Source: IMF – News in Russian
June 23, 2025
A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.
The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.
An International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission led by Mr. Alexander Culiuc visited Guatemala City during June 10-20, 2025 for the 2025 Article IV consultation. At the end of the visit, the mission issued the following statement:
- Prudent macroeconomic management has supported Guatemala’s resilience, delivering low inflation, robust policy buffers and a sustained current account surplus. With rising external uncertainty and mounting risks, stronger, more inclusive growth and poverty reduction can be achieved by accelerating reform implementation and enhancing policy coordination.
- Raising private investment from current low levels requires complementary public inputs—infrastructure, educated and healthy labor force, security—which can only be adequately delivered by simultaneously raising public spending and improving its quality.
- Improving quality and efficiency of spending entails better budget formulation, targeting, execution and control, and swift implementation of the anti-corruption agenda. We welcome the authorities’ efforts in this regard.
- In the short term, existing fiscal space enables financing higher levels of spending with debt, with greater reliance on domestic borrowing.
- In the medium term, raising revenues—primarily via comprehensive tax policy reform—would revert deficits to around 2 percent of GDP to preserve debt sustainability while maintaining priority spending at adequate levels.
- Other structural and governance reforms pursued by the authorities, including in the financial and labor sectors—particularly urgent in the case of the AML/CFT law—will help support private sector growth. Continued commitment to dialogue and consensus-building can sustain progress on key legislative initiatives.
Recent Economic Developments, Outlook, and Risks
Guatemala’s economy remains resilient despite rising external risks and domestic challenges. Real GDP grew by 3.7 percent in 2024, supported by strong private consumption. Inflation has eased significantly, with headline inflation falling to 1.7 percent in May 2025, while core inflation remains near 4 percent, and inflation expectations are well anchored. The current account surplus narrowed to 2.9 percent of GDP in 2024 as imports picked up, while remittances stabilized at 19 percent of GDP and international reserves reached US$27.1 billion. Public debt remains low—under 27 percent of GDP—and Guatemala is now only one notch below investment grade. Banguat kept its policy rate unchanged at 4.5 percent since the 25bps cut in November 2024.
Guatemala endeavors an investment-biased fiscal expansion. The August 2024 supplementary budget prioritized infrastructure and social spending and targeted a deficit of 2.7 percent of GDP; the realized deficit was significantly lower at 1 percent of GDP. The 2025 budget continues this expansionary approach, with a further increase in infrastructure and social allocations. While the original budget targeted a deficit of 3.2 percent of GDP, a supplementary budget, specifying carryovers from 2024 and one-off pension payments, raised the budget deficit to a notably high 3.8 percent of GDP.
The outlook for 2025 is encouraging; sustaining the growth momentum over the medium term will require steadfast policy implementation. Real GDP growth is projected at 3¾ percent in 2025, with the fiscal impulse expected to help cushion the effects of softening global demand and high uncertainty. Beyond 2025, growth is projected to slightly exceed 3½ percent, although an acceleration in public infrastructure execution and structural reforms could push both actual and potential growth higher in the outer projection years. Headline inflation is expected to gradually converge toward the monetary policy target, while the fiscal deficit is projected to remain elevated by historical standards at just below 3 percent of GDP through the medium term. The current account surplus is expected to narrow and eventually close, while public debt is projected to climb above 30 percent of GDP in the medium term.
The balance of risks is tilted to the downside. On the domestic front, there is a risk that ongoing political tensions could impede progress on legislative initiatives. Nonetheless, important progress has been made over the past year—including the approval of the 2025 budget and the competition law—demonstrating the capacity for reform even in a complex environment. Externally, intensified and/or protracted global trade disputes would weigh further on investment sentiment, although Guatemala is somewhat better positioned to weather additional trade shocks than some regional peers. Further changes in U.S. migration policy—including the proposed 3.5 percent excise tax on remittances—could disrupt remittance-supported consumption. On the upside, lower net emigration also offers a window to boost domestic employment if accompanied by targeted efforts to expand job opportunities in the formal private sector.
