в реальном выражении. Несмотря на некоторое уменьшение депозитных ставок, сохраняется высокая склонность домашних хозяйств к сбережению. Кредитная активность в целом остается сдержанной. Неценовые условия банковского кредитования жесткие.

Проинфляционные риски немного уменьшились, но все еще преобладают над дезинфляционными на среднесрочном горизонте. Основные проинфляционные риски связаны с более длительным сохранением отклонения российской экономики вверх от траектории сбалансированного роста и высоких инфляционных ожиданий, а также с ухудшением условий внешней торговли. Дальнейшее снижение темпов роста мировой экономики и цен на нефть в случае усиления торговых противоречий может иметь проинфляционные эффекты через динамику курса рубля. Дезинфляционные риски связаны с более значительным замедлением роста кредитования и внутреннего спроса под влиянием жестких денежно-кредитных условий. Дезинфляционное влияние может иметь и улучшение внешних условий в случае снижения геополитической напряженности.

Банк России исходит из объявленных параметров бюджетной политики. Ее нормализация в 2025 году будет иметь дезинфляционный эффект. Изменение параметров бюджетной политики может потребовать корректировки проводимой денежно-кредитной политики.

20 июня 2025 года Банк России опубликует Резюме обсуждения ключевой ставки.

Следующее заседание Совета директоров Банка России, на котором будет рассматриваться вопрос об уровне ключевой ставки, запланировано на 25 июля 2025 года. Время публикации пресс-релиза о решении Совета директоров Банка России и среднесрочного прогноза — 13:30 по московскому времени.

 

Обратите внимание; Эта информация является необработанным контентом непосредственно из источника информации. Это точно соответствует тому, что утверждает источник, и не отражает позицию MIL-OSI или ее клиентов.

Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

https://www.cbr.ru/press/PR/?file=06062025_133000key.htm