Fiscal Policy
The 2025 expansionary fiscal stance is appropriate, as private demand is projected to soften in the remainder of the year. Structural bottlenecks and recently strengthened anti-corruption controls are likely to limit the execution of capital spending, with the deficit projected at around 2½ percent of GDP, well below the revised budget of 3.8 percent. The historically high (1.3 percent of GDP) transfers to Departmental Development Councils (CODEDEs) require close oversight and monitoring amidst concerns of elevated risks of misallocation and inefficient use. The authorities’ ongoing multi-institutional efforts to strengthen the transparency, accountability, monitoring of CODEDEs transfers and capacity of municipalities are welcome and should be sustained.
A combination of revenue and expenditure reforms is needed in the medium term. Authorities should seek ways of reverting fiscal deficits closer to historical levels (around 2 percent of GDP) without jeopardizing the much-needed surge in public infrastructure and social spending. The tax authority (SAT) has made commendable steps in strengthening compliance through the rollout of mandatory electronic invoicing, enhanced border enforcement to combat smuggling, and more robust audits of high-income individuals and large corporations. Efforts to improve mobilization—in line with the now-public 2024 TADAT report—should continue and be complemented in the medium term by comprehensive tax policy reforms. On the expenditure side, strengthening institutional capacity for systematic expenditure reviews and embedding the National Development Plan into annual and multi-year budgets would align public spending with strategic priorities. A new Public Procurement law—currently under consideration—could alleviate bottlenecks in the execution of capital spending. Improved targeting in social programs would further increase their effectiveness. Strengthening the Medium-Term Fiscal Framework and multiannual budget planning underpinned by realistic, sector-informed projections will bolster confidence—including of market participants—in fiscal sustainability.
A well-calibrated financing strategy would help the macro-policy mix. While solid creditworthiness enables the government to borrow externally on favorable terms, greater reliance on domestic financing under a sound medium term debt management strategy (MTDS) would (i) reduce real appreciation pressures (which already weigh on Guatemala’s external competitiveness), (ii) help develop the domestic financial market, (iii) reduce currency risks, and (iv) lower costs of monetary policy operation incurred by Banguat to maintain price stability. The mission also encourages the Ministry of Finance to consolidate domestic issuances, introduce shorter-maturity instruments to help develop the yield curve, and regularly publish the MTDS and annual borrowing plans.
Monetary and Exchange Policies
The current monetary policy stance is broadly appropriate, but there is scope to further strengthen monetary policy transmission. The ex-ante real policy rate is at 1 percent, within the estimated range for the neutral real rate (1–2 percent). Given prevailing uncertainty regarding the inflationary impact of recent U.S. tariff measures and potential disruptions to global supply chains, there’s scope in maintaining the current policy stance and waiting for greater clarity before making further adjustments. Estimated passthrough of the policy rate to deposit rates has recently increased. More can be done, including by advancing financial market development and competition and reducing reliance on reserve requirements for liquidity management. These efforts should be underpinned by improvements in the legal framework and market infrastructure supporting monetary policy operations.
Banguat’s response to large remittances inflows is appropriate and requires closer coordination with MinFin to address ensuing sterilization costs. Banguat’s FX participation rule delivers a reasonable balance between enabling higher consumption and maintaining external competitiveness. The resulting external position is stronger than fundamentals and desirable policies, but this positive current account gap should be closed by raising investment. On the flip side, Banguat’s policy necessarily relies on costly liquidity sterilization operations to keep inflation in check. While recent international financial conditions have been supportive of Banguat’s profitability, these costs could be further reduced through higher reliance on domestic debt to finance the budget, and closer coordination with MinFin on liquidity management. In the long term, ensuring Banguat’s financial strength will require consistent enforcement of legal provisions mandating budget to cover central bank losses.
Financial Sector
Maintaining financial stability requires continued close monitoring of the system. Guatemala’s banking system remains sound, with solid capital and liquidity buffers and strong profitability. The authorities have made important progress in bolstering the regulatory and supervisory framework through enhanced credit risk regulations, more robust stress testing, broader regulatory coverage, and the inclusion—on a voluntary basis—of savings and credit cooperatives in the Credit Risk Information System. These efforts should be reinforced by expanding risk-based supervision and strengthening oversight of fintech and digital financial services. Adopting revisions to the 2002 Law on Banks and Financial Groups, transitioning to International Financial Reporting Standards, advancing the draft Secondary Market Law, approving the e-money law and continued implementation of other elements of the financial inclusion strategy are needed.
Governance and Structural Agenda
Strengthening governance and advancing structural reforms are critical to fostering inclusive growth and restoring public trust. Key legislative priorities include the adoption of a revised AML/CFT Law aligned with international standards, the Beneficial Ownership Law, the Public Procurement Law and the Law for the Protection of Whistleblowers to ensure secure reporting channels and legal safeguards. With GAFILAT mutual evaluation expected in 2027, further delays with the AML/CFT law could complicate Guatemala’s path to investment grade. Institutional progress—such as the creation of the National Commission Against Corruption and the rollout of probity offices across executive institutions—should be consolidated through a medium-term anti-corruption strategy. Accelerating infrastructure investment through amendments to the law on Partnerships for Development of Economic Infrastructure, and a new law on ports is essential to close persistent gaps and crowd in private investment. Continued efforts to formalize the economy and improve the business environment will help prepare the economy for the impact of lower net emigration on the labor market.
The mission wishes to thank the Guatemalan authorities for their cooperation and openness in the exchanges throughout our visit and wishes them every success in their efforts to move the country towards a new equilibrium characterized by high, inclusive and sustainable growth.
Guatemala: Selected Economic Indicators
|
|
Projections |
|||||
2023 |
2024 |
2025 |
2026 |
2027 |
2028 |
2029 |
|
(Annual percent change, unless otherwise indicated) |
|||||||
Income and prices |
|||||||
Real GDP |
3.5 |
3.7 |
3.8 |
3.6 |
3.6 |
3.7 |
3.8 |
Inflation (average) |
6.2 |
2.9 |
2.4 |
4.0 |
4.0 |
4.0 |
4.0 |
(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated) |
|||||||
External Sector |
|||||||
Current Account Balance |
3.1 |
2.9 |
2.5 |
1.7 |
1.3 |
0.7 |
0.2 |
Trade Balance (goods and services) |
-15.1 |
-15.5 |
-15.9 |
-15.8 |
-15.4 |
-15.0 |
-14.7 |
Remittances |
19.0 |
19.0 |
18.8 |
18.0 |
17.1 |
16.3 |
15.5 |
Financial Account (“+” = net lending) |
2.7 |
2.5 |
2.5 |
1.7 |
1.3 |
0.7 |
0.2 |
Central Government Finances |
|||||||
Total Revenues |
12.5 |
12.4 |
12.4 |
12.4 |
12.4 |
12.4 |
12.4 |
Tax Revenues |
11.7 |
11.8 |
11.7 |
11.7 |
11.7 |
11.7 |
11.7 |
Total Expenditure |
13.7 |
13.4 |
15.0 |
15.1 |
15.3 |
15.2 |
15.2 |
Current |
11.2 |
11.0 |
11.8 |
11.7 |
11.9 |
11.9 |
12.0 |
Capital |
2.5 |
2.4 |
3.2 |
3.4 |
3.4 |
3.3 |
3.2 |
Primary Balance |
0.4 |
0.7 |
-1.0 |
-1.1 |
-1.2 |
-1.0 |
-1.0 |
Overall Balance |
-1.3 |
-1.0 |
-2.6 |
-2.8 |
-2.9 |
-2.8 |
-2.8 |
Central Government Debt |
|||||||
Gross Central Government Debt |
27.2 |
26.3 |
27.1 |
28.0 |
28.9 |
29.6 |
30.2 |
Source: Bank of Guatemala; Ministry of Finance; and Fund staff estimates and projections. |
IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS
PRESS OFFICER: Meera Louis
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https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/23/guatemala-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2025-article-iv-mission